Optimizing the Iraqi Military
Recommendations for an integrated military reform and military integration

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Preface

In March 2008, I coordinated a roundtable conference at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University at which the Iraq Task Force convened an expert advisory team to elaborate on the necessary steps for a responsible U.S. withdrawal from Iraq.

The conference initially addressed the major problem of Iraq’s fundamental communal divisiveness that may result in political fragmentation and a collapse of the state. This divisiveness is particularly evident in the fact that the loyalty of many people inside the Iraqi governing structures and security apparatus primarily belongs to their communal group or militia and only secondarily to the nation and the nation’s military. Accordingly, a majority of those in the state and military are strongly biased toward their own communal groups and pursue only their narrow “identity group” goals which puts the country at risk to fractionize along ethnic and religious lines.

Consequently, the conference proposed a set of diplomatic, economic and political measures that should accompany a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq to advance national reconciliation and consent.¹ According to their findings the national political reconciliation process must be based on much stronger regional and UN cooperation and involvement in stabilizing Iraq. Essential to building such positive, cooperative regional involvement certainly is an end to U.S. occupation since the issue of collaborating with the occupier constantly feeds tensions between communities and parties within communities. Both the prospect of a U.S. withdrawal and building a framework of UN/regional cooperation will be vital in bringing forward the national reconciliation process. This will create a foundation for the necessary security sector reform measures that will be subject of the following study.

Jessica von Felbert, German National Merit Foundation
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A) Objectives and means

I) Objectives

This study focuses on contributing to a comprehensive optimization and enhancement of the Iraqi military’s capacity and capability to effectuate stabilization and reconciliation within the country.

Although the Iraqi military has made substantial progress in conducting counterinsurgency operations since the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT) has started its redevelopment in 2004 it is not yet able to operate effectively and still overreliant on Coalition support.\(^2\)

Army, navy, and air force particularly lack the ability to sufficiently secure Iraq’s borders from external threats. Syria and Iran are actively contributing to the country’s instability as they incessantly endorse the inflow of subversives and the proliferation of armament with which to support the insurgency campaign, and arms, munitions, and foreign fighters come across the borders regularly.\(^3\)

Without additional support, the Iraqi military is also overstrained and inapt to sweepingly secure Iraq’s provinces and protect its citizens, infrastructure, and transportation arteries from massive insurgent and terrorist assaults.\(^4\) Although the level of violence has overall declined, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) remains one of the most significant threats, and its assaults are regarded to still have enormous destructive and destabilizing potential. Even single victories such as in Basra, Mosul and Sadr City, experts repeatedly accentuated, were only achieved due to extensive U.S. engagement and paid insurgent support.\(^5\) Therefore, it is widely agreed that the Iraqi military is currently not capable to detain the country’s internal threats independently.

In addition, the Iraqi military is known for being highly infiltrated by subversive elements such as local militia members and foreign insurgents and is thus assessed to be an unreliable force which without supervision is at risk to fractionize.\(^6\) Therefore, the military is not just dependent on combat and border control support, but also reliant on assistance to ensure the furtherance of its durable cohesion, assertiveness, and integrity.

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Due to its unreliability and inability to detain internal and external threats it is feared that in case of a premature U.S. withdrawal the Iraqi military will not be able to stabilize the country. Experts assume that it will take years or even decades to transform the military into a reliable and effectively operating force and to instill a stable military culture in Iraq.\(^7\) Thus, the prospect of a U.S. withdrawal raises serious concerns whether the Iraqi armed forces will by then be independently able to prevent a resumption of sectarian violence which would irresistibly lead to civil war.\(^8\)

Against this background the study is directed to provide a set of optional measures which are both appropriate and feasible to further the military’s coherence and strengthen its operational effectiveness. Thereby, it is intended to counteract the current deadlocked exchange of sheer speculations about hypothetical scenarios and to rather encourage a constructive discussion about how to transform the military into a stabilizing factor within Iraq by tangible initiatives. In this way, the study aims to contribute to a timely implementation of adequate initiatives which effectively strengthen the armed forces and thus set a mandatory precondition for a responsible U.S. withdrawal.

II) Means

The study will address the underlying causes of the military’s unreliability and operational ineffectiveness in the first place and give a review of its most decisive problems. In this respect the study will first focus on general military issues that to a greater or lesser extent relate to all military units and will then turn to specific military deficits which predominantly compromise the effectiveness of a particular military branch. Subsequently, the study will identify military integration problems. This complex will cover the lack of coherence within the Iraqi military and the challenge to integrate members of the Awakening Movement\(^9\).

After the outline of major military problems the study will provide a compilation of optional countermeasures and disclose possible ways for their implementation. At first recommendations will focus on fundamental initiatives for a comprehensive military reform which are particularly based on the theoretical concept of confidence-building defense.\(^10\) According to the principles of the confidence-building defense

\(^9\) Awakening Movements, or Sahwa: coalitions between tribal Sheikhs established to maintain security and originally initiated among Sunni tribes.
theory, the Iraqi military should be transformed via a particular specialization on defense into a capable and cost-effective force which is least provocative to other nation states. Correspondingly, recommendations will focus on measures to reorganize, restructure, and equip the military in a way that maximizes its capacity to operate flexibly and effectively within its territory and simultaneously minimizes its capability to invade neighbor states. In this way, national stability and regional reconciliation shall be enhanced at the same time.

Subsequently, the study will present a variety of integration methods based on several respective case and research studies as well as proposals of various military analysts and working groups. Given recommendations for an enhancement of the military’s coherence imply a set of feasible measures to strengthen mutual cooperation and to reduce sectarianism and politicization of military units. Suggestions for the integration of the awakening fighters focus on regional pacification and imply integration strategies and preventive security initiatives.

B) Deficits of the Iraqi military

II) Military problems

1) General military problems

a) Integrated military concept

Overall, the Iraqi military lacks an integrated concept aligned with both its entire scope of responsibilities and to a mandatory code of conduct to respect the sovereignty of other nation states. Without such concept the Iraqi military will not meet the minimum requirement to affectuate stability all over the country and to be least provocative to its neighbors.

The absence of an integrated concept is caused by an insufficient determination of the Iraqi military’s security objectives and guidances towards national reconciliation and regional pacification which is essential to conceptualize a basic plan in order to be able to synchronize the military with its primary objectives. Accordingly, the Iraqi military focused on conducting offensive counterinsurgency or counterterrorism operations, whereas the execution of preventive defense missions, such as nationwide control and protection responsibilities to neutralize internal and
external threats, has been neglected. This unilateral offensive approach has led to a vicious circle - military forces get extremely scuffed in single offensive missions, while the lack of timely conflict prevention in turn heightens the necessity for further offensive interventions. As a consequence, the attrition of forces steadily spirals, while the country still cannot be stabilized area-wide.

Additionally, since the military has not been sufficiently directed to preventive defense, the gap of citizens and infrastructure protection has been partially filled by members of the Awakening Movement which has led to an additional internal security risk due to the fact that awakening fighters do not operate under the command of the MOD and are thus uncontrollable by the Iraqi government.

Besides, due to the lack of an integrated concept the military has not clearly defined its objectives and guidances concerning armament procurement. Consequentially, armament has been purchased without a corresponding strategic plan and irrespective of a military code of conduct to be least provocative to other nation states. According to this, the MOD has not revealed whether armament procurement will be subject to any limitations, and specific types of armament maximizing a military’s assault capacity, such as tactical missiles with ranges exceeding 100 kilometers or armored attack helicopters, have not been restricted. This deficiency raises concerns to which extent the Iraqi military will give regional power projection and deterrence a priority in the long run. The more so as Iraq has already become one of the biggest weapons buyers in the world, steadily purchasing more heavy armament. In addition Iraqi procurement requests do not usually meet much resistance by the U.S. due to the fact that their purchases reduce the reliance on American military resources, and arms deals have been highly profitable for American arms manufacturers.\textsuperscript{11} Even if the Iraqi military power is still assessed to be low in comparison to other Gulf States this intransparency of military security objectives, guidances, and armament already causes mistrust which could on a political level easily not only keep others from reconciliation or collaboration but even be perceived as a serious threat which has to be antagonized.

b) Logistics and maintenance system

The Iraqi military has not yet devised a functioning logistics and maintenance system.\(^\text{12}\) Therefore, combat units are prevalently short of weapons, vehicles, ammunition, spare parts, and other basic supplies albeit copious stocks of war material are stored in the Taji National Depot.

Due to these shortfalls the armed forces cannot revert to any backups for inoperable vehicles and high equipment attrition caused by inaccurate maintenance even amplifies this deficiency. Consequently, in a majority of cases commanders can only resort to confiscated equipment to make repairs and provide needed war material for ongoing operations.\(^\text{13}\) As a result of these shortcomings, operational effectiveness and readiness of armed forces are severely constricted and fighting units remain highly dependent on Coalition support.

The underlying reasons for this logistics and maintenance problem mainly stem from bureaucratic and personnel deficiencies. The bureaucracy of the MOD is complex, overcentralized, and lacks effective processes. Consequently, Iraqi units encounter fundamental difficulties when they try to obtain needed war material. In order to acquire e.g. ammunition by means of the existing logistics system, it takes a commander to dispatch an officer to the MOD in Bagdad in person to issue a requisition request which then might take months for clearance and execution.\(^\text{14}\)

In addition, the Iraqi military lacks logistics and maintenance personnel at all levels, and the few logistics officers they have at their disposal preponderantly lack expertise and are unfamiliar with many of the new systems and platforms. Thus, neither a logistics force structure plan nor an information technology system to support the command and control logistics system could yet be effectively implemented.\(^\text{15}\)


\(^{13}\) Cp. Ibid., p.70.

\(^{14}\) Cp. Ibid.

\(^{15}\) Cp. Ibid., pp.53.
c) Equipment

Iraqi armed forces are under-equipped and particularly short of crew-served and indirect fire weapons, ammunition, aircraft, medical capabilities, reliable communication systems, and basic battlefield equipment.\(^{16}\)

As aforementioned, part of the problem is due to the absence of a functioning logistics system which causes shortcomings and impedes the timely replacement of outdated, low-grade equipment.\(^{17}\) Accordingly, the program to replace AK-47s from various former Soviet republics and China with M-16 or M-4 rifles could only be executed partially.\(^{18}\)

Another problem is caused by procurement difficulties. Administrative procurement processes are afflicted with widespread corruption and inefficiency which causes funding deficits and extensive procurement delays. Military officials repeatedly complained that the Pentagon’s Foreign Military Sales program (FMS), set up to navigate the purchase of weapons, would be too slow and unwieldy for Iraqi wartime needs. According to this, in 2006 the Iraqi government deposited $2.6 billion in an account for FMS procurements, but by September 2007, in the midst of an extremely violent war period, less than $200 million worth of badly needed armament had been delivered.\(^{19}\)

Meanwhile, apart from recent attempts to expediate procurements, responsible Iraqi officials arbitrarily acquire military equipment irrespective of the FMS system and beyond essential national approval procedures. In September 2007, e.g., defense minister Abd al-Qadir and the planning minister Ali Glahil Baban secretly negotiated an $833 million arms deal with Serbia without the approval of the Iraqi contracts approval committee and without notice of respective senior Iraqi military leaders and American commanders.\(^{20}\) Such bypassing practices caused intransparency which in turn has many times seduced Iraqi officials to siphon off funds. In September 2005 anti-corruption investigators, who had examined 89 government contracts, signed from June 2004 through February 2005, discovered

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\(^{19}\) Cp. Ibid.
\(^{20}\) Cp. Ibid.
that during this period alone approximately over $1.3 billion allocated by the Defense Ministry for military procurement had been embezzled by officials and suppliers.\textsuperscript{21}

In addition, the Iraqi military has been inappropriately equipped due to a deficient assessment of military needs. Initially, the majority of military equipment has been more or less arbitrarily composed of Coalition donations. Consequently, the Iraqi military now possesses a hodgepodge of war material including firearms from the United States, China, the Balkans, Pakistan, and Russia, 150 types of land vehicles and a United Nations panoply of aircraft.\textsuperscript{22} This salmagundi further aggravates supply procurement and maintenance and challenges the operability of the overall scant equipment. Yet, due to an insufficient awareness of the retroactive effects, attempts to standardize weapons and vehicles have not been pursued consistently.

Further, the Iraqi military`s purchase priority has unilaterally been focused on facilitating offensive counterinsurgency operations of ground forces.\textsuperscript{23} The military has started to remedy this deficiency by e.g. reinforcing navy and air force combat capabilities through advanced weaponry, but still neglects to procure basic equipment for defensive surveillance missions. Due to that, essential equipment for border, airspace, and maritime control has not yet been sufficiently provided.\textsuperscript{24} Accordingly, Iraq is currently seeking to buy 36 advanced F-16s albeit the fact that these fighter jets are clearly not the best choice for combatting domestic militias, while the Iraqi air force still lacks basic equipment such as a reliable communication system and currently relies on a total of nine radios and about 150 cell phones.\textsuperscript{25}

Moreover, equipment has been purchased which is entirely unexpedient for military missions. Thus, tens of millions of dollars have been spent either on nonmilitary equipment, such as crowd control gear-batons, stun guns, and plexiglass shields usually designed for and used by police forces or incongruous military arms, e.g., certain mortar systems for $76 million which by virtue of their imprecision are not well suited to combat guerrillas, especially when fighting occurs in built-up areas.\textsuperscript{26} Coalition advisors have consistently tried to prevent such mispurchases and to raise

the awareness of military needs, but Iraqi leaders felt patronized and refused to accept their help accordingly.

d) Manpower

The Iraqi military lacks qualified manpower at all levels which hampers its readiness and effectiveness.

At present, approximately 30 percent of all battalions do not possess appropriate numbers of leaders.27 Thus, some troops act without sufficient guidance. Accordingly, C. Robertson exemplified in a New York Times article in August 2008 that “areas of Diyala heavy with insurgent traffic sit unpatrolled because the battalions are not told who is in charge of what”.28 In order to counteract this deficiency the government reemployed 20,000 officers, who had been previously banned, in the course of the de-Baathification.29 Additionally, NATO and Coalition forces have made considerable efforts to ensure sufficient training capacities, including the establishment of the National Defense University (NDU), run by the NATO Training Mission Iraq (NTM-I) and the provision of additional training and educational activities in- and outside Iraq.30 However, due to the virtual shutdown of many Iraqi colleges and universities and an ongoing emigration of many educated Iraqis, developing future leaders still remains problematic.

Likewise, the Iraqi military lacks qualified soldiers, who meet acceptable and generally applied standards of training. Most soldiers have just received basic training and many of them, due to different training programs in place since 2003, operate at different standards.31 In addition, insufficient qualification results from a unilateral focus on conducting solely counterinsurgency operations. Therefore, the military lacks particularly personnel which is trained to effectively execute border, airspace, and maritime control.

Another important factor limiting military manpower, beside training deficiencies, is absenteeism. On average Iraqi units are only at 60-75% of their Manning strength and units deployed for combat operations outside their usual area of operation have leave rates as high as 50 percent.32 Absenteeism is caused by

31 Cp. Ibid., pp.65.
32 Cp. Ibid., p.63.
various reasons. Some soldiers are wounded or leave to bring their families their pay in person, due to the absence of a functioning banking system. Others become AWOL\textsuperscript{33} due to the lack of military discipline. Exemplarily, in April 2008 one Iraqi company in Baghdad arbitrarily abandoned its position and forced American and Iraqi commanders to hastily organize reinforcements, and more than 1,000 recently qualified soldiers deployed to Basra deserted rather than obey orders to fight against Sadr’s Mahdi Army.\textsuperscript{34} Poor military discipline and disobedience predominantly result from the lack of enforcement of an Iraqi code of military discipline and the lack of a legal framework to protect and orient military’s human resources. Thus, soldiers simply do not have to fear the consequences of desertion since there is no effective military judicial system in place, and they are easily seduced to desert due to the fact that compensations for long-term disabilities and support for families of fallen soldiers are almost nonexistent. \textsuperscript{35}

2) Specific military problems

a) Army

Apart from those deficits covered in the previous chapter, one particular problem of the Iraqi army concerns its most capable element - the Iraqi Special Operations Forces.\textsuperscript{36} The ISOF are specialized in anti-guerrilla operations and particularly well-trained to place high-value targets in custody in “nonpermissive” environments. However, the fact that they report directly to the Prime Minister’s office, bypassing the national chain of command, raises concern about the neutrality of these units. Since the Prime Minister communicates orders directly to field commanders, it is feared that he would arbitrarily instruct forces to pursue unilateral Shi’a interests. This possibility arouses suspicion within the Iraqi population and perpetuates sectarian tensions.

\textsuperscript{33} AWOL: Absent Without Official Leave
\textsuperscript{34} Cp. Farrell, S., Oppel, R., 2008.
\textsuperscript{36} Cp. Ibid. pp.53,55, 63.
b) Coastal Protection

The Iraqi Navy’s responsibility is of vital strategic importance since it is in charge of protecting key Iraqi infrastructure that enables the shipping of most of Iraq’s oil. Yet, the poor relationship with the Iraqi coast guard hampers its operational effectiveness. Since both security forces operate in close proximity and have complementary missions, reciprocal collaboration and information exchange are essential. Yet, the two organizations either avoid – or compete against – each other, due to sectarian influences within the coast guard and the fact that both operate under different chains of command.

c) Air Force

The air force is currently organized for counterinsurgency operations and flies surveillance and combat missions over Baghdad and key critical infrastructure. It particularly faces the challenge to synchronize air capabilities with joint (special operations and army) missions. However, due to coordination deficiencies and insufficient personnel synchronization skills the Iraqi air force is presently not able to provide adequate air support for ground forces.

d) Intelligence Organizations

In order to plan and execute operations effectively the Iraqi military remains highly dependent on Coalition support of intelligence due to the fact that Iraqi Intelligence Organizations do not serve their purpose to provide information satisfactorily. Iraq possesses four known intelligence organizations, the Directorate General of Intelligence and Security (DGIS), the National Information and Investigation Agency (NIIA), the Iraqi National Intelligence System (INIS) and an independent intelligence organization established by the Ministry of State for National Security Affairs (MSNSA). All intelligence organizations need to work in close collaboration to support the ISF, but due to organizational competitiveness and mutual mistrust they neither share gained information among each other nor with the Iraqi military sufficiently.

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38 Cp. Ibid., pp.72-74.
39 Cp. Ibid., pp.52.
II) Military integration problems

1) Cohesion and loyalty

The Iraqi military’s cohesion is compromised by subversive infiltration and politicization and is thus consistently in danger to fractionize along ethnic and religious lines. This is basically due to an imprudent ethnic and religious composition of the military in the first place. Initially, the U.S. together with the Iraqi government created a Shi’a dominated New Iraqi Army which in this regard mirrored the negative pattern of the former Sunni dominated military under Saddam Hussein and was thus criticized as a tool for enforcing exclusive Shi’a dominance throughout the country. Sunni Arabs made up less than 10 percent of the ISF which is just half of their share of the country’s overall population, and most units lacked a balance of Sunnis, Shiites Muslims, and Kurds.

Due to this, Kurds and Sunnis felt disenfranchised and perceived the Iraqi military as a hostile Shi’a occupation force. The fear of Shi’a oppression was so intense that e.g. in Fallujah imams publicly called on the people to attack the Iraqi army. Consequentially, many Sunnis sought the aid of insurgents or even joined the insurgency as fighters.

In order to combat the increased insurgency the Coalition along with the Iraqi government decided to raise the number of troops by incorporating not only Sunnis but also Shi’a and Kurdish militias (Badr Brigade and Kurdish Peshmerga) although all militias independent of the Iraqi armed forces had been declared illegal under CPA Order #91 (June 2004). This decision, however, had far-reaching consequences.

On the one hand it encouraged the military’s infiltration by subversives who tried to counteract military missions and conducted numerous assaults on Iraqi soldiers. In October 2004 rebels, who according to investigators had inside information from military infiltrators, ambushed and executed 50 unarmed Iraqi cadets in civilian clothes on their way home, and in December, more than 20 people were killed on a U.S. military base near Mosul by an infiltrated suicide bomber of the

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43 Cp. Ibid.
Ansar al-Sunnah Army\textsuperscript{46,47} During that time Iraqi officials estimated that about 5 percent of the Iraqi government’s troops were infiltrated insurgents or sympathizers of the insurgency.\textsuperscript{48}

On the other hand Kurdish and Shi’á militias did not become loyal to the central government and remained independent units within the military which were more loyal to local tribal leaders and used their legitimation to enforce narrow parochial political agendas.\textsuperscript{49} The Los Angeles Times reported in 2007 e.g. that the 5\textsuperscript{th} Division of the Iraqi army stationed in Diyala province and headed by a Badr Brigade commander was abused to conduct an intimidation campaign against the province’s Sunni population.\textsuperscript{50} Such instances led many Sunnis to believe that the government incorporated Shi’á militias solely to systematically crack down on the Sunni population which did not only paralyze further Coalition attempts to integrate more Sunnis into the Iraqi army but also strengthened the sectarian strife overall.\textsuperscript{51} Due to the forseeability of such consequences various analysts criticized the decision to integrate militias as irresponsibly and imprudently directed to short-term political expediency instead to Iraq’s long-term national interests.

Thereupon, Coalition forces and the Iraqi government announced to intensify their efforts to abandon subversives and to create an Iraqi military that reflects the ethnic and religious fabric of Iraq, with diverse units loyal to the nation.\textsuperscript{52} In fact in the following reports indications agglomerated that the U.S. and the Iraqi military would finally make strides to detect and cull subversive elements and to develop more military divisions that are well integrated in terms of ethnicity and religion.\textsuperscript{53} In September 2008, Tehran Times stated that according to U.S. officials the ethnic and religious blend of Iraq’s security forces, consisting of 54% Shiites, 31% Sunnis, and 13% Kurds would finally roughly resemble that of the nation.\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{46} The Ansar al-Sunnah or Group of the Protectors of Sunnah is a militant salafi group in Iraq that is fighting the U.S.-led occupation and the Iraqi government. The group is based in northern and central Iraq and includes both Kurdish and Sunni Arabs as well as foreign fighters.
\textsuperscript{48} Cp. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{50} Cp. Moore, S., 2007, January 03.
\textsuperscript{54} Cp. Tehran Times 2008, September 17.
However, for want of evidence and due to obvious opposing trends these apparent integration improvements still remain questionable. Neither the U.S. nor the Iraqi government have provided detailed information about the actual quantity and internal composition of ethnically mixed divisions.\textsuperscript{55} Without such information analysts cannot evaluate whether the majority of divisions are in fact in balance or assess the proclivity of individual units to turn into partisan militias. This lack of transparency arouses suspicion, the more so as U.S. military spokespersons in the past had claimed to be unable to provide respective information and were thus repeatedly accused to disguise apparent deficiencies.\textsuperscript{56}

Further, reports suggesting an increased reliability of forces due to the successful abandonment of subversives have to be handled with care. The effectiveness of security procedures to detect infiltration is still assessed to be inadequate due to a deficient intelligence apparatus and additionally impeded by the incompleteness of files on individuals from Saddam Hussein’s regime.\textsuperscript{57} Thus, subversives are still frequently not traceable until they galvanize into action.\textsuperscript{58} Consequently, the persisting danger of subversive infiltration further on sows distrust between Iraqi forces and a comprehensive concept to actively strengthen the confidence and cohesion of military units has not been implemented so far. Thus, improvements of internal security, coherence or loyalty of combat units cannot simply be derived from a series of cases of detecting subversives.

Moreover, recent reports indicate that military units remain unchanged more likely to place their loyalties with political factions rather than with the Iraqi government.\textsuperscript{59} Accordingly, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki ordered a major offensive in Basra last spring to eradicate militia influence, but 75% of the enlisted soldiers and 80% of officers of the 14\textsuperscript{th} Division opposed to battle in their native area and deserted.\textsuperscript{60} Furthermore, journalists revealed in September 2008 that the Peshmerga forces still remain independent within the Iraqi army and would even gear up for combatting the Iraqi army due to a dispute between Kurdish leaders and the central government in Baghdad over the status of Khanaqin city. Such developments cast

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{55} Cp. Serchuk, V., 2006, March 9.
  \item \textsuperscript{56} Cp. Ibid.
  \item \textsuperscript{58} Cp. Sharp, J., 2007, January 18.
  \item \textsuperscript{59} Cp. Ibid.; Serchuk, V., 2006, March 9.
  \item \textsuperscript{60} Cp. Peter, T., 2008, September 15.
\end{itemize}
doubt on announced integration improvements and illustrate that the Iraqi military’s problem of cohesion and loyalty is still far from being solved.\textsuperscript{61}

2) Integration of Sahwa fighters

Since 2005 the so-called Awakening Movements, or Sahwa, – coalitions between tribal Sheikhs established to maintain security and originally initiated among Sunni tribes – have become a remarkable force that gained substantially in size and influence. At present, the movement consists of estimated 100,000 members, mostly Sunni, and many of them have so far been paid by the U.S. military to support anti-al-Qaeda operations.\textsuperscript{62} According to some analysts awakening fighters have effectively achieved to reduce violence in their operating areas and the U.S. military considers them to be one of the most effective vigors against AQI and an indispensable military backup.\textsuperscript{63} Due to their intensive engagement, awakening fighters thus demand to be officially incorporated into the ISF.

To the Iraqi government, however, the Awakening Movements are a thorn in its flesh, because they consider them as an armed Sunni opposition in the making. Accordingly, since several of the awakening members were former commissioners of the Saddam regime and active resistance fighters after the U.S.-Invasion, partially confederated with AQI, the government fears subversive infiltration and remains reluctant to integrate them.\textsuperscript{64} Due to political pressure and urged by the U.S., the government finally agreed to incorporate about 20\%\textsuperscript{65} of their strength into the ISF, but didn’t comply with this covenant so far.\textsuperscript{66} On the contrary, in August 2008, the government launched a campaign to disban the Sunni Awakening groups and issued 650 arrest warrants for high-ranking awakening members, whereupon Sunni tribal leaders threatened to take up arms.\textsuperscript{67} Thus, analysts and policy makers fear that this dispute could result in a resumption of sectarian violence or even escalate into civil war.\textsuperscript{68} The more so as the U.S. currently seeks to gradually hand over control of

\textsuperscript{65}Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki agreed to integrate 20\% of the awakening members, but a government spokesman later on declared that this concession was based on the government’s assumption that the Awakening groups would only consist of a total of 50,000 instead of 100,000 members. Cp. Mineeia, Z., Gharib, A. 2008, September 10.
Iraq’s provinces to the Iraqi government and consequentially of the awakening members which will raise tensions, if further U.S. payments disrupt and at least 80,000 Sahwa fighters will be left unintegrated.69

C) Recommendations

I) Recommendations for an integrated military reform

1) Suggestions: General military problems

a) Development of an integrated military concept

The study recommends a military concept which bases on the theoretical concept of confidence-building defense.70 Thereupon, the Iraqi military shall be transformed into a capable cost-effective force by enhancing the defensive potential of its armed forces while limiting its capacity for cross-border offensive action. In contrast to the current offensive approach a specialization on defense offers a way to stabilize the country area-wide without wearing down combat units. At the same time a nonoffensive defense posture, adopted by incorporating limits on the capacity for offensive action, improves crisis stability and mitigates interstates’ tensions. In this way an alternative approach to defense and arms control policy will strengthen the effectiveness of armed forces to detain external and internal threats and encourage national and regional reconciliation.

According to the principles of confidence-building defense, aggression will be principally deterred by lowering an aggressor’s probability of success, or in case deterrence fails, it will contain and exhaust aggression by using a combination of area-defense and smaller-scale maneuver forces and tactics.71 In adjustment to this a military concept should comprise the following efforts to enhance the defensive potential of regional armed forces.

The structure and deployment of forces should be adapted to the “spider-in-its-web” model72 in order to reach a higher troop dispersion for rapid military reaction and combat forces relief. Accordingly, forces should be restructured into an area-covering component of ground forces with low organic mobility and a mechanized/air-mechanized component in a three or four-to-one ratio. The fist component

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establishes a quasi-stationary net covering the country area-wide with crosspoints at critical urban spots and key infrastructure. Crosspoints should be manned by light infantry units. The area-covering component executes protective and control operations and serves as an early warning system for the mechanized/air-mechanized components to timely trace early signs of possible violent outbreaks, and in the event of war it provides intelligence, logistics, and combat support for forces of the second component. Thereby, in order to improve the intelligence gathering capacity of the first component it is necessary to place increased emphasis on the use of sensor fields, reconnaissance drones (e.g. of American, German, and Israeli origin), and network communications while putting less focus on intelligent weapons. Moreover, for the eventuality of aggression by a neighbor, the area-covering component should be in charge to prepare likely battlefields for the second component thoroughly by establishing e.g. anti-tank obstacles, trenches, shelters, minefields, and underground headquarter, mutually supporting, fortified strongpoints incorporating tanks in hull-down position and alternate protected firing positions for artillery.\textsuperscript{73}

In contrast, the mechanized component functions as a rapid deployment force to avoid the escalation of violent outbreaks by showing the flag or, if necessary, by combatting violent upheavals in an early stage.\textsuperscript{74} By operating in close interaction with the area-covering component the mechanized component should narrow the scope of armed clashes by selectively defending critical areas. Therefore, the mechanized component has to be featured with a high degree of flexibility to be able to move, like a spider in its web, quickly from one crosspoint of the quasi-stationary net to the other. The operational mobility for the speedy allocation of those troops derives from the decoupling of defensive from offensive mobility: marching rapidly to thicken up the net wherever needed ("hasten to defend"), but not being able to attach under heavy fire. This has structural and technological implications. Typically, the second component would comprise light mechanized infantry and cavalry formations on wheeled armored carriers and being equipped with monitoring and counter-mobility gear.\textsuperscript{75} Further, the mobility of troops should be partially substituted for placing increased emphasis on indirect fire (e.g. artillery systems). In accordance with a nonoffensive defense posture, the range of artillery systems should be limited

\textsuperscript{74} Cp. Ibid.
\textsuperscript{75} Cp. Ibid.
to 50 kilometers and the range of close air support aircraft to 300 kilometers combat radius. Likewise, Iraqi air force modernization plans should eschew expensive longer-range multi-purpose aircraft and emphasize shorter-range air superiority fighter and close-air support aircraft instead.

Furthermore, special provisions for border security should be made for the event of an invasion. Thereby, it is advisable to make better use of defensive depth to trade space for time and enemy casualties which outwears and demoralizes invaders while disburdening Iraqi troops. Military analysts Carl Conetta, Charles Knight and Lutz Unterseher developed an adjustable border-protection model which comprises three types of defense zones: a border zone, a borderzone/stronghold interface, and a stronghold area.⁷⁶

The border zone would be patrolled by light cavalry units with the mission to detect and evaluate incursions and in the event of an invasion delay invading forces by attacking its forward reconnaissance elements. According to field preparations, the border zone should be vested with an array of sensors, anti-tank obstacles, and minefields.

Attached to the border zone a borderzone/stronghold interface would function to further diminish an aggressor’s strength. In this area invaders’ mobility could be impeded by mines deployed by helicopters, covered by airmobile anti-tank units and ground-attack aircraft.

Behind the borderzone/stronghold interface follows a stronghold area which comprises tank obstacles and minefields, covered by anti-tank infantry fighting from prepared positions, mobile tube- and rocket-artillery systems, and mobile air-defense units. In order to permit adjacent strongholds to support each other and deliver overlapping fires on the areas between them, stronghold artillery and air-defense weapons could extend 30-50 kilometers beyond the stronghold’s boundaries. In this way armored and airmobile forces could operate under the cover of the artillery and air defense systems which themselves find protection within the stronghold area.

The adoption of the “3-zone-border” concept as well as the “spider-in-its-web” model and the consistent limitation of offensive capacities will contribute to greater stability within Iraq in two different aspects: by using depth and dispersal to reduce incentives for aggression and by minimizing the provocation of neighbor states to

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undertake preemptive strikes. However, in case aggression cannot be avoided, the “3-zone-border” concept offers a way to efficiently contain and exhaust invading forces, whereas the “spider-in-its-web” model provides the potential to reduce the scope of encounters and effectively combat guerillas. Therefore, the implementation of both concepts would not only advantageously effect Iraq’s current security situation, affected by regional tensions and local smaller-scale violence, but also provide adequate protection against possible large-scale external aggression.

Furthermore, the stabilizing effect of both concepts, along with the fact that defense is a more economical way of fighting, could reasonably be used to reduce the military’s manning strength. Thereby, reductions can be made by concentrating on trained recruits and qualified leadership in exchange for overaged less qualified personnel and by focusing on support units, to strengthen the effectiveness of troops by providing adequate logistics and medical support, while cutting the number of combat forces. Thereby, in order to avoid tensions, released personnel should be adequately compensated and/or integrated into established job-programs. This reduction of combat forces would not only save military expenses, but also add authority to the military’s nonoffensive defense posture.

In addition to the structural specialization on defense, it is further recommendable to reveal the country’s nonoffensive defense posture to other neighbor states in order to encourage national reconciliation. For this purpose Iraq could undertake a variety of confidence-building initiatives.\(^{77}\) The Iraqi government could e.g. elucidate the principles of the Iraqi military concept, its security objectives and guidances and give limited permission to neighbor states for monitoring and inspections of e.g. basic framework, procurement plans etc.\(^{78}\) Further, Iraq could officially pledge itself to refrain from destabilizing offensive-weapons arms races and pursue serious arms control efforts.\(^{79}\) Moreover, the country could publicly commit itself to announce military maneuvers and make arrangements with neighboring states for the exchange of observers. In this way by granting an adequate level of transparency the country could demonstrate to respect the sovereignty of other states and hence minimize the risk of external threats.

However, to furnish prima facie evidence of an Iraqi nonoffensive defense posture the presence of U.S. forces could expectedly emerge as a paralyzing factor.


\(^{78}\) As a matter of course this cannot include sensitive data e.g. about specific weapons positions.

The specialization on defense and the limitation of offensive capacities might not be taken seriously by Iraq’s neighbors as long as the country is still covered, guided, and equipped by a military superpower. Furthermore, the poor relationship between the U.S. and Syria as well as Iran and instances such as the U.S. recent disrespect of the Syrian border could make an Iraqi military nonoffensive defense posture untrustworthy. Due to that, U.S. presence should end as soon as possible. Yet, since the Iraqi armed forces will need time to implement the suggested changes and to credibly specialize on defense, the military might during its transition period rely on a third party’s assistance. In order to overcome this quandary it is thus advisable to pull U.S. forces out and to rather deploy an independent external force instead.

As a suggestion, a transition force of 30,000 soldiers authorized by the UN Security Council should be allocated to the country’s hot spots with the mission to monitor U.S. withdrawal and to bolster the Iraqi military over a fixed period. Thereby, in order to have a truly stabilizing confidence-building effect, the external force should not only be tactically and technically efficient, but also be able to work in close interaction with the Iraqi population. Therefore, it would be advantageous to recruit soldiers from moderate Islamic countries such as Morocco, Egypt or Jordan to avoid language or integrational discrepancies. In this way by timely deploying preventive forces U.S. withdrawal as well as the Iraqi military could be safeguarded while the Iraqi military could be disburdened to use an additional time-frame to transform and develop its capacities. In 1995, such a UN preventive force was established under General Secretary Boutros Boutros Ghali, as a consequence of the Rwandan Genocide which might have been averted by a single mechanized brigade.\textsuperscript{80} The insertion of the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia successfully exemplified that preventive deployment can be an effective form of peacekeeping, if it is done at the right time and with a clear mandate.\textsuperscript{81} Accordingly, instead of having troops on the ground the U.S. could play a far more supportive role by advocating the establishment of a UN

\textsuperscript{81} Within the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the UN Security Council decided, by adopting resolution 983(1995), that UNPROFOR would be known as the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) with mandate, responsibilities and composition identical to those in place. The UNPREDEP in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (also referred to under its acronym FYROM) is the first mission in the history of the United Nations peacekeeping to have a preventive mandate. Cp. United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (1999).
preventive peacekeeping force in the UN Security Council and could further help to finance it e.g. by paying back American debts to the UN. 82

b) Establishment of a functioning logistics and maintenance system

In order to become truly independent the Iraqi military needs to devise autonomous mechanisms of its own to optimize its logistics and maintenance system. Due to the assistance and support provided by the Multi-National Security Transition Command the Iraqi military has already taken first measures to establish a basis for a self-sufficient logistics apparatus by instituting basic systems and processes and reerecting/extending infrastructure.

Yet, as a given result of omnipresent deficiencies Iraqi leaders reject to simply entirely adopt U.S. suggested concepts which by virtue of their overreliance on outsourcing logistics are regarded to be completely incongruous with the Iraqi notion of a self-contained logistics system. Consequentially, instead of imposing the implementation of U.S. solutions upon the Iraqi military it is rather advisable to support the Iraqis in developing their own measures which embrace their particular needs, conceptions, and conventions. With respect to the long-term objective to establish a self-dependent Iraqi military the U.S. will now have to gradually curtail its engagement and confine itself to giving general advice and providing logistics expertise only.

Hence, the U.S. should initially focus on gradually replacing its current advisers and consultants with adequate indigenous advisers and analysts. In the long run an exclusively Iraqi logistics adviser team should be established accordingly. The replacement of all U.S. advisers will in turn require the employment of approximately 5,000 experts which as a matter of fact will be in the short- and midterm a difficult endeavor with regard to the current lack of qualified and experienced personnel within Iraq. In this respect it might be necessary and expedient to recruit additional logistics advisers from other moderate Islamic countries such as Kuwait, Jordan or Morocco for a certain interim period. Thus, the manning level requirements could be met and both language and integrational problems as well as general resentments against U.S. military consultants could be averted at the same time. These external advisers could be hired on a contract basis and later reduced and replaced by Iraqi

personnel as soon as the Iraqi logistics system has matured and a sufficient number of Iraqi logistics experts has been trained.

The logistics adviser team should basically be sectioned into three departments. The first department will assist the distinct military branches and work closely with Iraqi ground, air and maritime forces. Experts of this department would especially have to sensitize commanders to make preventive maintenance a priority and to timely request sufficient equipment, spares, and backups from the MOD.

The second department will be both responsible for operational procedures within logistics facilities such as warehouses or storages and for the organization of speedy and safe distribution of supplies including their passage in transit. Central issues of this task force will be finding measures to accelerate working processes and optimizing the protection of logistics facilities and routes of transport, e.g. by conceptualizing self-protection plans for single facilities and by minimizing the vulnerability of major supply lines. Additionally, the second department should also be tasked to assist in putting up a more decentralized supply system while limiting the importance of the Taji National Depot by raising a various number of other depots each being closely connected to respective key military facilities.

The third department will be working closely with the MOD to improve the provision of administrative logistics capabilities and to synchronize the first and second division with the key decision-makers. Advisers of the third department will assist the MOD in finding ways to accelerate administrative processes by simplifying or even decentralizing essential approval procedures. They will further the improvement of governmental and administrative support and their interaction with the military by making administrative processes more flexible. This will put the MOD and the military in a position in which they will be able to cope with alterations to the normal chain of supply in case of disruptions caused by enemy interference. Additionally, it is highly important that consultants induce a sense of foresight for timely planning of supply procurement and distribution in order to prevent requisition delays from automatically resulting in considerable logistics shortfalls. Likewise, advisers will also have to improve the collaboration between the different compartments of the MOD to facilitate maximum coordination of effort.

In order to ensure proper consultation of all advising units it is recommendable to subordinate the logistics adviser team to a separate governmental logistics analyst’s commission which coordinates and supervises advising units and in turn
reports directly to the Secretary of Defense. In this way both the logistics adviser team and the separate analyst’s commission will be adequately monitored and supervised. Personnel for the logistics analyst’s commission will be required to possess extensive logistics expertise and experience in logistics force structure analysis in order to be able to evaluate progress in development and detect emerging deficiencies.

In addition to the establishment of such expert teams, the Iraqi military will further need to train large numbers of qualified personnel in order to effectively implement the information technology system and the MOD’s logistics force structure plan. Since Iraqi leaders remain reluctant to outsource logistics services it is advisable for the Iraqi government to place further emphasis on the education of logistics personnel and the expansion of training capacities in cooperation with the U.S. and NATO. Apart from further expansion of internal capacities the Iraqi military could also resort to a considerable number of soldiers from combat units who will be dispensable after the targeted military reform. These respective soldiers could be both send to receive external training in neighboring countries such as Kuwait or Jordan and be reeducated by Iraqi capacities.

The provision of adequately qualified personnel, the development of Iraqi logistics adviser teams and an Iraqi analyst’s commission would be important steps for the Iraqi military to detach from U.S. patronage. Improved logistics support will automatically enhance the operational effectiveness of the Iraqi military and due to an innate advising apparatus the Iraqi military would further be able to solve its logistics and maintenance problems self-dependently and in accordance with an Iraqi agenda.

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83 For detailed information about possible initiatives see: recommendations for enhancing manpower capabilities and capacities (pp.28).
c) Improving the provision of military equipment

In regard to the military’s equipment problems, measures have to be found to ensure a timely provision of sufficient supplies. As aforementioned, shortfalls caused by a deficient logistics and maintenance system or by an ineffective bureaucracy have both to be remedied by extensive engagement of Iraqi logistics advisers and analysts.84

In addition, it is necessary to intensify endeavors against widespread corruption to warrant that funds for needed war material will not be diverted from intended use. Since corruption in Iraq has reached an enormous extent and recriminations from Iraqi leaders and U.S. officials have dramatically sapped each others confidence, it would be reasonable to seek the aid of an independent third party. Accordingly, the Iraqi government could request assistance of the United Nations which has developed specialized anti-corruption sub-organizations such as the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute and the Centre for International Crime Prevention. These organizations have been specifically installed for assisting developing countries to combat corruption and dispose of up-to-date information and extensive expertise on effective policy strategies to reduce and control this kind of crime.85 In this regard the United Nations could delegate a task force of anti-corruption experts to Iraq which together with the Iraqi government and respective key authorities of the MOD elaborate on a set of activities to prevent, detect, and fight corruption.

Accordingly, UN experts could at first assess existing national measures against corruption such as relevant legislation, institutions, and administrative regulations and, upon request, assist in the revision of ineffective legislation and/or in the adoption of specific provisions, including specific anti-corruption legislation.86 Subsequently, they could provide advise and technical support to establish and/or strengthen effective anti-corruption bodies such as an independent anti-corruption commission or an anti-corruption investigative unit and help to create internal structures and procedures within the MOD for inspecting and controlling. Furthermore, the task force could promote the prevention of corruption by various initiatives such as assisting the Iraqi government to raise anti-corruption awareness, drafting a code of conduct and ethics, setting up a system of disciplinary sanctions,

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84 S. pp.22-24.
86 Cp. Ibid.
and providing training on newly introduced anti-corruption measures. Indeed, such a concerted effort with UN experts could not only offer the possibility to effectively combat corruption and the misuse of military funding but also enable Iraqi leaders to implement their own conceptions while mitigating respective U.S.-Iraqi tensions.

Alongside anti-corruption initiatives, measures should be taken to ensure that the Iraqi military gets appropriately equipped. Therefore, it is necessary that the MOD along with the U.S. and a group of external military analysts place renewed attention on specific Iraqi military needs and jointly revise modernization and standardization plans.

Regarding the revision of procurement plans, the Iraqi military should refrain from facilitating unilateral offensive counterinsurgency operations and focus on defensive missions such as border, airspace, and coastal protection as well as on network-based control of domestic territory plus basic military supplies (e.g. engineer equipment, transport, medical care). Moreover, general standardization plans have to be elaborated and executed consistently. Finally, outdated equipment should be registered and disposed of while unexpedient equipment should, if possible, be transferred to the Iraqi Police Service (IPS), the National Police (NP) or the Department of Border Enforcement (DBE).

Recommendations (priorities of procurement):
In accordance with the recommended military reform there should be procurement priorities as follows:

In the context of the ground forces planning would have to concentrate on:

- the protective, all-encompassing net which needs simple, robust and effective communication equipment along with reinforced sheltering facilities for the crosspoints,
- and on a standard family of light armored vehicles (4x4, up to 10t) for both: mechanized infantry and cavalry – the former stronger in dismounted personnel and the latter with more firepower (ATGMs with bunker-breaking capability, machine cannon, automatic grenade launchers).
- The same family of vehicles would also serve as basis of reconnaissance formations – to be urgently equipped with tactical drones (UAVs) and battlefield radar.
- As a backup for the lightly structured (local) infantry in the net and for intervening mechanized elements, there should be a component of mobile, protected artillery (preferably the French CAESAR or the Slovak ZUZANA) to provide – alternating between strongholds – flexible and accurate indirect fire. In a first phase 3 battalions would suffice.
- Combat engineers should concentrate on countermobility rather than on mobility-enhancing gear.
- The logistics system needs modern infrastructure for a decentralized depot organization: to be integrated with the net. From these regionally distributed bases a standard family of trucks would “feed” the troops within reasonable reach (1/3 of the trucks with armored cabins and mine protection).

With respect to the air force urgent requirements are:
- Above all, base infrastructure and service-wide communication need the planners´ attention and substantial investment.
- To achieve at relatively low cost an all-weather, around-the-clock surveillance of national territory, and especially of border areas and coastal waters, drones (UAVs) of operational range / endurance should be procured.
- Easy to handle prop-jet aircraft for advanced training and COINmissions (Swiss PILATUS, Brasilean TUCANO) should form the backbone of the manned flying component: 3-6 squadrons in the beginning.
- Light jet fighter bombers (1-2 squadrons).
- The plan to purchase 36 F-16 fighter bombers in the U.S. should be reconsidered: particularly as it appears in the context of arming against Iran. 18-24 fighters for armed surveillance, to protect the integrity of national airspace, should be enough. If multi-role aircraft are to be procured, they should be equipped in such a manner (no air-to-surface weapons) that their defensive dedication is unambiguously clear. Given its greater potential for upgrades the Swedish JAS-39 seems to be a better choice than the F-16.

With respect to requirements for coastal protection:
- A combination of armed patrol boats (machine cannon, anti-ship missiles), e.g. from German production, and a few platforms for mine-countermeasures has to be considered.

d) Enhancing manpower capabilities and capacities

In order to come across the current lack of qualified personnel the Iraqi military needs to place special emphasis on the education of an increased number of commissioned and non-commissioned officers as well as on qualified logistics and medical personnel. Besides, the military should prescind from its current unilateral training focus on combat operations and intensify its endeavors to train soldiers thoroughly in conducting control and protection missions instead.

Therefore, the Iraqi government along with NTECG should direct its attention to expanding educational capacities in- and outside Iraq and to instituting additional training programs. Accordingly, the teaching staff of the NDU consisting of the Joint Staff College (JSC), the Iraqi Military Academy of Ar Rustimayah (IMAR), and the National Defense College (NDC) should be augmented considerably. In this way additional capacities could be provided to raise the recruitment ratio of Iraqi military leadership personnel essentially and to offer an ample variety of pivotal training courses. This would not only allow to provide intensified training in defensive missions but also to submit refresher courses to remedy the current deficiency of well and evenly educated personnel.

In addition, further facilities for professional logistics and medical education have to be established. Yet, until completion measures have to be taken to provide respective education in foreign countries. In order to allow an increasing number of Iraqi personnel to be trained abroad, e.g. in foreign NATO schools and training centres, either the capacity of the Iraqi military’s language institute has to be enhanced or soldiers have to be given access to language schools outside Iraq.

Such an expansion of capacities will go along with the need of an increased number of trainers and apprentices. Those could be recruited specifically from the pool of redundant combat forces that will remain after the aspired military reform. Furthermore, it could also be considered to revert to capacities in the Iraqi Awakening groups and endorse their enlistment which could even be auxiliary to mitigate current Sunni-Shi’a tensions.
Besides, the development of new educational facilities and the submission of more training programs will require long-term engagement and considerable financial resources. In this respect it might be inevitable to extend NTM-I to at least 2012, and to encourage NATO members to rather support educational programs instead of making equipment donations that counteract Iraqi standardization plans.

Beyond the improvement of military education, measures have to be taken to raise the effectiveness of active troops by enhancing military discipline and motivation. Enforcing military discipline will require a well elaborated military legal and judicial system and the sustainable implementation of an integral military code of conduct in the first place. As this law-related project demands great skill and experience in legislation, it is advisable to establish a special independent commission of expert legal advisers assigned to reassess and revise existing statutory provisions and redraft relevant legislation with regard to fundamental Iraqi conventions.

Due to a rather restricted timeframe for new development of a sustainable military legal framework it would be quite reasonable to seek to transfer respective legal conceptions from foreign countries which have stood the test of time. Comparable processes of transference of legal doctrines from one legal system to another have been performed by several countries in the past, e.g. Japan largely adopted the European (primarily German) civil law system and the Greek civil code of 1946 is highly influenced by the German civil code of 1896. Correspondingly, Lebanon´s civil law is designed after the French model and Turkey´s civil law has been built after the Swiss “Zivilgesetzbuch” of 1907.

Against this background it could be considered to basically adopt the German military disciplinary code (German: Wehrdisziplinarordnung, WDO\textsuperscript{87}), for instance, which has proved itself to be well-balanced and effective and has shaped the German military´s reputation of stern discipline. On the one hand the German military disciplinary code comprises an ample variety of sophisticated disciplinary measures which are individually graduated according to the specific types of breach of duty reaching from reprimands, curfews, forfeits, degradation, and imprisonment while avoiding any kind or notion of corporal punishment which in turn is a daily occurrence in Iraq. On the other hand it provides a distinct rewarding system for extraordinary military performance which functions as an effective motivation tool. The

implementation of such a well-balanced system of reward and retribution by means of a disciplinary code will in turn act as a self-regulating factor.

Apart from instituting self-regulating mechanisms it is also recommendable to establish a self-contained military jurisdiction for effective law enforcement purposes. Both the adoption of the German military disciplinary code and the establishment of military courts could substantially improve military obedience and reduce desertion while enhancing soldiers’ motivation by awarding particular combat performances.

Besides, desertion could also be reduced by giving incentives to military personnel in the shape of enhanced state support. This may include a wide range of measures such as providing better medical care for military personnel and their families particularly emphasising e.g. the coverage of counseling and traumata treatment, granting adequate compensation of soldiers with long-term disablilties, and supporting surviving dependants of fallen soldiers.

2) Suggestions: Specific military problems

a) Army

In order to enforce the neutrality of all military forces national command lines must flow through the Minister of Defense and the Commanding General of the Iraqi armed forces. Accordingly, steps have to be taken to ensure that command and control of the Iraqi Special Operation Forces are executed through the national chain of command. Therefore, the Iraqi Prime Minister should refrain from respective bypassing practices and abolish or transform institutions which are geared to circumvent national command lines such as the Counter-Terrorism Bureau and the Office of the Commander in Chief.88 (Conceptionally, the ISOF should be regarded as – additional – spider elements in the net).

b) Coastal Protection

Improving maritime control requires to either merge navy and coast guard into one single organization for coastal maritime security or to strengthen the cooperation between those organizations considerably.89 Establishing a single organization would enable navy and coast guard to operate both under the command of the MOD which

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would be conducive to achieve an effective distribution of work and to encourage mutual cooperation. Otherwise it would be recommendable to establish platforms for information exchange and arrange joint training courses in order to ensure mutual collaboration. Assistance to the organizational merger as well as to the development of joint courses and platforms could thereby both be provided by the Maritime Services Transition Team, which should gradually be replaced by advisers from moderate Islamic countries.

c) Air Force

Enhancing air and ground synchronization requires concerted efforts of ground operators, planners, and airpower experts to develop streamlined practices and further the interoperability of different formations. In order to improve the synchronization of Coalition forces, for instance, Coalition members quarterly organize expert conferences to address air and ground synchronization issues. In accordance with this, Coalition members could utilize their gained knowledge or available expertise and establish a network of ground operators, planners, and airpower experts to assist the Iraqi military and develop in collaboration with NTECG special synchronization training courses.

d) Intelligence Organizations

By establishing competing intelligence organizations Iraq obstructed the passage to develop an effectively working intelligence apparatus. The structural division of agencies obliged to maintain secrecy inevitably conflicts with the need for information exchange, generates unnecessary duplication of effort, and due furthers the waste of resources. The intelligence transition team’s current attempt to solely mediate between those organizations will supposedly only marginally enhance collaboration and coordination.

In contrast to this approach, it is recommendable to centralize the Iraqi intelligence system and merge all intelligence agencies into one single organization divided into two departments - one for internal and the other one for external affairs. The advantage of a centralized intelligence system is to be able to pool related areas of operations, such as analysis and evaluation of information, HUMINT or SIGINT.

This will not only accelerate information processing and alleviate cooperation and coordination but also facilitate the efficient use of resources.

In order to provide professional assistance to the merger of Iraq’s intelligence organizations it would thereby be beneficial to create a new intelligence transition team. Due to the fact that the U.S. possess an intelligence system that is even more decentralized than the present Iraqi apparatus and which is in contrast to Iraq’s requirements preponderantly geared towards SIGINT, American advisers might not be suitable for establishing a centralized system with a balanced relation of HUMINT and SIGINT. Since other Intelligence Systems such as the Dutch, British and German Intelligence System are both centralized and in regard to the acquisition of information well-balanced, it could thus be reasonable to set up a respective european advisory team.

II) Recommendations for military integration

1) Enhancing cohesion and loyalty

Reducing subversive tendencies will require to construct the military in a way that finds more acceptance within the Iraqi population. Therefore, the military’s constitution has to be aligned with the democratic principle of equal rights.

Accordingly, the military’s ethnic and religious composition has to correspond with the proportional share of Sunni, Shia, and Kurds within Iraq to ensure that all major sections of the population equally participate in the exertion of military power. Likewise, to prevent the dominance of partisan interests, all military divisions have to possess a high degree of heterogeneity and military leadership should rotate irrespective of ethnic or religious boundaries at regular intervals, suggestively every 3-4 years. In this way the Iraqi military would clearly reveal to avouch the representation of superior national interests which could considerably reduce stimuli for hostile infiltration.

In addition, loyalty and cohesion within the military could further be strengthened by reinforcing democratization through advocating equal rights and treatment of all military employees. Accordingly, the military should elaborate on a universal code of conduct and ethics to demonstrate its policy of equality and soldiers should receive lectures in ethics to encourage a sense of democratic awareness and tolerance. Besides, the military should underline its policy of equal treatment by
developing standardized hiring and career advancement procedures to ensure that respective decisions are solely based on performance and not on ethnic or religious sympathies.

Furthermore, the military has to set up a legal framework to protect each employee’s rights and duties along with national interests. Correspondingly, legal regulations and institutions have to be established which effectively proceed against disregard and mortification of personal rights as well as against subversive activities. Suggestively, the Iraqi military should install a code enforcement complaints procedure which enables each soldier who falls victim to rights violation or witnesses subversive actions to file a complaint against comrades and superiors.\textsuperscript{91} Thereby, in order to encourage soldiers to report malfeasances, the immunity of each complainant has to be guaranteed to protect witnesses and victims from retaliation.

Further, an investigative unit should be established which is tasked to thoroughly check up on applicants and to investigate in cases of misconduct to effectively reduce subversive elements and detect deviant behavior. In case of evidenced misconduct the degree of penalty has to be determined in accord with an elaborated disciplinary code and possibly decided by special military courts. In order to ensure the effectiveness of the investigative unit it is further recommendable to additionally establish an independent supervisory committee subordinated to the Iraqi parliament which monitors investigators’ activities and defines policies and strategies for dealing with misconduct. An effective criminal prosecution is an essential prerequisite to reduce cases of malfeasance, and it provides confidence in the military which is decisive to create a sense of loyalty and solidarity. Thus, by advocating equal rights the military could be enabled to effectively reduce separatist tendencies and become a reliable and coherent force.

\textsuperscript{91} E.g. code enforcement complaints procedure, German military: Wehrbeschwerdeordnung, WBO: http://bundesrecht.juris.de/wbo/ ; http://www.deutsches-wehrrecht.de/Beschwerderecht.pdf.
2) Integration of Sahwa fighters

As the Shiite-dominated Iraqi government's current negative approach towards Sahwas fuels tensions between the two major religious groups in Iraq, the government immediately needs to strive for reconciliation to avoid any further commotion.

Accordingly, the Iraqi government has to guarantee the incorporation of 20,000 Sahwa fighters into the ISF as promised to restore confidence in government authorities and to bring forward the integration process. The effectual integration of Sahwa members in the Iraqi military will be instrumental in improving Sunni-Shi’a relations fundamentally as it not only substantiates the readiness of the Iraqi government to equally share military power, but also demonstrates the willingness to act jointly on a political level in the future as well.

Additionally, an independent investigation committee subordinated to the Iraqi parliament should be constituted to scrutinize recent arrest warrants that were issued against high-ranking Sahwa members. In cases of wrongful imprisonment the Iraqi government should issue their immediate release and provide adequate compensation.

Moreover, while the Ministry of Interior (MOI) is incapable of action due to a widespread infestation with sectarianism especially among police authorities the ISF is keeping a superabundance of dispensable police forces. Therefore, it is recommendable to initiate substantial downsizing of police forces and rather incorporate respective numbers of Sahwa fighters into the Iraqi military not only because Sahwa fighters have been most effective in fighting AQI but because they also largely enjoy the confidence of the Sunni population. This public acknowledgement will be considerably valuable both for counterterrorism operations and intelligence support.

As a matter of course Sahwa aspirants have to be subject to extensive scrutiny in terms of their maintenance history to guard against the hazard of subversive infiltration. Respective investigations and the gathering of vital background information should again be conducted by a special military intelligence unit directed and supervised by an independent government commission in order to ensure their diligence and effectiveness.
References


