Transformations of citizenship: the turn towards adjective qualifiers

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The concept of citizenship is one of the key notions in political philosophy. Therefore, it has also been shaped by a variety of theoretical approaches. In political liberalism, citizenship has been interpreted in terms of basic rights and responsibilities of persons as members of a political community (Rawls 1996, 194ff.). As a response to political liberalism, civic republicanism has paid tribute to the common good as a core notion in defining citizenship. Citizens are persons that should contribute to the common good, foremost so by acting virtuously (Pettit 1997; Sunstein 1988; Sewing 1993). In deliberative democracy, citizens are interpreted as constituents of the public sphere; they contribute to rational deliberation and to an active public forum (Habermas 1994). In short, the meaning of “citizenship” depends on the framing political theory. The effect of this situation is a variety of different meanings of citizenship. Even though many approaches regard discourse on rights and duties as key, there is a variety of options to develop the content of these concepts.

The already existing diversity in theorizing citizenship has recently again been increased. Today, the concept of citizenship is discussed in special discourses on various functions of citizens. Instead of focusing on the underlying ideas in the “big programs” of political philosophy, the debate is nowadays split into debates that focus on one or another subsphere of society. In particular, each of these discourses relates to a particularly problematic field of interaction between citizens and the political society and its institutions. Instead of debating citizenship per se, authors give a more precise and detailed concept in adding adjective qualifiers. The outcome is a variety of qualified concepts of citizenship, including ecological citizenship (Bell 2005; Dobson 2003; Hailwood 2005), economic citizenship (Ulrich 2001), consumer citizenship (Barber 1999) or educated citizenship (Gutman 1999).

In my view, this transformation of the political and philosophical debate on citizenship deserves attention. In particular, it poses some intriguing questions: Does the shift towards...
qualified notions of citizenship imply that citizenship is no longer a coherent notion? How does citizenship per se as a key notion in political philosophy relate to qualified notions of citizenship? And: How do qualified notions of citizenship refer to each other? This talk is dedicated to answering these questions – at least so in some respects. Yet, before that, the debate on qualified notions of citizenship needs to be portrayed.

This contribution has four sections. In order to introduce into the debate on qualified concepts of citizenship, the first section discusses three examples. This includes a short sketch on economic citizenship, the educated citizen, and on ecological citizenship. The second section explores the concept of “citizenship competence”. I argue that the category of competence is particularly suitable to serving as a basic category in debates on qualified citizenship. Yet, in order to discuss competences, it is appropriate to going back to the double aspect already mentioned. A competence addresses a bare minimum; and it addresses a functional role of a person in a specified context. Section three discusses the implications of this approach within the context of citizenship debates more broadly. It questions the effects of this recent turn in citizenship theory regarding the underlying normative claims in citizenship theories. Does the recent turn include a deviation from the big normative themes in citizenship theory, as for instance the concepts of freedom and of justice? Or does it add to these debates something new? I shall try to give a brief answer to these very general and deep questions. Section four discusses some objections against this proposal in order to also give a critical assessment the category of a competence and what I have called the recent transformation of citizenship theory.

1.  Qualified citizenship: three examples

Recently, citizenship has been reasoned in many special discourses. In order to indicate the qualification that citizenship receives, authors have turned to “adjective” concepts of citizenship. They do not discuss citizenship per se. Instead, they discuss “economic citizenship”, “ecological citizenship” or “educated citizens”. Before addressing these three examples, it also has to be said that not all qualified notions of citizenship fit into the discourse of philosophy. Some of the concepts are not meant to indicate a subtle layer of citizenship; instead, some of them are employed in order to criticize recent developments provocatively. Therefore, each of the notion also needs to be scrutinized against the background of inherent tensions and perhaps even paradoxes that these notions provoke. Yet, 

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2 As for a discussion of the tensions inherent in „consumer citizenship“, see (Kallhoff, Angela 2013a)
even these concepts address deep normative issues, including the questions of how the democratic rights of citizens will be protected.

The three examples that I shall introduce in order to prepare the discussion are: economic citizenship, educated citizenship, and green citizenship. It is not the space here to discuss them in length. Instead, I wish to introduce them in order to prepare the debate on transformations in the theory of citizenship.

**Economic citizenship**

I shall now turn to our first example: “economic citizenship”. Peter Ulrich reasons the concept of “economic citizenship” in the context of an approach to economic philosophy that resonates with major themes in political philosophy (Ulrich 2001). In discussing an approach to the private sphere of the market that supports political goods, Ulrich relates the discourse on economic participation and economic duties to the discourse on republican citizenship in political philosophy. His main argument is that performances of the economic sector should be evaluated against the background of a valuable life of citizens; simultaneously, citizens have the duty to care for economic performances as part of their political life. In defending this view, Ulrich introduces a fundamental critique of theories on economics as value-free enterprise. Simultaneously, he redefines citizenship in terms of “economic citizenship”. As one of the conclusions that are drawn, Ulrich claims “economic rights” for citizens in order to enhance the conditions of freedom (Ulrich 2001, 259–288).

Yet, only one part of his discussion of citizenship is in the lines of civic republicanism. Ulrich is also interested in “citizenship rights” in a more general sense. Therefore, he argues for access rights of citizens to the economic sector. Moreover, these rights are not interpreted as claim-rights, but rather as rights that citizens need to defend actively (ibid.). Another revisionist part of the theory defines citizenship in terms of virtues that persons need to fulfill their role as citizens and as participants in the private sector simultaneously. Economic citizenship is given a normative turn in that it says how individuals should act within the realm of economic performances as persons who – as political persons – are responsible for the realm of life.

In two respects, this approach differs from former approaches to economic ethics in the context of the broader debate in philosophy. Firstly, citizenship is not identified with freedom of choice in the market, as for instance proposed by the Friedmans (Friedman und Rose D. Friedman 1990; Friedman 2002). Even though this particular approach has been

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3 For a thorough discussion of each of these dimensions of citizenship, see (Kallhoff, Angela 2013b).
attributed to the “Chicago School of economics”, many subscribe to the idea that citizens should be free to partake in the sphere of the market according to the preferences they share. Secondly, in Ulrich’s approach the economic sphere is not regarded as a separate sphere of life, in particular as different from spheres of political life that are the appropriate reference for citizenship discourses. Instead, citizenship is specified regarding this subsphere of society. More general insights in the rights and duties of citizens are applied to the sphere of economics. I shall turn later to a more thorough discussion of this proposal. For the moment, I shall leave it here and introduce a second qualified concept of citizenship: the educated citizen.

**The educated citizen**

The second example for a recently intense discourse on qualified conceptions of citizenship is the debate on “citizenship education”. As political liberals have been discussed for a long time, citizenship education is a delicate matter (Mill 1989; Humboldt 1903). On the one hand, persons cannot take part actively in political life, unless they are equipped with a basic education. In order to understand the main functions and mechanisms of political life and to be capable of forming a political judgment, persons need to be educated. They need to develop their intellectual capacities and need to develop capacities to judge. Even though the content of necessary intellectual capacities of citizens cannot be set in an abstract way, Amy Gutman appears to be right in saying that citizens need to be in a better situation than the UNESCO demands in terms of minimal literacy. At the very least, they also need to be in a situation to understand and interpret the main political texts, e.g. the constitution of a country (Gutman 1999). Martha Nussbaum adds that citizens also need to develop an understanding of the variety of lives that are lead in various parts of the world in order to develop a sense of world citizenship. In particular, she argues in favor of education in Universities that subscribe to a focus on the Humanities – persons should read about foreign lives in order to develop the capacity to imagine lives that differ from their own (Nussbaum 1997).

Yet, on the other hand, in order to respect the intellectual freedoms of persons, the nation state should refrain from shaping the content and style of education. Even though many agree that education should be supported by the nation state, diversity in education and freedom of shaping the content is also an important right of the institutions providing education. Therefore, a sharp line between interests of the state in educated citizens and interests of citizens must also be respected.
The insight of both the need and the limits of state support for education have been reiterated through the history of philosophy. Yet, the recent debate on citizenship education also highlights some new aspects. Authors in political philosophy are aware that education in terms of literacy etc. is not sufficient for becoming a citizen of our age. Instead, citizenship education comprises the teaching of mutual respect and virtues that have been developed in the context of debating the basics of political liberalism (Galston 1989; Macedo 1990). In order to participate actively in a culture of debate and argumentation, it is necessary to learn listening to other citizens and deliberating commonly. In short, citizenship discourse does not only have to focus on the content of citizenship; it rather also needs to include a debate on the capacities and the conditions for realizing capacities in order to partake actively in political life. “Educated citizenship” is a concept that highlights this broader context.

Green citizenship
Another important discourse in terms of “qualified notions of citizenship” focuses on the relationship between citizens and nature. Obviously, the overall ecological situation is one of a deep crisis. Authors in philosophy have interpreted this crisis as also resulting from a misinterpretation of citizenship; at the very least, environmental duties and environmental rights have not been reasoned sufficiently. In this context, proposals for reasoning “green citizenship” in a forward-looking way have also been made. Andrew Dobson was one of the first authors who defended a concept of ecological citizenship that highlights not only the rights of citizens regarding a natural environment, but also the duties that citizens have regarding nature (Dobson 2003). Since Dobson made this proposal, many authors have elaborated proposals not only for reasoning “green citizenship”, but for doing so in the context of the liberal state. Since duties to care for the natural environment cannot be reasoned without also debating the impact on liberties of citizens – as for instance most obviously regarding individual life-style and mobility -, they try to reconcile political liberalism with environmental duties in various ways (Barry 1999; Eckersley 2004; Barry und Wissenburg 2001). Some authors do not prefer the parlance of the “green state” or “green citizenship”, but instead explore the issue in terms of “green rights” or “rights to a green future” – often so in a critical approach (Doherty und Geus 1996; Hayward 2004; Hiskes 2009).

It is not the space here to get into that discussion in more detail. Yet, some core insights of these approaches shall be highlighted. These are insights that the authors appear to share, even though their theories vary immensely as for the details. Firstly, the approaches to
green citizenship highlight the need to transcend the idea that it is a matter of theories of justice to discuss the share that persons deserve in terms of natural resources. Instead, they understand that citizenship cannot be reasoned without also exploring the relationship between citizens and nature on a basic level (Bell 2005). The question is not whether or not persons deserve a distinct share in natural resource. It is also the question of whether or not persons have access to an intact environment and what the rights and duties in this relationship are. Secondly, some general presuppositions in reasoning citizenship are challenged in theories of green citizenship. Obviously, the ecological crisis is a global phenomenon. Yet, reasons for debating environmental citizenship in units that are detached from the nation-state do not only result from empirical facts. Instead, the claim that environmental citizenship needs to cohere with green agendas that transcend political units, is an explicit normative claim. Whether or not the global level is the most adequate unit, is another question.

Before the next steps in debating qualified notions of citizenship will be done, I shall give some brief comments on the proposals that have been referred to so far. In comparing the proposals and in reconsidering debates on qualified concepts of citizenship, two insights can already be summarized. Firstly, even though qualified concepts address particular problems - often so in a critical way - they are not detached from the big themes in political philosophy. Even though always related to a specified area of political life, they address basically normative claims in terms of the freedoms of citizens and their rights and duties. Moreover, they do not result in path-breaking new approaches to citizenship. Instead, they draw on insights that have been reasoned in normative approaches to citizenship before.

Secondly and differently from former debates on citizenship the debate points to a blind spot in former theories of citizenship. It says that former theories of citizenship do not pay attention to the fact that citizens need to be equipped both with occasions and with capacities to fulfill the obligations of citizenship. I shall turn to this latter point in the following section.

2. Citizenship competence: a new focus of concern

My question in this section is: What do qualified notions of citizenship – as shortly introduced in the last section – imply in terms of presuppositions of citizenship? Obviously, one of the messages of qualified notions of citizenship is that persons need to be prepared in order to fulfill citizenship duties and in order to “function” as citizens. This is indeed an important
blind spot of the “big programs” in political philosophy. In complex political societies, the content and the normative principles expressed in terms of citizenship duties need to correlate with capacities of persons to fulfill them. This leads to an important question: How can persons be supported in order to partake actively in the citizenry?

Instead of questioning the approaches to citizenship that have been reasoned in the tradition of political philosophy, it adds a new perspective. I guess that many philosophers agree that citizens deserve a set of basic rights (political liberalism), they would agree to the relevance of some political definition of the common good and corresponding political virtues (civic republicanism); most philosophers also agree that the public forum is the forum for citizens to debate on issues of public concern (deliberative democracy). Yet, the general insights do not suffice in order to explain how persons come into the situation to actually live a life of active citizenship.

A theory that can answer to these claims has two characteristics. Firstly, one key category is “citizenship competence”. A “competence” has two sides: on the one hand, it relates to a sphere of life or to a system that provides a normative frame. It explicates the tasks that persons have to fulfill in terms of a distinct competence. The competent reader knows to read a book; the competent citizen instead knows how to participate in the sphere of citizenship life. The concept of a competence is close to, yet not identical with a functional interpretation. A competent person responds to a situation which challenges her – yet, she responds in a way which standards of best practices and adequate behavior in that situation prescribe. A competent speaker knows the rules of a language; moreover, she knows to apply the rules correctly. Yet, the competent speaker is also the person without whom language in its current form would no longer exist. The competent speaker even transforms language – together with all the other competent speakers. The competent citizen knows now to participate in subspheres of shared life – be it the economic sphere or the sphere of education or – more recently – environmental challenges. Yet, simultaneously, it is part of the competence to shape the sphere according to best knowledge and know-how.

In particular, competences of citizens are not restricted to politics any longer. Instead, one of the key messages of qualified concepts of citizenship is that the rights and duties that have been attributed to persons as citizens are as important in the context of education, economics or relations to the nature as in explicitly political activities. Yet, on the other hand, a competence also denominates something that a person must have, must possess in order to being in a situation to fulfill a certain task. Competence means a equipment, yet one that
persons deserve as members of a political society. This encapsulates a normative claim: Citizens do not have to equip themselves with the presuppositions to unfold a capacity. Instead, persons deserve that equipment.

Secondly, competences whose support citizens deserve are not uniform. Instead, they correspond to the spheres of life in which citizens need to claim their rights, need to fulfill their duties, and need to contribute to actively shaping normative frameworks. This includes the spheres of economics, of education and of the human-nature relationship. Yet, it also goes beyond this. It also includes new perspectives in terms of cosmopolitan citizenship (Appiah 1996; Benhabib 2006). It also needs to be emphasized that it includes the special needs of women as female citizens (Fraser und Gordon 1994; Moller Okin 1989, 1991; Rosenblum 2002; Shklar 1991). As for the design of a theory of citizenship competences, this insight proposes the structure of a list-theory (Kallhoff 2013b). The items are not reducible to each other, but instead are necessary elements in order to mirror the rich content of citizenship. Each point on the list corresponds to a specified sphere of citizenship, as for instance: a citizen as a free person, a citizen as involved in the market sphere, a citizen as person that deserves education. In particular, the debate on the content of duties and rights of citizens is not detached from debates about the internal capabilities of persons on the one hand and external presuppositions in order to develop competences on the other hand.

3. Theoretical consequences
This new turn in theories of citizenship has some immediate effects on theory-building in that area of research. Before highlighting this, I wish to emphasize what this shift does not amount to. It is not fair to regard it as an effort to get rid of the “big programs” of philosophy and the underlying moral claims. Quite the opposite is true: The approaches to qualified concepts of citizenship highlight the need to rethink normative claims that have been reasoned for many years, if not centuries. To remind us of only some of the key historical perspective on citizenship: Aristotle’s Politics of the 4th century B.C. is regarded as the first systematic

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4 This aspect of the term “competence” is most obvious in the meaning of the “beneficium competentiae” in Law. This gift is one that a person deserves without presuppositions; it refers to the living minimum that cannot be withheld from any person, even from persons who have committed a crime.

5 This claim comes close to Martha Nussbaum’s claim that political institutions need to provide persons with the conditions for developing a basically good life in terms of basic functional capabilities (Nussbaum 2000; Nussbaum 2003).

6 The distinction between internal and external aspects of capabilities is borrowed from Nussbaum’s analysis of functional capabilities (Nussbaum 2000, 84–85). Nussbaum argues that the development of capabilities into combined capabilities presupposes both the equipment with internal capacities, as well as support from outside. Different from Nussbaum, I do not relate to presuppositions of a good life, but instead my discussion focuses on roles of citizens in a political community.
approach to a theory of citizenship (Aristotle 2009). Aristotle thinks that citizens are persons who are willing and predisposed to partaking in the political agencies of the city-state (Aristotle 2009, III.1, 1275 a 22–24; 1275 b 18–22). Moreover, Aristotle is very much concerned about the virtues of citizens. Indeed, he thinks that justice is a core competence in both governing the city-state and serving as a member of the citizenry (Aristotle 2009, III. 4–5).

Since then, debates about the political person are an integral part of political philosophy. I shall not recall this debate here. Instead, I shall just remind us of the reception of the fact that ancient philosophy did not only characterize the citizen in terms of active participation in political affairs and institutions. Instead, following a claim of J.G.A. Pocock (Pocock 1995), the structure of the debate on citizenship was already manifested in ancient philosophy. In ancient philosophy, two ideals of citizenship were already explicated and contrasted with each other: This is the idea of civic freedom on the one hand, and the idea of civic equity that was prefigured by Roman Law and its concept of personhood (ibid.). Since then, the debate on citizenship has primarily been an attempt to either juxtapose or reconcile both ideals: the ideal of civic liberty that in ancient philosophy received the specific shape of freedom to shape the political affairs (Constant 1946), and the ideal of equity - a debate that in terms of “distributive justice” has an enormous impact on the idea of justified claims of citizens until today.

In my view, the recent debate on qualified concepts of citizenship does not shift this focus of concern. Instead, it addresses sub-spheres of societies in which both normative perspectives are particularly challenging, perhaps even endangered. In order to underpin this claim, let me recall the examples of section 1.

As for economic citizenship, the main worry of philosophers is not whether or not citizens are free to choose or to partake in the market sphere. Instead, they discuss the particular limits and concrete contents of freedom in the economic sphere. Moreover, a general claim is that citizens should not only be free to partake in the economic sphere; instead, they should be free to do so under conditions that do not infringe on their basic civic freedoms and conditions of justice, including the chance to choose an adequate workplace, the opportunity to partake in the gains of economic performances (Ulrich 2001).

As for educated citizenship, the main worry is that persons might not be in a situation to partake actively in the various spheres of political life. This includes worries about literacy; yet, it goes far beyond that. Citizens are not equipped with citizenship competences, if they are not in a situation to debate and to exchange rational arguments; they cannot shape political
agendas effectively if they do not have access to books and to new media and if they have not learned to imagine life-styles and ways of life that differ from theirs. In order to defend their liberty by means of political participation and in order to contribute actively to fair politics, citizens first need to be equipped with the competences of reading and of interpretation, as well as of rational exchange of arguments.

As for green citizenship, it is certainly unfair to ask persons to change their way of life in order to protect the environment – without providing opportunities for effective change. Some authors argue that environmental duties depend on the prospects of success; others argue that even negative duties that transcend the limits of personal relations or the nation state need to be supported by institutional means that enhance the conditions of fulfilling duties effectively. Independent of the varieties in defending green duties do many authors subscribe to the thesis that citizens need to be equipped both with green education as well as with institutional settings that enhance and enable an ecological lifestyle. Here again, the big themes are freedoms of citizens on the one hand, as balanced against claims of justice on the other hand. It is not easy to develop theories of justice that also pay respect to the liberties of individuals. Yet, theories of green citizenship claim that it is necessary to do so – both in empirical and in normative respects. In short, recent approaches to qualified notions of citizenship share the concern for the “deep morality” of citizenship with approaches to citizenship in the history of thought and the big programs in political philosophy likewise.

4. Critical assessment of this proposal
In this paper, I have first outlined some examples of qualified concepts of citizenship that document the turn towards qualifiers in debating the concept of citizenship. I have argued that the turn towards qualified notions of citizenship is another remarkable transformation of citizenship theory in political philosophy, in particular one that is still ongoing. In section 2, I have discussed “competence” as an adequate category in order to highlight the theoretical impact of that transformation in theory-building. In section 3, I have given another assessment of that transformation. I have argued that even though the debate on competences provides a new focus of concern, this does not include a loss of former big issues in citizenship theory. Instead, both the claims of freedoms of citizens and of justice are echoed in recent debates on qualified notions. In particular, authors try to give both liberties and claims of justice a more concrete content in addressing these themes in the context of particular sub-spheres of civic life.
In order to shape the argument, I shall finally discuss challenges to the theoretical approach of this paper. The most challenging aspect correlates with the status of citizenship rights as unalienable rights. To put it negatively: If this approach implied that “full citizenship” and the attribution of a full set of rights depends on good performances in terms of citizenship competences, this approach would break with a basic dogma of citizenship theory in political liberalism and beyond: Presupposed persons are qualified as citizens – which implies the double claim of political reality, yet also of normative claims of inclusion (Benhabib 2004) –, in a situation like that their rights do not depend on their performances of citizens; instead, citizenship rights are unalienable rights. In my view, this objection is not as difficult to handle as one might think. The normative weight of claiming that citizens should be equipped with competences to participate successfully in the sub-spheres of political life is firstly put onto two different shoulders, and secondly it is detached from the basic rights of citizens as claim rights. As for the first aspect, the claim that persons should be equipped with competences has been addressed to political institutions (see section 2). It is not the duty of each person to develop competences; instead, persons should be equipped with means in order to being in a position to develop citizenship competences.7 As for the second aspect, a theory of citizenship competences does not substitute for basic rights; instead, it translates them into a more concrete setting and perhaps it also gives them new directions.

In my view, the concept of competences is not primarily helpful in discussing “full citizenship” as opposed to something like “good citizenship”. Instead, it highlights and simultaneously transforms a key insight in citizenship theory. In defining citizenship, one of the most important endeavours is to define the lines between spheres of political influence and a realm that owes its shape and its contents to the engagement of persons as private persons. One way to react to this demand is the effort to define clearly what political institutions have to do and what they should refrain from. Even though this has been a key issue throughout the centuries, it has proven extremely difficult to give a clear idea of where this line can be drawn. Instead of developing a general formula for this, the concept of “competences” offers the chance to rethink that line in different lines. A competence also demarcates the units that

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7 One might argue that it is wishful thinking that persons really want to develop citizenship competences. In order to address this claim, it would be necessary to take a closer look on the set of competences that are addressed in theories of qualified citizenship. Yet, part of the answer can also be given without this detailed discussion: Citizenship competences are not isolated from each other; instead, they need to be interpreted as mutually supportive capabilities. In Kallhoff (2013) I argue that a list-theory implies a second look on the mutual relationship between the various spheres of citizenship; this can only done by taking a close look on specified competences. Competences of green citizenship, for instance, can be supported by competences as educated citizenships – yet only so, if education implies education in ecology and in sustainable practices of life. For a more detailed discussion, see (Kallhoff 2013, pp. 205ff.).
each citizen is in a position not only to respond to, but also to form and shape. Instead of asking what political institutions should refrain from, it draws attention to spheres of justified influence of citizens – in building on the specified capacities of citizens. Moreover, an approach to citizenship competences implies that there is no general idea about the sphere of influence that political institutions should have – except for the idea that citizens have an alienable right to a minimum provision in each sphere of competences. What precisely this minimum implies is a question that has to be decided in discussing the specific spheres.

At the end of this paper, I also wish to highlight that this approach to citizenship might have some positive side-effects. First of all, it allows a more concrete discussion of citizenship in concrete terms – moreover it allows discussing a variety of recent developments, including critical assessments of rather new aspects of citizenship, as for instance “cyber citizenship” or “consumer citizenship”. Secondly, it does not leave the realm of liberalism, but instead adds to the discussions on a “spatious liberalism”. Many political liberals are no longer satisfied with an approach on political society that abstracts from the concrete needs of citizens as well as from the need to shape political institutions accordingly. Education, health care etc. are themes that belong on the political agenda. Simultaneously, it does not suffice to keep these issues apart from the core issues of political liberalism. Instead, the public goods and the needs that correspond to them are as important as civil rights and political rights. Thirdly, the concept of citizenship competences sets an accent that differs from more conventional approaches of citizenship. In particular, it leaves realm for rethinking the relevance of political units to discussing citizenship. Traditionally, citizenship has been tied to the nation state. Yet, an approach to citizenship competences leaves realm for addressing units different from that political entity. Citizenship competences need to be discussed on a transnational, perhaps even global scale.

Bibliography


8 I learned this term from debates on the role of women in the public sphere, see (Elshtain 1993). Yet, it is also a term that fits approaches to political liberalism that try to supplement the core ideas with additional contents, as for instance in discussing capabilities, see (Nussbaum 2006).
9 I defend this claim in length in (Kallhoff, Angela 2011).


