Worlding Cape Town by Design

Creative cityness, policy mobilities and urban governance in postapartheid Cape Town

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"[T]he ways in which societies compose and invent themselves in the present (the creativity of practice) is always ahead of the knowledge produced about them. In addition, these compositional acts always move in multiple and unforeseen directions. What binds societies, made up of multiple assemblages and disjunctive syntheses, is some kind of artifice they come to believe in."

(Mbembe & Nuttall 2004, pp. 348f)
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Recurrent acronyms

ACC  African Centre for Cities
ANC  African National Congress
BID  Business Improvement District
CCI  Cultural and Creative Industries
CCID Central City Improvement District
CCDI Cape Craft and Design Institute
CEO  Chief Executive Officer
CITI Cape Information Technology Initiative
CTFC Cape Town Fashion Council
CTICC Cape Town International Convention Centre
CFC  Cape Film Commission
Cape MIC Western Cape Music Industry Commission
CoCT City of Cape Town
DA  Democratic Alliance
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
ICSID International Council of Societies of Industrial Design
IDP  Integrated Development Plan
IT  Information Technology
Jo'burg Johannesburg
LED  Local Economic Development
MayCo Mayoral Committee
PANSA Performing Arts Network South Africa
PGWC Provincial Government of the Western Cape
SDF  Spatial Development Framework
TEAMS Tourism, Events, Arts and Culture, Marketing and Strategic Assets Directorate
USD  United States Dollar
UN  United Nations
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
VANSA Visual Arts Network South Africa
WCFI Western Cape Furniture Initiative
WDC 2014 World Design Capital 2014
WESGRO The Western Cape Tourism, Trade & Investment Promotion Agency
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Obwohl die Kreativstadtdebatte unter kritischen Stadtforschern seit dem Jahrtausendwechsel bereits sehr weit vorangetrieben worden ist (Peck 2005; Ponzini & Rossi 2010; Borén & Young 2012), gibt es nach wie vor nur wenige Arbeiten, die sich mit den polit-ökonomischen Dynamiken und sozialräumlichen Effekten dieses populären Planungsparadigmas in Städten des so genannten 'globalen Südens' auseinandersetzen. Dies liegt nicht zuletzt daran, dass diesen Städte oft noch immer nur die Fähigkeit zur Nachahmung 'westlicher' Stadtentwicklungsmuster attestiert wird. Kritik an dieser paternalistischen Haltung von Seiten des internationalen Stadtforschungsmainstreams wurde in den vergangenen Jahren von einer wachsenden Zahl postkolonialer Forscher geübt, welche sich derzeit auch immer laustärker für eine selbstbewusstere Theoriebildung durch konsolidierte empirische Auseinandersetzungen mit 'worlding cities' (an Stelle der traditionell normgebenden 'world' bzw. 'global cities') einsetzen (Simone 2001a; Robinson 2011a; Roy & Ong 2011; Edensor & Jayne 2011; Roy 2014). Dieser epistemologischen Idee des 'writing back' sieht sich auch die vorliegende Arbeit verpflichtet, weshalb Kapstadts Kreativstadtambitionen auch nicht von vornherein einzig
als das Ergebnis global verordneter städtischer Neoliberalisierung begriffen werden (Robinson & Parnell 2011; Parnell & Oldfield 2014).


In besonderem Detail widmet sich die Arbeit dem erfolgreichen Bewerbungsverfahren Kapstadts um den Titel des World Design Capital 2014. Sie verfolgt, wie diese alle zwei Jahre verliehene internationale Auszeichnung seit 2010 zu einem immer prominenteren Ankerpunkt des lokalen Stadtentwicklungsdiskurses geworden ist und zeigt darüber hinaus, welche neuen Akteurspositionen und -netzwerke von 'design' als neuem politischen Handlungsimpuls hervorgebracht werden. Gleichzeitig setzt sie sich aber auch kritisch mit der Frage auseinander, welche Konsequenzen diese Verschiebung hin zu einer eher netzwerkorientierten Steuerungslogik für unterschiedliche stadtpolitische Akteursgruppen hat. Dabei beruft sie sich auf einen von Foucault's Governementalitätstheorie inspirierten Theorierahmen in Verbindung mit 'Mitteltheorien' aus dem Umkreis derzeitiger Arbeiten zum Thema interurbaner policy mobilities (McCann & Ward 2011; Temenos & McCann 2013; Cochrane & Ward 2012; McCann 2013) und postkolonialer (Stadt-)Forschungskonzepte (Simone 2004; Myers 2011; Roy & Ong 2011), um vor allem die Herstellung von 'design' als lokaler Technologie des Regierens, sowie die Verhandlung gesellschaftlicher Macht in den Blick nehmen zu können. In Anbetracht der steigenden Erwartungen an das spätmoderne Kreativsubjekt im Allgemeinen und im Fall von Kapstadt speziell an professionelle Designer, versucht die Arbeit außerdem, einen explorativen Einblick in die
unterschiedlichen Subjektivierungsprozesse und ihre institutionelle Einbettung innerhalb der lokalen urban governance Strukturen zu geben.

Insgesamt kommt die Arbeit zu dem Ergebnis, dass Kreativstadtprozessen in Städten des 'globalen Südens' mehr sind, als nur das Produkt 'westlicher' Wissensimporte. Vielmehr zeigt sich, dass auch dieses Konzept einer 'Provinzialisierung' (Chakrabarty 2008; Sheppard et al. 2013) bedarf, um eine 'ex-zentrische' Sichtweise (Bhabha 2004) zu ermöglichen und damit schlussendlich den Blick für eine topologische und stärker relationale Analyse von Kapstadts urbanen Transformationsdynamiken freizugeben.
"The continent we have in mind exists only as a function of circulation and of circuits."
(Mbembe & Nuttall 2004, p. 351)

"Place is the 'event in space', operating as a 'dislocation' with respect to familiar structures and narratives. It is the eruption of the Lacanian 'real', a disruptive materiality. It is the unmapped and unmoored that allows for new moorings and mappings. Place, like the subject, is the site of becoming, the opening for politics."
(Gibson-Graham 2006a, p. xxiii)

1

Introduction

Cape Town is again reinventing itself, and the world is invited to its "renaissance", read the opening line of the travel section of the New York Times in September this year (Khan 05.09.2014). Not only did the short article praise the city's eminent status as the World Design Capital 2014 but it also put it at the top of its coveted annual destination roster. Has Cape Town become the latest victim of the highly contagious "creative city fever" (Kunzmann 2010 in Novy & Colomb 2012, p. 6)?

Not quite…

In a longitudinal analysis, this thesis grapples with the intricate and aspirational politics that lined Cape Town's long and winding road of becoming not only a mundane "wannabe creative city" (Ponzini & Rossi 2010, p. 1037) but the 'first African design(er) city'. It proposes that through retracing how the notoriously peripatetic creative city
paradigm1 has gained a foothold in Cape Town's postapartheid urban transformation we are able to learn more about the city's constitutive political networks and interior spaces of urban ordering. Furthermore, it argues that scrutinising Cape Town's creative city politics by accompanying the city through its different motions of becoming the World Design Capital 2014 also reveals the often speculative nature of these "world-conjuring projects" (Ong 2011b, p. 1). Following Robinson (2014), seeing such processes as hybridized urban experiments then also helps us to "analytically displace the possibility of an overarching and predetermined global process" (p. 6). For the research at hand, this means that it is less concerned with the question if Cape Town can or cannot rightfully claim to be a 'creative' city. Instead, it is much more intrigued by the question how this longing to become perceived as part of an imagined community of 'design(er) cities' has permeated the minds of local governance actors and how this collective "elite dreaming" (Ong 2011b, p. 17) has stirred and continues to stir urban political action in contemporary Cape Town.

This thesis is also greatly indebted to the epistemological advances made by so-called 'southern' (urban) theory. For Leitner et al. (2008, p. 6), 'southern' signifies "those, everywhere, whose livelihoods have been made precarious by geohistorical processes of colonialism and globalizing capitalism." However, as Comaroff and Comaroff (2012c) rightly criticise, "[d]espite the fact that it has replaced 'the third world' as a more-or-less popular usage, the label itself is inherently slippery, inchoate, unfixed" (p. 2). Later, they continue "this is why 'the south' cannot be defined, a priori, in substantive terms. The label bespeaks a relation, not a thing in or for itself. It is a historical artifact, a labile signifier in a grammar of signs whose semiotic content is determined, over time, by everyday material, political and cultural processes, the dialectical products of a global world in motion" (Comaroff & Comaroff 2012a, p. 47, original emphasis). In turn, while I am using the term (for want of a better one) as an important heuristic device throughout this thesis, I have chosen to highlight its interminability and decisively anti-essentialist reading by using it in inverted commas.

As I will show, Cape Town's World Design Capital 2014 process has given rise to both new and refracted imaginaries of urban 'Africa' and also functioned as a site of differential power dynamics. However these have not merely precipitated within the city's

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1 I have chosen to speak about the creative city as a paradigm instead of the commonly used idea of a 'script'. This is in order to refute the common presumption that it has some kind of inherently prescriptive power, as well as to highlight the term's fluidity.
geographical boundaries. What I refer to as the evolving local creative city governance complex is in fact firmly embedded within intersecting global circulations of urban policy knowledge and practice.

As the prolific strand of policy mobilities literature, which has been developing over the past five years, has shrewdly argued, what we perceive of as 'local' urban politics, on closer examination often presents itself as a hotchpotch of inter-scalar knowledge dynamics and emergent governmentailities (McCann & Ward 2011b; Cochrane & Ward 2012; Peck & Theodore 2012; Clarke 2012b; Temenos & McCann 2013; Blanco et al. 2014). Nowadays, urban political arrangements are made up of both interpersonal and inter-organisational relationships that stretch across and beyond city spaces. In turn, "it is necessary to acknowledge the extent to which urban politics, by its very nature, incorporates actors and interests that are often implicitly and explicitly assumed to be located elsewhere" (Cochrane 2011 in McCann & Ward 2011b). Hence, this work is trying to think through the different connections that have permeated Cape Town's 'local' governance regimes, specifically on the back of the World Design Capital 2014 title as a powerful vehicle for mobilising ideas, knowledge, objects and not least people.

Through carefully reconstructing how the malleable ideas of 'creativity' and 'design' are summoned, renegotiated and not least transmogrified in contemporary Cape Town, I propose that we can perceive the city as a fracture zone of prominent creative city logics. This also allows us to speak back to urban theory, firstly to those interested in tracing the variegated 'politics of becoming' associated with (creative) city-making in different locales (Ponzini & Rossi 2010). And secondly to postcolonial urban scholarship, more broadly, in support of its advocacy for a more relational and topological approach to urban research that understands cities as continuously made up of intersecting and potentially conflicting processes of 'worlding' (Roy & Ong 2011).

In turn, the following will be taking the reader through the different episodes of Cape Town's emergent creative-cum-design(er) city nexus by asking:

**How has the idea of a creative city been grounded and rearticulated in postapartheid Cape Town?**
1.1.1.1 State of research and research questions

There is no doubt that the international debate around the creative city is well matured. Urban policymakers worldwide continue to adopt, adapt and transmogrify creative city-type policies and the creative economy has firmly entered the textbooks of global culture-led development and growth imperatives (United Nations 2008, United Nations 2010, United Nations 2013). Nonetheless, while there have been some advances in trying to grapple with the role of cultural and creative industries in so-called developing countries (for example Barrowclough & Kozul-Wright 2008), there remains a veritable dearth of scholarship that looks at how creative city idea(l)s have come to shape urban locales commonly charted under the 'global south' rubric.

However, as the eminent anthropologist AbdouMaliq Simone comments: "[t]here is a growing recognition that cities can effectively operate in the world without having to adhere to a uniform set of prescriptions - either of economic development, governance or the shape of the built environment" (Simone 2010, p. 15). This sentiment has been echoed by numerous other scholars working on African cities, who have vigorously argued that we need to find ways of coming to grips with the "generative potentialities" (Pieterse & Simone 2014, p. 27) of hybrid 'southern' urban modernities on their own terms. For me, this has specifically translated into the need to re-examine the seemingly 'global' hegemony of paradigmatic 'north-western' creative city tropes that has even been assumed by critical scholars (Peck 2005). As some have already argued, one way of taking the local variegation of creative cityness seriously is by acknowledging that it's not a mere whole-sale reception of pre-determined policy packages, but that it is in fact the result of an intricate process of intense multi-scalar engagements (Dzudzek & Lindner 2012, p. 4).

In turn, what I hope to contribute is - to frame it in the words of Homi Bhaba - a more "ex-centric" view (Bhabha 2004, p. 6) on how globally meandering policy idea(l)s such as the creative city are on the one hand grounded and re-assembled in 'southern' cities and on the other hand how local governance regimes and governmental rationales might also be transformed through the ensuing 'politics of becoming'. Thus, the thesis seeks to grapple with the following set of questions in its three parts.
Part I investigates,

1. What are the most conventional urban development tenets that are commonly associated with the creative city label?

2. What are the underlying rationalities and societal shifts that could explain the global rise and persistence of the creative city as allegedly universal urban policy paradigm?

Part II then examines,

3. Given the growing body of postcolonial urban scholarship that urges us to rethink cities not only of but also from the 'global south', how do we need to refract our approach towards the rearticulation of the creative city paradigm in 'southern' locales?

4. In what ways can recent critical advances on practices of 'worlding' and global policy mobilities help us in this endeavour? And what other meta-theoretical approaches do we need to take into account for also being able to consider shifting terrains of urban governance and inter-scalar power dynamics?

Finally, Part III asks,

5. What is the local genealogy of Cape Town's creative city nexus?

6. How has it given rise to and strategically informed the plan of local urban actors to bid for the title of World Design Capital 2014?

7. What kind of urban actor positions, knowledge networks and governmental rationalities have derived from the emergent idea of Cape Town as the 'first African design(er) city'?

8. How have these impacted on and potentially transformed local urban governance discourses and practices?

9. What are the consequences for the city's contemporary politics of contested postapartheid transformation?
1.2 Structure of the thesis

The remainder of the thesis is divided into nine chapters, grouped into the already mentioned three parts. The first part - comprising chapters 2 and 3 - reviews the conventional demeanour ascribed to 'creative' cities and also offers a comprehensive contextualisation of its most common assumptions. Chapter 2 then unravels the major tenets of the popular creative city paradigm in three parts: firstly, it tackles the cultural and creative industry complex, scrutinising how the creative economy has increasingly become a mainstay of urban policy interventions concerning the broader knowledge economy; secondly, it provides a critical examination of Richard Florida's creative class concept, specifically focused on the kind of city that is envisioned as the allegedly 'natural habitat' of this elusive class construct; and thirdly, it also tackles the body of scholarship that has framed 'creativity' in urban governance as the defining feature of a 'creative' city, an angle that has been seldom discussed in comparison to economic and socio-spatial characteristics.

Rounding off the first part, chapter 3 then engages with the expansive critique of creative city logics. The chapter develops a set of three underlying root causes in order to contend with the global pervasiveness of the creative city paradigm and to also offer some rebuttal on popular creative city 'truth claims'. First of all, it proposes that the notion of creativity should be framed as a permeable social dispositif as it has arguably assumed the position of a powerful leitbild of late-modern societal development. This includes the emergence of the Kreativsubjekt as a new form of subjectivation, that is furthermore intimately connected to (neo-)liberal governmentalities and questions of biopower. Secondly, the chapter also explicates some recent dynamics of cultural globalisation and how this has further shifted the focus towards decidedly urban economies. The third root cause for the spread of the creative city as a malleable urban policy paradigm is traced through and found in the burgeoning practice of "city diplomacy" (Acuto 2013). I argue that the creative city as one of the most peripatetic urban development paradigms has been

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2 The word 'creativity' is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as "the ability to create." 'To create', in turn, means "to bring into being; cause to exist; to produce where nothing was before; to form out of nothing."
further mobilised and circulated through different "urban learning assemblages" (McFarlane 2011b, p. 134), which particularly include international urban accolade schemes.

The first part then concludes by arguing that it is critically important to look beyond the creative city as a 'Floridian' incarnation, especially as some alternative readings such as the idea of vernacular creativity have proliferated (Edensor et al. 2009; Gibson et al. 2009). In turn and inspired by postcolonial urban scholarship, I then propose the notion of creative citiness as an antithesis to the errant idea of trying to determine any normative set of features that could define universal creative city-ness.

In the second part, comprising chapter 4, 5 and 6, I present my theoretical framework, provide a more detailed background of Cape Town's past and present urban development trajectories and discuss my methodological approach. Chapter 4 further details the proposed shift from city-ness to citiness in recourse to epistemological advances in literature on so-called 'southern urbanism'. It argues for redirecting our analytical view, away from static and moralistic accounts of how a city 'is' or should 'be' to more relational and process-oriented investigations of how a city and its citizens are continuously embroiled in politics of becoming. For grappling with these divergent politics, I propose a combination of Roy and Ong's (2011) mid-range concept of 'worlding' with recent theoretical advances that urge us to engage in greater detail with global policy mobilities. As 'southern' perspectives on urban theory are also inherently indebted to postcolonial and feminist frameworks, they strongly advocate for a more topological (instead of merely topographical) perspective on power, which I seek to empirically flesh out.

As this in turn requires a theoretical approach that takes into account both macro- and micro-technologies of power, I have turned towards the Foucault-inspired notion of governmentality. I argue that it provides a prolific lens for engaging with the question of how power is produced in and through both, practices of worlding and policy mobilities. This is not least because it allows us to take into account the possibility that power relations might also be stretched across different geographical spaces and institutional scales. Nonetheless, the chapter does not ignore the fact that the notion of governmentality has been initially conceived and further developed against the backdrop of a particular
social order, namely so-called "advanced liberal democracies" (Rose 2006). Thus, it also grapples with the thorny question if African cities can and should be regarded as frontiers of governmentality and how the concept's explanatory acumen might change in relation to doing "urban theory beyond the West" (Edensor & Jayne 2012b).

In turn, the final part of the chapter then problematises the current discussion on what I have called the more-than-neoliberalisation conundrum. It critically discusses the issue that, as contesting neoliberalism has in itself become a kind of 'common-sense' reflex in critical social theory, this has often led to framings of cities in the 'global south' as a kind of "mimicking periphery" (Bunnell 2013, p. 12). While I do by no means want to argue for outrightly abandoning a central locus of our criticality, I agree with the assessment that in its current form, it has tended to obstruct more differentiated accounts of societal complexities and hybrid governmental formations; for example (also in the case of South Africa) the emergence of a "neoliberal-developmental state" (ibid., p. 10).

Chapter 5 then hones in on Cape Town's historic background and deciphers its contemporary socio-economic, spatial, cultural and political dynamics. It starts off with delineating what makes South African cities and particularly Cape Town both an intriguing and important place for critical urban research. Then, it delves into the city's history, in order to relate how different regimes, particularly the vile racist apartheid state, have shaped and continues to influence its urban form. In turn, the chapter also presents insights into more contemporary dynamics, such as Cape Town's persistent polarisation but also its economic growth, not least within the cultural and creative industries sectors. As it is particularly relevant to the research questions at hand, the chapter also examines the basic characteristics and idiosyncrasies of the local developmental state, as well as its implications for Cape Town's increasingly 'stakeholder-based' urban governance realm. This also includes a critical assessment of the Cape Town Partnership, arguably the city's most prominent and omnipresent public-private-partnership vehicle. In sum, the chapter is trying to provide the foundational groundwork to enable readers who are unfamiliar with the city itself, to make out the nuances of my ensuing empirical argument.

The final chapter of this part, Chapter 6, is concerned with presenting my methodological approach, detailing my research process as well as reflecting on my own positionality in the field. Firstly, it introduces the "extended case method" (Burawoy
2009) and argues that it offers a viable way for tracing the messy and concurrent practices of worlding, particularly because it also allows to take into account inter-scalar dimensions of knowledge production. This discussion is then followed by an explication of my research process and the set of methods I applied in the field. As I have focused my inquiry particularly on local governance 'elites', I am also arguing for the importance of considering this often neglected part of the societal spectrum in committed postcolonial scholarship on African cities. Apart from crucial questions of access, rapport and trust with regard to my semi-structured interviews, I also provide details on my experience as a participant observer in different 'sites', including the digital realm in the form of #ethnography. In closing, I also grapple with my own positionality and reflect on how notions of whiteness and privilege have undeniably shaped my research process, material and findings.

The empirical analysis of my qualitative data forms the third part of the thesis in chapters 7 and 8. Chapter 7 first scrutinises the genealogy of Cape Town's creative city nexus and tries to discern some of the most important channels through which the paradigm has become emplaced within the local urban development discourse. Here, it also zeros in on the institutional path-dependencies and emergent 'stakeholder' dynamics that evolved between Cape Town's status as a major host city of the 2010 FIFA World Cup and its bid to become the World Design Capital (WDC) for 2014. A detailed analysis of the bidding process and its aspirational narrative takes up the rest of the chapter. This includes a close reading of the bid book as a powerful 'worlding device' in its own right, as well as an excursus that tackles the implications of the increasingly internet-based forms of participation displayed during the WDC 2014 process. The chapter then concludes with a rich empirical picture of Cape Town's official designation as the WDC 2014, arguing that the award functions as a powerful crucible of "elite dreaming" (Ong 2011b, p. 17), interurban knowledge exchange and new 'stakeholder-based' governance dynamics.

Chapter 8 as the second analysis chapter tries to unravel the speculative politics and governance logics that ensued after Cape Town was announced as the winner. First, it hones in on the different experimental and performative measures taken to consolidate an expansive 'stakeholder'-network and to proliferate a number of new intermediary organisations to manage the accolade. The second part of the chapter then turns towards
scrutinising what I have come to tentatively refer to as Cape Town's emergent design(er) governmentality. Here, I specifically ask how the "idea of design" (Milestone 2007) has become increasingly deployed as an intellectual technology of governance in the wake of the WDC 2014 designation. I enter this discussion through the figures of 'the designer' and 'the design community' respectively, looking at three intermediary 'stakeholder' institutions as places where the idea of design and designer subjectivities have become actualised and negotiated in different ways. These are the annual Design Indaba Conference and Expo, the Cape Town Design Network and the municipality's own World Design Capital 2014 department. In closing, I argue that even though Cape Town's currently dominant 'design(er) city narrative' appears largely defined by notions of ubuntu capitalism and postpolitical pragmatism, there still remain unforeseen possibility spaces that allow for alternative readings to emerge. This is explicated through the controversy, which came to engulf the Fringe - Cape Town's 'first Design and Innovation District'. Here, the 'creative' opposition of the District Six Museum against a lack of consideration for its own 'stakeholdership' in the design of the project has effectively led to a 'de-branding' of the area, in turn providing a telling case of subversive politics and the possibilities of antagonistic pluralism.

Finally, chapter 9 provides the concluding part of the thesis in linking the empirical findings with the theoretical thoughts of the preceding chapters. It discusses the implications of the findings and methodological approach as well as their limitations and

Comment on multimedia content

Given the great amount of moving images produced around the WDC 2014 process, I chose to support my arguments with some of these visual impressions. Hence, where appropriate, I have inserted a reference to the relevant multimedia content that can be accessed through the accompanying DVD.
Part I
Tracing the creative city syndrome
The popular demeanour of a creative city

The main objective of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive review of the copious global policy complex that has been internationally galvanised by the promise of a more creative city. In order to be able to critically engage with its global mobility and specific re-articulation in Cape Town over the course of the next chapters, it is first of all paramount to understand the spectrum of conventional imaginaries, "travelling truths" (Peck 2005, p. 767) and "symptomatic narratives" (Amin & Thrift 2007, p. 157) commonly associated with this label, before proceeding with its scholarly deconstruction. Healey (2012) calls this an "origin narrative"\(^3\), which has to be carefully unravelled before one can move on to investigating the trajectories of movement, i.e. the channels through which ideas, notions and policy fragments have passed, and how these have become adopted and adapted (ibid., pp. 190f).

The popular narrative of the creative city broadly commands three areas of action, which are seldom found on their own but can rather be regarded as building blocks, assembled in various ways and orders during local cultural and urban development policy processes. These three areas are the creative economy complex, the creative class and 'creative' subjectivities, and the idea of fostering greater creativity within city administrations. Nonetheless, as I will show, there is still more to each of the concepts than just the same adjective ('creative') being stuck in front of a different noun (economy, economy).

\(^3\) What will become clear over the course of this chapter though is that the creative city has no singular point of origin but rather draws on multiple sources with the idea being embellished as it was rolled along in a snowball-like fashion.
industry, class, governance, citizenship). In fact, the individual weight of each of those denominators already hints at the breadth of the normative spectrum that spans between the conflicting societal priorities of market and culture, as well as citizenship and consumption within the contemporary dispositif of creativity (Hartley 2005; Reckwitz 2012; Figure 1).

![Figure 1 Creative economy 'values']

Source: Author's own, following Hartley (2005); design E. Gooris.

Chapter 2.1 will focus on unpacking the economic complex of cultural and creative industries (or short: CCI\(^4\)). It starts off with tracing the 'contested history' (Pratt 2009, p. 10) of the terms before considering their political (and politicised) role as a juggernaut in contemporary global urban policy. While the CCI complex is credited as having originated against the backdrop of European urban experiences, 'spreading' from the United Kingdom to the European mainland and - more recently - beyond, chapter 2.2

\(^4\) CCI is used as an umbrella to address both the creative as well as cultural industries. As Pratt (2009) correctly notes, the usage of the precise term has specific political connotations and where this is relevant, I will point out and make use of this distinction.
casts a look across the Atlantic where an equally iridescent and popular notion emerged around the turn of the new millennium: the creative class. In comparison to the genealogy of the CCI, which can be traced back to a select number of powerful institutions (mainly the British DCMS, UNESCO, UNCTAD, and the COMEDIA consultancy), the creative class nexus is indivisibly connected⁵ to a single name: Richard Florida. His book "The Rise of the Creative Class And How it's transforming work, leisure, community and everyday life" (2002) became a bestseller in the United States, and later throughout the world. The book's popularity with city officials and urban planning practitioners was further enhanced through Florida's tireless consultancy and public lecture tours, in which he urged cities to enhance their creative competitiveness in order to rank high on his various urban creativity indexes. As much as Florida and his work have been lauded for their inspirational value, as loud and diverse were the voices of his critics (from left, right and centre) who have questioned his conceptions for both their validity and plausibility (Malanga 2004; Peck 2005; Blakely et al. 2005; Gibson & Kong 2005; Montgomery 2005; Markusen 2006; Wilson & Keil 2008; Hoyman & Faricy 2009; Oakley 2009; Batabyal & Nijkamp 2008; Pratt 2011; Krätke 2010, to name but a few). Some of the critique focuses specifically on dismantling Florida's argument, but more often his concept is used as a stepping stone for raising broader concerns around the creative city as a harbinger of urban neoliberalisation. Thus, I have decided to divide my comprehensive literature review into two parts in order to do justice to the depth and breadth of this capacious critique (see chapter 3).

Although Florida is by far the most (in)famous scholar associated with the creative city, the term was originally coined by British planning consultant Charles Landry in his publication The Creative City – A toolkit for Urban Innovators (2000). Summing up his experience from culture-led urban planning programmes in the UK and specifically the small town of Huddersfield, he extrapolates his findings to inform a broader manifest for creative urban planning practices. In this, he echoes other prominent public planning and organisation scholars, such as Healey (2004), who seek to shake up bureaucratic and

⁵ Though it is pivotal to note that Richard Florida did not 'invent' this notion but that his 'creative class' constitutes an implicit compilation of various other social theory concepts from William Morris' Intellectual Proletariat (1888) to Peter Drucker's Knowledge Workers (1966) and from Jon Katz's Digital Citizens (1997) to Ursula Huw's Cybertariat (2002). For an insightful chronology of these preceding conceptualisations see Barbrook's The class of the new (2006).
generic planning practices through 'creative interventions'. Chapter 2.3 will introduce this often overlooked yet subliminal strand of creative city discourse, as it provides an important background for the following analysis of local governance strategies in Cape Town.

Lastly, the chapter will conclude with a brief outlook on the other side of the state/subject-interface to the makings of 'creative citizenship'. This includes, but is not limited to, the transformation of labour relations and reconfiguration of working environments, the shifting role of the artist and aesthetic work(s), as well as the revaluation and negotiation of citizenship in urban environments dubbed as 'creative'.

"The cultural sector mixes money and value, making money and making sense."  
(O'Connor 2000)

2.1 Creative economy and the cultural and creative industry complex

The cultural and creative industries (CCI) in their various shapes, forms and conceptualisations, are regarded as the central sector of the creative economy, though a considerable terminological confusion persists. Terms like "cultural industries", "content industries", "copyright industries", or "entertainment industries" (Cunningham 2005, p. 284), "intellectual property industries", "knowledge industries", or "information industries" (Garnham 2005, p. 16), as well as "arts and culture industries" (Galloway & Dunlop 2007, p. 17), or simply "cultural" or "creative sector" (O'Connor 2000, p. 17) have been used - often interchangeably. Thus, Mommaas (2009) laments that 'creative' has become "a catch word, a free-for-all term, without much consideration for the complexities and differentiations involved" (p. 52), while Galloway (2007) describes it as a "Russian doll", filled with "terminological clutter" (p. 23, 27), and Pratt (2005) even points out that "it would be difficult to identify a non-creative industry or activity" (p. 33).

Beyond the very tangible irritation and probably irresolvable difficulty of finding an unambiguous term that does not provoke definitional debate, a certain semantic
transition from cultural to creative industries - as the most popular terms in use - can be discerned over the course of the past two decades. Sometimes, 'cultural' and 'creative' industries are still used individually, in order to consciously distinguish between them and highlight the historical evolution from 'traditional' arts and culture institutions and events (such as museums, collections or carnivals), to new media and digital design enterprises (such as advertisement agencies or animation studios). In consequence, some scholars have even resorted back to using the terms in critical opposition to one another to emphasise the competitive shift in policy rationales from local cultural programming to creativity as post-Fordist mode of regional flexible specialisation (Pratt 1997; Garnham 2005; Pratt 2011). What makes the cultural and creative industries such a slippery slope is the fact that their models and concepts have evolved alongside their practical implementation, which means that they have always been simultaneously lived and theorised (Hartley September 2007, p. 12). Thus, it comes as no surprise that the definitional history of the creative and cultural industries (and by extension their studies) has been described as "tortuous and contorted" (Roodhouse 2006, p. 14; Mommaas 2009, p. 51).

Nonetheless, by unravelling some general strands of this intricate and complex debate, I seek to provide some clarification on the CCI's conceptual bearings and commonly associated socio-political rationales. First, I will briefly focus on the important albeit often omitted historic precursors of the terminology, before moving on to some initial conceptualisations of the cultural industries as a public policy tool. Then, I will turn towards contextualising the emergence of a powerful and nowadays often naturalised relationship - the idea of cultural industries as drivers of urban regeneration. And lastly, I will address the eventual transgression from the cultural towards the creative industries at the turn of the new millennium, which in retrospect can be said to have paved the way for the emergence of the creative economy as a "global form" (Prince 2010b, p. 169) in different locales such as Cape Town.

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6 In the breadth of this research, the overall genealogy and diverse theorization of culture - albeit very important - cannot be holistically addressed. However, for an apt analysis of the terms etymology see Throsby (2001) and for a comprehensive assessment of its historical transformation see Reckwitz (2000).
2.1.1 From *Kulturindustrie* to cultural industries

An intriguing fact that is however often tucked away in the footnotes of contemporary research on the cultural and creative industries is that the term was first forged in a critical Marxist academic tradition. Though the commercialisation of cultural production gradually intensified with the transition from feudalism to capitalism from the 19th century onward, it accelerated in industrialising societies. During the 1930s and 1940s, the Frankfurt School, namely Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, used the term *Kulturindustrie* (culture industry) to express their antipathy against the growing totality of mechanical reproduction in standardised mass culture (Adorno & Horkheimer 1997). They lament that "culture now impresses the same stamp on everything" (p. 120), and that the underlying technological rational enshrined in mass production presents the ultimate form of domination. For them, a cultural industry is essentially an entertainment business that uses an arsenal of technologies for mass deception, its disciplinary power nipping any opposition or revolutionary tendencies in the bud. According to Adorno and Horkheimer's *Kulturkritik*, one such problematic technology of deception and normalisation was advertisement, spawned by the popularisation of radio and television. They wrote: "The most intimate reactions of human beings have been so thoroughly reified that the idea of anything specific to themselves now persists only as an utterly abstract notion: personality scarcely signifies anything more than shining white teeth and freedom from body odor and emotions" (ibid., p. 166). Thus, the *Kulturindustrie* is not only an effect of power, but constitutes a stabilising hegemonic force in its own right, ostensibly chipping away at the population's ability to think critically (Lange 2007, p. 76). In consequence, culture as industry for the Frankfurt School constituted the very core of alienation and undemocratic public delusion.

However, especially in the counter-culture movement of the late 1960s and in the wake of an increasing awareness of the political economy of culture, Adorno and Horkheimer's proposition of the demise of autonomous arts and culture and their transformation into a pre-programmed and singular 'industry' came under critical scrutiny. Their take on materialism was at the same time critiqued as being an over- as well as an understatement; While culture was regarded as being completely reducible to capitalistic needs, no further details were provided on how it was actually produced and by whom (Garnham 1990; O'Connor 2007).
It is interesting to note that although this terminological rootedness in critical theory is widely acknowledged in earlier scholarly engagements with the CCI (but for obvious reasons remains largely absent in policy guidelines and documents), it often appears rather detached, making it seem to hold little further meaning for the contemporary purchase of the cultural and creative economy. O'Connor (2000) even goes as far as to caution us: "When we hear the word cultural industries we should not automatically reach for our Adorno" (O'Connor 2000, p. 20). It is undeniable that Adorno's and Horkheimer's critical eulogy to culture is in many parts polemic, cynical and outright fatalistic, and thus has been rightfully critiqued for its simplistic and reductionist take on culture and society at large.

However, I argue that this should not lead us to forget how pertinent their underlying ethos of critical social inquiry is in thinking about the contemporary socio-political purchase of the CCI complex and the construct of the creative city narrative at large. After all, proponents of the Frankfurt School were amongst the first to observe the intimate connection between culture, city dwelling and the "aestheticisation of politics" (Benjamin 1936, p. 65). Thus, their thoughts have – both implicitly and explicitly – acted as a canvas for more contemporary critiques of cultural commodification\(^7\) in the symbolic economy, from which my own empirical analysis in part III has also taken its cue (see for example Zukin 1989; Lash & Urry 1994; Zukin 1995; Scott 2000; Peck 2005).

\subsection{The political economy of culture and the cultural industries}

The Frankfurt School's damning critique of popular culture reverberated for a considerable amount of time, especially after Europe's shocking experiences with mass propaganda in the wake of the Second World War inevitably drove home some of their key arguments. Thus when the culture industry approach resurfaced in the late 1960s it again followed a critical trajectory, this time brought forward by the Situationist International. If the Frankfurt School's outlook on culture was already grim, the Situationist movement took cultural 'doom and gloom' to the next level. Though largely taking their cue from Adorno and Horkheimer, the Situationists' interpretation

\footnote{Also, it reminds us that at the heart of culture as commodity, there remains a persistent tension between its exchange and use value (O'Connor 2007, p. 23).}
emphasised the commodification of culture as a three-pronged process of unification, trivialisation, and homogenisation of time and space (Gotham & Krier 2008, p. 170).

The importance of spatial registers in the production, commodification and consumption of culture was enshrined in their notion of "unitary urbanism", a term they used for describing the vehicles of consumer culture such as mass suburbanisation, shopping malls and car-dependency in post-WWII societies, and their rise at the expense of authentic local culture (ibid., p. 171). The French intellectual Guy Debord concisely formulated these points in his "Society of the Spectacle" (1967), coining a term which is still widely used in discourses on urban (mega-)events (see chapters 3.3 & 4.2.2). Though similar critiques as the ones levelled against the Frankfurt School have been brought forward against the Situationist International, even from otherwise sympathetic leftist circles, Debord's early predictions on the transformation of how we understand culture in the 21st century is nonetheless uncanny: "When culture becomes nothing more than a commodity, it must also become the star commodity of the spectacular society. [...] in the second half of this century culture will be the driving force in the development of the economy, a role played by the automobile in the first half of this century, and by railroads in the second half of the previous century" (Debord 1983, p. 193). Notwithstanding this accurate assessment, scholars have pointed out that this should not preclude the possibility for cultural resilience and progressive creativity in local contexts (Scott 2000, p. 15; Hartley 2005, p. 12).

Apart from a rejuvenation of the Frankfurt School's Kulturindustrie within a 'spectacular society', the culture industries also gained momentum in economic policy circles. The international recognition and growing influence of (largely American) entertainment heavyweights such as Hollywood's film studios (like MGM or Disney) and global record companies (like Universal and Capitol Records) demanded new analytical categories. Moreover, the cultural economy was increasingly recognised by economists who saw it less as a publicly sponsored but rather as a tradable good, with "corporate lobbyists, pro-competition academics and 'liberalizing' policy-makers unleash[ing] a series of waves of marketization on the media and communications sectors" (Hesmondhalgh & Pratt 2005, p. 5).

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8 In addition, the increased popular usage of the term also concurred with a large ground shift in academic inquiry, known as the 'cultural turn': "Social cohesion was now explained in terms of shared belief systems; social domination in terms of cultural hegemony and social struggles were seen not as struggles over economic power and material distribution, but as struggles between sub-cultures and identity groups for recognition and legitimation" (Garnham 2005, pp. 17f).
Thus, stripped of much of its Marxist pedigree, the cultural industry took to the stage once more in the 1970s and 80s (Hartley 2005, p. 14). In the beginning, the term cultural industry was predominantly used to accommodate new media and information technology sectors. By the early 1980s, a wider empirical understanding of the complex structure and variegated dynamics of cultural production within the massively evolving post-Fordist networks of communication, production and distribution had been reached. To honour this increased conceptual grasp, the cultural industry multiplied into the cultural industries (Hesmondhalgh 2007, pp. 15f).

Nonetheless, already in its advent days, defining the cultural industries presented a thorny undertaking and was met with suspicion, as Hesmondhalgh (2005) describes: "Some have argued, on the basis of the flexibility of the term 'culture', that it is useless to talk of the cultural industries at all. Others have implied it by arguing that all industries are cultural industries because all industries are involved in the production of goods and services that become part of the web of meanings and symbols we know as culture. This is to stretch the concept beyond breaking point" (Hesmondhalgh & Pratt 2005, p. 6). In order to not throw the baby out with its the bath water, he and others (ibid., p.11; Hirsch 2000; Power 2004) suggest that the cultural industries' main characteristic lies in the symbolic, aesthetic and artistic nature of their output, and that the boundaries between cultural and 'non-cultural' production will always remain porous, provisional and relative.

Concurring with this perception and in lieu of a definition, O'Connor (2000) describes the cultural industries as "those activities which deal primarily in symbolic goods – goods whose primary economic value is derived from their cultural value. [...] This definition then includes what have been called the 'classical' cultural industries – broadcast media, film, publishing, recorded music, design, architecture, new media – and the 'traditional arts' – visual art, crafts, theatre, music theatre, concerts and performance, literature, museums and galleries [...]" (O'Connor 2000, p. 18). In this way, the cultural industries were also able to accommodate hybrid business models of the New Economy, i.e. those businesses whose scale and commitment resembled that of a typical arts company but sported an "ethos of commercial practice – wealth creation and meeting their markets" (Cunningham 2002, p. 63). In consequence, the cultural industries gained significant traction in the public administration realm, firstly by putting the social and economic benefits of creativity onto the policy agenda, and secondly in providing a gateway for the application of neoclassical economics to the arts (ibid., p. 60).
While the cultural industries were to become particularly prominent in connection with national cultural policy reform, especially in the UK, the first significant attempt of crafting applicable policy instruments to address them took place on a supranational level. In 1982, recognising an "industrial revolution in culture", the UNESCO convened an international conference to thrash out the benefits of cultural industries for global socio-economic development. In the conference's proceedings, it published what was effectively one of the first political definitions:\footnote{9} "Cultural Industries are defined as those industries which produce tangible or intangible artistic and creative outputs, and which have a potential for wealth creation and income generation through the exploitation of cultural assets and production of knowledge-based goods and services (both traditional and contemporary). What cultural industries have in common is that they all use creativity, cultural knowledge, and intellectual property to produce products and services with social and cultural meaning. The cultural industries include: advertising; architecture; crafts; designer furniture; fashion clothing; film, video and other audiovisual production; graphic design; educational and leisure software; live and recorded music; performing arts and entertainment; television, radio and internet broadcasting; visual arts and antiques; and writing and publishing" (Girard 1982, p. 19).

This baseline definition is still applied within today's UN Creative Economy Reports (United Nations 2008, 2010, 2013) and as these reports have played a key role in actively promoting the cultural and creative industries as a governance tool for socio-economic development in so-called developing countries such as South Africa, the definition has also become widely circulated.

Although by the beginning of the 1980s the cultural industries were increasingly debated in Europe, not least in connection to a dynamic cultural public sphere that sought to protect its national cultural heritage against a suspected Americanisation (especially in France's 'exception culturelle'), the term had virtually no purchase in the United States' deregulated cultural and economic policy discourse "where the marketplace and consumer rule[d]" alongside a locus of individual creativity (Cunningham 2002, p. 55; Uricchio 2004 in Galloway & Dunlop 2007, p. 82).

In spite of the US's paramount role in producing and disseminating creative and cultural content (most notably through Hollywood's film and media machinery), the

\footnote{9} The UN-system is no exception when it comes to terminological confusion and lack of clarity. UNESCO's definition of the cultural industries forms the ideological cornerstone of the UN's creative economy definition from the late 2000s (see United Nations 2008, 2010) Though UNCTAD is championing the term creative industries, UNESCO with its focus on heritage and traditional cultures still uses the cultural industries label for its programmes.
history of the cultural industries as a deliberate target of governance remained a distinctly European one well into the 1990s. More specifically, the United Kingdom had pioneered the concept, and later also acted as the 'frontier state' regarding the conceptual transition from cultural to creative industries. Political awareness for cultural industries was first raised by the Labour-controlled Greater London Council in the 1980s (Roodhouse 2006, p. 16). However, as the Labour government was a rather conservative advocate of traditional elite culture, it regarded the concept mostly as a civilising tool against commercial mass culture (Black 2006, p. 137). Thus, as Tony Blair's 'New Labour' campaign\(^\text{10}\) sought to distance itself from sclerotic 'Old Labour' policies that had brought the party into severe disrepute, he also embarked on a quest to review his party's approach to cultural affairs. With the rise of pop culture dissolving the boundaries between so called 'high' and 'low' culture, public cultural institutions and the creative arts at large were no longer regarded solely as a source of expenditure but as source of income: "Wrapping itself in the entrepreneurial veneer of the cultural industries, New Labour chilled to 'Cool Britannia', surfed the IT heat of the knowledge economy and sought to re-brand Britain as 'the creative workshop of the world'" (ibid., p. 137). However, soon after 'New' Labour's landslide victory in 1997, Blair altered his terminology from cultural to creative industries, accompanied by strong research and policy advocacy channelled through his Department of Culture, Media and Sport (henceforth DCMS). What were the reasons for this important terminological shift?

That it was not merely semantic but carried a more strategic rationale becomes evident when looking at the critique that had been levelled against the concept of the cultural industries. For Cunningham (2002), cultural industry policy had simply become a victim of its own success, because even though the cultural industries were lauded for taking 'industry' into the direction of 'culture', they were increasingly deemed unfit for the emerging knowledge economy's demands of taking 'culture' into the direction of 'industry'. In other words, the biggest obstacle for the cultural industries was their inherent division between autonomous arts and commerce, a distinction which O'Connor (2007) deems more of an ideological construct than an actual analytical reality (O'Connor 2007, p. 18). For many, this "museum paradigm" (Venturelli 2005, p. 395) in cultural policy felt

\(^{10}\) Black (2006) points out that 'New Labour' also made extensive use of services provided through the cultural consultancy DEMOS, which was also instrumental in publishing Charles Landry's seminal book "The Creative City" (2000) (p. 139).
too restrictive and protectionist for meeting the economic imperative at the breaking dawn of the global information age, that demanded embracing globalisation and free trade, as well as fostering "creative explosion and innovation in all areas of the arts and sciences" (ibid., p. 396). After all, the hype predicted nothing less than for the newly-forged creative industries to "produce the 'gold' of the information economy" (ibid., p. 392). In consequence, if nations were to 'mine' this ostensibly infinite resource, they needed to recognise that arts and culture were now living in the realm of commerce - and vice versa! In South Africa, this rhetoric has been most prominently reiterated in the national government's 2011 *Mzansi's Golden Economy Strategy*, which connected arts, culture and heritage to the country's New Growth Path policy (Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology 2011).

At this point, I want to however leave national policy scale in order to turn towards a second, equally if not more fundamental factor for the rise of the creative city paradigm - the role of cultural and creative industries within projects of late-modern urban renaissance.

### 2.1.2 Cultural industries and urban regeneration

Though the contemporary urban development and cultural policy discourse across the globe predominantly leans towards the *creative industries* as the conceptual denominator, the term did not materialise out of thin air, but grew "on the back of nearly 20 years of localised strategic development in the uses of *culture*, often in the guise of the *cultural industries*, in the context of urban regeneration" (Taylor 2009, p. 154, original emphasis). Place, culture and economy have always been at their most symbiotic in cities, in turn making them the primary spaces for capitalising on the deriving synergies (Scott 1997, p. 325). Cultural industries - from large international media conglomerates to individual "culturepreneurs" (Lange 2007) - were seen as catalysts for transforming a city's cultural landscape. As O'Connor (2007, p. 19) describes it, "[...] galleries, bands, record companies, labels, bars, artists, restaurants, clubs, performances, independent marketing, flyers, designers, independent retail, fixers, 

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11 It is important to recognise that this was neither a one-way road nor a top-down decree but that from the late 1980s, representatives of the creative arts (such as visual artists, musicians etc.) were effectively lobbying to be included into the cultural industries: "The arts sector began to develop arguments about managerial efficiency and economic benefits in terms of employment, tourism and image enhancement" (O'Connor 2007, p. 32).
chancers, new media people” were all part of an initial interface between cultural industries and local policy makers within urban regeneration efforts.

In her\(^\text{12}\) ever more timely accounts *Loft Living* (1989) and *The Cultures of Cities* (1995), American urban sociologist Sharon Zukin shows how cultural attractiveness was incorporated into market- and state-led responses, aimed at countering the urban decay left behind by inner-city disinvestment, de-industrialisation, and urban flight as direct consequences of the 1970s oil crisis (Taylor 2009, p. 155). During her in-depth research in New York's SoHo and TriBeCa areas, Zukin became especially aware of the newly forged kinship between artists and property development within an emergent symbolic economy of place-making. She noted: “As both site and symbol, the artist's loft serves a purpose in a world city\(^\text{13}\) of a new type: the capital of banking, finance, and arts markets. In this sense it is not surprising that declining manufacturing centres like New York have hailed artists as an ‘industry’” (Zukin 1989, p. 112). Even in those early days of urban renewal and re-urbanisation - a process that would only expand and accelerate globally over the following two decades - the ‘industrialisation’ of culture as an available and growing capital (especially in times of no growth) was already clearly visible.

An ever-widening range of economic activity appeared to be concerned, in one way or another, with producing and marketing aesthetic and symbolic goods and services to an emerging group of culture- and place-conscious consumers (Lash & Urry 1994). In turn, it was rightly predicted that in the dawning 21st century, sectors engaged in the production of cultural-creative goods and services would constitute "some of the most dynamic economic frontiers of capitalism" (Scott 1997, p. 324). Thus, from the 1980s onward, the cultural economy moved steadily into the focus of city administrators and urban scholars alike - from the United States across European\(^\text{14}\) capitals (Du Gay 2006),

\(^{12}\) In order to acknowledge the pertinent critique of feminist and queer scholars levelled against the sexist and heteronormative bias in mainstream academic writing, I have sought to apply gender-neutral language wherever possible, with the exception of direct references to public personas and respondents I have personally interviewed.

\(^{13}\) The discussion about so called ‘world’ and ‘global’ cities and their socioeconomic efficacy is of course intrinsically linked to the rise of the cultural economy, culture-led urban regeneration and gentrification as various scholars have already pointed out (Yeoh 2005; Atkinson & Bridge 2005; McDonald 2008; Lees 2012).

\(^{14}\) The EU’s Structural Development Funds did their bit in turning culture into an urban currency by funding cultural neighbourhood interventions (see for example INTERREG IVC program on ‘Creative Metropoles’) and inaugurating the European Capital of Culture accolade in 1985.
and - since the new millennium - further towards cities of the 'global south' (see chapter 5.3).

What generated further attention for the cultural economies of cities\(^1\) was the productive tension between culture as distinctly place-bound and local, and its new ability to become extrapolated and disseminated through global networks - a possibility earned by means of new media technologies, globalised trade, and communications. An economic planning theory that promised to straddle this conundrum of scale and in turn has become a 'fellow traveller' of many "urban-regeneration-through-cultural-districts project[s]" (Mommaas 2009, p. 48), is Michael Porter's cluster theory. Though arguing that traditional reasons for spatial clustering had diminished since the advent of globalisation, the American economist (Porter 2000, 2005) emphasised - based on Schumpeterian innovation economics - that co-location still constituted a competitive advantage, especially for the internationally coveted knowledge-based industries. Porter's cluster theory received wide-spread international attention because it was able to strategically connect the emerging *cultural turn* in urban governance with existing regional development models by merging them into a cultural-industrial\(^2\) policy complex (Mommaas 2009, p. 53). Even UNESCO, generally rather cautious towards the wholesale adoption of trendy economic growth models, celebrated cultural and creative clusters as an enabler of regional innovation, a vehicle for catapulting local cultural output into the global marketplace and, overall, as "a driver of development, able to penetrate even the most entrenched pockets of poverty" (UNESCO 20.11.2006).

Noting this high level of political compatibility between Porter's regional innovation theories and the rise of the creative city paradigm is particularly important considering that cluster theories 'a la Porter' have also come to constitute "a big fashion" (Interview Elk 21.11.2012) in Cape Town's local economic development circles (also Rogerson 2008). Numerous of my interview respondents have evoked his ideas on sectoral industry clusters and regional innovation policies as the basic tenets of their urban development politics in general and their support for the *Fringe Design and Innovation*

\(^1\) This is also the title of Scott's (2000) seminal book on the topic.

\(^2\) Though Mommaas (2009) also remarks, that the intricate and subtle relationships characterizing the cultural sphere were in many instances ignored, as cultural clusters became more and more treated as just another variation of general industrial development logic (p. 53).
precinct in particular (Interview Kolala 30.11.2010; Minty 05.01.2011; see also chapter 8.2.5).

However, in the beginning of the 1990s - in a time when South African cities in general were just starting their troublesome transition from apartheid towards democratic rule - the West European context had already provided plenty of opportunities for putting cultural policy firmly on the urban development agenda: On the one hand, rampant de-industrialisation\(^ {17} \) resulted in a plethora of large-scale, post-industrial vacancies, with their maintenance costs putting further financial strain on already cash-strapped regions. On the other hand, a decline in working time and a significant increase in leisure spending resulted in a growing, more sophisticated and differentiated public demand for cultural offerings (Bianchini & Parkinson 1993, p. 1). However, a review of earlier cultural 'flagship'-projects and public private partnerships across the diversity of Europe's cultural place-making traditions showed that the role of culture in urban regeneration lay less in the creation of wealth and employment and more within the construction of positive urban images, tourism development, and strengthening competitiveness for increased inward investment (ibid., p. 2). At the same time, urban cultural policy was also regarded as a lever for unlocking a possibility space for reclaiming the democratic public domain and enhancing public social life beyond mere lifestyle economy parameters (Bianchini 1993, p. 200).

This hope strongly resonates in the six strategic principles that were said to have guided culture-led regeneration projects until the mid-1990s:

1. A concern with making traditional cultural institutions, such as museums, more accessible to the wider public, and fostering their involvement in local community;
2. An expanded support programme for community arts, ethnic minority cultures, and socially and culturally deprived neighbourhoods (what would later morph into urban 'diversity management' strategies);

\(^{17}\) De-industrialisation processes are by no means exclusive to late-modern cities of the global North but have also occurred in South Africa after 1994 (Rogerson 2000; Nel 2001). In Cape Town for example, the demise of large-scale clothing and textile manufacturers in the early 2000s due to import deregulation has also left behind a large industrial building stock, which has been the target of considerable culture-led urban regeneration and gentrification dynamics since 2006 (Wenz 2012).
3. An intensified focus on cultural production facilities such as studios and marketing support organisations within the planning of 'cultural districts';

4. A revision of cultural policies in order to include new technology sectors and provide greater exposure for popular culture;

5. Recognition for the role of arts in urban renaissance, typically involving 'flagship' development projects for arts centres and concert halls in decaying inner-city areas, and

6. Investment in high-profile events and festivals linked to local heritage, to encourage cultural tourism (Bassett 1993 cited in Taylor 2009, p. 155)

That these propositions were often connected to competing and contradictory interests of vastly opposing stakeholders groups, and are thus hard to reconcile within an urban development agenda, will be further exemplified in chapter 3. At this point I just want to mention that particularly the last two propositions - a focus on often costly 'flagship' infrastructure and urban festivalisation through the staging of mega-events - would soon after draw a significant amount of public and academic criticism, as both tended to displace the same cultural industries (in their traditional meaning of small-scale and heritage-focused), that they once supported as engines of 'organic' urban regeneration (see for example Guy et al. 2002; Evans 2005; Barnes et al. 2006; Evans 2009; Fuller 2012). In consequence, as widely noted in the literature, the issue of gentrification frequently 'travels' alongside the implementation of creative city strategies (Ley 2003; Markusen 2006; Oakley 2009; Lees 2012). Thus, the issue of what has been aptly called the creative or "artistic precariat" (McRobbie 2009; Bain & McLean 2013) as well as the residual resistance of some 'creatives' against becoming co-opted by neoliberal urban management techniques, will be taken up again in chapter 3.

All of this however continues to emphasise the important point that the development of the cultural and creative industries is inherently sensitive to, and greatly reliant on, space and place. This might also serve as an explanation as to why it is especially the urban scale that nowadays dominates the realm of policy responses; after all, by 2009, over 80 cities and city-regions worldwide had already produced a total of 235 policies and plans specifically geared towards growing their respective creative
economies, with much suggesting that this growth continues rather unabated (Evans 2009, p. 1010).

In sum, I argue that the lineages of the creative city narrative can be traced back to a dispersed array of comparatively incremental and discrete cultural industry developments. Over time, these became increasingly recognised and consolidated as urban policy tools through the formalisation of culture-led regeneration strategies and local innovation clusters. Though nowadays these still represent key instruments of creative city making not least in Cape Town (see chapters 7 & 8.2.5), the next section will show how the discursive transition from cultural to creative industries provided the final push needed to kick the creative imperative into full throttle.

2.1.3 From cultural to creative industries

As mentioned above, the UK turned from a use of cultural industries during New Labour's election campaign to the creative industries after their victory in 1997. According to Garnham (2005, p. 15), there was a general understanding that this was not merely a swap of labels, but went along with a larger shift in theoretical and political stakes. 'Cool Britannia' was the slogan of the day and Brit Pop (short for British Popular culture) was celebrated, from fashion designers like Vivienne Westwood to the notorious Young British Artists' collective and local music groups such as Blur and the Spice Girls (Oakley 2004). Whereas the notion of cultural industries as previously described was more prone towards egalitarian ideas of heritage, traditional knowledge and artistic elements of creativity, the creative industries now clearly placed the focus on individual creativity and its applicability within the hybrid 'New Economy' context (see Table 1).

If the push for cultural industries was already moving towards the collusion of the 'high', creative arts with digital media, corporate communication and scientific invention, then advocating for creative industries meant to officially bless this alliance. Furthermore, Garnham (2005, p. 16) reminds us that the creative industries were drawing their ideological power from the prestige and economic impetus ascribed to the rise of the information society at the dawn of the new millennium. In turn, the traditional notion of state-sponsored culture has to a certain extent fallen into disrepute and was regarded by many as elitist and exclusive. The immediate connection between popularised cultural
expression and creative industries alongside the World Wide Web revolution that promised to make knowledge and information available to everybody anywhere, had led to 'creativity' being embraced as more democratic and inclusive (Hesmondhalgh & Pratt 2005, p. 5; Galloway & Dunlop 2007, p. 18). The creative industries thus benefited from "the fuzziness of the boundaries between […] freedom and comfort, public and private, state-owned and commercial, citizen and consumer, the political and the personal" (Hartley 2005, p. 18).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Creative Industries</th>
<th>Cultural Industries</th>
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<tr>
<td>Global/local</td>
<td>Nation State</td>
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<tr>
<td>Digital</td>
<td>Analogue</td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;New economy&quot; economics</td>
<td>Neoclassical economics applied to the arts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMEs in 'flotilla-mothership formation'</td>
<td>Relabeling large, established popular industries as 'cultural'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergent sectors and inputs into wider service economy</td>
<td>Established sectors</td>
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Source: Cunningham 2005, p. 285; adapted LW

It is nowadays commonly accepted that the term creative industries was officially coined by the British Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) in their first "Creative Industry Mapping Document", published in 1998 and repeated in 2001. Their definition has remained largely unchanged and has been widely adopted as a baseline for similar research and policy programmes conducted by international organisations, countries and cities worldwide (Rosselló & Wright 2010, p. 18). For the DCMS, "[t]he creative industries are those industries that are based on individual creativity, skill and talent. They are also those that have the potential to create wealth and jobs through developing intellectual property. The creative industries include: Advertising, Architecture, Art and antiques markets, Crafts, Design, Designer fashion, Film and video, Interactive Leisure software, Music, Performing arts, Publishing, Software and Computer Services, Television and radio (see Department for Culture 1998, 2001). Though all the sectors were marked by a split between large multinational corporations alongside many small and

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18 This was also accompanied by "the acceptance amongst neo-liberal conservatives and the postmodernist left that the commodification of culture was not something that could any longer be 'resisted' through arts subsidies and other traditional forms of cultural policy" Hesmondhalgh & Pratt 2005, p. 5.
medium-sized enterprises, the study calculated that the creative industries nonetheless accounted for almost a million jobs, 4% overall GDP and £7.5 billion export earnings\(^19\) in the UK (Rosselló & Wright 2010, p. 15).

In the debate unfolding over the following years, there was nonetheless an increasing realisation of the fact that the creative industries could hardly be assessed in isolation, as they were deemed to have much wider socioeconomic effects: Firstly, they added value to other industries, for example through design and branding; Secondly, they formed part of the broader 'knowledge economy' as they employed highly skilled and educated people, thereby pulling them closer to research and tertiary institutions; Thirdly, they contributed to the regeneration of urban environments and were said to accelerate community building by creating shared experiences (ibid., p. 18). This also encouraged the perception that the creative industries were not to be seen as an industry per se, but formed one element of a broader economic innovation system (Potts & Cunningham 2008, p. 243). In consequence, from 2008, the British government adopted and used the term creative economy, to honour these added dimensions (ibid., p. 17).

Whereas the cultural industries had to scramble for public attention beyond Arts and Culture departments, the creative industries received broad-based governmental endorsement. The term also became well-used in the private and third sectors as a political shorthand that assumed a common understanding of the creative industry sectors and the idea that their support would ensure competitive advantage in business and society (Garnham 2005, p. 16; Taylor 2009). "The creative industries have moved from the fringes to the mainstream", announced former Culture Secretary Chris Smith in his foreword to the UK's second Creative Industries Mapping Document, "[t]he most successful economies and societies of the twenty-first century will be creative ones. Creativity will make the difference – to businesses seeking a competitive edge, to societies looking for new ways to tackle issues and improve the quality of life ... I want all businesses to think creatively, to realise creativity is not an add-on but an essential ingredient for success" (Department for Culture 2001, p. 3). In retrospect, Smith's statement needs to be regarded as nothing less than exemplary for the way in which creativity has since become increasingly promoted as the imperative and seemingly universal leitbild of societal

\(^{19}\) The updated figures from 2012 record an overall upward trend with 1.68 million creative industry employees, £71.4 billion Gross Value Added and 5.2% GDP contribution in the UK (Department for Culture January 2014)
development in the 21st century (see further chapter 3.2). Furthermore and importantly for the argument of the creative city's global mobility, the UK made sure that word about its new policy innovation was put out into the world from an early stage, mainly through the British Council's Creative Industries (later: Creative Economy) Unit, founded in 1999 (Rosselló & Wright 2010, p. 19). Due to its colonial history, South Africa also maintains strong ties to the British Council and particularly the Gauteng region has explicitly drawn on its Creative Industry mapping methodology (Wits University & Joffe 2008, see also chapter 7.1).

In conclusion, what this section has shown is that the creative economy has become a popular field of governmental intervention that can be traced back to a number of models, programmes and policy responses (of which I was only able to reference the most popular ones). However, as Hartley has aptly inferred, "[a] peculiarity of evolution in the cultural field is that extinction does not occur. Ideas hang around, often for centuries" (Hartley September 2007, p. 9). In other words, even though creative industries in their current discursive form only emerged in the mid-1990s, their antecedents linger - either as alternatives or even as adversaries (ibid.). This 'sideways' development of the CCI field also explains why the various models, sector definitions, flow-charts, and policy programmes cannot be regarded as a clear-cut progression.

Rather, various readings continue to (co-)exist across a variety of public domains and thus mean different things to different people at different points in time and in different places (Hartley September 2007, p. 6; O'Connor 2000). Nonetheless, in explicating this conceptual fuzziness, I tried to trace the general lineages of the CCI-complex and the creative economy at large. From its early roots in the critical realm of the Frankfurt School's cultural scepticism, the CCIs have since evolved into a "global form" (Prince 2010b, p. 169) that is normatively understood as good, innovative and valuable to both the development of the individual and society at large. They represent a part of the prominent knowledge-based economy, often alongside new emerging work and lifestyle practices that are in turn accompanied by transformed needs for space and modes of sociocultural interaction (see also chapter 2.2).

While up to this point my conceptual review has focused primarily on the European context (and specifically the British experience), it is pivotal to note that the
creative economy approach shows distinct geographical variation. After all, the notion of creativity has also captured the imagination of business people and policy-makers across the Atlantic round about the same time. Whereas the European context is shaped by diverse traditions of national arts development and cultural citizenship, as described above in the evolution of the cultural industries, interpretations of creativity in the US have always presented themselves as more market-driven and consumer-friendly.

Though the first US renditions on the creative economy were published in the form of Richard Cave's Creative Industries - Contracts between Art and Commerce (2001), to be followed shortly after by John Howkins' business management guide The Creative Economy - How People Make Money from Ideas (2002), both books were greatly eclipsed by the impact and resonance of Richard Florida's The Rise of the Creative Class (2002). In it, the author enlivens the creative economy trope with emergent entrepreneurial subjectivities and urban lifestyle imaginaries of the nascent 21st century, thus providing a compelling yet erroneous narrative that I will turn to in the following section.

However, as a final caveat, it needs to be kept in mind that many so-called emerging-market societies such as South Africa tend to be susceptible to both US-American and European socio-political idea(l)s, interlacing them with their own policy goals. Hence, public understandings of the creative economy in 'developmental' state spaces often reflect a rather hybrid mix, deriving from trying to straddle the antagonistic rifts between market and citizenship, consumer and culture that make up the contemporary dispositif of creativity (see Figure 1; also chapter 3.1).
2.2 The creative class or: a man on a mission

Whereas the previously discussed CCI complex has had a rather diverse conceptual upbringing, the opposite holds true for the creative class proposition. While there is certainly great agreement on the fact that scholarship thrives the most in heated and controversial debates, there have been few propositions that have polarised opinions across the globe as relentlessly as Richard Florida's *The Rise of the Creative Class: And How it is Transforming Work, Leisure, Community and Everyday Life* (2002). This American geographer has by now reached a celebrity status far beyond his original discipline and has ascended to become one of the most internationally renowned and (in)famous public intellectuals of urban, cultural and economic affairs. As the general goal of this chapter is to introduce what has commonly been conceived as making up the canon of creative city making, this section first outlines the basic elements of Florida's influential creative class concept, his key hypotheses and research findings. The second part provides a first overview of responses and reactions to Florida's conceptualisations, while a more elaborate critical engagement with their consequences will be undertaken in chapter 3.

As an economic geographer, Florida - like many others - has been concerned with "isolating the germ cells of economic growth" (Brown 2010, p. 119) for many years. Based on quantitative regression analyses conducted across 276 US Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs), he created a variety of indexes that ranked these city-regions according to different variables that for Florida and his team indicated creativity and conduciveness to their creative class. His hypotheses worked on the assumption that "[p]aradigm-busting creative industries could single-handedly change the way cities flourish while driving dynamic and widespread economic change" (Florida 2002c, pp. 1f). Or, as the renowned economist Ed Glaeser aptly put it in his review of Florida's oeuvre:

"Florida's basic thesis is that the economy is transforming, and creativity is to the 21st century what the ability to push a plough was to the 18th century" (Glaeser 2005). And indeed, one of Florida's key
propositions is the universality of human creativity as an ostensibly all-inclusive asset that exceeds even technology or information in its ability to produce economic growth (Florida 2002c, p. 26).

However, though creativity as human ingenuity is inferred as infinite, its availability is far from ubiquitous. The "Creative Age" (p. 26), as Florida argues with missionary zeal, goes along with a "new global competition for talent" (p. 3). And the winners of this economic race will be those "creative centres" able to retain a high number of creative-class individuals, as Florida solves the job/growth causality conundrum by proposing that companies follow their prospective employees "- or in many cases, are started by them" (Florida 2003, pp. 8f).

Institutional sclerosis or rather the reluctance of city administrations to act and 'think business' is identified as the biggest hindrance to city growth: "More and more businesses [...] are making the adaptations necessary to attract and retain creative class employees - everything from relaxed dress codes, flexible schedules, and new work rules in the office to hiring recruiters who throw Frisbees. Most civic leaders, however, have failed to understand that what is true for corporations is also true for cities and regions: Places that succeed in attracting and retaining creative class people prosper; those that fail don't" (Florida May 2002).

Growing this entrepreneurial ethos supposedly requires an integrated community 'ecosystem' with "abundant high-quality experiences, an openness to diversity of all kinds, and, above all else, the opportunity to validate their identities as creative people" (ibid.). Though his concept initially seems to repeat a previously existing emphasis on human capital, he sees his argument amending its hypothesis in two regards: Firstly, it specifically identified creative practitioners as the key to economic growth. Secondly - and most important for my urban geographic argument at hand - it also linked creative capital accumulation to certain locational qualities, thus speaking directly against other popular economic theories building on footloose industries and the death of distance (Florida 2003, p. 8; Cairncross 1997). While economic mobility was certainly accelerated through rapid globalisation, place according to Florida continued to matter; however no longer on the basis of natural resources and transportation, but as access to talented

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20 Also referred to as the 'chicken-and-egg' problematic, the question if jobs follow people or people follow jobs continues to be one of the most fundamental debates in economic geography, with avid supporters on both sides of the spectrum.
knowledge workers as well as quirky yet appealing public amenities (Reese et al. 2010, p. 347)

In this way, Florida was able to fuse largely aspatial human capital theories with new economic geography paradigms, such as Michael Porter's ideas on the benefits of clustering and co-location, and Pine and Gilmore's experience economy (Porter 2000; Florida 2003; Pine & Gilmore 2011). Florida's focus on cities stems from the idea that opportunity costs of knowledge transfer are reduced through spatial proximity, allowing for new ideas to emerge and circulate more quickly (Florida et al. 2008, p. 618). Hence, his creative class proponents are inherently urban and described as basing their locational choices on post-materialist values such as "authenticity", "uniqueness", "diversity", and "indigenous street-level culture", which they find in a mix of independent art galleries, local designer boutiques, hole-in-the wall coffee shops and sidewalk buskers (Reese et al. 2010, p. 365). According to Florida's observations, 'creative talent' roamed the city in search of stimulation, "want[ing] to pack their time full of dense, high-quality, multi-dimensional experience" (Florida 2002c, p. 134), leading him to draw one of his most catchy and widely repeated conclusions: that "cities without gays and rock bands are losing the economic development race" (Florida 2002).

In spite of wide-spread critique levelled against his assumptions and measurements, what stuck was the idea that 'creative' neighbourhoods could effortlessly (and cost-effectively!) integrate the historical and the contemporary. After all, combining "the gritty and the pretty" (Interview Reesberg, 19.06.2013) in order to forge a conducive environment for lifestyle consumption is - as I will further discuss below (chapter 2.2.4.1) - one of the most pervasive Floridian logics. Moreover, a concise understanding of this narrative is certainly required if we look at how this formula of 'free wifi + fresh coffee + fashionable ambiance = good business location' has also become a leading truism within Cape Town's creative city discourse and practice. By way of example, one of the first official motions of The Fringe Design and Innovation District was to subsidise the opening of a 'pop up' exhibition space-cum-artisan coffee shop in order to 'incubate networking opportunities' and provide 'attractive lifestyle elements' for the area's 'emerging design talent' (Cape Town Partnership March 2011; see further chapter 8.2.5).
2.2.1 Catching up with the creative class

But who are these people that make up this elusive creative class? First and foremost, according to Florida, they are a highly-educated and well-paid segment of the workforce (Florida 2002c, p. 70). However, the level of education is not necessarily the most important denominator of said group (as it is in the case of human capital theory), but they rather share "a common ethos that values creativity, individuality, difference, and merit" (ibid., p. 9). Out of what he recalls as "a personal and intellectual frustration with the snobbery of such concepts as 'knowledge worker' or 'the high-tech economy'" (ibid., p. 34), and due to further anecdotal evidence that some of the most successful new economy entrepreneurs like Bill Gates don't even hold a college degree, Florida bases his model on occupational rather than educational analysis. Though he initially frames creativity as egalitarian ("Every human being is creative", ibid., p. 32) rather than being confined to a certain elite segment of society, creative class people for him are those who "engage in complex problem solving that involves a great deal of independent judgement" (ibid., p. 8) thus still requiring higher levels of education.

The occupational groups of the creative class are split into a more narrowly defined so-called "super creative core"²¹ made up by: "computer and math occupations; architecture and engineering; life, physical and social science; education, training and library positions; arts and design work and entertainment, sports and media occupations" and a wider range of "creative professionals" that include "management occupations, business and financial operations, legal positions, health-care practitioners, technical occupations and high end sales and sales management" (Florida et al. 2008, p. 625). In general, members of the creative class are not restricted by otherwise structural dimensions of age, ethnicity or race, marital status or sexual preferences (Florida 2012, p. 305). Nonetheless, the renown urbanist is mindful of the different levels of creativity required from the two groups: Whereas the super creative core is explicitly tasked with the "production of the relatively new" (Reckwitz 2012, p. 110), the droves of "normal' creatives [...] may sometimes come up with methods or products that turn out to be

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²¹ The term 'creative core' has a prominent precursor in David Harvey's (2001) critical deliberations on global cultural commodification. Curiously, Harvey also asserts a certain "class positionality" (p. 93) for the growing number of cultural producers and transmitters. However, in contrast to Florida, Harvey values this group not for their economic exploitability but for their "political and agitational powers" (p. 94), which he sees threatened by their increased instrumentalisation for urban growth.
widely useful, but it's not part of the basic job description" (Florida May 2002). With this distinction, Florida also picks up on the ground shift regarding the increasing flexibilisation and hybridisation of working environments and labour relations. His theory seeks to transcend the traditional division between 'blue collar' and 'white collar' (as well as the gendered 'pink collar') work place, celebrating the new codes and customs of the 'no collar' era, where casual attire expresses a broader casual attitude, which ostensibly leads to dwindling vertical cooperation and ultimately to an erosion of top-down hierarchies (Florida 2012, pp. 100f).

According to his calculation, the share of the sleeveless creative class representatives in the overall workforce [sic!] ranges as high as 30% - with an upwards trend - in the creative centres and as low as 15% - with a downward trend - in what he calls "classic social capital communities" (low in diversity and high-tech concentration) and "organisational age communities" (old corporate-dominated cities such as Detroit) (Florida 2005a, pp. 43f). In Florida's sum, the creative class has developed in leaps and bounds, counting 38.3 million Americans, and thus up to 30% of the country's workforce. Moreover, members of the creative class are financially well-endowed, with an average salary of 50,000 USD in 1999, roughly double the wage of a working class American (Florida May 2002).

Another decisive factor mustering the creative class is their set of ostensibly mutual and thus seemingly quantifiable lifestyle proclivities, which Florida measures in his Bohemia Index (Florida 2002a). For him, bohemians are the linchpin of the creative class. They comprise creative practitioners from the super creative core - the "'thought leadership' of modern society" (Florida May 2002) - as well as students and the gay population (see below). In calling the latter two the "Canaries in the Talent Mine" (Florida 2002c, p. 147, 2005a, p. 131), Florida sees their spatial concentration as indicative of an attractive, thriving and accommodating urban environment, that in turn promises to also charm the broader spectrum of creative professionals and high creative/human capital holders into locating their value-adding and growth-inducing business in such areas (Florida 2002a, pp. 56f). But - apart from the already mentioned urban amenities, what were the other ingredients that cities needed to throw into their policy cauldrons in order to become the heralded melting-pots of creativity?
2.2.2 The three Ts

Florida's answer to this question is subsumed in his 'three T' formula. Standing for Technology, Talent and Tolerance, these three factors constitute the most critical urban preconditions in his point of view (Florida 2005a, p. 37). Yet they are deemed insufficient in isolation and thus have to be closely interconnected, as his relational model of regional development indicates (see Figure 2). That high-technology innovation and concentration has proven to be and thus needed to remain the fundamental factor of regional economic success is self-evident for Florida, and therefore does not require any further elaboration on his part (Florida 2002c, p. 37). Instead, he focusses on the co-constitution of the other two Ts: Talent and Tolerance. Traditionally, market-related factors like the availability of jobs have been regarded as the most pivotal factors for people's locational choices. Though Florida does in no way negate this, he proposes that 'soft' factors such as lifestyle, environmental quality and outdoor activity space, as well as social amenities and an open and diverse society are other factors equally sought out by talented individuals (ibid., pp. 50f). The factor of talent - as mentioned above - is measured by both level of education and occupation. In consequence, Florida's favoured indicator for high-technology talent is what he identifies as the category of 'software workers', a recurring measure in his multivariate analyses.23

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22 The factor of talent varies across Florida's different studies. Whereas his first papers were more focussed on conventional human capital enshrined in formal education, later publications recalibrate these measures according to his creative capital propositions which are more focussed on actual occupations (Florida 2002b; 2012).

23 It is interesting to note that Florida does also test traditional arts and culture institutions and professional sports in his multivariate analyses. He however admits that both turned out to be rather poor indicators for high-technology growth (Florida 2005a, p. 74).
Unlike the first two factors, Florida elaborates at length on his third T - the tolerance component - without which neither technological growth nor talent influx could occur. The importance ascribed to the notion of tolerance, understood as urban diversity, openness, and a certain *laissez-faire* attitude of local administrations - is also mirrored in Florida's methodology: While the first two factors are only receiving statistical attention, the measurement of tolerance is not only conducted through number-crunching, but furthermore thrashed out in extensive focus group interviews, conducted with selected creative class proponents about their urban experiences and socio-spatial demands across the United States (pp. 82ff). Here, Florida also draws on the work of prolific urban thinkers such as Jane Jacobs, who already in the 1960s recognised the importance of a multicultural and inclusive urban environment for social innovation and growth (Florida 2005a, p. 91; Jacobs 1970).
As a result, Florida and his team developed - amongst many other descriptive variables - four distinct indexes for measuring city-regional diversity and tolerance in relation to the creative class: The Melting-Pot Index, the Gay Index\(^\text{24}\), the Coolness Index, and the Bohemian Index.

\(^{24}\) Whereas *The Rise of the Creative Class* (2002) refers to this measure as 'Gay Index', the sequel *Cities and the Creative Class* (2005) calls it the 'Diversity Index' (p. 94). Though Florida has not explicitly commented on this semantic variation, it can be seen as a reaction to the controversial debates around this variable.
The Melting Pot Index - in high correlation to the Tech-Pole Index developed by the Milken Institute, it examines the relationship between the percentage of foreign-born population and high-tech industry concentration (Florida 2002c, p. 40). Moreover, it was inspired by Florida's personal encounters with Indian IT specialists working in the US, and on this basis makes a strong case for the recognition and (temporary) absorption of foreign talent into the domestic economy: As a transition from 'brain drain' to 'brain circulation' unfolds, high-skilled immigrants are not only beneficial to the US economy, but can furthermore act as developmental and cultural catalysts in their respective countries of birth (Florida 2005b, p. 109). Though it is not statistically significant in relation to the creative class, the Melting Pot Index serves to underscore Florida's point that a restrictive and monolithic society hampers economic development, and thus low barriers to entry represent a pivotal growth prerequisite for the next "Silicon Somewhere" (Florida May 2002).

The Gay Index is probably the most infamous and controversially debated outcome of Florida's research. It works on the assumption that "... homosexuality represents the last frontier of diversity in our society, and thus a place that welcomes the gay community welcomes all kinds of people" (Florida 2002c, p. 13). The Gay Index displays a strong correlation to the creative class, which for Florida asserts the hypothesis that the concentration of gay households has a positive impact on city's high-technology concentration and economic success (Florida 2002c, p. 257, Florida 2005a, pp. 41f). In addition, the presence of same-sex households signals a diverse, progressive, and open environment and the LGBTI community often doubles as harbinger of physical urban upgrade (Florida 2005a, p. 131).

Not an original Floridian creation, but an adapted measure of an urban 'coolness factor' that had been proposed in a lifestyle magazine (Florida 2002b), the Coolness Index counts the percentage of population between the ages of 22 and 29 as well as the number of bars, nightclubs, galleries and museums per capita (Florida 2005a, pp. 93f). As Florida's focus groups had already indicated that cultural and social amenities played a crucial role in drawing especially young talented knowledge-worker into cities, this index shows a strong correlation with the talent index and proves the importance of an active nightlife and bustling entertainment scene for the creative class.

Last but not least, the Bohemian Index directly measures a certain population share across the different metropolitan areas. Based on a variety of previous writings on the new urban bohemians (or BoBos - Bourgeois Bohemians - as they were famously called by Brooks 2010, see also Frank 1997), Florida conceptualises the bohemian group for his statistical purposes as authors, designers, musicians and composers, actors and director, craft artists, painters, sculptors, photographers, dancers as well as artists and performers. Interestingly, this strongly overlaps with traditional cultural industries concepts (see chapter 2.1.2). The index is basically a location quotient that measures the percentage of bohemians in a region compared to their national share, and divided by the percentage of regional as compared to the national population (Florida 2002a, p. 59). In his analysis, he finds that a large share of the bohemian population goes along with the presence of many high human capital individuals - especially in the 'traditional' epicentres of bohemian lifestyle such as San Francisco, Los Angeles, Boston and New York (ibid., p. 66).
Though all these measures ostensibly support the assumption of an almost reflexive relationship between a city's tolerance and its development, Florida et al. are careful to point out that this should not be regarded as a mechanistic relation (Florida et al. 2008, p. 643). After all, the creative class does not build upon a traditional Marxian interpretation of class that asserts a common group awareness which in turn forms the basis for joint proletarian struggle. In fact, the creative class promotes the antithesis to the Marxian ideal, as Florida himself points out the rather detached attitudes towards community and the strong sense for individual self-realisation in "quasi-anonymity" (Florida 2005a, p. 30). Also, he admits elsewhere that "[a]lthough Creative Class people are generally liberal-minded, solidarity has not been their strong suit" (Florida 2012, p. xv). However, contrary to Putnam's concerned analysis in his sociological classic Bowling Alone (Putnam 2000), Florida does not see these individualistic tendencies as a general threat to society, but as an asset; not as a death sentence for conviviality, but as an innovative reconfiguration of community going forward into the era of creativity. After all, looser ties also mean more free ends for outsiders and newcomers to connect to their adopted homes - most likely located not in the traditional 'Bible Belt' or sprawling 'Sun Belt' cities, but in the buzzing downtowns of emerging creative centres.

A detailed quantitative economic analysis would hardly be complete without a set of political recommendations. Florida lays these out in his third book as an "Agenda for the Creative Age" (Florida 2005b, p. 245). In it, he not only repeats his call for urban tolerance and an open society, but also advocates investment in creative infrastructure and education, especially at university level, in order to activate and economically leverage the creative potential of urban denizens. Whereas his first two compendiums had been confined to American cities and their specific socioeconomic conditions, his idea of a global creative age (and the accompanying indexes like his 'Global Creativity Index') keenly embraced globalisation, not only taking the US business makers and politicians to task for implementing the three Ts, but all nations and their urban leadership across the board. The rise of the creative class had turned into a race for the same, as "global talent magnets" (established, large world cities such as London and Paris) were competing alongside "global Austins" (newly emerging and predominantly Asian IT-hubs such as Taipei or Bangalore) (ibid., pp. 10, 159ff).
Though Florida increasingly acknowledges that the United States did not have the creative playing field to themselves as the creative class was 'going global' (Mellander et al. 2013), the yardstick against which he measures other international cities' creative class performance remains firmly set against the United States' global leadership: "American universities and corporations have long been the educators and innovators of the world. If this engine stalls [...] the whole world will have to live with the repercussions" (Florida 2005b, p. 269). Hence, his call for defending and augmenting the vanguard role and accompanying responsibility of US cities as world leaders of creativity is nothing short of a revived patriotic project for the 21st century. This underlying notion might also, in part, explain why Florida's ideas have been met with some level of reservation by European policy-makers. Nonetheless, this hardly disparages the global reach of his concepts and their impact on urban development strategies in cities across the globe (Mellander et al. 2013).

2.2.3 Explaining Florida's impact...

Florida's supporters and critics alike have grappled with the reasons for Florida's raving success as a blockbuster for the urban political sphere. Some have lauded him for bringing to the fore the importance of place in urban economic development, though he was by no means the first scholar to do so. In fact, he does reference a range of influential predecessors in this regard, such as Jane Jacobs (1970) and Robert Park et al.(2010) throughout his books. Hence, more than the actual content of the argument, it seems to be the way in which it was presented as enumerated 'common sense' that directly spoke into the listening of planning practitioners: For Florida, any city had the potential to come up with the right creative formula and secure a 'first mover advantage'. For Brown (2010), Florida's writings were an "optimistic debriefing [of] what could be learnt from the American dot.com economy" (p. 118). Furthermore, he applauded Florida for his "bold rhetorical stroke" of juxtaposing creativity and class "especially in America where anti-intellectualism and populism often hold hands" (ibid., p. 120).

Others point out that Florida's timing could not have been better, as he incepted what had already been on the minds of many people involved with urban economic

25 Nonetheless, Florida has been repeatedly criticized for his erratic style of reference and for overlooking important contributions on culture and cities beyond the US such as Sir Peter Hall's extensive oeuvre Blakely et al. 2005, p. 207; Hall 1998; Hall 2000; Miles & Hall 2008.
development, providing them with "a whole new set of policy buttons to push that had never been pushed before that are cheap, seem inventive and that seem like you are doing something [...]" (Blakely et al. 2005, p. 214). He also received praise from weathered economic analysts like Ed Glaeser, who asserted that Florida's book was "fundamentally right" and furthermore did a terrific job in popularising the academic debate around human capital and its indispensable value for urban development (2005, p. 595). Even Florida's harshest critics had to concede that with his compelling mix of "cosmopolitan elitism and pop universalism, hedonism and responsibility, cultural radicalism and economic conservatism, casual and causal inference, and social libertarianism and business realism" (Peck 2005, p. 741), he was able to sell a positive and emphatic imaginary to urban economic policy, a field which had not been graced with many new and innovative ideas for a while. As a high-profile round table discussion on Cities and the Creative Class (2005) concluded, "People are willing to grasp at something that might not be that solid, but it is a story they can understand" (Blakely et al. 2005, p. 210). Furthermore, much of Florida's calculations are based on readily available or at least easily accessible quantitative data, which makes them replicable for local economic development practitioners who can then compare their results to the 'Florida template'. As Blakely et al. (2005) remark: "There is a certain power to using numbers, particularly numbers that people can easily grasp" (ibid., p. 208). Thus, Florida's indexes also clearly tapped into the growing disciplinary power of auditing and enumeration technologies in local governance (Power 1994).

While this low theoretical threshold paired with Florida's flourishing consultancy trade might well be the main reason for the wildfire-like spread of his ideas, this "expert citation" (Gibson & Klocker 2004) has been a major point of critique. As Florida's name as well as the creative class turned into buzzwords of conventional planning wisdom that spoke to an ostensibly shared agenda of urban liveability, it also became easier "[...] for policy makers and management consultants to jump on the bandwagon, without really investing much time in trying to inform themselves about what was actually being implied or communicated" (Mommaas 2009, p. 52). This 'grapevine'-effect was what effectively turned the creative class credo into a powerful and seductive urban policy phenomenon, and not only earned Richard Florida the label 'cool-cities' guru but moreover a daily speaker rate well above five figures (Peck 2005, p. 740).
The abovementioned praise extended towards the creative class as the saviour of ailing urban economies and to Florida as their good prophet has been at least matched if not drowned out by the chorus of critical voices. Coming from left, right and centre, the commentary ranges from outrageous homophobic attacks to poignant identifications of statistical and logical inconsistencies. While the polemics can be at best noted, but should - particularly in their far-right outfit - be by and large ignored, substantial inquiry and argumentative deconstructions command further attention. However, as many of those critics use Florida's ideas merely as a proxy for a much broader problematisation of contemporary city-making, urban policies and (late-)modern society at large, I will repeatedly draw on their rich insights throughout this thesis. Thus, this section will only present a first broad-brush account of counter-Floridian arguments and thus not even attempts to replicate the profound and concise reviews that have already been carried out elsewhere (see for example Marcuse 2003; Blakely et al. 2005; Gibson & Kong 2005; Peck 2005; Markusen 2006; Pratt 2008; Wilson & Keil 2008; Krätke 2010; Reese et al. 2010; Pratt 2011).

2.2.4 … and debating his assumptions

Generally, reactions to the creative class concept can be divided into two groups: First, issues of quantitative operationalization and validity regarding the variables and datasets used for calculating the different indexes, and secondly the normative and teleological socio-political conclusions made on their basis.

2.2.4.1 The quantitative criticism

From a quantitative angle, Florida has been called out on his outdated statistical sources - ranging from between 1990 and 1998 - by numerous peers (Rausch & Negrey 2006; Reese et al. 2010; Blakely et al. 2005). Furthermore, they have lamented a missing sense of relative validity as models have been used inconsistently. Also, they identified a variety of missing indicators that also affect people's locational choices, such as quality of local schools and services, crime rates, proximity to other large urban nodes, quality of transportation, etc. (Reese et al. 2010, pp. 346ff). Thus, Reese et al. conclude that "much of the creative class argument simply does not hold up under empirical analysis […]" as
they cannot detect any correlation to economic growth (ibid., p. 361). Hoyman & Faricy (2008) put forward similarly damning results and go on to challenge the notion of individualistic creative capital, stating that attention should instead be given to social capital and networks as those had much greater effects on human capital and proliferated a more inclusive urban development.

Other quantitative studies, such as Rausch and Negrey (2006), find that the 'creative engine' of economic growth is at least partly running as they are able to discern some positive correlations. Thus, they do not in principle question the creative class hypothesis, but take issue with the fact that Florida fails to address his negative coefficients and does not comment on how this might affect his model. Furthermore, their results lead them to question his assumption that the number of creative individuals, i.e. the size of the creative class, is supposedly the decisive growth factor (ibid., pp. 483f). Krätke (2010) also debunks the myth of a highly affirmative and somewhat unified creative class, showing that Florida's hotchpotch mix subsumed under the label of creative professionals (i.e. financial service providers and other speculation-driven occupations) resembles a rather mundane 'dealer class' that moreover does not have a significantly positive impact on sustainable urban development. In spite of this profound criticism, Florida's creative capital indicators continue to feature in scholarly and public empirical analyses of urban economies (Batabyal & Nijkamp 2008; Hansen et al. 2009; Mellander et al. 2013).

2.2.4.2 The qualitative criticism

The second strand of critique is even more prolific, as it challenges the concept from its ideological presumptions to the undesired social and political consequences produced in the wake of creative class policy implementation. Here, I want to highlight five of the most common counter-Floridian arguments, all sounding different notes of caution.

First of all, Florida is often criticised (and sometimes lauded) for his opportunism, as his manufactured indexes take advantage of and further expand the "rich seam of envy and aspiration for city boosters" (Pratt 2008, p. 108) by creating artificial urban hierarchies. With the creative class being paddled as yet another "potion" for elusive economic growth - at high costs on the part of cash-strapped municipalities and for
personal financial gain on his part - Florida is snubbed as a racketeer, a "new-economy huckster" (Peck 2005, p. 740), and a "snake oil salesperson" (Pratt 2008, p. 109). In pushing the perception that human creativity is the last remaining beacon of possibility within an ocean of urban decay and crisis, he manages to effectively raise the spectre of its antonyms: After all, a municipality that does not endorse creativity (or in Florida's words, that "doesn't get it", Florida 2002c, p. 302) openly displays the ultimate urban ills of narrow-mindedness, intolerance, conservatism and rigidity, for which Florida's consultancy group can of course administer a ready-made treatment (Peck 2005, pp. 748, 765).

Related to this is the second much-repeated point of critique: the creative class concept neither has specific historic awareness, nor does it recognise certain local path-dependencies. Hence, the source of urban creative energy or 'juices' can hardly be as universal as Florida suggests, and thus cannot be adequately catered for through applying his formulaic approach. The danger exists that Florida's uniform prescription annihilates the stamina of cities to truly engage with their cultural and economic idiosyncrasies, thus leading them to believe - in their desperation - that culture and creativity are nothing more than an opening act for high-technology attraction and that the only opportunity for wealth creation is to bring in talent from the outside (Pratt 2008, pp. 108f). Flagging this peril of reductionism, Scott (2006) argues that "creativity is not something that can be simply imported into the city on the backs of peripatetic computer hackers, skateboarders, gays, and assorted bohemians, but must be organically developed through the complex interweaving of relations of production, work, and social life in specific urban contexts" (2006, p. 15).

The third issue goes directly to the heart of the creative class concept. As mentioned above, it stretches across a broad professional spectrum that is - regardless of its diversity - deemed to have both: common value and common values. In both regards, the creative class as a homogeneous subpopulation with a joint ethos is widely contested as a myth. For one, jobs across the aggregated creative class spectrum vary greatly in autonomy, stability and income, negating Florida's thesis that the creative class universally ranks in the upper income brackets (Flew 2003, p. 91; Marcuse 2003, pp. 40f). In fact, the level of instability and income stratification in the cultural and artistic sector, i.e. the 'super creative core', greatly increased in the past decade as the conflation of self-actualisation with the promise of a glamorous creative career (or 'Hollywoodisation')
has led people to accept longer periods of precarious employment as well as securing their income base by means of multiple, simultaneous jobs (McRobbie 2009, p. 112; see also Markusen 2006; Rössinger 2008; Bain & McLean 2013). On the other hand, Florida has repeatedly stressed that the creative class shares not only common lifestyle trajectories but also a common vision for the pursuit of humanistic ideals (Florida 2002c, pp. 316f).

Filled with starry-eyed idealism, the homo creativus is perpetuated as an autonomous subject that - regardless of its intermittent community aversion and lamentable liability to gentrification - will act as a positive agent of change through its power of cultural and creative consumption26 (Peck 2005, p. 746; Pratt 2008, p. 111). That creative class attraction is in fact not intended to bring about the fundamental change and urban integration needed for a sustainable city future, but merely acts as another tool in the shed of local economic development, which becomes evident in Glaeser's (2005) plain argument: "I know a lot of creative people. I've studied a lot of creative people. Most of them like what most well-off people like—big suburban lots with easy commutes by automobile and safe streets and good schools and low taxes" (p. 596). This idea that designated creative city hubs support rather than subvert social inequality is also highlighted by Wilson and Keil's (2008) proposition that the real creative class is in fact the urban poor, a group that only features marginally in Florida's concept in the form of the faceless, undefined, service-providing workforce catering to the naturalised leadership of the creative class. However, what will become clear in my subsequent analysis of Cape Town's creative city discourse is that the urban poor are not always seen as the antagonistic 'other' of creativity. Quite to the contrary, in the case of Cape Town's WDC 2014 initiative, the developmental imperative of addressing the needs of the urban poor through creative 'design solutions' is turned into a logical buttress of the local creative city governmentality (see chapters 7.3 & 8.2).

Though the debate around the faultlines of culture- and creativity-led urban regeneration extend well beyond the critique of Florida's particular concept, processes of social polarisation and gentrification have been commonly associated with his name. The features of Florida's 'creative class habitat' - authentic historical buildings, converted lofts, co-working spaces with free internet, walkable streets with rich displays of 'indigenous'

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26 Especially from the field of creative industry research, Florida has been widely rebuked for overemphasising consumption and neglecting cultural and creative production (Pratt 2005; McCann 2007; Pratt 2008; Flew 2012).
culture and plenty of independent coffee shops - are by and large the same features of gentrifying inner-city neighbourhoods that are born out of generic public regeneration strategies that seek to "domesticate by cappuccino" (Atkinson 2003; Ley 2003; Atkinson & Bridge G. 2005; Krajewski 2006; Lees et al. 2010). As Novy and Colomb show in their study of creative city struggles in Hamburg and Berlin, the creative class apostle is perceived by many civil society movements as a haunting spectre that is spreading a contagious "creative city fever" (Kunzmann 2010 in Novy & Colomb 2012, p. 6). If this remains unchallenged, it will in the end drive out real diversity as well as non-commercial cultural production and creative consumption. This argument links in with the already mentioned contestation around the commodification of culture and the emphasis of profit-oriented lifestyle consumption at the cost of everyday cultural production.

The last point of criticism is also the most important one to consider for the research at hand, as it highlights the immanent triple bias of creative class theory towards high technology/high culture, urban realms and Western, (late-)modern cities. In turn, this overemphasis is borne by 'low-brow' culture and vernacular creativity, rural and suburban spaces, as well as by (sub)alternative imaginaries beyond the global North. That creativity and the creative class should neither be seen as confined to hip downtowns nor reduced to sociocultural elitism has already been critically addressed by numerous scholars (see Wilson & Keil (2008) on Florida's class-bias, Bromberg (2009) on non-economic neighbourhood spaces, Bain (2009) on suburban multipurpose centres, or Gibson et al. (2009) and Ingle (2010) on rural festivals and artist colonies, as well as the compendium on vernacular creativity by Edensor et al. (2009)).

Nonetheless, the largest part of both positivist and critical creative city knowledge remains cast from the mould of democratically governed Euro-American cities that incorporate humanistic planning ideals and a certain level of welfare state provision. This fact has unwittingly turned certain Western global cities into bulwarks of creative capitalism and once more revived the colonial impetus of urban planning ideals trickling-down from "the West to the rest" (Roy 2011a, p. 309). That cities in the 'global south' are more than the inane receiving end of policy hand-me-downs is a key argument

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27 This degree varies geographically with the US-American political and economic system being more deregulated than their European counterparts.
of this thesis, which will be further exemplified in chapter 4, where theoretical implications of worlding and policy mobility are considered and subsequently substantiated in the analysis of Cape Town's creative city-ness provided in part III.

This plethora of critical points has not gone unnoticed, and Florida himself has repeatedly admitted he does not regard his new geography of creativity as entirely unproblematic. In fact, tucked away in his follow-up books are some sobering remarks on the increase of inequality\(^\text{28}\), particularly in the highest-ranking creative centres like San Francisco and Austin (Florida 2005a, p. 9; Stolarick & Florida 2006, p. 17). He also acknowledges that not all seems to be rosy for creative workers and even more so for traditional blue-collar workers in creative cities, as net incomes drop while stress levels and house prices rise relentlessly. Thus he conceded that the creative economy should not be perceived as a singular panacea to the multiplicity of contemporary urban problems (Florida 2005b, p. 44). He even goes so far as to say that "the creative economy […] will both exacerbate existing social problems and create new ones" (ibid., p. 61) - that is of course only if it was to continue unregulated and without (his) expert oversight. For the most part however, Florida remains aloof and dismissive of his critics, denouncing them as "squelchers […] who divert and derail human creative energy" and politicking naysayers that are not able to or simply do not want to recognise the revolutionary merit of his concepts (ibid., p. 21).

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\(^{28}\) Keeping with tradition, Florida and his research partner Kevin Stolarick even developed an Inequality Index which they measured against their other indexes (Stolarick & Florida 2006).
2.2.4.3 The creative class, 10 years on

In 2012, *The Rise* (this popular shorthand being just another indicator of the book's blockbuster status) celebrated its 10th anniversary and was published in a revised edition. Here, Florida not only seeks again to lambaste his critics, but also revisits some of his key assumptions against the backdrop of major world events of the past decade - from the aftermath of 9/11 to the bursting of the Tech bubble, and from the credit crunch in 2008 to the large-scale social movements spreading between New York's Zuccotti Park and Cairo's Tahrir Square. Especially with respect to the last two events, he sees himself as utterly vindicated: First of all, after the financial meltdown which he euphemistically calls 'the great economic reset', creativity has become even more fiercely promoted as a driving force alongside a jumble of other post-materialist ideals. He asserts that periods of existential crisis have also proven to be the times of the most rapid innovation in capitalism (Florida 2010). Secondly, the world-spanning mass-protests and public displays of people's discontent and global solidarity for him are signs of the creative class "coming of age" and finally developing some kind of common class consciousness (Florida 2012, pp. 398f). Based on more recent survey data, Florida argues that the creative class's share in the overall workforce did decline during the crisis, though relatively less in comparison to the working class. However, seen over an extended period of time, it has been growing steadily since 2001 (ibid., p. 49).

Though creative class growth has been stalled by the crisis and admittedly "the great promise of the creative age is not being met" (ibid., p. xi), Florida hardly holds back his glee as he crows over the fact that "many pundits were ready to stake their reputation on the certainty that they [his ideas] were only passing trends" (ibid., p. ix). For Florida, it is certain that the creative class will again be at the forefront of yet another economic paradigm shift - "from dumb growth to true prosperity" (ibid., p. 396) - as he muses that creativity will in the end prove itself as the great leveller of global injustices. In consequence, he calls for a new social compact, "a creative compact", which for him
represents the moral compass\(^{29}\) that will guide the way to the universal realisation of humanity's collective creativity (ibid., pp. 396f).

Seeing past this strategic idealism, delivered with great evangelical pathos, the persistence of the creative class should not be confused with its questionable pertinence. Though Pratt (2008) might be correct in saying that "we have to accept that lay usage of Florida's work is commonly deployed as the means by which cities may be made creative (Pratt 2008, p. 107)", this does not mean that it is the only idea circulating within the global urban policy ether. In fact, the past ten years of post-Floridian creative city debate have subjected the paradigm to extrapolation, citation, (dis)assemblage, fusion, sublimation, transformation and sometimes mutation beyond recognition. Though its most crude and stereotypical incarnation in the form of the creative class ideal might still be championed by its 'inventor' and thus rightfully remains the target of witty academic critique and a boiling point for civic resistance, the practical implementation of creative city policies in diverse urban localities such as Cape Town has long transcended any pure form. After all, the global mobility of the creative city has often been attributed to its amorphous nature that allows for it to be moulded into existing neoliberal development strategies (Gibson & Klocker 2005). To put it bluntly: The creative city notion has by now outgrown the erroneous creative class hypothesis. Rather, as Pratt (2008) reminds us, the creative city nowadays presents itself as a "high-touch' environment" (Pratt 2008, p. 115) - a diverse informational field in which various governance actors and networks translate, negotiate, filter and reproduce fuzzy knowledge encompassed by perpetual uncertainty. Hence, in rounding off the presentation of the creative city paradigm's most popular tenets, the next section hones in on its relationship with urban governance techniques and questions of citizenship.

\(^{29}\) The six principles laid down in his compact are however not entirely new and are little more than an elaborate reiteration of his previous recommendations for the creative age (compare Florida 2005b with Florida et al. 2008 and Florida 2012).
2.3 Creative city governance and cultural-creative citizenship

While the two preceding sections of this chapter have scrutinised creativity in its currently most prominent socioeconomic formations - namely as cultural-creative industries and creative class - this chapter shifts the focus towards the meaning of creativity in the realm of urban governance and citizenship. Though in comparison this domain has attracted a significantly lesser degree of popular debate and theorisation, it is nonetheless indispensable for providing a holistic introduction to the common creative city canon. In addition, it also serves as an argumentative bridge to the following chapter 3, in which I will talk in greater depth about creativity as an emerging social dispositif and corresponding modes of subjectivation. In general, the nexus of governance and creativity can be approached from two distinct angles that are however co-constitutive and which I will address consecutively: The first revolves around the question of how public institutions can be infused with creativity through cultural planning interventions, while the second takes a closer look at the effects of this new-found governmental awareness for creativity as a lever of subjectivation.

2.3.1 Creativity and urban governance

Bureaucratic state administration and creativity were - and in many ways still are - regarded as antagonistic opposites. Healey (2004) describes it as a dynamic dualism of popular perception, in which 'more government' automatically means 'lesser creativity' (p. 87). In a historical perspective, modern government as well as strategic planning as its core activity were understood as a set of established administrative routines that followed rule-bound bureaucratic procedures. Thus, it was regarded as ill-equipped to keep abreast with social innovations and retain control over urban dynamics that routinely escaped any regulatory framework (ibid., p. 89). This administrative sclerosis gave weight to the common libertarian call, still sounded today by many business people and artists alike that "government [...] should 'get out of the way' when it comes to the promotion of innovation and creativity [...]" (ibid., p. 91).
Turning this perception of bureaucratic order as the millstone around the neck of urban innovation on its head is the main endeavour of the cultural planning field\textsuperscript{30}. One of its most well-known proponents is Charles Landry, who, with his seminal book *The Creative City: A Toolkit for Urban Innovators* (2000) is also the actual 'sloganeer' of the creative city (and not Richard Florida as is often believed). The majority of commentaries mention Landry and Florida in a single breath, thus presenting them as ideological twins who have teamed up in paddling the creative city as their joint conceptual brainchild. As the rather reserved British cultural planner gets tarred with the same brush as the flamboyant American economist, their significantly different epistemological premises, normative positions, and methodological vantage points are vastly obscured. Particularly in light of how creativity has been recently discussed as an overarching social dispositif (Reckwitz 2012) and disciplinary social technology (Osborne 2003), I argue that it is important to also spell out Landry's position within the genealogy of the contemporary creative city paradigm. His approach is furthermore relevant to my analysis in chapter 8, which shows how the notion of 'design thinking' has become emplaced as a novel governmental technology within Cape Town's local administration.

Whereas Florida promotes creativity in the vein of free-market economics, Landry is more interested in what he calls the 'dull stuff', i.e. the investigation of how administrative procedures and bureaucratic regulations can be measured through their creative intentions and reformed by means of innovative shifts in the overall rule system. Central to his conceptualisation of the creative city are not economic growth principles, though they also feature as an effect of 'good governance', but ideas around institutional ethos, accountability and ownership, enshrined in his notion of 'civic creativity'. He defines civic creativity "as imaginative problem-solving applied to public good objectives. The aim is to generate a continual flow of innovative solutions to problems which have an impact on the public realm. 'Civic creativity' is the capacity of public officials and others oriented to the public good to effectively and instrumentally apply

\textsuperscript{30} The notion of cultural planning has gained much currency in the wake of the broader 'cultural turn'. Though it by and large assumes a pragmatic perspective towards urban neoliberalisation, it condemns an instrumental use of culture for achieving non-cultural goals. Instead it advocates a more holistic approach geared towards inclusive affluence rather than exclusive profit (Bianchini 07.02.2004).
their imaginative faculties to achieving higher value within a framework of social and political value" (Landry 2000, p. 190).

Contrary to the popular perception of creativity as something endowed entirely with positive virtues, for Landry it is essentially "value-free", as its trajectory is ultimately determined by its use in context (ibid., pp. 14f). Moreover, to him the city-scale is the ideal governmental realm for harbouring creativity, as he notes: "Urbanity itself - critical mass, diversity and interaction - pushes forward a certain type of creativity characterised by specialisms and niches as well as hybrid ideas" (ibid., p. 18). This specific format of "urban creativity" is further animated by the prospect that all urban denizens should be given the opportunity to realise their full human potential through an enabling framework of governmental accountability, skill-building, and inclusion. After all, Landry argues, in times when the state's executive and resource powers are increasingly rescaled to the city level, reformed and resilient governance institutions are as important to urban innovation as new products, services and technologies (ibid., pp. 17, 36). But he also cautions that their development is often stifled by entrenched interests and inflexible bureaucracies that fail to realise participatory principles and leave the public good vulnerable to private capitalist interests - a situation that he explicitly identifies as detrimental to his creative city proposition (ibid., p. 28).

Though he shares with Florida certain neo-liberal ideals concerning the quality of life, selection of urban lifestyle amenities, social diversity and networking dynamics, Landry delves much deeper into the mundane operational structures of cities. For him, creativity is neither singular nor individualistic but collective, as it builds on a combination of divergent cultural roots, civic pride and local heritage. While the celebration of local identity for Florida is a means to an end for the ultimate premise of economic growth, Landry recognises it as an end in itself.

Though both have realised that for many urban practitioners, it is hard to value something which they cannot calculate, they offer two different takes on this conundrum: While Florida has gone through great lengths for packaging creativity as a measurable rank-size asset, Landry has repeatedly spoken about the need to perceive creativity as a collective mind-set, something that will always remain to a certain extent intangible31, but

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31 This does not mean that Landry was in any way opposed to quantitative surveying methods. In fact, he followed Florida's example and devised a Creative City Index which he now markets through his
that is nonetheless pivotal for realising an inclusive urban future. His approach to how
culture relates to the urban economy, however, remains rather pragmatic when he notes
that "a key challenge for culture is to come to terms with living in a market economy and
to assess whether what is valued can be given a price" (ibid., p. 40).

Owing up to his goal of providing a hands-on 'toolkit' for running a city creatively,
Landry dedicates large parts of his book to discussing concrete examples of programmatic
interventions in order to provide examples for innovative thinking in urban governance. Through this,
he also paints a vivid and empathic picture of his target readership - urban
policy makers and practitioners. According to Landry, the make or break of urban
creativity resides in their individual and collective capacities to shift bureaucratic
mentalities and enable public dialogue, because "[…] creative persons operating in the
civic realm perceive value, create value and add values" (ibid., p. 191).

In the pursuit of this endeavour he sketches them as tragic Faustian figures, often
cought between a rock and a hard place: On the one hand there is a certain awareness that
the city should be approached as an organism that allows for and responds best to
imagination, intuition, holistic thinking and experimentation - including risk-taking,
making mistakes and accepting failure as productive learning experience (ibid., p. 33). On
the other hand, he also recognises that city administrations are subject to a mechanistic
paradigm which perceives the city as an engine that needs to be run as efficiently and
smoothly as possible. Unfortunately, this engine suffers from a plethora of spanners in the
works: sectional interests, patronage and lack of political will, formula thinking,
"bureaucratic proceduralism", "short-terminism", professional self-justification,
thoughtlessness, lack of effort and dynamics of capital (ibid., pp. 45–49). In consequence,
he advocates for a significant governmental shift, the key tenets of which are listed in

consultancy website as an individual assessment tool that can be purchased by city administrations. For
more see: http://charleslandry.com/contact/join-in-the-creative-cities-index/

32 It needs to be noted that Landry's ideas about the premises of 'lateral thinking' in urban governance had
not been entirely new. In fact, core issues such as the role of leadership, collective idea generation,
information brokering and institutional openness to learning had already been and continue to be discussed
in the vast literature around new public management, participatory governance and collaborative planning
(see for example Healey 1997; Schedler & Proeller 2000; Barzelay 2001; Fung & Wright 2003; Healey
2003; Hickey & Mohan 2004; Fischer 2006; McCarthy 2007).

33 What exactly constitutes an urban practitioner oscillates throughout the book. However Landry
repeatedly stresses that, as his creative city governance is based on ideals of stakeholder democracy, this
circle is likely to include committed individuals beyond the formal political sphere (Landry 2000, p. 38).
Table 2. This schematic depiction of 'creative governance' tenets is also important to keep in mind as many of these rationales have also prominently featured in the set-up and institutional conduct of the City of Cape Town's internal WDC 2014 Department (see chapter 8.2.4 for more).

Table 2 Schematic presentation of Landry's 'creative transition' in urban governance principles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Centralism</th>
<th>→</th>
<th>Devolution</th>
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<td>Isolation</td>
<td>→</td>
<td>Partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>Control</td>
<td>→</td>
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<tr>
<td>Leading</td>
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<tr>
<td>Information</td>
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<td>Quantity</td>
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<td>High blame</td>
<td>→</td>
<td>Low blame</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conformity</td>
<td>→</td>
<td>Creativity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failure</td>
<td>→</td>
<td>Success</td>
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</tbody>
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Source: Landry (2000), p. 113

Landry's ideas also resonated with neoinstitutionalist scholars who criticise the linear concept of development, its spatial determinism and a narrow focus on efficiency as hampering abilities of cities to grapple with complex urbanisation dynamics (Graham & Healey 1999; Bridge & Watson 2000).

Instead, they argue that administrations needed to come to terms with the fact that "all policy interventions are more like risky bets than steps on a defined pathway to a specified future" (Healey 2004, p. 90), and that "there is no simple equation between the characteristics of a 'creative city' and 'creative' modes of urban governance, no 'one size fits all' recipe" (ibid., p. 100). Conversely to this support, Landry's creative city toolkit also received criticism, albeit less vociferous than that levelled against the creative class: A rather naive bureaucratic utopianism, a danger of fragmented governance processes, and an undifferentiated take on culture as a sphere for political intervention, have been three major points of critique (Stevenson 2001; 2004). What is however even more

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34 This perspective argues that governance institutions cannot be solely regarded as formal organisations, legal procedures and codified planning practices. Instead, institution refers to all social norms and standards that shape formal and informal, individual and collective ways of thinking and acting (Healey 2004, p. 91).
critically important in the context of this thesis, is that this creative-city-as-creative-governance nexus also implies new modes of subjectivation, enshrined in the idea that urban cultural policies could be utilised as "therapeutic technologies of creative citizenship" (Grundy & Boudreau 2008, p. 347).

2.3.2 Creative citizenship?

Not only has the procedural conduct of the local state come under scrutiny at the dawn of the 'creative age', but in a dialectical fashion, the citizen subject has also become a target of creative city interventions. As Scott (2006) infers, for example, a truly creative city engages (and activates) its entire social spectrum, as every citizen had to be equally regarded as a host of diverse creative potentiality. But he also warns that "[i]n the last analysis, any push to achieve urban creativity in the absence of a wider concern for conviviality and camaraderie (which need to be distinguished from the mechanical conception of 'diversity') in the urban community as a whole is doomed to remain radically unfinished" (p. 15). Thus, in order to be able to problematize creativity as an emergent dispositif in the next chapter, the following outlines how it has manifested itself in the re-imagination of the citizen-subject as a self-reliant "creative worker" (Garnham 2005, p. 27).

As I have already alluded to in my discussion of cultural and creative industries (ch. 2.1) and the creative class (ch. 2.2), a prominent focal point of the creative city paradigm pertains to the transformation of the modern working world and its changing subjectivities. Two directions can be discerned regarding the study of labour in the creative city: One is looking at the ways of working, i.e. the actual practices, contents and challenges of everyday creative work, while the second focusses on where this work takes place, i.e. the micro-geographies and new environments in which the (re-)production of cultural value(s) happens. As these perspectives are of course closely interlinked, they are often studied from their multiple intersections (Lange 2007; Rifkin 2005; Roscoe 2005; McRobbie 2006; Markusen et al. 2006).

One effect of creative labour is what Flew (2004) has termed the emergence of a 'new humanism'. Alongside the broader post-Fordist shifts in advanced liberal societies, there has also been a rediscovery of people's basic need for reflexive self-expression, cultural participation and recognition of the individual human condition in the workplace (Flew 2004, p. 162). Rose (1999) has referred to these 'soft skills' as therapeutic
technologies, emphasising their canonical role in contemporary management practice (p. 84). A telling example is the way in which freelancing professionals and self-employed contractors - a prevalent form of labour in the CCIs but also increasingly beyond - are prompted to micro-manage their own creative talent, leverage their personal networks and market their professional identities in ways that yield both maximum financial benefit and fun (Flew 2004, p. 162; McRobbie 2002).

As Leadbeater and Oakley (1999) advise this 'new breed' of independents: "Make work fun. If it stops being fun people will not be creative" (1999, p. 28). The popular label of "cultural entrepreneur" (ibid.) or "culturepreneur" (Lange 2006) reveals this intrinsic connection forged between entrepreneurialism, self-promotional strategies and multi-tasking, which effectively often means having to juggle several jobs at once (McRobbie 2002, p. 517; Potts et al. 2008). Hence and regardless of its possible economic precarity, the creative subject is elevated as a "heroic figure" that is furthermore "[...] valorized as a leader in the collective drive for innovation, one who sheds the narrow preconceptions of calculative and instrumental rationality to generate new possibilities for action" (Grundy & Boudreau 2008, p. 350 with reference to Landry & Bianchini 1995, pp. 17f). As chapter 8 will elaborate in further detail, the same logic also rests at the heart of Cape Town's budding design(er) governmentality, which has styled the designer subject as the epitome figure of local urban transformation. The accompanying idea that anybody could now become the master of their own 'designer future' by means of self-reliant and flexible labour also needs to be seen against the broader backdrop of the prevailing "work-citizenship nexus" (Barchiesi 2011, p. 10) in postapartheid South Africa, which has been sharply criticised as a buttress of prevailing inequality and stark social hierarchies.

From a built environment perspective, the 'creative' citizen subject has also been said to demand and simultaneously create new spatialities, from the micro spaces of post-Fordist offices as design(ed) 'playgrounds', to the level of macro-level urban renewal projects featuring iconic architecture and new symbolic landscapes (Ley 2003; Lange 2007; Miles 2007; Markusen & Gadwa 2010; Prinz 2012). A central tenet in this regard is the creative milieu, which has been defined as "either a cluster of buildings, a part of a city, a city as

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35 This imperative is part of a longer list of principles, providing interesting insights into the common 'start-up'-mentality. Other credos include "Don't have a plan: It will come unstuck because it is too inflexible. [...] Don't aim to become the next Bill Gates, aim to be bought out by him" (Leadbeater et al. 1999, p. 28).
a whole or a region - that contains the necessary preconditions in terms of 'hard' and 'soft' infrastructure to generate a flow of ideas and inventions. Such a milieu is a physical setting where a critical mass of entrepreneurs, intellectuals, social activists, artists, administrators, power brokers or students can operate in an open-minded, cosmopolitan context and where face to face interaction creates new ideas, artefacts, products, services and institutions as a consequence contributes to economic success" (Landry 2000, p. 133; see also Lange 2006 as well as Heßler & Zimmermann 2008 and Metzger 2008 for the sociological history of the concept).

Of course, this links directly back to previous questions around the kind of spaces ostensibly required and at the same time produced by this smorgasbord of cultural types and hip characters (see also the case study of Cape Town's Fringe Design and Innovation District in ch. 8.5.2). Again, these questions also provide much raison d'être for the ongoing discourses, analyses, social struggles, theorisations, policy interventions, polemics, mapping studies and planning strategies weaved around the creative city paradigm.

However, it has been argued that regardless of the actual shapes and forms of such creative milieus, they would always be the most likely places for creative citizenship to be negotiated, realised, contested and governed. As Grundy and Boudreau (2008) show in their study of cultural and creative planning projects in Toronto, the attributes of the 'creative citizen', i.e. the need for self-realisation and self-monitoring as well as active participation, are being leveraged for a broad range of regulative and disciplinary objectives such as socio-spatial cohesion, community renewal and global competitiveness (p. 351).

However, in line with Rose's (1999) understanding of new moral governance technologies, they emphasise that the role of creative city policies in (re-)making the urban citizen is constantly in flux, diverging from the economic reductionism and elitist impetus of the 'creative class'-thesis to more therapeutic rationales that define creativity in a more inclusive humanistic conception (p. 352). This supports Pakulski's (1997) earlier observation that contemporary processes of citizenship are increasingly evolving around the proliferation of non-national and non-class identities, as well as the expression of individual lifestyles and cultural differentiation (p. 83). Though this supposedly emphasises yet again the creative acumen of all citizens, a practical distinction is consistently perpetuated in the globally meandering creative city discourse and
government practice: Here, the artist, designer or "creative worker" (Garnham 2005, p. 27), by virtue of their generally liberal and cosmopolitan attitude and their ability to provide and manage a mixture of symbolic and cognitive knowledge in an increasingly volatile global socioeconomic setting, is presented as the "paradigmatic creative citizen" (O'Connor 2000, p. 20; Grundy & Boudreau 2008, p. 356). Against the background of a more general shift in focus from cultural-creative production to culture-led consumption as mentioned above, it is also important to note that the socio-political and socioeconomic processes that have forged the 'creative citizen' are in many ways congruent with those that have also given currency to the "citizen-consumer" (Clarke 2007). These points are particularly pertinent to remember in relation to the intricate ways in which Cape Town's WDC project has elevated the figure of the designer onto the podium of local urban governance, a process which is critically examined and problematized in part III.

In sum, compared to the depth and breadth of academic and popular discussion around the creative economy and the creative class, questions of citizenship and local governance have remained relatively marginalised. More generally, Borén and Young (2012) have identified a "creative policy gap" (p. 1807) within contemporary research, as there seems to exist little between the celebratory hype of the creative urban buzz and the critical literature that regards any formal acknowledgement of creativity in urban development as a hostile take-over. Following their argument, I concur that whether we like it or not the creative city paradigm is here to stay. In consequence, I argue that we need to carefully unpack its broader societal root causes if we are to better understand the contemporary politics of creative city-ness in different locales such as Cape Town, and how it is mobilised through emergent governmental technologies and new modes of urban citizenship.
"We come to know the world through the world that we know." (Barac 2011, p. 40)

"An idea whose time has come"?
A critical account of creative city logics

After having discussed the history of creative city idea(1)s, this chapter turns to investigate the reasons and rationales underlying the paradigm's unabated global popularity. Since its humble beginnings as a British cultural town planning initiative in the 1990s, it has grown into a seemingly universal policy paradigm that has moved across the globe in leaps and bounds. For Richard Florida, the reason for this was best explained through an aphorism by Victor Hugo: "You can resist an invading army, but you cannot resist an idea whose time has come" (quoted in Peck 2005, p. 758). This however naturalises the popularity of the creative city and reduces the manifold reasons for its proliferation to sheer serendipitous ingenuity. Moreover, it obliterates the fact that the persistence of the creative city paradigm in urban development programmes worldwide cannot be attributed to its actual quality but is rather due to a wide range of subjective, structural and multi-scalar root causes that cumulatively worked in its favour.

This chapter will discuss these in three steps: First, it will investigate the spread of creativity as a social dispositif with increasing purchase, particularly in Western late-modern societies. Secondly, it will turn to scrutinise, how the political economy of cities has shifted over the last decades, especially in the wake of world city rhetoric and cultural economy imperatives. Lastly, following a recent emphasis on the theory and practice of global policy mobility, it will be looking at the role that intensifying interurban relationships and the emergence of "urban diplomacy" (Acuto 2013) have had on the

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36 It is a curious fact that, in spite its strong emphasis on large urban agglomerations, the creative city actually started as a creative town initiative with Huddersfield counting a mere 120,000 inhabitants (Landry 2000, p. 227).
rescaling of governmental power and the accelerated circulation of 'best practice' planning examples.

An integral part and central process of the "dispositif of creativity" (Heubel 2002) is the production of creative subjectivity through the aestheticisation of the social (Reckwitz 2012). Though Andreas Reckwitz's book title asserts 'The invention of creativity' (2012), the German cultural theorist does not suggest that the notion of creativity is, or should be, treated as something entirely new - and neither does this thesis. Rather, it seeks to point out how creativity has as of late been promoted as the 'natural' connective tissue between the social structure and subjective agency, and how different 'regimes of novelty' (ibid., p. 20) and their respective aesthetics are (re-)structuring our daily encounter with the world and one another.

As Heubel (2000) notes: "More effectively than any other term, creativity serves to romanticise advanced capitalism" (p. 7, translated LW). This newly forged societal alliance between individual creative output and "cultural-cognitive capitalism" (Scott 2011) is most visibly manifest in urban agglomerations. What Scott (2011) refers to as cultural-cognitive economy has also come to be popularly known as knowledge economy or, most recently, creative economy (the key features of which were presented in the previous chapter). Drawing on regulation theory, Scott (2011) identifies three waves of urbanisation with the last episode, which is still unfolding, being characterised by a post-Fordist shift towards new digital technologies, flexible yet poignantly stratified labour relations, increased inter-city competition and 'creative' clusters and milieus as new sectors and sites of value creation (ibid., p. 300). Thus, the current urban-global economic shifts are deeply interconnected to the rise of the 'creative city' paradigm.

Furthermore, Scott suggests that these shifts are most commonly taking place in global and mega-city regions though similar aspirations and logics are shared by many smaller or less prominent cities (ibid., pp. 291f). This assertion leads me to a third 'root cause' for the persistent popularity of the creative city as global planning paradigm.

Whereas nation states were long the dominant articulators of key trajectories in the global economy, privatisation and deregulation together with a growing (in numbers) and tightening (in quality) informational and social network between urban centres further elevated the city's role as harbinger of social, economic and political innovation (Hall
At this stage, it is important to note that this debate was never about constructing a simplistic dualism of city versus nation state with one trying to curb the power of the other. Rather, it continues to constitute an intricate process of rescaling in which power is continuously shifted, renegotiated and adapted (Brenner 1999; Taylor 2000).

To theoretically acknowledge and empirically capture the growing importance of cities within the world's economic system, Sassen (1991) coined the now seminal term 'global city'. Though Sassen's approach initially only identified three cities as eligible for this status - namely the urban triad of New York, Tokyo and London - a vast body of research has since grown around the concept, and the list of cities with certain 'global city'-attributes was quickly expanded (Knox & Taylor 1995; Beaverstock et al. 1999; Taylor 2000). Apart from the aim to establish a comprehensive classification system, one of the main research interests for global- and world-city scholars became the measuring and mapping of interurban connectivity. In order to address the empirical imbalance between the vast knowledge produced regarding the globalised function of specific urban nodes and their - in comparison - rather understudied relations with one another, scholars - many associated with the Globalising and World Cities Network (GaWC) - have committed themselves to unravelling this "relational network of world cities" (Beaverstock et al. 2000, p. 126).

In addition, over the past couple of years a reinvigorated emphasis on mobilities in urban research has also extended towards global circulations of policy paradigms.

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37 Though the terms global city and world city are often used interchangeably, Sassen decisively opted for the term 'global' instead of 'world' city, in order to emphasize the novelty of the phenomenon. She explains that world city "had precisely the opposite attribute: it referred to a type of city which we have seen over the centuries in earlier periods in Asia and in European colonial centers" (Sassen 2005, p. 28).

38 The most widely known classification system has been developed by the Globalization and World Cities Network under the stewardship of Peter J. Taylor. It comprises three main categories: alpha beta and gamma cities, each including three subcategories. For more refer to www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc/

39 GaWC's data sets - albeit their empirical richness and extensive volume - however fall short in two regards: Firstly, they are only able to measure the quantity but not the quality of these intensifying inter-urban relationships and therefore are in no position to elaborate how these are established and nourished through particular practices and ephemeral events. Secondly, by virtue of their data sources, they are mainly concerned with the relationships between other global cities falling within their own alpha-to-gamma classification scheme. This polarisation between the study of a selected few global or world cities in comparison to the vast number of seemingly inane 'non-global' urban places has been the point of much critique directed towards this line of study. As similar critiques have also been brought forward regarding the creative city, the following Chapter 4 will address the issue of city hierarchies and the resulting difficulties with the dictum of Western 'urban supremacy' in more detail.
(McCann & Ward 2011b; Cochrane & Ward 2012). This so-called "mobility turn" (Urry 2007), not only keeps urban relationality centre stage but also lays bare the limitations of structuralist research approaches, which are deemed less and less capable of capturing the highly spatialized complexity, simultaneity and multiscalarity of contemporary (city)-life that is unravelling itself in the productive dialectic between fixity and flow. Thus, Urry (2007) reminds us that "analyses of the forms in which social relations are 'stretched' across the globe are generating theories, research findings and methods that 'mobilize' [...] analyses of social ordering that are achieved in part on the move and contingently as processes of flows" (p. 6). Broadening the term's applicability, mobility now transcends its association with linear and physical transportation of goods, services and their providers. It rather allows us to think of 'movement' as not necessarily bodily, 'travel' as not having to involve a physical crossing of territory and 'transfer' as non-linear and evanescent. Thus, I argue that recasting the tightening network of interurban relationships against this backdrop opens new possibilities for understanding the multifaceted discourses and practices by which knowledge about the creative city - both codified and tacit - is 'looped' around these rhizomatic connections and becomes grounded in certain cities, while it may bypass others.

In light of this prolific and nuanced theorisation, it is rather unsatisfactory that much of the research on global policy mobilities still implicitly or explicitly frames African cities as little more than a 'knowledge destination', the inert receiving end of pre-packaged policy 'solutions' from elsewhere. Though it cannot be denied that many African municipalities are heavily understaffed and policy innovation gets impeded in many ways, it cannot simply be assumed that urban development models are simply plucked from more resourced cities and uncritically transplanted into the local urban fabric. Rather, as the example of Cape Town's WDC 2014 process shows, local urban governance practices are strongly influenced by networked urban elites, who are able to draw on vast material, intellectual and interpersonal resources and are therefore capable of mixing and matching 'global' ideas to 'local' policies "in an often self-consciously comparative and relational manner" (Cook & Ward 2011, p. 2523). But before these blind spots can be empirically elucidated in part III, they need to be clearly defined. This
chapter closes with this goal in mind and introduces some key theoretical provocations that will allow us to subsequently take on the creative city from the 'global south' in Part II.

3.1 Root cause I: the spread of creativity as social dispositif

"If there is one wish within contemporary culture that exceeds the limits of the comprehensible, it would be the one of not wanting to be creative" (p. 9; translated LW) writes German cultural theorist Andreas Reckwitz in his introduction to The Invention of Creativity - On the process of societal aestheticisation (2012). In the book, Reckwitz dissects the impressive spectrum\(^{40}\) of subjective, economic, spatial and political processes set in motion by the promise of creativity as the new \textit{leitbild} of late-modern societies\(^{41}\).

In connection to the spread of digital media in the 1990s, Appadurai (1996) already identified "\textit{the work of the imagination}" (p. 3; original emphasis) as a constitutive feature of modern subjectivity. Nowadays, such individual creative capacity and with it "creative self-transformation" (ibid., p. 9) have become the indispensable credo for any progress in the 'good society', be it economical (ch. 2.1), political (ch. 2.2), or social (ch. 2.3). Van Osten (2003) refers to this as the "creative imperative" (van Osten 2003, p. 159) and regards it as a problematic normalisation of difference, co-opted by - as Boltanski and Chiapello (1999) call it - \textit{The New Spirit of Capitalism} (2005). However, Reckwitz emphasises that the creative dispositif is made up of both, the imperative to 'be creative' as well as the intrinsic human wish for a meaningful creative existence and aesthetic satisfaction (Reckwitz 2012, p. 314; Bröckling 2006, p. 516).

These authors regard significant shifts in social subjectivities as central to this transformation, epitomised by the new 'stardom' of the artist subject and the growing social 'hype' around of the field of artistic production, which has also reached new heights in Cape Town's city-making discourse (see ch. 5.3.4 and part III). Previously a renegade bohemian dwelling at the margins of society and therefore a reliable source of radical

\(^{40}\) Reckwitz discusses the emergence of creativity in different societal fields, from education and consumption to work, psychology and sexuality. As this thesis is primarily concerned with its urban implications, it will only be able to draw on some key aspects of this very rich discussion.

\(^{41}\) This is not to say that the creative dispositif would constitute a truly postmodern society but actually also plays on the dialectic relationship between modern and postmodern elements of society.
critique, the figure of the artist and its derivatives (musicians, performers, actors and not least designers!) have been turned into the prime representatives of unlimited innovativeness, productive self-marketing and self-motivation, unperturbed ingenuity, infinite passion and expressive individualism - trumped by the mass media regime as unique yet imitable (van Osten 2003, pp. 9f; Reckwitz 2012, pp. 239f). With specific regard to my empirical argument on what I have come to frame as Cape Town's emergent design(er) governmentality (see ch. 8.2), this section discusses the main reasons that undergird this important blurring of values by framing the spread of creativity as a social dispositif with the Kreativsubjekt as a central co-constituting element.

First of all, this prompts the question: If creativity has become a social dispositif, what actually defines this ominous term? The dispositif was coined by French philosopher Michael Foucault who also referred to it as 'apparatus'. He first proposed an - albeit iridescent - definition in a published round-table interview, stating that the dispositif is "a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions – in short, the said as much as the unsaid. Such are the elements of the apparatus. The apparatus itself is the system of relations that can be established between these elements" (Gordon 1980, p. 194). As the list of dispositif elements seems rather inconclusive, scholars from the realm of critical discourse analysis have long grappled with defining them and crafting a viable set of methods.

However, different analytical takes on "the order of discourse" (Foucault 1990) have sometimes been in stark opposition to one another, disagreeing especially on questions of ontology and subjectivity. Though my work cannot attempt to resolve those issues, their most pertinent aspects must be addressed, as the dispositif can be applied as a central theoretical tool for unravelling both creativity and policy as fields through which political, social and cultural transformation can be observed. Thus, I will return to the methodological critiques and stumbling blocks of engaging (with) the dispositif in a governmentality-oriented urban research framework again in chapter 6.

For now, the focus lies on providing a working definition in order to pave the way for grasping the reach of creativity as a dispositif. In turn, the dispositif can be seen as comprising the interplay between discursive (the said) and non-discursive (the unsaid)
practices as well as their materialisations (Glasze & Mattissek 2009). In his *Archaeology of Knowledge* (1969), Foucault emphasises that the discursive is not merely confined to the world of text and speech but actually lives in the act of speaking and the iterative relationships, materialisations and subjectivities inevitably produced by enunciation (Wrana & Langer 2007, p. 4). The dispositif is thus the field inhabited by these "lines of sedimentation", "breakage" "fracture" and "force" (Deleuze 1992, p. 159). A dispositif is inherently a formation based on what Foucault described extensively as the power/knowledge nexus. For him, the dispositif's "major function at a given historical moment [is] that of responding to an urgent need. The apparatus thus has a dominant strategic function" (Gordon 1980, pp. 195; original emphasis). In their recent reader on biopolitics, Campbell and Sitze 2013 see the concept as a bridge between life and politics, as "one of the ways in which their chiasmic intersection is measured, effected, and felt as a strategic 'urgency'" (p. 11). With regards to the question of whether creativity has become a social dispositif, Osborne's (2003) assertion of a popular "doctrine of creativity" (p. 510) insinuates that there is a qualifying strategic demand, formulated within an intellectually and morally driven process. While this argument holds merit, he and others have at the same time cautioned that the dispositif cannot be reduced to mere functionalist tactics or even conscious ideology. Though intentional acts are part of the dispositif, it remains a variegated plurality, its effects ultimately depending on "the interplay between circumstances" (Ploger 2008, p. 54) – an ontological point that my empirical analysis in part III certainly backs.

Moreover, Heubel (2002) makes the important argument that dispositifs not only differ from ideologies through their strong focus on everyday practices and materialities but also through their principle ambivalence: "While 'ideology' clearly designates something as 'wrong', dispositifs [...] link the dichotomy between [...] restraint and enablement, control and production; in a sense they are mutual formulae for freedom and domination" (p. 7; translated LW). Thus, I argue that framing creativity as a dispositif serves a twofold analytical purpose: Firstly, to unmask creativity as representative for manifold, subtle and productive "technologies of power" (Rose 1999, p. 52), but secondly not to simultaneously preclude the possibility for it to

42 However, it has been pointed out that this division can easily be misread as dichotomist categories and that even for Foucault it has at times been an unhelpful and irresolvable paradox (Wrana & Langer 2007, pp. 5f).
spur emancipatory and subversive processes (Heubel 2002, pp. 7f). In the case of the creativity dispositif, it is thus important to emphasise that while its genealogy and effectiveness can be meticulously described, creativity and aesthetics are also socially laden with affect, emotion, and normativity, thus rendering an objective analysis impossible (Reckwitz 2012, p. 17). This expands Foucault's conceptual deliberations, as he concludes that in order for a dispositif to form and prevail, it not only relies on hegemonic effects of power but just as much on cultural imaginaries that promise satisfaction and fascination, i.e. a persistent affective allure (ibid., p. 51).

What holds the dispositif together as an - albeit fragile - social formation is the conjuncture of its various social segments under a certain order of knowledge. Reckwitz (2012) identifies four such segments, which I have also come to find in my own research on Cape Town's WDC 2014 process: (1) practices and everyday technologies guided by implicit, often tacit, knowledge; (2) forms of the discursive production of truth, imaginaries and social problematisations; (3) certain constellations of artefacts such as architecture, media and infrastructure; and lastly (4) different patterns of subjectivization (p. 49). In arranging these different societal fields, the dispositif is "transversal" (ibid.) but not totalitarian. Though it builds upon, joins with and absorbs other dispositifs, it also competes with and displaces other existing social value systems, beliefs and dispositions. And moreover, what also links in well with recent theoretical advances on relational urbanism (see ch. 4) is that the dispositif presents itself as a highly processual form of social ordering, which responds to a specific historical, path-dependent and local constellation in space and time (ibid., p. 50).

But how did the dispositif of creativity actually come about? In a necessary generalisation and against the backdrop of European Enlightenment in whose wake the term 'creativity' first gained popular currency, four phases can be discerned: preparation, dispersed formation, critical consolidation and finally, hegemonialisation (ibid., pp. 52f). For the dispositif of creativity, the first characteristic preparatory stage was the emergence of a distinct artistic field from the end of the 18th until the end of the 19th century. In this time, a bourgeoisie audience for art developed alongside increasing attention and social recognition for ingenuous 'creative' inventions. From 1900 until the 1960s, the second formative phase occurs in its dispersed yet subliminally connected manner: Niche
practices and fragmented discourses unravel around the new socioeconomic fields of fashion, design and advertisement while creativity takes centre stage in the realm of psychology through research on intelligence and self-growth. In addition, mass media develops a systematic interest in star artists, while avant-garde movements oppose the confinement of creativity to the persona of the 'artist genius' and set out to democratise the notion of authorship. The third phase of the creativity dispositif's critical consolidation takes place between the 1960s and 70s within the realm of counter cultures, youth subcultures and international political protests, in combination prompting a radical popularisation of some of these previously marginal discourses and niche practices. From the 1980s, the fourth and on-going phase leads the notion of creativity to its new hegemonic status with the already described signifying powers of the creative industries, an extensive psychological self-help regime, the seemingly arbitrary system of media stardom, globally commodified aesthetic and symbolic economies, and - most importantly for my argument - the tenacity of the creative imperative in urban policy discourses (ibid., p. 52ff).

Though the creativity dispositif on the one hand emphasises the universalism of human creativity, it is on the other hand often strategically linked to concrete performance requirements. This creates a conflict-prone paradox: Though everybody is potentially creative, not everyone is able to realise this potential (ibid., p. 346). In consequence, social marginalisation seems to occur due to a single, simple reason: a lack of creativity. Or translated into Cape Town's popular 'design(er) city' logic of the day: "You either design…or resign" (M'Rithaa, event transcript 01 December 2012).

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43 One of the most prominent examples is Andy Warhol's 'art factory' studio where he employed dozens of painters, writers, sculptors and performers to realise his artistic projects. Thus, many of his most important works remain disputed in terms of authorship and originality, often determined in costly legal battles. An interesting situation given that Warhol's works were often a direct response to the increasingly blurred lines between art and consumerism (for example his famous screen print of an oversized Campbell's Tomato Soup can, 1986).

44 This can be exemplified with emerging musical scenes such as Pop, Rock and most notably Punk as a movement that combined political opposition with distinct performances, fashion and self-realisation.

45 This lack of creativity can then again be spun in a way that it falls back on personal responsibility. McRobbie's observation of precarious labour in the creative industries and yet a lack of resistance against this state of affairs makes a similar argument: "Self-blame, where social structures are increasingly illegible or opaque, serves the interests of the new capitalism well, ensuring the absence of social critique" (McRobbie 2002, p. 521).
In conclusion, the creativity dispositif is stabilised and expanded through the following interconnected social dynamics: a prevalence of symbolic capitalism enshrined in the globalised design and experience economy, continued medialization and with it a rising competition for consumer attention; increasing political awareness that has identified human creativity as a key resource for growth and development; and lastly a perpetual emphasis on creative self-expression as the ultimate measure of emotional fulfilment (ibid., p. 367). It is important to note however, that Reckwitz follows Gramsci in referring to this process as 'hegemonization' (instead hegemony in absolute terms) in order to also acknowledge the possibility for modes of subversion and "terrains of resistance" (Routledge 1993) against the mobilisation of a neoliberal Kreativsubjekt.

3.1.1 The Kreativsubjekt

In order to be able to critically reflect on the popular dynamics of urban neoliberalisation commonly inferred by creative city logics, I argue that it is also vital to understand the underlying social issues and contestation around the Kreativsubjekt as the central form of subjectivation forged within the realm of the creative dispositif. Creativity as an individual and social process cannot live nor thrive without a creative subject as its 'host': "Creativity is tied to the human potential to bring into being something new. Its basis is, first, the power of imagination as the capacity to make the absent present; and second, building upon this, fantasy as the capacity to bring into being the as of yet inexistent" (Bröckling 2006, p. 513; translated LW). However, creativity also remains highly contingent and unpredictable in its occurrence (ibid., p. 514).

Nonetheless, over the past century, we have witnessed an unparalleled and accelerated expansion of inventions, innovations and new artefacts and - as Latour (1994) calls them - hybrid "quasi-objects" which are at the same time cultural and material (pp. 51f). This also went along with an increase in self-actualisation and self-referentiality, starting with individualistic semantics in the late 18th century and leading to new contemporary psychologies of self-growth and self-management (Reckwitz 2012, p. 38).

In a tongue-in-cheek remark Bröckling (2006) notes that, though Creatio ex nihilo only exists as a divine act, creativity as a form of secularised human capacity has not been entirely taken over by rationalisation: "Invocations of creativity always have something of the supplicatory prayer about them: Veni creator spiritus" (p. 513).
In seeing creativity construed as a "learnable competence" (Bröckling 2006, p. 516) Bröckling concurs with this view and drawing on Marx ads: "In this sense, creativity is 'general labour', the innovative side of general intellect and, as such, a direct productive force (Marx, 1894/1969, p. 114)." Leaving behind the serendipitous artistic ingenuity and recasting creativity a reproductive force of the social is one of the core ontological shifts that characterise the dispositif of creativity. But what does this mean for the emergence of the Kreativsubjekt?

The move from pathologising to promoting creativity also needs to be seen against broader biopolitical coercions and societal depoliticisation that have already been shrewdly described as causing a "crisis of the subject" (Dzudzek & Strüver 2013, p. 147; also Dzudzek 2013). Furthermore, it has been suggested that technologies of 'creative' subjectivities could be divided into three general imperatives: micro-logics of changing social perceptions, expansion of ostensibly creative everyday practices and creativity as mechanism for garnering public attention (Reckwitz 2012, p. 228). Over time, these have all helped to further blur the lines between the artistic and the entrepreneurial subject, with creativity being increasingly forged as a "form of capital in its own right" (Osborne 2003, p. 523).

While in the 1950s creativity was still framed as a key aspect of predetermined intelligence, it has since evolved into a cognitive value, an intrinsic core competency for the knowledge economy which can systematically grow and mine the creative problem-solving skills of the individual (Osborne 2003, p. 508; Reckwitz 2012, pp. 222f). Here, popular psychology converges with management literature, producing titles such as Me Inc - How to master the business of being you (Ventrella 2007) or the Harvard Business Review's Managing for Creativity (Florida et al. 2005), a dogmatic guideline for turning managers into 'creatives' for a "graceful transition into the creative age" (p. 8).

The common belief undergirding these publication was that 'rationalist' and 'bureaucratic' approaches to organisational culture had for too long caged the creative enterprise of the individual worker, whose productivity was ostensibly decreasing due to

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47 This went along with the pathologising of creativity as the artist was seen as the other by mainstream society, dwelling on its margins and from time to time pulled in for inspiration and innovation (Heubel 2002; Reckwitz 2012).

48 This also connects to recent debates on performative politics of the body (Strüver 2011). This topic has however been comparatively underexplored in relation to the production of creative city logics (for an exception see Zuckerwise 2012).
the lack of meaning and purpose. The response to this lamentable situation (in the eyes of capitalism) was the reconfiguration of management practice from 'locking in' to unlocking creativity (Salaman 1997; Clark & Salaman 1998). As we will see, in Cape Town, the idea of creating a legion of active (and self-reliant) Kreativsubjekte is most prominently enshrined in the notion of 'design thinking', which is being vigorously promoted as a learnable 'technique' to urban governance practitioners and the local citizenry alike (see ch. 8.2).

As both Frank (1997) and Bilton (2010) note, 'manageable creativity' thus evolved from a paradoxical chimera to a core mantra for progressive business culture via the convolution with an emerging advertisement industry since the 1960s that catapulted notions of 'cool' and 'hip' straight into corporate boardrooms. In this vein, Bilton (2010) distinguishes between an individualistic notion of creativity, epitomised in the figure of the 'eccentric business maverick' (he references Steve Jobs as an example) and a more sociocultural conception of creativity that is dispersed and networked (p. 256).

The core characteristics of 'heroic' creativity are especially prone to modern management practice as it focuses mainly on ideation - providing the creative 'spark' - and can ostensibly only be found in a limited number of exceptional individuals, organisations and places, which by default creates both a hierarchy and a clear-cut trajectory for transformation: "Individual creativity is the cause; collective transformation is the effect" (ibid., p. 258). As part III elaborates, a similar trickle-down logic also permeates Cape Town's emergent design(er) governmentality as the figure of the designer is perpetually enunciated as expert 'problem-solver' and heroic custodian of said 'design thinking'.

In his critical analysis of self-management literature, Bröckling (2004) draws upon a telling quote that exemplifies another key biopolitical logic of the self-entrepreneurial creative within the creativity dispositif: "Be someone selected...or you'll be rejected"

49 Though Bilton (2010) points out that it is unresolved whether this shift is merely a superficial adoption of language, clothes and attitude or a genuine shift of general business ethos (p. 258).
50 In an elucidating argument that draws on August Compte's Church of Humanity as well as religious mythology Sørensen 2008 traces how the entrepreneur is stylized into a religious figure, 'saving' our world through performing "the tale of creativity" as a semi mystical function (p. 91) Though the rootedness of creativity in religious connotations is hereby acknowledged, they cannot be further elaborated in this space. For further reading see Arieti (1976); Apostolos-Cappadona (1995); Sørensen (2008) and Heubel (2002)
51 This convergence can, for example, be observed in the new psycho-technology of consulting as profession on the rise in virtually all economic sectors. For more on the subject of consulting and the 'consulting subject' see Traue (2010).
(Peters 2000, p. 8 quoted in Bröckling 2004, p. 30, translated LW). Consequentially, where there used to be fear of not conforming to society's mores and values, in the age of creativity this has been altered into the fear of not being able to distinguish one's self, not to stand out in the crowd: "The duress of otherness has superseded the furore of homogenisation" (Bröckling 2003, p. 36, translated LW). Thus, a 'good' creative subject excels in the field of self-marketing by means of its "expressive individuality" (Reckwitz 2012, pp. 239f) - an exercise more or less successfully displayed daily on popular television and other media outlets, where stars and starlets struggle for recognition in the face of society's ever-shortening attention span. Regardless, the Kreativsubjekt is simultaneously presented as sovereign in its longing for positive affectivity, as it ostensibly seeks satisfaction from the constant reproduction of the new and seemingly 'authentic'.

Yet the figure of a sovereign homo creativus, which rationally acts on its creative habitus, is not only highly questionable and also morally untenable. Because "[...] creativity is a value which, though we may believe we choose it ourselves, may in fact make us complicit with what today might be seen as the most conservative of norms: compulsory individualism, compulsory 'innovation', compulsory performativity and productiveness, the compulsory valorization of the putatively new" (Osborne 2003, p. 507). In consequence, if the creative subject is coerced into its creativity and creativity has become normalised as everyone's everyday practice, alternatives to creativity seem hard to come by. This was certainly not what Foucault (1984) had in mind when he critiqued that the label of creativity was too often confined to objects: "But couldn't everyone's life become a work of art? Why should the lamp or the house be an art object, but not our life?" (2010b, p. 350) According to Rose (1999), for Foucault, aesthetic politics were not something like today's celebration of individual dandyism (or the reincarnation of the bohemian under the 'hipster'-label Frank (2000)) but rather an invitation to creative experimentation. What he did not and probably could not foresee was the popular reduction of creative self-actualisation to notions of consumerist narcissism and neoliberal managerialism (Rose 1999, p. 282).

In sum, what I want to take away from this rich seam of critical literature on the contemporary creative imperative (see further Thrift 2000; Osborne 2003; van Osten 2003; Bröckling 2006; Peck 2005) for my own analysis is a recognition for the ever-increasing convolution of culture and commercialisation with the former often seen
as subsumed by the latter. The subject is no longer only in the market place but becomes itself a place of marketing (Bröckling 01.06.2012).

Though particularly orthodox Marxist and structuralist analyses of this subjective transformation would suggest that this is, yet again, a rather definitive and inescapable onslaught of capitalist co-optation disguised in the fuzzy pink coat of creativity, others challenge this universal paralysis of "creative destruction" (Schumpeter & Bottomore 1976) in favour of more nuanced assessments. Ultimately, they believe in and argue for potential spaces of hope, be it in the form of defiance and subversion (Horn & Bröckling 2002; Novy & Colomb 2012; Dzudzek 2013), agonistic pluralism and radical democracy (Mouffe 1992, 1999), "rebel cities" (Harvey 2012) or "vernacular creativity" (Edensor et al. 2009). As much as creativity in its current use often seems to back agendas of neoliberalisation, it also still remains a possible tool for emancipation or, as de Certeau (1988) has called it, a potential "weapon of the weak" (p. 127). The research presented over the course of the next chapters thus seeks to stand on the shoulders of some of these prolific critical social theorists and further explore their ideas in an endeavour to apprehend and provincialize the creative city nexus from the perspective of contemporary Cape Town.

3.1.2 The Kreativsubjekt as 'creative class'?

Based on the above argument, it can be said that as much as the formation of the "entrepreneurial self" (Bröckling 2007) has corresponded to the phenomenon of the "entrepreneurial city" (Harvey 2001; Mattissek 2008), the creative subject has also been pivotal to the emergence and proliferation of the contemporary creative city script (Landry 2000; see chapter 3.1). That both these subjectivities find strong resonance within the proclaimed age of creativity and often overlap in urban neoliberalisation processes is evidenced by neologisms such as the "culturepreneur"52 (Lange 2007). But within the dispositif of creativity, it is not only creative subjectivity in all its forms that can and must be governed. In the past decade, city governments have realised the possibility of

52 For Lange (2006) 'culturepreneurs' are defined as "start-up-entrepreneurs in local cultural industries [who] practice new forms of social networking, in order to invent products on a highly flexible market" (p. 23).
governing 'through' creativity\(^53\) (Dzudzek 2013), i.e. invoking it in the name of place-making, place-branding and place-marketing as well as social cohesion, job creation and, particularly in the case of so-called 'developing' countries, poverty alleviation.

As I have already laid out in the previous chapter, the notion of the "creative class" (Florida 2002c, Florida 2005a) as a "travelling truth" (Peck 2005, p. 767) has been central to this endeavour. In turn, as the 'creative class' hypothesis builds on the assumption, that the individual *Kreativsubjekt* congregates in a spatialized collective of like-minded individuals, I argue that it has worked as a complementary governmental technique to geographically anchor the above-mentioned biopolitics of creativity. In other words, the creative class hinges directly on the emerging *Kreativsubjekt* as ideal denizen of late-modern cityscapes\(^54\).

Nonetheless, the relationship between creativity, subjectivity, local state institutions and built urban form still remains full of contention as has been shown by many contributions focusing on the role of artists in urban development and regeneration (Ley 2003; Markusen et al. 2006; Miles 2007; Paquette 2008; Markusen & Gadwa 2010). From a British context, Miles (2007) unpacks these contradictions in culture-led and bohemia-focused urban renewal projects: On the one hand, he clearly sees the danger of culture being domesticated and instrumentalised for political and economic ends, but on the other hand he also provides tangible examples of how artists are able to formulate and drive counter-hegemonic "cultural dissidence" (p. 13) in the city. He is cautiously hopeful when describing spontaneous forms of artistic and cultural expression in urban development as something that might be able "to open critical thinking, to widen the cracks in systems of power, including the cultural economy, and to expose contradictions while indicating that there are alternatives" (ibid., p. 24).

\(^53\) This opportunistic notion of "governing through" should not be confused with what will later be discussed as a "studying through" approach, proposed by policy anthropologists as a methodological approach for understanding urban governance (see chapter 4).

\(^54\) Again, it needs to be emphasised that the creative class is, of course, not a carefully observed sociological theorisation, but in essence an economic development rationale. This ill-fitted conflation has been repeatedly criticised for its nebulous concept of creativity that affirms class-based and neoliberal social concepts and has led to a narrow idealisation of an atomised, autonomous *homo creativus*, whose creative class consciousness and shared lifestyle preferences inform exclusionary social practices and gentrification (Peck 2005, p. 746; Krätke 2010, p. 836; see also chapter 2.2).
That creative city programmes could offer opportunities beyond mere financial gain, if they took these kinds of social and political critique serious as an "artistic dividend" (p. 380), is the point driven home by Markusen and Gadwa (2010). However, the way in which artists have been framed in different creative city tropes has so far remained unsatisfyingly dualistic. Considering my own research experience with active subversions of Cape Town's creative-cum-design(er) city nexus (see further ch. 8.2.5), I support Borén and Young's (2012) differentiated insertion that "viewing artists as either inner-city and diversity enthusiasts [...] or as individualized dupes complicit in the reshaping of the neoliberalized city [...] does nothing to probe their role in struggles over urban form and social welfare. Similarly, it does little to inform us of their relationship to 'creative city' policies and policymakers. [...] Many artists are politically progressive, theoretically informed and critical of urban development and elite visions of the city. However, they also have to make a living. [...] Cultural producers are often aware of cultural policy and the rhetoric around 'creativity', subverting it for their own ends (e.g. to gain funding for projects and salaries while simultaneously critiquing the direction urban policy is taking)" (pp. 1807f). This argument has also been supported by some of the recent civic protests that have galvanised around creative city-branded projects (Forkert 2013, p. 161). In fact, resistance movements borrowing from Henry Lefebvre in demanding a right to the (creative) city, like in the case of Hamburg's Gängeviertel or on the banks of Berlin's river Spree, have seen and benefited from a significant involvement of critical artists and cultural producers (Scharenberg & Bader 2009; Novy & Colomb 2012). This development supports Harvey's (2001) hunch that the political stance of this 'cultural mass' is not inconsequential as artists' voices have often been at the most powerful ones in revolutionary politics (p. 94).

In sum, it is not about trying to decide whether creative practitioners are an opportunistic avant-garde or a rebellious lot of do-gooders with a constant crisis of conscience. Rather the Kreativsubjekt (specifically from the 'Southern' urban perspective presented in chapter 4) needs to be accepted as 'both/and': mobilised as much by the need for self-validation and a meaningful life as by economic reward through the production of symbolic goods, and simultaneously enabled and constrained by its integration into policy, corporate interests and spatial transformation. What this shows however is, how powerfully our cultural imaginaries and social practices are being geared toward cultural-economic production, self-creation and the perpetual experience of the putatively
new in a creativity-prone way of life (Reckwitz 2012, p. 367; see also Amin & Thrift 2007).

The "many practical and personal dilemmas which arise in the nexus between capitalist globalization, local political-economic developments and the evolution of cultural meaning and aesthetic values" (Harvey 2001, p. 93) thus demand not only to be merely acknowledged but further investigated as a powerful dynamic shaping the 'variegated logics' of localised creative city strategies (Brenner et al. 2010). Also, when looking at the current dynamics of urban culturalisation as an important social field within the larger dispositif, the urban artistic and 'creative' scene should not be regarded in isolation.

In fact, as chapter 5 shows and part III empirically sustains, it constitutes but one of the many collective agents that make up this conflicting theatre of operations: post-materialistic middle-classes, academics and planning 'gurus', cultural tourists, an increased emphasis on aesthetic and symbolic consumption, locally and globally networked creative business clusters and of course a growing emphasis on cultural regeneration, festivalization, spectacle and place-branding in urban politics are all part of the bigger analytical picture (Reckwitz 2012, p. 287).

Alas, the example of the contradictory role played by artists and cultural practitioners in urban development also exemplifies the bespoke crisis of the contemporary Kreativsubjekt: "On the one hand, creativity is meant to be mobilized and set free; on the other hand, it is meant to be controlled and reined in" (Bröckling 2006, p. 514). It also constitutes the core dialectic of the dispositif of creativity, where a romantic assumption of creativity as universal good continuously clashes with the multiplicity of its relational emplacement and situated performance in socio-politically structured urban spaces. As we shall see in the case of Cape Town's politics of becoming the WDC 2014, this tension can be diametrically traced across various social spheres - from the private to the public and from the individual to the collective (see part III).
3.2 Root cause II: cultural globalisation and shifting urban economies

The previous chapter showed that some reasons for the manifold replication and global perseverance of the creative city paradigm can be found in the ways in which subject positions are being produced and framed within an emergent social dispositif of creativity. Another important field within said dispositif, which has been instrumental for helping the creative city narrative to 'take off' and keep 'flying' is the sphere of urban political economies. Hence, in understanding the creative city paradigm as a reaction to structural economic and political ground shifts (rather than as a genuinely new and progressive action), it is also essential to tease out some of the connections between this policy "syndrome" (Peck 2012) and recent dynamics between cultural globalisation and an urbanised knowledge economy.

As I have already laid out in the discussion of cultural and creative industries (see chapter 2.1.), an ever-growing range of goods and services have become 'culturalized'55. According to Lash and Urry (1994, p. 64), this means that "they are deliberately and instrumentally inscribed with particular meaning and associations as they are produced and circulated in a conscious attempt to generate desire for them amongst the end-users". That this new "economy of signs and symbols" (ibid.) has been accompanied by a rise in what they then called "cultural intermediary occupations" - nowadays better known as 'creative class', cultural workers, or simply 'creatives' - has already been reflected upon in the previous section. Thus, in order not to repeat myself, I want to focus more specifically on the place of globalised cultural economy as a particularly urban rendition. This is, of course, not to wrongly assert that it is exclusively confined to cities. In fact, it has been widely noted that, following the ontology of new urbanism, the 'urban question' cannot be addressed in an essentialist manner, as people and places reflexively script each other (Amin & Thrift 2002, p. 23).

Within this theoretical contest, the following argument taps into the rich body of literature that investigates the powerful systematic impact of the cultural economy on cities and city-regions (Gibson & Kong 2005; Du Gay 2006; Anheier & Isar 2008; Jessop

55 The continually high academic interest in cultural perspectives must nonetheless remain mindful of the "culturalism" trap that leads to over-generalisation and risks to conceal important cultural differences DiMaggio 1994.
& Oosterlynck 2008; Jessop 2010). For, as Amin and Thrift (2007) have put it, the urban is deeply implicated in narrating a plethora of 'trendy' economic mantras such as 'green', 'smart', 'sustainable' and, of course, 'creative'. Hence, it provides a useful vantage point - a "visual laboratory" - from which to observe the various overlays and interactions between different political cultural economy impulses (p. 147).

In as much as economic enterprises are imbued with cultural imperatives and vice versa, so too have contemporary city development strategies become the hot frontier of cultural policy - previously a formal concern for national governments (and a minor one in that), which has seen considerable socio-political rescaling (Grodach & Silver 2013). "Culture is now seen as the magic substitute for all the lost factories and warehouses, and as a device that will create a new urban image, making the city more attractive to mobile capital and mobile professional workers" (Hall 2000, p. 640). Hall's statement highlights three key points: First, that this 'cultural turn' in urban policy is commonly informed by a utilitarian reading of culture: culture as a means to an end rather than an end in itself. That this narrow normative conception of culture as a panacea for the harsh social restructuring caused by de-industrialisation comes with a whole host of possible traps from fierce identity politics to unbridled neoliberalisation has been repeatedly expressed (Harvey 2001; McCann 2002; Gibson & Klocker 2005; Amin & Thrift 2007, p. 150; Miles & Hall 2008; Edensor et al. 2009; Pratt 2011). Secondly though, it makes the important point that culture as logic of urban development in the age of the knowledge economy is both shaping and being shaped by multiple global mobilities - not only of capital, but also of people, ideas and artifacts. Thirdly, the city is not only a place of cultural consumption but has also been rendered a cultural good in its own right with the 'urban experience' as a major unique selling proposition that is inherently connected to the growing shift towards tertiary service sectors (Zukin 1995; Getz 2008). With regards to the cultural economic politics of

56 This 'cultural turn' should not be confused with its poststructuralist namesake and its ensuing academic debates in humanities and social science, which is based on more nuanced conceptualisations of culture and economy (see for example Werlen 2003; Castree 2004; Jessop & Oosterlynck 2008).
57 Cultural and creative products can be divided into highly movable goods (such as films, photographic images, recorded music) and highly immovable ones, bound to certain spaces and temporalities (such as cultural events or in situ installations and performances). Nonetheless, this does not mean that the first category cannot be temporarily fixed in place (for example in film festivals or exhibitions) or that the second category cannot be mobilized, as it is often captured in images and text that reflect on the experience (art catalogues, blog posts, photo essays). Undisputedly, this cycle is tightly connected to difficult questions on cultural trade, commodification and consumption (Harvey 2001, p. 95).
local urban development in Cape Town, it is thus vital to keep in mind, that meaning-making and place-making always occur simultaneously and within an entangled and complicated web of global and local, individual and structural power dynamics. But what are the concrete lineages running between the cultural economy of cities and the contemporary focus on wanting to plan (for) urban creativity?

First of all, quasi-ubiquitous globalisation dynamics have been brought about by the diffusion of a new socio-technological paradigm, poignantly described by Castells (2009) as the *Network Society*. Rather than describing this reform of social organisation merely as an augmented ability to produce knowledge and information, the reinvigoration of networks as dominant organisational form points to the ever-accelerating and increasingly digital and virtual ways in which these are circulated. The logics of the rhizomatic network permeate societies worldwide and have had a huge impact on the visibility of cultural expression and the transnational circulation of cultural commodities (Crang et al. 2003). Appadurai (1996) describes this cultural dimension of globalisation as a continuous flow of difference and disjunction between the spheres - or ‘-scapes’ as he calls them - of subject positions, digital technologies, disorganised capital, media and information complexes, and competing ideologies.

Cities as the key spatial intersections of people, cultures, business and knowledge have been particularly favoured by this development and have become the primary playing field for the multiple economies of cultural mobilisation (Amin & Thrift 2002; Gotham 2005). Though here, it is worthwhile to extend Castell's (2005) sensible caveat, that the contemporary network society does not include all people (p. 5). In a similar vein it can be argued that the global cultural economy does not touch upon all cities in the same way. Certain types of cities - namely the handful of emblematic 'global' cities - have been regarded as the beacons of cultural capital exchange and production, as they offer access to various hallmark financial and political institutions, a rich, diverse and top tier labour market, as well as 'world-class' public amenities (Sassen 1991; Knox & Taylor 1995; Taylor 2003; Yeoh 2005). Furthermore, cultural and creative industries are inherently project-based and thus by default heavily reliant on space-bound, ad hoc networks with

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58 Appadurai (1996) defines five dimensions through which we can observe global currents of cultural flow, namely ethnoscapes, mediascapes, finanscapes, technoscapes, and ideoscapes. He uses the suffix ‘-scapes’ to highlight their irregular shapes as well as our situated and subjective angles of analysis (p. 33).
collaborators, clients and audiences (Grabher 2002), especially in the so called 'star'-markets - the upper echelons of creative capital networks that cluster in and connect between a selected few cultural 'headquarters' and niche hubs worldwide (Currid-Halkett & Ravid 2012). The result is that only a limited number of particularly visible, powerful and globally networked agglomerations are deemed capable of relying profoundly on the merits of their cultural and creative industries to sustain their economic growth - a hypothesis highly affirmative of repeatedly proposed global city hierarchies and ensuing uneven geographical development. In consequence, the concentration of creative industry actors within the world's urban system is stratified yet selective, making it hard to easily replicate the success of long-established cultural economy clusters (Krätke 2011, p. 201).

One of the most notorious examples for such a globally privileged hub of cultural production is Hollywood and its multi-billion dollar film industry (Scott 2000). Some have identified the American 'Dream Factory' as the prime culprit for dumping down local popular culture in favour of hegemonic, mind-numbing and all-encompassing 'Americanisation' (Jameson 2000; Beck et al. 2003). But others, particularly those concerned with anthropologies of globalisation, have argued that cultural homogenisation does not replace local diversity but that it is the tension-laden encounter between the two that ultimately yields new hybrid forms of cultural reception and performance (Inda & Rosaldo 2008). Cowen (2002) for example claims that, as Hollywood cinema has built its imaginary from its outset on inspirations, impressions and people from around the world, it is as much a cosmopolitan project than an American one (p. 5). Latching onto this argument, Hartley et al. (2012) even regard such continuous re-visioning as one of the creative economy's key concepts, as it embodies change and transformation, thus unlocking possibilities for an unforeseen emergence of cultural innovation (pp. 53f). Another development that merits this claim comes again from the film sector: Though Hollywood remains the producer of the most popular and capital-intensive movies, both India's glitzy Bollywood as well as Nigeria's largely low-cost, home-produced Nollywood have outranked the United States in terms of the number of productions, establishing themselves, if not (yet) as economic, then at least as transnational cultural counterweights (Mishra 2013; Krings & Okome 2013). Furthermore, an increasing number of so called 'runaway productions' leave the Hollywood hills in search of lower production costs and
fresh sceneries, bringing with them the possibility of fostering the establishment of alternative film hubs (Scott 2006, p. 14). As the Nigerian film market is largely sustained by local productions for local consumption, the African city that probably benefits the most from such satellite film production coming from the US and Europe is Cape Town. It is thus not surprising that the film industry has also played a significant role within the city's earliest creative city politics (see chapters 5.3.2 & 7.1).

Another type of image production, in which global cinematic representation has certainly played an important role, is the making and marketing of cities in the process of cultural globalisation. For Harvey (2001, 2009) the cultural commodification of place and urban entrepreneurialism are co-constitutive and furthermore embodied in the growing importance of city branding and benchmarking strategies. As the field for interurban competition has shifted from uniform, mass-producing factories to 'authentic' cultural assets and world-class tourist attractions, cities are investing heavily to redirect capital flows through growing and promoting their unique "marks of distinction" (ibid., p. 102). Again, global cities like New York, Paris and London are regarded as key locations for the generation and dissemination of popular lifestyle images (Krätke 2011, p. 153). They are framed as the brand leaders of the urban, "symptomatic cities" (Amin & Thrift 2007, p. 153), who, through both policies and cultural actions, formulate the benchmark against which other cities are measured and measure themselves (Larner & Le Heron 2004). As a reaction to this increasing competitive pressure - also exemplified by the explosive growth of international city rankings (Amin & Thrift 2002, p. 74) - branding has become a universal phenomenon for any cultural urban regeneration endeavour (Franke 2002; Evans 2003; Kavaratzis & Ashworth 2005; Rantisi & Leslie 2006; Dinnie 2011).

The city marketing staples range from physical interventions such as contemporary art museums, waterfront entertainment complexes and iconic 'star'-architecture, to more temporal events and performances. Again, their spectrum is large and includes anything from spontaneous, ephemeral enactments of local customs and traditions to planned, corporate international mega-events like world EXPOs, Olympic Games or 'cultural', 'design', 'green' or 'smart' city accolades (Smith 2012; 59 See Krüger and Buckingham (2009) for a further exploration of the recent conjunctures of creative city script with urban sustainability narratives.)
Vanolo 2013). The creative city paradigm generally inscribes and combines both, a certain degree of hard-branding through 'brick-and-mortar' manifestations coupled with soft-edged interventions around public participation and cultural citizenship (Pratt 2011; see also chapter 2.3.2).

While Scott (1997, p. 32) maintains that the outputs of urban cultural-cognitive capitalism - including urban marketing - are not arbitrary but always bear a determinate relationship to their local social milieus of production, Harvey (2009, pp. 105f) cautions, that the collective symbolic capital of cities is continuously in danger of perishing by its own success. He uses the example of Barcelona - then as much as now one of the most prominent 'best practice' examples for creative city policies (Dodd 2008; Gonzalez 2011) - to problematize this 'cultural fix' in urban development practice. In the Catalan city, the pressure of monopoly rent-seeking capital has led to indistinguishable postmodern waterfront developments, spurred gentrification and pushed the limits of existing transport infrastructure - all at the cost of the historic urban fabric. In its worst aesthetic uniform, such "disneyfication" can erase exactly those marks of distinction that it was supposed to showcase and compliment (Harvey 2009, pp. 105f).

In relation to the current creative city debate, Pratt (2011) has grimly echoed this concern in stating that there is a large gap between the imagined creative city ideal of carefully balanced production, distribution and consumption, and the "actually existing creative city" (p. 123), which was all too often solely operationalised around symbolic consumption, thus lacking redistributive outcomes and failing to leverage local assets while simultaneously slowly obliterating them. Even though, as one of the scholars that have put urban creative economy firmly on the research agenda60, he does not fully dismiss the creative city paradigm, he sees many of its contemporary renditions not as the silver bullet for urban renaissance but as little more than a "neo-liberal hell" (ibid., p. 128).

And lastly, Amin and Thrift (2007) lament, that a spotlight on urban cultural spectacle simultaneously casts a long and obscuring shadow on the everyday city, whose complicated realities now appear as the inane and undesirable 'other' and are in turn

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Gibson and Klocker (2004) and Gibson (2012) have commented extensively on the role of academia as an integral part of the creative economy. They argue that the heightened scholarly attention has actually done its bit to produce the creative economy in its current form, "as if it really were a component of the economy existing out there and just waiting to be documented and analysed" (Gibson 2012, p. 286).
relegated to physical and mental confinement on the urban margins\textsuperscript{61} (Amin & Thrift 2007, p. 152).

The ways in which cultural perspectives have been invigorated in city-making endeavours through the funnel of creative city strategies present themselves as a double-edged sword. On the one hand, many studies have documented how cultural economy initiatives and urban creativity programmes have been simply used as unobtrusive and readily available add-ons for cash-strapped municipalities with a growing stock of empty warehouses and factories to continue forging ahead on the well-trodden path of privatisation and urban boosterism (Gibson & Kong 2005; Peck 2010; Yeoh 2005; Krätke 2010; Peck 2012; Wyly 2013). Without negating the multiplicity of resulting detrimental effects - from social exclusion through the backing of elitist, property-driven urban visions to the caging and homogenisation of cultural expression, all of which continue to beg socio-political critique - it is worthwhile pointing out that the interaction of culture and economy does not inevitably lead to a complete colonisation of the former by the latter (Mommaas 2004).

Though capital has indeed tirelessly searched for and found ways to extract monetary value from cultural difference and local aesthetics, these opportunities would seize to exist if they were to be erased by too overt attempts of homogenisation and formalisation: "And if capital is not to totally destroy the uniqueness that is the basis for the appropriation of monopoly rents [...] (and there are many circumstances where it has done just that and been roundly condemned for so doing) then it must support a form of differentiation and allow for divergent and to some degree uncontrolled local cultural developments that can be antagonistic to its own smooth functioning" (Harvey 2001, p. 108). Even for radical scholars like Harvey, in a close-up perspective, cracks appear in the seemingly solid cast of accelerating global capitalism, which in turn open up a space for potential subversion and alternative urbanisms. Furthermore, it is helpful to note, that though creative industries are also intrinsically "city industries" (Krätke 2011, p.\textsuperscript{62} However, they also put this critique into perspective by soberly remarking that "[…] the core insight offered by the cultural-economy perspective regarding the current momentum to enact the economy via selling urban culture is to explain how even the most implausible and flawed new economic promises come to persuade, stick and guide future action" (ibid., p. 153). This implies the need to go beyond a mere critique of popular urban development paradigms - albeit irremissible as a first step - and actually go on to scrutinise the array of political logics and governmental practices set in motion through the local grounding and retrofitting of such global urban planning ideals. It thus also speaks to recent demands for a more generative mode of critique (McFarlane 2011a; Roy & Ong 2011), an impetus which I seek to follow in my subsequent analysis of Cape Town's creative city planning complex and the evolving aesthetic politics.\textsuperscript{85}
they only constitute some of the multiple "worlds of creativity" (ibid., p. 198), which inhabit and populate a city. Hence, the creative economy has to be seen in the light of an increasingly cosmopolitan world. To paraphrase Scott (2006), a transnational, networked creative urban economy has the ability to combine skills, ideas and capacities from various places and increase opportunities for interaction and exchange, whose benefits can hardly be reduced to and simply measured in terms of return on investment (p. 13).

This perspective, which focuses on the city as place of cultural economic interaction and intermediation, resonates strongly with recent thinking about the importance of socio-cultural performativity in the making of markets (Amin & Thrift 2007; Berndt & Boeckler 2007; MacKenzie 2008; Jessop & Oosterlynck 2008). Without delving much further into this debate, I consider it vital to note, that particularly in the field of economic geography, this has challenged the prevailing neoclassical orthodoxy as well as the dichotomy between market ideals as ideology and the squalor of uneven capitalist realities, entrenched in conventional thought in the field of political economy. Focusing not on the conditions of (im)perfect markets per se, but on the intricate, ambivalent and sometimes even counter-intuitive ways in which they realise themselves through complex socio-technical arrangements, "twin processes of framing and overflowing" (Berndt & Boeckler 2009, p. 547) comes into view.

Drawing on Callon's (2007) concept of continuous overflowing as a productive process created by the market's constant struggle for its own calculable containment, Berndt and Boeckler (2009) echo the argument, that this dynamic can trigger the proliferation of new social communities, "which may articulate economic and non-economic alternatives" (p. 546). Though Jessop and Oosterlynck (2008) question this distinction between economic and non-economic practices, their argument for a cultural political economy also recognises the merit of the cultural turn as it understands the process of capital accumulation as contingent, relational and socially constructed.

Now, what can we make of the diverse linkages between cities and the cultural-cum-creative economy nexus? And where does this leave us with regards to grappling with the smorgasbord of creative city iterations across the globe, particularly the case of Cape Town, to which we are gradually inching closer?
Pratt and Hutton (2013) have identified the creative city as a field function, an argumentative hook from which a range of diverse policies can be hung, ranging from the production of elusive 'world-class-ness' fundraising from foreign direct investment to the formal inclusion of creative professions into industrial strategies, and from the protection of local heritage and urban cultural history to social regeneration and creative neighbourhood 'upliftment' (pp. 90–92). In their conceptual reflection that is guided by the profound repercussions of the international financial meltdown in 2008 they also come to the conclusion that traditional modes of analysis have proven insufficient for significantly broadening our understanding of how the creative economy, and by extension the creative city, is proliferated and assembled in different social, political, cultural and spatial settings. For them, many city administrations have for too long regarded the creative economy as little more than "a 'good time' candy-floss" (ibid., p. 93). Thereby consciously ignoring or hastily forgetting the positive and negative interdependencies between the city and the creative economy (ibid., p. 90).

Interestingly, this conundrum had already been aptly described a decade earlier by Amin and Thrift (2002) whom I cite at length: "The city [...] is not a source of contextual or tacit knowledge rooted in particular kinds of business practice [...]. Nor is it an uncommitted reservoir of creativity to be found in the market of knowledge workers. Instead, it can be seen as a site of varied compositional knowledge, situated in schools, colleges and universities, workplaces, night classes and voluntary gatherings, libraries and cultural centres, learned societies and certification agencies, and so on. How the knowledge generated in each setting translates into local economic benefit is almost impossible to theorize in advance. What could be significant, though, is the sheer variety of types of institutionalized knowledge available, as a pool of diversified and redundant know-how. This is a pool with unpredictable effects in the space economy, both in terms of its generative effects, and where these effects are manifested [...]"(pp. 75; original emphasis). The theoretical and moral consequence they draw from this observation could not be more pertinent for research and practice in today's variegated mesh of creative cities: The need to maintain the city as a political arena of contentious dis/empowerment, as well as to find new vocabularies to capture hybridity, circulation and multiplicity as key urban moments (ibid., p. 77). How far recent works disseminating from a revived focus on policy mobilities and urban-global cultural politics have sought to provide an inroad for this ambitious endeavour is the question that will be pursued in the following section.
3.3 Root cause III: global urban diplomacy and policy mobilities

As the extensive body of literature on 'global' or 'world' cities shows, they - or at least a certain idealised league of them\(^{62}\) - play an important role as primary trading posts of goods, services, capital and information in our globalised economy (Sassen 1991; Knox & Taylor 1995). Places like the London Stock Exchange or Manhattan's Wall Street are only two prominent examples for how city institutions are inextricably invested in the economic fate of their respective home country and the world economy at large. The various economic, cultural and political 'headquarter' functions of global cities (both nationally and internationally) are indeed well-documented and their strategic position in the new urban and regional geographies of rescaled statehood has provided a rich field for progressive theoretical debate on urban governance (Pierre 2000; Peck 2002b; Jessop 2002; Brenner 2004; Brenner et al. 2008).

However, their obvious common denominator, the role of global cities in global governance has been, by and large, neglected until recently\(^{63}\). In his innovative study, Acuto (2013) addresses this gap by tracing how cities as global agents come to form powerful political forums and strategic alliances around pertinent global issues, in his case the conundrum of climate change. Coming from an International Relations background and using an ANT-informed structuration approach, he presents a strong argument around how global politics are negotiated within certain powerful metropolitan contexts and how such cities are simultaneously shaping international political agendas as "strategic hinges of globalization" (Acuto 2011, p. 2953). In light of this development, policy-making can no longer be seen as defined by the conventional top-down/bottom-up dualism, but has to be understood as an inherently transnational process that involves extensive networking between cities and their increased presence as joint group actors in international politics (Acuto 2013, p. 36). The production and maintenance of this "urban link" (ibid.) has brought further attention to the role of (global) city mayors as charismatic commentators,

\(^{62}\) On a worrisome side note, the economist Ricardo Petrella (2005) has outlined what Beaverstock (2000) called a "global apartheid dystopia", in which he sees the 30 most powerful city regions replacing the G-8 as new global governance heavyweights by 2025" (Beaverstock et al. 2000, p. 131).

\(^{63}\) This hesitation towards framing cities as global actors in their own right has by no means been unfounded, as it does certainly bear conceptual dangers such as over-emphasising and naturalising urban agency or pitting national against local governance. However, Acuto (2013, p. 55) suggests that such risks could be mitigated by assuming a relational stance, regarding cities as an interactive node alongside states, global civil society and international organisations.
who are urged or feel obliged to articulate pressing issues of a cosmopolitan public (Ponzini & Rossi 2010; Jayne 2012; Beal & Pinson 2013; Pasotti 2013).

Probably one of the most well-known showpieces of this 'global mayor'-phenomenon is New York's former mayor Rudy Giuliani, whose name (together with that of NYPD commissioner William Bratton) are inseparably linked to the notorious 'Zero Tolerance' approach and the tireless promotion of Business Improvement Districts as urban regeneration 'solution'. His successor Michael Bloomberg quickly assumed an equally iridescent global political presence as the chairperson of the prestigious and influential "C40 Cities - Climate Leadership Group", following in the footsteps of two other international mayoral heavyweights, Ken Livingston (London) and David Miller (Toronto) (Acuto 2013). As chapter 5 will further expand, Cape Town's post-apartheid political set-up has also fostered the emergence of charismatic leadership politics. Global aspirations have certainly risen since former mayor Helen Zille received the coveted World Mayor Award in 2008 (see below) and current mayor Patricia de Lille has evidently pursued similar longings in her support of Cape Town's WDC 2014 bid (see chapter 7.2).

Of course it is important to note that transnational exchanges between cities are by no means a recent phenomenon but can be traced through expansive histories of town twinning initiatives and sister city agreements (Zelinsky 1991; Vion 2002; Clarke 2009; Jayne et al. 2011; Jayne et al. 2013). Nonetheless, I argue that the growing urgency in finding viable responses to the effects of massive global urbanisation has had a two-pronged effect on reinvigorating such interurban partnerships: For one, it has added new dimensions of policy learning and economic cooperation to existing bilateral intercity initiatives that have traditionally been focused on cultural and educational exchanges. Secondly however, it has opened up a space for new multilateral global forums in which city leaders come together to compare notes on topics such as urban infrastructure, crime prevention or human settlement issues (United Nations 2012).

Overall, this new "city diplomacy" (Acuto 31.05.2012), also expressed through the increasing number of designated external/international relations departments within local administrations, has become an additional source of both political legitimacy and
new policy knowledge for local leaders. For example, tracing the international engagements sustained by the mayor of Saint-Étienne, a medium-sized city in the Southeast of France, Beal and Pinson (2013) show how urban internationalisation strategies - often coupled with major sporting, cultural or conference events - are indicative of shifting local political governance logics. They however argue that international activities are actually less of an instrument for garnering local votes but rather a strong vehicle for formulating future urban policy and governance trajectories:

"The networks that the mayor and his team encountered and constituted during their international activities - associations of mayors, professional organizations, network chairs, consultants, academics - are social and professional networks that are channels of resources for urban public policies rather than resources directly applicable to political and electoral contests" (ibid., p. 13).

In comparison to Acuto (2013, p. 167), who despite his otherwise progressive analysis, also affirms the entrenched global city hierarchy for matters of global urban governance, Beal and Pinson's (2013) example provides an alternative perspective that is also relevant for the research at hand. In fact, Saint-Étienne and Cape Town share an intriguing commonality: Both their elected city-leaders were at one point shortlisted for the World Mayor Prize (ibid.). This anecdotal comparison supports two important points that have also been raised within the larger urban geography debate: Firstly, though the dominance of cities like London or New York is likely to persist in terms of capital accumulation, the complexity of contemporary urban challenges has led to an increased demand for cooperative and multi-scalar approaches across the board, with new policy impulses being sought increasingly amongst the policies and (best) practices of "ordinary cities" (Robinson 2006), i.e. small or mid-sized centres often located beyond North-Atlantic core cities. Secondly and on a more theoretical note, postcolonial urban scholarship has long insisted on the need to decentre our narrow analytical gaze from the

64 In his provocative book, Barber (2013) portrays mayors as the best equipped to respond effectively to complex transnational problem statements. For him, their winning characteristics are a certain indifference to grand questions of national political ideologies and sovereignty, wide-ranging networking capabilities, and a deep-seated pragmatism, that makes them much more flexible to respond to civic needs of participatory democracy.

65 Acuto (2013) as well Beal and Pinson (2013) see this relocation of policy formulation from the local public realm to the arena of international policy professionals as a worrying signal for post-democratic tendencies, a point which I will also consider in my own analysis.

66 The prestigious international accolade is awarded annually by the non-profit City Mayors Foundation which seeks to raise the profile of mayors worldwide in honouring their visionary political and innovative entrepreneurial acumen, regardless of their city's size, location and status (http://www.worldmayor.com)
few beacons of global and world-class city-ness. On the one hand because it obscures the
diversity of every-day urban experiences in different localities, while on the other hand it
also fails to acknowledge the intricate politics of becoming that are shaped by networked
dynamics of de- and re-territorialisation of people, objects and objectives, ideas,
ideologies, and imaginaries (Robinson 2005; Roy 2011c; Roy & Ong 2011; see chapter
4.1.).

3.3.1 From policy transfer to policy mobilities

Both, the pragmatic necessity for interurban knowledge exchange and learning as
well as the theoretical urge to critically engage in relational urban analysis beyond the
canon of (Western) modernity are reflected in the recent flare of interest in urban policy
transfer. Lesson-drawing between different institutions and across territorial scale is of
course neither a novel phenomenon\(^{67}\) nor a uniform process (Stone 1999). It can be either
carried out in an active, voluntary manner, occur in a more rigid regulatory format (for
example as compliance request from supranational organisations towards specific
countries), or be attributed to overriding structural forces of knowledge diffusion and
convergence (Berry & Berry 1999; Dolowitz & Marsh 2000). What exactly is transferred
also varies greatly, from policies and institutions to ideologies and justifications, and from
attitudes and ideas to negative lessons and abject failure (Dolowitz 1999 cited in Stone
1999). However, the idea that something is imported from elsewhere on the normative
premise that it will in some way benefit the context into which it is brought remains a
general commonality of traditional policy transfer literature (ibid., p. 52). In allegory to
medical operations, Jong et al. (2002) even speak of policy transfer as "institutional
transplantation" between a "donor" body and a receiving "host" country. Their discussion
contrasts two perspectives: The first one sees the transplantation process as a strategic
'pulling in' of desirable ideas by institutional actors who only pay limited attention to its
particular local workability, while the second one sees a need for comparable local
conditions in order to achieve a more organic evolution (sic!) of policies in order to fit the
specific context (ibid., p. 23f).

\(^{67}\) However, Michel (2013) argues that the current policy mobility debate distinguishes itself in both
quality and quantity and that there seems to be a certain type of policy mobility that deeply corresponds to
'the height of neoliberalism' (p. 1016).
The ‘traditional’ literature on policy transfer provides a basic descriptive vocabulary as well as some valuable empirical observations, and should therefore not be entirely dismissed (Künkel 2014). However, it has been rightfully critiqued for offering little theoretical solace in terms of addressing issues of urban policy travels. As the majority of studies have been coming from within the political science discipline, their analysis mainly focuses on transfer between individual nation states or between nation states and supra-national governing bodies, thus ignoring the growing practice of policy borrowing on subnational levels. In his detailed analysis Peck (2011b) problematizes the notion of seemingly straightforward policy transfer versus more fragmented policy mobilities (see Table 3). In literally suggesting a formalist and linear process that is carried out under the epistemological premise of rational choice, policy transfer is confined to representing a technocratic model search for objective success stories. Terms like 'cloning', 'off-the-shelf solutions' or 'transplants' thus fail to address the selectivity of the process and cannot appropriately capture the subjective and contingent politics of "policies in motion" (Ward 2006; see also Peck & Theodore 2001; Ward 2007b; Peck & Theodore 2010a; Clarke 2012b).

Table 3 Policy transfer versus policy mobilities

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Source: Peck 2011b, p. 3; adapted LW
Peck's copious deconstruction forms part of a broader, interdisciplinary intellectual project that has been trying to forge new ways in how we can think about the multitude of relationships between cities and global processes. The project is intricately bound to a rejuvenated emphasis on mobility across the social sciences, based on a social-constructionist understanding of space (Urry 2004; Urry 2007; Sheller & Urry 2003; Larsen et al. 2006; Cresswell 2006; Heyman & Campbell 2009; Cresswell 2010; Sheller & Urry 2012). Particularly studies from the field of urban political geography have repeatedly shown that we can no longer approach neither space nor place nor policy as a given entity, but that we need to frame them in an anti-essentialist motion as simultaneously territorial and relational; as "the coming together of the previously unrelated, a constellation of processes rather than a thing [...] open and [...] internally multiple" (Massey 2005, p. 141).

Regarding research on the production of policy space, this has led to a double focus on both physical sites in which certain knowledge and practices are mobilised as well as the topological and imaginative spaces through which ideas travel, such as epistemic communities of transfer agents (Clarke 2012b, p. 28; see also Stone 1999; McCann 2011a; Temenos & McCann 2012).

These "interlocal policy networks" (Peck 2005, p. 767) have been roughly categorised into 'incoming' and 'outgoing'. The first invites global thought-leaders or senior politicians from leading metropolitan centres to share their experiences and directly project their knowledge onto the respective local urban canvas through site visits and field trips. The latter provides travel opportunities for city managers, planning experts and even mid-level bureaucrats to gather information about political, technological and social innovations abroad, for example during summits, trainings workshops or individual 'fact finding' trips, the outcomes of which are then fed back into the local network through reports or newspaper commentary (Hoyt 2006). The scale and scope for such "policy tourism" (Ward 2011a, p. 733) ranges from informal, singular and small-scale networking between individual envoys to the attendance of more or less regular, often topical global

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68 For more detailed discussions of the mobility paradigm see Cresswell (2010).
69 Talking about the mobility of policy also raises the ontological question "what is policy so that it moves?" (Freeman 2012, p. 13). See this author for a detailed discussion. McCann (2011a, p. 109) on the other hand warns that the ability of policies to move should not lead us to fetishize policies as naturally mobile objects as there is always the possibility for knowledge to be locked-in, stuck and immobile.
conferences, as well as from formalised high-ranking official delegation visits (Gonzalez 2011) to the regular institutional practice of bureaucratic reciprocity, enshrined in city twinning agreements (Jayne et al. 2011; Jayne et al. 2013). As this line of inquiry by default stretches across multiple scales, it also provides further insights into the productive dialectic between the local and the global. Because, as Cochrane & Ward (2012) note, "global policy networks are fundamental to the construction of apparently local responses, while, at the same time, apparently global phenomena, globalized policies, only exist in particular, grounded, localized ways" (p. 5). In such a reading, one can only concur that "time spent travelling is alive with possibilities" (McCann 2011a, p. 118).

McCann, Ward and others are however careful to remind us that these possibilities are by no means endless and in their limitation and uneven distribution are an avid display of social power dynamics. As the subsequent analysis reveals, a diverse array of urban actors is invested in the struggle over the 'local' meaning and impact of such 'global' flows of planning ideas and practices, the powerful act of translating the incommensurable into the commensurable (Larner & Le Heron 2004; Cook & Ward 2011). What Ong (1999) has referred to as "translocal fields of power" (p. 159) do not only emerge through formal political discourse but can be equally traced in seemingly banal practices and "face-to-face interactions in globalizing microspaces" (McCann 2011a, p. 123). For example, drawing on Lapham's (1998) work on theatrical performativity at the annual World Economic Forum in Davos, Amin and Thrift (2007b) note how "the statements, postures, and informal gossip that circulate in such places are often constitutive of future global principles of economic governance" (p. 146). However, these politics of mobility are as much defined by flow as they are by stasis: "For power lies in the capacity to direct these movements one way rather than another, to control the mechanics of talking and writing: to determine who attends and who speaks, who records and who writes. And this with a crucial caveat about the third dimension of power afforded by discourse, which generates the capacity sometimes to say and do nothing yet still protect an interest: the power not to be there, not to move" (Freeman 2012, p. 19).

In general, recent studies around policy mobility have been keenly aware of issues around uneven development and social power struggles, thus productively drawing on the

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This need to focus simultaneously on physical sites and more aloof connections, mundane practices of situated actors and structural forces poses a set of tough theoretical and methodological challenges (McCann 2011a; McCann & Ward 2010; McCann & Ward 2012). These conundrums will be discussed in more detail in chapter 6.
wealth of critical thought on political economy (Harvey 1989; Jessop 2010). However, using the mobility paradigm as a theoretical link, they have also sought to incorporate post-structuralist approaches to further explore how policies are represented, embodied, learnt and practised in different places71 (McCann 2011a; see also Table 3).

Prominent propositions for such post-structuralist renditions of political economy thought can be found in current debates on urban assemblage (Farias 2011; McFarlane 2011a; McFarlane 2011b; Farias & Bender 2012), planetary urbanisation (Brenner et al. 2012; Merrifield 2013b) and global governmentality (Larner & Walters 2004; Robinson 2011b). These have in turn informed a plethora of rich and innovative empirical studies on "vehicular ideas"72 (McLennan 2004) in urban policy, focusing on New Public Urban Management and Business Improvement Districts (Ward 2006, Ward 2007a; Cook 2008; DIDIER et al. 2012), drug policy and social security reforms (McCann 2008; Schwegler 2011), city visioning (Robinson 2011b), urban infrastructure upgrading practice (Wood 2014), as well as new solidarities amongst urban social movements (Roy 2011b; Roy 2011c; Harvey 2012).

The opportunities and constraints bestowed by this 'hot' theoretical and empirical offering upon the aim to understand the politics of grounding the creative city paradigm within the context of post-apartheid Cape Town will be more thoroughly unpacked in the Chapters 4.2 and 5. For now, the remainder of this chapter will hone in on those works that have already made some headway in grappling with the notorious global modelling power of the creative city paradigm through the lens of urban policy mobility.

71 In the face of a globally uneven distribution of 'mobility devices' from transport infrastructure to internet access, it is however pivotal not to mistake mobility as natural prerequisite, an important caveat that has been repeatedly stressed by various proponents of mobility studies (Larsen et al. 2006; Cresswell 2006; Urry 2007; Cresswell 2010).

72 "Vehicular ideas emerge as ways of problem-solving and 'moving things on'. Anyone who wants to get from A to B, for whatever reason, can therefore usefully embrace certain sorts of ideas as 'vehicles' for doing so, whatever their other differences with fellow-travellers. There is an ineliminable vagueness and 'mobility' about these ideas because their significance can change with context, and they can be 'owned' [...] by different parts of the user network. [...] they serve as inclusive umbrellas under which quite a range of advocates can shelter, trade and shift their alignments and allegiance" (McLennan, 2004, p. 435; also cited in Temenos & McCann 2012, p. 1402 and Peck 2012, p. 19).
3.3.2 Creative city on the move

The "viral spread" (Peck 2012, p. 464) of the creative city paradigm over the past decade has turned the idea into an ostensibly consolidated planning orthodoxy: In 2009, over 80 cities and metropolitan regions in 35 nations across all continents had created a total of 235 policies or strategies for the promotion of 'urban creativity' (Evans 2009, p. 1010). Following Rose (1999), a general reason for this can be found in the power of the creative city label that "assembles a new individuation of concepts, symptoms, moralities [and] languages", in turn "confer[ing] a kind of mobile and transferable character upon a multiplicity" (p. 28). However in more concrete terms, the global pervasiveness of this label needs to be attributed to its active promotion through Evans (2009) has called the global "creative city advocacy movement" (p. 1006), i.e. the jumble of networked gurus, knowledge intermediaries and supranational institutions, which provided it with a quasi-scientific veneer through mapping studies, best practice forums and project reports.

In turn, Peck (2007a; 2007b) has repeatedly referred to this phenomenon as a 'creativity fix', which allowed cities to tout a liberal and individualistic orientation towards market-led urbanism masked by the unobtrusive feel-good factors of social diversity and tolerance.

The creative city paradigm is however not a uniform set of ready-made interventions that is just passed on like a second-hand garment. It rather constitutes an elastic "field of policy" (Pratt & Hutton 2013, p. 90), which becomes evident when looking at the spectrum of underlying political rationales that are put to work in flexible combinations of social, economic and spatial programming technologies, ranging from local heritage preservation, incremental neighbourhood planning and questions of social inclusion, to conventional corporate downtown 'renewal', sectoral industry development and city marketing (see Figure 3). Thus, following Lees (2012) observation of gentrification as "parasitic" (p. 163), the creative city paradigm can equally be framed as attaching itself to and living off other 'host' policies such as economic cluster strategies, diversity policies or modernisation initiatives.
However, based on his rich observations, particularly in many North-American cities bedazzled by the mantra-like repetition of Florida's creative class *spiel*, Peck (2005) has often observed how the creative city label has simply been "bolted onto" (p. 760) existing, unimaginative and neoliberal planning measures, thus belying its pretence of providing alternative imaginaries for urban change (Peck 2007a, Peck 2010). "In this way, the creativity fix typifies the rising generation of urban 'models' that have been purposefully disembedded and unmoored from local conditions of possibility, after which they can be prescriptively abstracted as ostensibly pan-urban solutions. As such, the models themselves are effectively constructed within an interurban space of policy circulation, across which they continue to mutate" (Peck 2012, p. 479). As this dialectic process of de- and re-territorialisation seems to work at an inexorable speed in the global age, it has also been dubbed "fast policy" creation (Peck & Theodore 2001; Peck 2002a, Peck 2007b, Peck 2011b; Peck & Theodore 2010a). However, as I have argued elsewhere, albeit their critical origin, this moniker wrongfully implies a naive, unchecked, whole-sale adoption of seemingly 'strong' models (often based on Western planning ideals) into ostensibly 'weak' local political contexts (Wenz 2014).
While, particularly with regards to the growing influence of transnational planning elites in developing contexts, this often appears to hold true in programmatic announcements and expert citations, the actual ways in which certain sets of popular global policy trends are grounded within local contexts are subject to much more intricate and contradictory processes of "worlding" (Roy & Ong 2011). These 'not-so-fast'-policy negotiations will be further theoretically and analytically substantiated in chapter 4 and part III respectively. After all, Peck and Theodore (2010a) themselves have acknowledged elsewhere that "[t]he claim that 'policy time' is speeding up, along with intensifications in the inter-referentiality and interpretation of policy regimes, cannot simply be accepted on face value but must be subjected to empirical verification" (p. 172). That some presumably 'quick fixes' can be met with a 'not-so-fast' reaction in the face of disparate political contestation, contextual re-purposing and strategic misappropriation needs to be accepted as a possible consequence of the creative city's 'arrival at' (Robinson 2013). Moreover, Clarke (2012b) also points out that "much more can be made of the local politics of fast policy" (p. 40), and even its original proponent recently conceded that fast policies needed to be brought closer to the ground (Peck & Theodore 2012, p. 28).

Though the compelling siren call of creativity continues to reverberate in cities across the globe, many local administrators and politicians - being caught up in context-specific problem statements, socio-political priorities and governmental traditions - have grappled with figuring out its actual meaning and tailoring an appropriate response. This has led to a palpable disjunct where the talk about the creative city "has to date outpaced institutional capabilities to implement it" (Markusen 12.11.2006). Even Austin as one of the early-adopters and most powerful "zone[s] of verification" (Peck 2012, p. 465) for Florida's creative class theory, continues to struggle with its poor institutional articulation a decade down the line. "The creative city model, then, is not simply an instrument of neoliberal development, but a site of contest" (Grodach 2012a, pp. 93: 16; see also (Novy & Colomb 2012; Colomb 2012), and hence we cannot simply assume the simplistic reproduction of 'creative' urban policies from the perusal of marketing brochures and planning frameworks (Borén & Young 2012, p. 1804). Instead, we need to fundamentally question our common assumptions about urban learning trajectories, particularly in order to be able to challenge entrenched ideas about "creativity and mimicry as the preserve of wealthier context" (Robinson 2011b, p. 22, see also McFarlane 2011b). In the end, the creative city's
local persuasiveness as a "path-shaping imaginary" (Grodach 2012a, p. 93) might be better understood not by the undeniably high speed of its global circulation and frequency of local discursive sojourns, but through its ability to be pulled in, get mixed up with broader socio-political objectives and become retrofitted to support often directly competing local agendas (Luckman et al. 2009).
"Everywhere is not the same as everywhere else, but everywhere borrows and reuses everything through particular practices, in ways that join it up with elsewhere all the time. In other words, elsewhere is right here as much as it is over there." (Cochrane in McCann & Ward 2011b, p. xi)

3.4 [Interim conclusion part I] Towards a second wave of inquiry - urban creativity beyond the 'Florida syndrome'

"Creative-industries/cities policies may seem to be everywhere, but they are simultaneously going nowhere" (Peck 2012, p. 471). This laconic statement aptly captures the wide-spread sense of frustration regarding the stubborn perseverance of the creative city phenomenon. Indeed, providing a comprehensive outline of over a decade worth of research and practice across the creative economy/industry/city-spectrum can be compared to the fight against the snake-headed Medusa: Once one of its venomous extremities has been clipped, three more start to appear in its place, turning it into a rather tedious and futile struggle. After the creative city and its 'prophets' have been alternately celebrated and dismissed, lauded and critiqued, applauded and condemned, it nonetheless seems that academic research has reached an impasse as its vocal and valid objections appear to have gone largely unheard by urban policy and planning practitioners (Borén & Young 2012, p. 1812). Its high mutability combined with all the positive virtues associated with human creativity has made it more than a fly-by-night fad. As the creative city phenomenon cannot be simply wished away, there is a growing need to overcome the current state of analysis paralysis: "We argue that we need to move beyond the dichotomy between policy-friendly literature celebrating the hype of 'creativity' and critical literature rejecting a role for creativity in the city" (ibid., p. 4). In building on the nuanced digests of critical insertions over the past decade, this 'second wave' of creative city research clearly distances itself from
the reductionist presumption of a uniform 'Florida syndrome' and its default neoliberal boosterism (Gibson 2012, p. 284).

Instead, it sees the creative city within the broader context of an urbanised cultural political economy, focusing for example on understanding diverse expressions of vernacular creativity (Edensor et al. 2009; Bromberg 2009; Leslie & Rantisi 2011), critical intersections between race, gender and social justice in creative city-making (Leslie 2005; Catungal et al. 2009; Leslie & Catungal 2012), the conjuncture of remote, small-town, suburban and working-class environments with cultural and creative industries (Jayne 2004; Gibson et al. 2009; Luckman et al. 2009; Bain 2009; Lorentzen & van Heur 2013), urban social movements struggling for the right to the creative city and testing new tactics for political dissent (Novy & Colomb 2012; Dzudzek 2013), as well as attempts to revisit the creative economy and rewrite the creative city script from different localities beyond the West (Barrowclough & Kozul-Wright 2008; Edensor & Jayne 2012b; Grodach & Silver 2013). As Pratt (2009) has aptly argued, "the subtle interaction of [cultural] production and consumption generates a genuine translation of ideas, not simply a passive transmission. I would argue that this active translation is the essence of creativity, and the creative city" (cited in Borén & Young 2012, p. 1807).

In sum, there is a growing recognition that a critical approach towards the global multiplicity of contemporary creative city renditions also has to take into account its social 'productivity' - from anti-essentialist cultural dialogues to counter-hegemonic insurgency, and from a re-politicisation of the subject to alternative spaces of resistance (Mommaas 2004; Krätke 2011; Dzudzek & Strüver 2013). Furthermore, as these and other authors were already able to show, the focus on the relational production and increased normalisation of creative city mobilities opens up new pathways for governmentality-oriented and post-structuralist urban analysis.

As we are slowly leaving behind the fetishism of the Floridian creative class and the equally erroneous assumption of universal conformity in creative city policy and practice, we are gradually inching closer towards more nuanced accounts of the predicaments presented by globally-local creative city politics. Nonetheless, some blind spots remain on our current research agenda, particularly pertaining to the lack of sustained empirical studies on how African cities have taken on internationally circulating policy knowledge as a mode of 'worlding' (Roy & Ong 2011) beyond stringent urban
hierarchies and global city league tables. While closing this gap is already well underway with regard to Asian cities (see for example McFarlane 2008; Roy 2011b; Ghertner 2011; Ren & Luger 2014), African cities are only just about moving into the broader focus of such a postcolonial research agenda that seeks to generate urban theory from Southern cities (Robinson & Parnell 2011; Parnell & Pieterse 2014; Parnell & Oldfield 2014).

In conclusion, accounting for the multiplicity of local creative city iterations cannot be achieved in sticking to well-worn analytical dualisms that have been marked by either lamenting the gap between some elusive model ideal and its messy, necessarily imperfect realisations, or by trying to distinguish the 'original' historic cultural city from its glitzy post-modern, pop-culture 'copies'. Instead, we need to analytically confront the diversity of people, places, cultural identities and traditions, competing governance rationales and policy emplacements, historic trajectories, aesthetic representations, embattled meanings and complex interdependencies across space and time that constitute contemporary self-styled creative cities; in turn making this diversity the foundation of our own research and learning process (Pratt 2011, p. 129).

Thus, as I will further elaborate in the following, I propose that a shift towards more idiosyncratic creative cityness (as opposed to normative creative city-ness) is particularly useful in two regards: Firstly, because it widens the scope for exploring the transitory existence of this popular policy paradigm within the local socio-political and spatial context of post-apartheid Cape Town in a time as the city has set out to refashion itself as the World Design Capital 2014. Secondly and more broadly, it also challenges urban scholars to confront the entrenched analytical bias that has often seen Southern cities being reduced to the inert receiving ends of Northern, late-modern and liberal humanistic planning idea(l)s. Thus, it also presents a platform for opening up the debate towards pivotal questions raised by Southern urbanists on the current 'epistemic failure of imagination' (Mbembe & Nuttall 2004; Pieterse June 2009) in researching African cities, which have hitherto also been vastly neglected in the debate on global creative city travels - a circumstance which clearly motivates the following theoretical discussion.
Part II

Taking on the creative city from 'the south'
Theorizing the 'southern' urban experience

After having unpacked the 'conventional wisdom' associated with the creative city as a universalised urban planning and management paradigm (chapter 2), and providing a critical assessment of the broader social, economic and political logics behind its "paradigm-building publicity" (Bunnell 2013, p. 4, chapter 3), I now want to bring a different theoretical spectrum into the conversation: Over the past couple of years, a growing body of works has been emerging that urges us to rethink cities not only of but also from the 'global south'. This double notion is inherently co-constitutive to an ambitious, budding epistemic project, which has been broadly discussed in the Social Sciences under taglines such as Southern Theory (Connell 2007a) and Theory from the South (Comaroff & Comaroff 2012a). Within urban studies, more specifically, it has

73 Many prominent proponents of this debate have been at pains to point out that the 'global south' is by no means a stable ontological category intended to symbolise subalterity (Yiftachel 2009a; Patel 2014; Vainer 2014). Roy (2014), for example, has recently flagged the danger of the South being fashioned into another "privileged worldview" (pp. 15f), and has rightly cautioned that "to assert the global south as a signifier of theory requires constant vigilance" (ibid. p. 17). In the same publication, Mabin (2014) has also vehemently spoken against a wholesale vilification of Northern/Western urban theory: "Certainly as soon as I read the use of a general term such as 'Euro-America' I become suspicious about a failure to grapple with the very diversity and subtlety demanded by those who wish us all to take 'southern urbanism' and its theoretical potential seriously" (p. 27). While I acknowledge the danger of perpetuating dichotomic readings by semantically pitting a global 'North(-West)' against a global 'South(-East)', for me the lively and ongoing debate has emphatically shown that we need to grapple more openly with the locatedness of our urban theorisation.
filtered through in notions such as *Southern Urbanism* (Pieterse April 2013) or the idea of creating *Urban Theory Beyond the West* (Edensor & Jayne 2012b). Animating this line of inquiry is the realisation of an acute imbalance: Although the majority of the world's population has now been declared 'urbanised', with the highest growth taking place outside of traditional Atlantic74 'core cities', in expansive metropolitan agglomerations such as Shanghai, Mumbai, Nairobi and Sao Paulo (United Nations 2012), the theoretical registers by which we seek to approach them are still firmly rooted within Western ontologies. "Thus," explains Pieterse (2010), "urbanism is largely equated with complex social, natural and material interactions that unfold in Western cities, whereas non-Western cities are only good for describing absences and wanting, even if fuelled by a moral agenda to alleviate material deficiencies" (p. 207). In consequence, it has been argued that particularly African city life has been 'flattened out' and confined to this narrow focus on linear development trajectories, progressive modernisation, and the repeated failures thereof (Mbembe & Nuttall 2004). However, contesting the artificial division between Southern cities, as ethnographic (basket) case studies or "reservoirs of raw fact" (Comaroff & Comaroff 2012a, p. 1), and their Atlantic counterparts, as the paradigmatic template for universal urban theories, has been central to recent endeavours of "theorising back" (Ward 2008, p. 407; see also Robinson 2002; Mbembe & Nuttall 2004; Myers 2011; Parnell & Oldfield 2014).

This scholarly call to action has prompted a number of thought-provoking conceptual and methodological interventions, that suggest studying cities through their intricate ways of "worlding" (Roy & Ong 2011), as global assemblages of circulating people, policies, places, and materialities (Ong & Collier 2005; McFarlane 2011d). In trying to capture the evolving "mobile urbanism" (McCann & Ward 2011b) through a "comparative gesture" (Robinson 2011a), these seek to debunk Western exceptionalism and level the playing field for engaging Southern cities on their own terms. While these different lines of inquiry engage with a plethora of debates in various disciplines, their common trade is a critical attitude towards conventional readings, and applications of political economy and postcolonial frameworks (Ong 2007; Grosfoguel 2007; Roy 2011a; Patel 2014).

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74 I borrow this term from Mignolo (2002), who uses it to allude to the coloniality of North American and European knowledge traditions.
Of a productive nature, this critique nonetheless recognises the important contribution of these theoretical genres, but seeks to "trouble" (Roy 2011a, p. 307) them in their singular position as analytical 'gold standard' in global metropolitan studies. A key point of contestation is the recurring dualism between a seemingly all-encompassing 'planetary capitalism' as the ultimate harbinger of urban modernity, with its unilateral trajectory "emerging from the West and spreading to the rest" (ibid., p. 309), and the often wishful search for a singular subaltern voice of resistance that can be elevated to some kind of moral high-ground, and from there can be 'empowered' to discover a pathway to 'alternative' development (Escobar 1995). It is precisely this definitive and often foreclosing 'either/or'-fashion of such inquiries, that many of the abovementioned scholars seek to challenge and replace with the recognition that Southern cities are rather 'both/and' or even 'more-than'. Thus Ong (2011, p. 9) aptly concludes: "Only by liberating the city as a conceptual container of capitalism and subaltern agency can different analytical approaches explore methods for explaining how an urban situation can be at once heterogeneously particular and yet irreducibly global" (see also Ong & Collier 2005).

Informing this exploration is a critical remixing of both classic and contemporary, structuralist and poststructuralist thinkers, from Bhaba to Butler, Fanon to Foucault, and Marx to Mignolo, in order to develop a new vocabulary for relational and topographical urban research. A difficulty in putting to work these rich insights - for want of a better expression tentatively labelled as "southern turn"75 (McFarlane 2008, p. 340; Bunnell 2013, p. 9) - is the fact that they find themselves at different stages of argumentative development, as conversations are still ongoing and new nuances are added with almost every issue of one of the leading urban studies journals. While some discussions have already been consolidated to a certain degree, in passing through some rounds of theoretical debate and empirical substantiation such as the notion of "assemblage" (see for example City 2011, vol. 15, no. 2/3) or "policy mobility" (Clarke 2009; Peck & Theodore 2010a; Peck 2011b; McCann & Ward 2011b; Shore et al. 2011; Peck & Theodore 2012; Cochrane & Ward 2012; Temenos & McCann 2013), others - the discussion around "planetary urbanisation" (for example Merrifield 2013b, Merrifield 2013a; Brenner 2013)

75 This arguably unsatisfying, broad-brush label is more frequently used for subsuming African and Asian urban scholarship, while Latin American examples are charted under a different set of keywords that revolve around critical notions of global coloniality and decolonial thought (Asher 2013; Varley 2013).
have only been recently publicised. With this caveat in mind, I will nonetheless try to untangle from this dense emerging field those ideas that will help me understand the intricate interurban and multilevel governmentality of the creative dispositif in Cape Town.

Thus, this chapter is divided into four sections: The first one will examine the notion of city-ness, and how its meaning has started to shift from a normative focus on the hierarchies of 'global' and 'world city-ness' to the encounter of \textit{cityness} (sic!) as the politics, practices and spatialities of everyday urban life (Simone 2004; Chase et al. 2008; Simone 2010). Tracing the evolution of this term also allows highlighting some of the central concerns for 'southern' urban research.

The second section will then engage more concretely with the already mentioned conceptualisations around "policy mobility" (Peck & Theodore 2010a; McCann & Ward 2011b; McCann 2011a; Clarke 2012b) and "practices of worlding" (Roy & Ong 2011; Jayne et al. 2011; Roy 2012), in order to unlock them for the later analysis of Cape Town's \textit{creative cityness} iterations. To further be able to grasp the governmental effects of inter-city referencing and the politics of dispersed urban agency in a proverbial "world of cities" (Robinson 2005), the third section looks at recent advances around "global urban governmentality" (Le Heron 2007; Larner & Walters 2004; Neumann & Sending 2010). This includes exploring the possibilities and limitations of framing the \textit{creative city} not only as a powerful global discourse of urban neoliberalisation, but also as a locally moored dispositif that cannot be explained solely by assuming mere "neoliberalization from above" (Bunnell 2013, p. 3), countered by sheer subaltern resistance from below.

Again, complicating this "epistemological dualism" (Pieterse 2010, p. 208) of political economy and postcolonial thought in urban studies through an emphasis on emergence, speculation, aspiration and experimentation, has become one of the central modes of operation for 'writing back' from cities of the 'global south' (Myers 2011). Thus, the concluding section of this chapter focuses on the specific analytical consequences this holds for approaching \textit{creative cityness} and its governmental logics in post-apartheid Cape Town.
4.1 From city-ness to cityness

This section aims to unpack recent theoretical advances and provocations offered by scholars studying cities located in what has been called the 'global south'. In particular, I argue that these can be best exemplified by looking at the analytical shift from city-ness to cityness: Following Robinson (2004), city-ness can be defined as the normative lens through which we have come to identify and understand the urban as a set of universals, even though it has been by and large fashioned from observations of a few paradigmatic European and American cities. Conversely, cityness (note the missing hyphen) has been recently put forward by (Simone 2008; Pieterse 2010) and others as an experimental notion (rather than a conclusive analytical category), in an attempt to challenge the traditional prerogative of 'northern' cities to inform urban theory and to instead foreground urban experiences of so-called 'southern' cities.

This should not be read as an explicit attempt to replace one universal with another, but is rather intended as a careful and necessarily incomplete investigation of how certain types of cities have come to stand as prime reference points for what is conventionally admitted as a city. In particular, this refers to the ways in which the paradigmatic concept of 'world' and 'global city-ness' have been used as powerful "regulating fiction[s]" (Robinson 2002, p. 546) in both urban theory and practice. As I have previously shown, due to their congruent economic imperatives, 'creative' and 'global city' tropes are highly complementary and are fuelling official city aspirations across the globe in an often seamless blend (see chapter 3.2 & 3.3; also Yeoh 2005; Currid 2006). In consequence, as many of the ways in which 'global' and 'world city' theories have been recently challenged for entrenching a linear urban development trajectory, I argue that they are equally suggestive for a refracting our views on the mainstream creative city discourse.

Historically, the conceptual origins of city-ness are deeply rooted within both European and American urban experiences (Simmel 1903; Mumford 1937; Lefèbvre 1991). However, his notion of city-ness differs from the debate I seek to advance here, as he uses it in a more historical perspective to analyse the emergence of earliest urban forms in Mesopotamia.

It is noted that though intertwined, the 'world' and 'global city' hypotheses differ, with the former focusing mainly on economistic explanations, while the latter incorporates socio-economic and socio-spatial analysis and is thus better attuned to questions of inequality and power (Sassen 1991). For a detailed explanation of differences and commonalities, refer to Acuto (2011).
Particularly regarding the latter, entire urban study schools were founded on a select few archetype cities such as Chicago (Wirth 1938; Park et al. 2010) or Los Angeles (Scott & Soja 1996; Dear & Flusty 2001). For them, the in-depth study of these cities was the key to defining universal qualities of urban life, and in turn to combating its detriments in practice. Thus, these cities became as much the "hallmark of modernism, progress, development and the metropole - the opposite of provincialism", as they were seen as the signifier for "a set of social ills, the dark side of development contrasted with an idyllic rural past" (Sheppard et al. 2013, p. 894). Regardless, urbanity remained the synonym for courteousness and a refinement of manner (Simmel 1903). This civilising impetus of city-ness has also featured prominently within the colonial project of the late 19th and early 20th century: Enshrined within the enterprise of development and scripted into professional registers of urban planning (Harrison 2006, p. 325), it played a significant role in the "making of the Third World" (Escobar 1995), and became a powerful driver of what Pieterse (2010) calls the Western "liberal humanist moral project" (p. 205).

Through an increased occupation with developing the colonies, the 'other' of the Atlantic city was no longer confined to its own rural periphery, but was now found in the urban centres across the now neatly categorised global (semi-)periphery. Within a world-system logic, city-ness became equated with core-ness - the ability to influence and manage the flow of global capital (Wallerstein 1979; Friedmann 1995). The functionality and relevance of cities as "strategic hinges of globalisation" (Acuto 2011, p. 2953) were quantified and charted through measuring the concentration of advanced producer services such as accountancy, advertising, banking, law, insurance and real estate, as well as specialised production chain circuits in a relational approach (Sassen 1991; Knox & Taylor 1995; Knox 1996; Beaverstock et al. 1999; Taylor 2003).

Over the past two decades, the Globalisation and World City (GaWC) research network, based at the University of Loughborough, has become the leading academic authority for producing and continuously refining the variables of city-ness under the premise of an ongoing rescaling of statehood: "The world according to GaWC is a city-centred world of flows in contrast to the more familiar state-centred world of

78 Though Edward Soja (1992) famously coined the oxymoronic phrase "city-full non-cityness" to describe LA’s postmodern condition as the expansion of the built environment without neither a city character nor a coherent sense of place (p. 95).
79 For a more detailed conceptual introduction, refer to Sassen (2005).
boundaries" (http://www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc/gawcworlds.html, last viewed 12. October 2013). Moreover, within this specific world view, these flows and their connections also provide the basis for a clear urban hierarchy of command and control from the 'alpha++ cities' of NYLON (New York and London) via 'beta cities' - such as Cape Town, specified as a "secondary global city in a developing country" (Gibb 2007) - to those cities with only a certain 'sufficiency' of services80 (Taylor 2003).

Given its longevity, the field of world and global city research has undeniably evolved through continuous engagement with its critics; for example, regarding its neglect of social and cultural parameters, issues of urban social inequality, and the production of uneven development (Sassen 2000; Gugler 2004; Taylor et al. 2008; Derudder 2008; Parnreiter 01.02.2012). Proposed alternatives such as the "globalising city" (Yeoh & Chang 2001; Marcuse & van Kempen 2008), the "developmental global city" (Olds & Yeung 2004), or "global cities in the South" (Lemanski 2007), sought to highlight the fact that globalisation cannot and should not be studied solely through the experience of a handful of 'headquarter' cities. Yet, the narrow analytical focus on capital accumulation continues to limit the remit of much global city research. McCann (2004) rightly notes: "Global cities literatures represent a very limited research focus; one concerned with the undoubtedly important activities of small groups of actors based in a few cities (or, more precisely, in a few neighbourhoods in these cities) engaged in the 'command-and-control' of certain aspects of the global economy" (McCann 2004b, p. 2318; see also Smith 2013a). Thus Knox (1995) acknowledges that "just as we can see the world city-ness of regional metropolis, so we can see the Third-World-ness of world cities" (p. 15).

However, as the work of Jennifer Robinson (2002; 2005; 2006) shows, even these progressive attempts to rethink the global city topos remain largely caught up in a dualistic and over-generalised reading of the well-run global cities of the 'First World' and the chaotic mega-cities of the 'Third World', thus reifying flawed ideas of a pre-determined urban hierarchical order that "establish[es] some cities as exemplars and others as imitators" (Robinson 2006, p. 94; see also Robinson 2002, Robinson 2005). As King (1995) pointed out earlier, the thrust of global and world city research was also largely

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80 Though this is the lowest represented category, the majority of cities, mostly secondary and tertiary cities in Africa, Latin America and the Asian-Pacific remain 'uncharted' as "non-global cities" (McCann 2004b, p. 2315).
confined to a single direction based on the premise of urban exceptionalism: "[The w]orld city talks at length about the meaning of that particular city to the world but much less about the meaning of the world to the city" (p. 217). Thus, a pertinent question posed by urban theorist working through the 'global south', is how to challenge the status of a selected few cities as the gold standard for urban development, without reducing globalisation dynamics in different urban localities to merely another contraction of "world city syndrome" (McDonald 2008)? How can we move beyond dichotomies of 'original' and 'copy' without losing our grip on the important tool of relational urban analysis? I argue that recent moves beyond (global) city-ness, as highly normative and formulaic register towards cityness (in its unhyphenated form) provide some important pointers in this regard.

Sassen (2010) writes that "the term cityness suggests the possibility that there are kinds of urbanity that do not fit into the definition developed in the West" (p. 14). This observation has been echoed by calls for more holistic and cosmopolitan urban research in general, which seeks "to decolonise [our] imaginations of cityness in order to break free of the categorising tendencies which dominate urban theory, suggesting that an emphasis on epochal or archetypal global cities has led to a dominant interest in the structural positions of cities" (Edensor & Jayne 2012a, p. 3; reiterating Robinson 2002, p. 546). However to paraphrase Pieterse (2010, p. 209), thus far a rounded conceptualisation of cityness remains a big gap in our knowledge and understanding of urban life in Africa and elsewhere. Nonetheless, Robinson's (2002) proposal of 'ordinary cities' in order to challenge conventional framings of Southern cities as failing at being urban, can be seen as a conceptual lead: "In developmentalist perspectives cities in poor countries are often seen as non-cities, as lacking in city-ness, as objects of (western) intervention. Ordinary cities, on the other hand (and that means all cities), are understood to be diverse, creative, modern and distinctive, with the possibility to imagine (within the not inconsiderable constraints of contestations and uneven power relations) their own futures and distinctive forms of city-ness" (p. 546; Robinson 2006). Most likely with

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This demand to de-centre the global city from a postcolonial vantage point has not only be met with approval as illustrated in two articles by Smith (2013b, 2013c), in which he macerates the concept and its proponents as missing the neo-Marxist thrust of global and world city research through consistent misrepresentation and logical fallacies strewn into their critiques. Responding to these serious allegations, Jayne (2013) and Maringanti (2013) however lay out, how the ordinary city trope - though certainly not entirely unproblematic - has unlocked many innovative and productive arguments about the dispersed geographies of theory (Roy 2009b) and the real need for alternative approaches, a fact that Smith not only chooses to ignore but actively obliterates in his venomous spite. He would do well considering the wise question posed by non-other than the pioneer of postcolonial studies Edward Said (1983), who asks "[a]nd what is critical consciousness at bottom if not an unstoppable predilection for alternatives?" (p. 180).
Robinson's deliberations in mind, Pieterse (2010) also refers to *cityness* as "the nature of the ordinary" (p. 210), in an attempt to call into question the predominant rationalisations of African cities as the location of underdevelopment, and highlight their social inventiveness which frequently eludes linear patterns of modernisation.

An important characteristic of *cityness* is that it implies a sense of local autonomy in relating one's city to the world, as opposed to being passively globalised amidst the throes of a capitalistic world order (Ong 2011b, p. 10). Urban anthropologist Simone (2010) provides a more prosaic yet suggestive framing of *cityness*, as he states: "The demands of putting together livelihoods, managing domestic spaces, and demonstrating accountability to key institutions and personal networks all limit the ways in which we engage cities. Yet [they] point to what is the simultaneous promise, threat, and resource of cityness – i.e. the city's capacity to provoke relations of all kinds. Cityness refers to the city as a thing in the making" (p. 3). In consequence, he emphasises social interactions over and above capital accumulation as the locus of urbanity and in turn urban analysis. However, due to his anthropological focus on everyday practices of survival and urban livelihoods, for Simone *cityness* is primarily produced through processes of 'worlding from below' (Simone 2001a).

In contrast, I want to point out that my own research foregrounds a slightly different understanding of worlding than that of Simone (see further chapter 4.3), as it has primarily tried to grapple with Cape Town's emergent creative city complex through the study of interurban policy mobilities and elite actor positions. Based on this experience, I argue that while urban elite practices have been greatly neglected in scholarship on African cities (see chapter 6.3), they nevertheless need to be considered as a crucial part in the production of *cityness*. In consequence, *cityness* should not be confined to popular imaginaries of much 'Southern' urban analysis such as 'the slum' or 'the informal', but instead needs to be understood as embedded in and expressed through the messiness of *all* urban practices, including those of seemingly 'formalised' urban governance. My intention to grapple with Cape Town's (creative) *cityness* also ties in with Mbembe and Nuttall's (2004) call to "throw people off their routine readings and deciphering of African

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82 A similar point is also made by Yiftachel (2009a) when he notes that 'informalities' have long 'infiltrated' North-Western cities, and that in turn knowledge and concepts gained from 'South-East' cities are being increasingly used to understand and manage them (p. 487).
spaces", through a process of defamiliarisation for which "there is no better site or scene than the city" (p. 352).

Furthermore, I want to briefly spell out three possible misunderstandings that can arise from invoking *cityness* as an alternative urban epistemology: First, it must not be mistaken for a call to urban anarchy. Rather than being perceived as the kryptonite of urban order, cityness rather prompts us to recognise the city as made up of divergent and overlapping forms of structuring orders and governmentality. Second, in spite of being mostly championed by scholars empirically concerned with African and Asian cities, *cityness* should not be reduced to a synonym for the non-Western urban. This would wrongfully negate the prolific work of many postcolonial scholars who have managed to show how coloniality has emerged as a global condition that is not confined to former places of settler colonialism (Quijano 2000; Mignolo 2009, 2012).

Thus, as Ward (2008) contends, cityness transcends such dichotomies as it "moves us away from searching for similarities and differences between two mutually exclusive contexts and instead towards relational comparisons that uses different cities to pose questions of one another" (p. 406). And third, though Robinson's (2002) call for "cities without categories" (p. 542) might be misleading in this context, cityness is not an attempt to denounce the existence of uneven development and thus depoliticise urban research. Smith (2005) rightly warns that "[i]f hierarchies vanish today in our academic theories, then so too vanish most of the targets of our political critique" (p. 897). However, rejecting the pre-determined league tables of global city-ness and their idealised meta-narratives of urbanisation as linear purveyor of development and modernity, in favour of alternative imaginaries and epistemological pathways is, in fact, a deeply political project (Mbembe & Nuttall 2004, p. 352).

Smith's caveat is nonetheless a timely reminder that the everyday life of cities, and city dwellers for that matter, is inherently framed by and inextricably linked to questions of state, capital, and strategies of collective public action that cannot simply be blocked out. Recent attempts of rethinking subaltern urbanism (Roy 2011b; Simone 2012) and provincialising global urbanism (Sheppard et al. 2013) have highlighted this danger to belittle and romanticise local ingenuity in the face of abject poverty and inequality. Nonetheless, this conundrum should not deter us from reiterating the need to find "counter-argument[s] in a context where the dominant perspective involves a belief in the
I want to conclude with thrashing out what the notion of *cityness* means for my research on creative city-making in post-apartheid Cape Town. "Western urban theory has framed for itself a particular phantasmagoria of city-ness" writes Robinson (2004, p. 570), and counts "wonder, speed, diversity, density, verticality, innovation" as some of the powerful 'fantasies' that were conceived against the backdrop of a few Atlantic cities. With reference to chapter 3, I would add the dispositif of creativity as the latest entry to this list of hegemonic urban desires. The "invisible college of world city research" (Friedman 1995, p. 28; cited in Acuto 2011, p. 2953) has received a new creative city faculty, which rather unsurprisingly has an equally vivid interest in the creation of global urban hierarchies through rankings and indexes developed on the basis of a selected few archetype cities. Following King (1990), who provocatively notes that "all cities today are 'world cities'" (p. 82, cited in Robinson 2002, p. 534), one could simply declare all cities to be creative cities in their own right.

However, apart from being a moot point, this assumption would disregard the actual persuasive power of creative city aspirations and the ways in which these have emerged in and been transformed by divergent urban contexts. Thus, instead of looking at a set of boxes to tick for determining whether or not Cape Town adheres to some pre-determined and normative standards of creative city-ness (note the hyphen), I am interested in looking at the ways in which this globally mobile urban policy phenomenon is adopted, adapted and transmogrified within the context of post-apartheid Cape Town; in the process becoming "something new that is both part of and separate from Western modernity" (Harrison 2006, p. 323). Thus, using the trope of *creative cityness* offers two opportunities: Firstly, framing my research within the radically unfinished epistemological project of 'southern urbanism' allows me to investigate how Cape Town is implicated within increasingly complex organisational architectures of circulating global knowledge, labour, technology and capital (Mbembe & Nuttall 2004).

Secondly, tracing the often disruptive de- and re-territorialisation of knowledge, discourses, people, and artifacts that make up Cape Town's creative city governance complex expands the argument beyond the limiting dichotomy of pale copy and elusive
original towards the politics of becoming. Ultimately, this could also be considered as yet another small step on the way towards decentring Euro-American narratives as "truth spots" (Gieryn 2006) of urban development, and thus bringing to the fore more "ex-centric" (Bhabha 2004) accounts of city-making.

In turn, shifting the epistemological focus from city-ness to cityness has been fruitful for framing my research; First, because it allows me to focus on fuzzy logics and messy politics of becoming instead of singular and over-determined states of being. Second, because it also explicitly points towards the multiple global entanglements that bind different cities across the globe together in often unforeseen ways (see also ch. 8.1.3). As such, researching cityness means looking at both "how different cities are implicated in each other's past, present and future" (Ward 2008, p. 406), and - more generally - how flows of ideas about what constitutes cities can be altered to accommodate a larger variety of urbanities (Myers 2014). With these caveats in mind, I turn again to Simone (2010), whose words aptly illustrate the dialectic nature of cityness: "For all efforts made to ensure order, accountability, and the transparency of how things work and decisions get made, cityness continues to haunt the city. This is because in the same place and time, another set of conditions, another way of doing things, and another reality have always already been possible - and in an important way, were always already in place. [...] So, cityness also includes a sense that behind the present moment there is another time operating, other things taking place, unfolding, waiting, getting ready or slipping away, and that we know only a fragment of what is taking place" (pp. 8–9). Thus, as one possibility of capturing how 'global designs' meet 'local history', cityness might just be where "the imaginary of the world system cracks" (Mignolo 2012, p. 23).

In sum, taking cityness seriously means studying 'southern' cities not through their alleged pathological difference to elusive norms of modernity (Kamete 2013), but instead through their commonalities and strategic linking of their denizens to a larger urban world in order "to navigate the local contingencies of their own urban lives" (Simone 2010, p. 50). Understanding this myriad of citations, allusions, aspirations, comparisons, competitions, speculations and experiments defines the need for finding new enunciations in order to describe how cityness is relationally reconstituted in different localities across

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83 The notion of 'becoming' is borrowed from Deleuze & Guattari (1987). It highlights "the pathways along which a concept may be transformed while retaining a family resemblance to its former incarnation" (Patton 2000, p. 78). Applied to Cape Town's politics of becoming a creative city, this means that the process will inevitably lead to the production of creative cityness as something that finds itself consistently in transformation.
the globe (Bunnell 2013; Sheppard et al. 2013; Myers 2014). Thus, in the next section I discuss some recent theoretical propositions in this respect - namely the notions of worlding and global policy mobilities.
"Our critical edges are honed not from
single placements
but from multiple displacements,
multiple focal lengths,
multiple interpellations,
multiple movements
both away and towards." (Comaroff &
Comaroff 2012b, p. 1)

"Reisen bildet" [Travel educates] -
German Proverb

4.2 Practices of worlding and mobile urbanism
As the previous section has shown, recent advances in urban studies have sought to
challenge the peripheral status of urban experiences from Africa, Asia and Latin America
within the production of knowledge and theoretical reflections (Simone 2010, p. 39;
Comaroff & Comaroff 2012a; Sheppard et al. 2013; Oldfield et al. 2004). Within this
intellectual realm and over the past couple of years, a voluminous and fruitful discussion
has evolved around the closely related notions of "worlding" (Simone 2001a; Roy & Ong
2011), "mobile urbanism" and "travelling policies" (McCann & Ward 2011b), all of which
also form part of a broader debate on 'urban assemblage thinking' (Collier 2006; Venn
2006; Brenner et al. 2011; McFarlane 2011d). I'd like to start off by exploring the concept
of worlding, followed by some reflections on how it connects to questions of interurban
policy mobilities (see also chapter 3.3.), and finally how these find practical expression in
international accolades as relays of urban policy 'solutions'.

'Worlding', as an intellectual approach goes back to the postcolonial critique of
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1999), and has been subsequently unlocked for urban
studies by Simone (2001a) and, more recently, by Roy and Ong (2011). As noted in the
previous section, both authors use the notion to describe the production of cities through
ephemeral translocal connections and global forms in circulation (including that of
capitalism) (Roy 2009b, p. 823). However, though Simone's work speaks more directly to
urban contexts in Africa, his approach is - by virtue of his ethnographic methodology - centred first and foremost on individual and often idiosyncratic practices. In contrast, Roy and Ong's approach takes into account larger socio-economic power structures and focuses much more explicitly on understanding local iterations of globally pervasive urban policy paradigms, thus making their analytical offering more conducive for my research on Cape Town's creative cityness.

McCann et al. (2013) define worlding as a "heterodox project" that seeks to "disrupt the established maps of global urbanism" (p. 584). Just like the notion of cityness, which I explored in the previous section, it is borne by intellectual frustration with the hegemonic status of 'global cities' as the universal benchmark for urban analysis, and the way this reduced Southern cities to passive, inert recipients rather than proactive producers of theoretical knowledge. Comaroff and Comaroff (2012a), for example, problematise that "the non-West, now the global south, is presented primarily as a place of parochial wisdom [...] of unprocessed data [...] as reservoirs of raw fact: of the historical, natural, and ethnographic minutiae from which Euro-modernity might fashion its testable theories and transcendent truths" (p. 1). Thus, besides comprising a host of practices, which I will elaborate on below, worlding also commands a self-reflective interrogation of mainstream 'worldviews' and representations of 'southern cities' produced in contemporary urban scholarship (Simone 2010; Roy 2011a; Chattopadhyay 2012; Roy 2014). For McCann et. al (2013) argue: "In urban studies, worlding must be understood as an intervention in this structured divide between theory and ethnography" (pp. 584ff; emphasis added).

In rebuking a singular and linear logic of urban transformation, worlding emphasises the processual character of city-making, the fact that cities everywhere are able to "create global connections and global regimes of value" (ibid., p. 585), or, as Ong (2011b) explains, "worlding [...] is linked to emergence, to the claims that global situations are always in formation" (p. 12). However, worlding does not follow any grand historical logic of world-making or world city-ness for that matter, but is rather concerned with the multiple instances of "being in the world" (ibid., p. 11; also Mbembe & Nuttall 2004, p. 347) through a variety of constantly unstable relationships and precarious connections (Simone 2001a, p. 23). Moreover, worlding does not occur on a single scale but is a result of interlinking practices, a "mix and match of different components" (Ong 2011b, p. 12) in an inter-scalar recomposition that is taking place in the vast space between local
"idiosyncratic compromises" (Simone 2001, p. 18) and global narratives of urban transformation. As my empirical analysis in part III shows, we need only look at the divergent and heterogeneous ways and means by which the creative city paradigm has been reiterated in Cape Town's post-apartheid governance realm - most recently through its retrofitting in the wake of becoming the designated World Design Capital 2014 - in order to catch a glimpse of these highly dynamic, interscalar practices through which different actor positions negotiate Cape Town's place in the world.

While there is vast scholarly agreement on these basic ontological premises of worlding, different opinions exist about its appropriate epistemological framing. In her introduction to the seminal book *Worlding cities, Asian experiments and the art of being global* (2011; together with A. Roy), Ong displays a deep-seated disenchantment with both political economy models and postcolonial preoccupations with subaltern subjectivity. For her, both approaches are over-determined by what she calls their "Marxist pedigree" and the way it leads to reductionist readings of capitalism as the all-encompassing norm for social reproduction and class struggle as the only possibility for subverting it (ibid., p. 2). Hence, she is adamantly calling for "mid-range theorizing" (Ong & Collier 2005) to minimise the risk for any claims to universal applicability and other allure of grand theory; to rather "[...] stay close to heterogeneous practices of worlding that do not fall tidily into opposite sides of class, political, or cultural divides" (Ong 2011b, p. 12).

Roy, on the other hand, though sharing some of Ong's discomfort regarding the limited remit of conventional political economy approaches to grapple with 'Southern' urbanities, sees a more expanded theoretical reach for worlding as an "archival structure" that could eventually help to shape "the post-colonial as a deconstructive methodology" (McCann et al. 2013, p. 584; see also chapter 6). Her intervention is based on the fact that in the complex interface between cultural self-determination and transmodernity, postcolonial accounts have often been limited to questions of "how to be 'Western without depending on the West'" (Yeoh 2005, p. 947).

Moreover, such narrow ways of inquiry sometimes did the opposite of what they set out to achieve, as holding up a mirror to the colonial (con)quest often ended up reifying
a seemingly absolute otherness of the non-West. Speaking particularly on Africa Mbembe and Nuttall (2004) illustrate "[...] Africa so often ends up epitomizing the intractable, the mute, the abject, or the other-worldly. So overdetermined is the nature of this sign that it sometimes seems almost impossible to crack, to throw it open to the full spectrum of meanings and implications that other places and other human experiences enjoy, provoke, and inhabit. The obstinacy with which scholars in particular (including African scholars) continue to describe Africa as an object apart from the world, or as a failed and incomplete example of something else, perpetually underplays the embeddedness in multiple elsewheres of which the continent actually speaks" (p. 348). Thus, Roy's move away from a focus on subaltern subjectivity towards divergent episodes of subalternity and the ways in which these are reproduced as part of global urbanisation dynamics is a timely and useful attempt to address this conundrum and reconsider the role of local autonomy. After all, "worlding cities are mass dreams rather than imposed visions" (McCann et al. 2013, p. 585), and Ong concurs that "[t]here is a mix of speculative fiction and speculative fact in the worlding exercises as practitioners aim to build something they believe is for the better" (2011b, p. 12). Taking this as a cue for my own research, I have been trying to understand how and to what effect different local governance actors have experimented with creative city narratives as a means of 'worlding' post-apartheid Cape Town. Through my empirical observations I have come to think of the emerging creative city politics not as a kind of 'imposed vision' or programmatic prescription from elsewhere, but instead as an intricate mesh of interscalar governmental technologies, relational social practices, and competing political logics that has formed around the powerful collective desire of positioning Cape Town as the continent's first 'design(er) city' (see part III).

In order to provide some analytical structure to this fluid spectrum of socio-political practices that can be subsumed under the notion of worlding, Roy and Ong (2011) propose 'modeling', 'inter-referencing' and 'new solidarities' as three heuristic categories for understanding the city as a "globalised field of intervention" (p. 11). They define urban modeling "as a global technology that is disembedded from its hometown and adopted in other sites as a condensed set of desirable and achievable urban forms" (ibid., p. 14). Urban modeling

84 As noted previously, this argument can of course be easily turned around, as particularly early postcolonial critiques featured rather reductionist and monolithic perceptions of 'the West' (Mabin 2014).
85 In her reading Roy follows the later works of Spivak (2003) in seeing subalternity as 'more than the general attribute of subordination'. Rather, she notes that "the subaltern subject is simultaneously strategic and self-exploitative, simultaneously a political agent and a subject of the neoliberal grand slam" (Roy 2009b, p. 827).
thus refers to the ways in which certain cities have been framed as go-to examples for a range of urban transformation dynamics. Examples for such "over-referenced places" (McCann et al. 2013, p. 582) include New York's long history of urban upgrade and gentrification (Marcuse 1985; Abu-Lughod 1994; Lees 2003; Freeman & Braconi 2004), Toronto as the birthplace of Business Improvement Districts (Hoyt 2003; Ward 2006, Ward 2007a), Austin/Texas as Richard Florida's archetype Mecca for the creative class (Florida 2005a; Long 2009), or Barcelona, Bilbao and Glasgow, as vanguard cities of (European) capital cultural planning (Gomez 1998; Plaza 1999; Garcia 2004; Gonzalez 2011).

However, as Ong, Roy and others are at pains to point out, Western cities are no longer the ultimate points of reference. Be it the innovative participatory budgeting of Porto Alegre (Baiocchi 2001; Novy & Leubolt 2005; Lara 2010), Bogota's public transport export hits Cyclovia and TransMilenio (Bus Rapid Transit System) (Montezuma 2005; Cervero et al. 2009; Sarmiento et al. 2010), or Singapore's and Lagos' role as respective template cities for popular Asian and African urban imaginaries (Cartier 1995; Chang 1997; Zolo 2001; Huat 2011) - emergent cities in the 'global south' are increasingly turning towards one another (if only with one eye) as knowledgeable and capable partners for sharing ideas on how to address common problems (Sanyal 1990; Robinson 2011b; Bénit-Gbaffou et al. 2012). In essence, though model building requires a certain degree of ostensibly ready-to-implement codification in order to 'normalise' the respective urban experience and make it widely commensurable, this does not mean that its reception is a passive automatism but rather "an active zone of adaption and transformation, not to say joint constitution" (Peck & Theodore 2012, p. 23). Hence, regardless of its level of abstraction, discrete packaging and promulgated transferability, any modeling exercise remains subjected to discerning scrutiny. Based on my own findings on how Cape Town has negotiated its creative cityness, I agree with Ong's statement that "[t]he use of blueprints, plans, or built forms as a guide does not mean that modeling is a faithful copy of the original, but rather a practice that tries to capture some aspect, style or essence of the original" (Ong 2011b, p. 15).

In comparison, inter-referencing as a practice is defined as a less consistent, ephemeral and hotchpotch mix of "citation, allusion, aspiration, comparison, and competition" (ibid., p. 17). Whereas models are usually linked to concrete projects and interventions in particular cities, inter-referencing rather describes the salience of
overarching imaginaries, such as 'smart', 'green', 'creative' or 'liveable' city themes. These
are often promoted through city rankings and competitive charts, where the top cities on
the respective index are usually also prone to being seen as potential urban role models.

As Ong (2011) notes: "The discourses that sustain this inter-referentiality shape an intense
inter-city consciousness of contrast, comparison, and rivalry, as well as an idiom that initiates and
legitimizes the extravagant claims of mega urban makeovers" (p. 23). In turn, summoning urban
desires presents a powerful socio-political and culturally-normative strategy that also
makes use of "a symbolic language of significant urban style" (ibid., p. 18) and further
accelerates its global circulation. As Cape Town's process of becoming the WDC 2014
aptly illustrates (see chapter 7), this constant looping and passing-through of competing
aspirational imaginaries can both assert and upset a city's worldly position (as well as the
self-esteem of its local urban elites). Either way, it spurs a desire for international
recognition, and yields new inter-urban relationships in the form of "citizen, denizens, and
dreamers [who] evaluate different cityscapes, mingle in each other's cities and comparison shop for
consumer goods, ideas and lifestyles" (ibid., p. 19). In light of what I have come to view as Cape
Town's burgeoning '#governance', it is also important to note that this personal 'mingling'
and comparing of notes is an inherently interscalar practice that can take place in both
physical and virtual spaces (see further chapter 7.5).

Yet this "elite dreaming" (ibid., p. 17) of professional city-makers and 'global
citizens' is not the exclusive driver of worlding processes. In fact, it is just as much created
through migratory patterns and new solidarities amongst subaltern subjects that go
beyond and mostly run against formal government domains (Featherstone 1995; McCann
et al. 2013, p. 585). In the digital age of social networks and instant communication, new
ways of how to speak truth to power and publicly articulate demands are disseminated at
an equally high speed. However, this constant tweaking of tactics and strategic
partnerships has also lead to a recombination of entrepreneurial and civic elements within
the realm of social activism. For example, in her brilliant dissection of global poverty
management, Roy (2011c) shows, how the articulation of subaltern subject-power is by no
means devoid of neoliberal calculations, and sometimes even incorporates contradictory
market logics. In another piece and drawing particularly on the practises of protests
against the Indian rendition of world-class city-ness, she elaborates on how this generates
forms of "homegrown neoliberalism" (pp. 260f), surprising alliances and unforeseen coalitions under the elusive banner of progress.

Overall, these three modes of worlding help to analytically re-position the 'Southern' city: From its precarious perception as a passive victim, suffering from its multiple pathologies of "pollution, excrement and decay" (Davis 2006, p. 174 quoted in Myers 2011, p. 6; see also Kamete 2013) that validate rigorous 'corrective' measures, towards an experimental and perpetually unhinged "milieu of intervention" (McCann et al. 2013, p. 586). Furthermore, it also stresses the fact that the global is not the pinnacle of some predetermined and universal pyramid scheme of urban development, but a spatialised, contingent, and ever-emerging "terrain of problematization" (Ong 2011b, p. 23). While the notion of 'worlding' provides a rich perspective for analysing the global geographies of urban knowledge circuits and inter-city expertise, its full potential for researching Cape Town's creative cityness is best unlocked when combined with questions of policy mobilities, and in particular international accolades as interurban knowledge relays, a task to which I will now turn (see Figure 5).
4.2.1 'Travelling' policies

Ideas of worlding, policy, mobility, and the global 'travels' of certain popularised urban-isms, are closely connected within the current scholarly discourse (see also chapter 3.3). Their intellectual proximity is not only expressed through shared epistemological vantage points that stress the need for relational and topological forms of urban inquiry, but also through the practical fact that the respective key proponents often contribute to each other's edited volumes and special issues, appear as co-authors, or sit on the same conference panels (see for example McCann et al. 2013). This demonstrates the amicable nature of this scientific dialogue, but should not be mistaken for a convergence of arguments.

Though studies on worlding and policy mobility are both interested in understanding how knowledge about the urban is created, passed around and translated in "a world of cities" (Robinson 2004), they emphasise different points: While worlding has been distinctly positioned to investigate what it means to be global as a city, and has therefore focused more on the local politics of globalisation, particularly in the making of Asian cities, work on policy mobilities has often focused more on examining the global politics of localisation, by tracing how different popular policies were created in one city and subsequently 'travelled' across different urban contexts (McCann et al. 2013).

Furthermore, while the motivation for putting forward the notion of 'worlding' derives mainly from a desire to challenge dominant urban theory-making by means of more nuanced postcolonial argumentation, policy mobilities research has grown out of dissatisfaction with the conventional policy transfer literature for understanding multi-scalar, interurban knowledge loops and, based on this criticism, is trying to delineate a space for critical urban policy studies (Peck & Theodore 2010a; McCann &

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86 I agree with Dzudzek and Lindner (2012) who make the pertinent point that the metaphor of a 'travelling policy' should not be misconstrued as following a linear trajectory but that it needs to be recognised as "as set of performances organized around a permanently contested agreement over the necessity of creative-city development" (p. 4).

87 It is important to point out that Roy and Ong (2011) have used their concept of worlding first and foremost to describe "nodes of an emergent global order marked by the ascendancy of Asian powerhouses, from the Gulf States to India and China" (McCann et al. 2013, p. 585). In turn, their approach has not yet been taken up widely in studies of Latin American or African cities. Particularly regarding the latter, I seek to address this gap by investigating Cape Town's creative cityness as a form of worlding.
Ward 2011a). Nonetheless, it needs to be acknowledged that these are rather broad-brush distinctions and that the two approaches have in fact experienced frequent and productive cross-pollination.

The study of how and why different policies cross national borders and are emulated in different contexts has a long tradition in political science research. As Dolowitz (2003) asserts, "policy transfer is a fairly simple concept, which has been going on ever since one caveman [sic!] saw how another was more effective at hunting and adopted similar techniques" (p. 107). In general, orthodox policy transfer studies have focused extensively on largely formalised exchanges amongst state actors and with supranational institutions, looking for example at the transnationalisation of policies between the European Union and its member states (Radaelli 2000), or at more coercive policy measures such as IMF and World Bank's structural adjustment programmes (Dolowitz & Marsh 1996). They are largely premised on rational-choice assumptions, by which policymakers - not unlike the bespoke cavemen - are relentlessly searching for the objectively best solutions that promise maximum benefits and increased competitiveness. In turn, the policy as a product is continuously optimised in order to iron out possible kinks for smoother and swifter diffusion and convergence (Peck & Theodore 2010a, p. 169).

In this vein of analysis, policy transfer is a highly normative and positivist endeavour, focusing mainly on 'success' stories and their uniform transmission "across generally inert institutional landscapes" (Peck & Theodore 2012, p. 23). The semantic allegories used to capture this state-centred process further reveal its utilitarian and extractive inclinations, as they talk of 'transit' and 'transaction' (Dolowitz & Marsh 2000), 'lesson-drawing' (Rose 1993b; Stone 1999), and even 'transplantation' between 'donor' and 'recipient' countries (Jong et al. 2002). Hence, McCann (2011a) deducts that "[i]t is often an a-social, a-spatial, and, ironically, somewhat a-political literature"88 (p. 101), and is thus not adequately suited for analysing the embodied, multi-scalar, peripatetic, often

88 In light of the postcolonial critiques I introduced earlier, I would also add 'a-historical' to the list, as the mainstream policy transfer literature does not acknowledge the colonial roots of this practice, even though the colonies and particularly their capitals were often used as experimental testing grounds for policy 'innovations' from the heart of the empire (Saunier 2002; Nasr & Volait 2003; Simone 2010).
selective, and always political 'travel conditions' of globalising urban policies\textsuperscript{89}. However, it has been rightly pointed out that this wholesale critique of policy transfer literature by key proponents of policy mobilities has disregarded the fact that more recent publications on policy transfer have already self-critically engaged with many of the issues mentioned above (Benson & Jordan 2011).

In sum, the point remains that we should not regard policy designs, technologies, frameworks and platforms as fixed objects and conventional practices. Instead, they should be conceptualised as emergent social constructs, created through and performed in "policy networks, each of which possesses specific institutional, ideational, and ideological characteristics, and each of which can ultimately be seen to possess its own 'social life'" (Peck & Theodore 2012, p. 23, also Peck & Theodore 2010a). One of the core premises of urban policy mobility studies is therefore, that "policies-on-the-move" (McCann & Ward 2012, p. 50) are also always "policies already-in-transformation" (Peck & Theodore 2010a, p. 170), and their study thus provides an invaluable opportunity to "denaturalize' globalization processes, to account for their diverse and often contradictory socioinstitutional forms, and indeed to problematize the production of globalization projects themselves" (Peck & Theodore 2012, p. 21). Furthermore, studying what McCann and Ward (2010b) call the "global localness" of policy paradigms (such as the creative city) enables us to grapple with the intricate power dynamics that play out within an expanded urban governmental field that exceeds formal institutional spheres as spaces of policy creation to include the varied compositional and spatialised knowledge of various "transfer agents" (Stone 2004). This includes, but is not limited to, well-travelled consultants, development and management gurus, public intellectuals, think tanks, public-private partnerships, techno- and bureaucrats, investors and analysts, street-level experts, cultural and media brokers, activists, as well as members of a concerned and/or affected public, who all play a part in the messy social processes of "making up", passing on and emplacing policies (Larner & Laurie 2010, p. 219; McCann et al. 2013, p. 582; see also Amin & Thrift 2002; McGuigan 2009; Lange 2009; Söderström 2013).

\textsuperscript{89} Though many recent studies have criticised policy transfer studies for their ignorance of sub-national and particularly urban governmental scales, the analysis of "critical mobilities" (Söderström et al. 2013) is of course not limited to the urban realm. In fact, it rather pursues an approach that actively recognises the dialectic relationship of territoriality and relationality (for a detailed explanation, see McCann & Ward 2010).
In consequence, the main questions of policy mobility research do not revolve around the "dominant fairy tales of rationalism" (Czarniawska 2004, p. 130), such as normative viability or technical manageability of certain ostensibly universalised policy packages\textsuperscript{90}. Instead, they try to discern what gets moved and what stays behind, which networked routes the different components and constituencies 'travel' along, and where and how they are temporarily fixed, transmogrified, and eventually cut loose again (Clarke 2012b, p. 35). Finding ways to capture these complex motions, to make sense of the many "loose threads" (Söderström & Geertman 2013) and to follow how policy paradigms meanders across different sites and scales, also poses considerable methodological challenges, which I will discuss in more detail in chapter 6.

In general, in order to grapple with the particular "policy ecologies" (Peck 2011a, p. 52) of Cape Town's creative city governance complex, one has to recognise the vital dialectic relationship between fixity and flow which brings about multiple mobilities. Because, just like capital, policy knowledge is not traversing a flat earth in a footloose manner, but is rather (un)bound by the distinct embeddedness of people - in place, time and stratified social fields of power (McCann et al. 2013, p. 584, drawing on Harvey 1982).

As I have already laid out in Chapter 3.3, the creative city paradigm has been at the forefront of contemporary "policy circulation repertoires" (Söderström & Geertman 2013, p. 12), with its spread aided by a variety of supportive and interlinking conditions, including "Richard Florida's brand of guru performativity" (Peck & Theodore 2010b, p. 171), the easily accessible 'tool-kitting' of mainstream cultural planning interventions, and the political promotion of entrepreneurial self-governance and DIY-citizenship, often in conjunction with fiscal austerity measures. In order to avoid repetition and pull the focus closer to my research interest in the construction of Cape Town's \textit{creative cityness} in the wake of becoming the designated World Design Capital 2014, I want to use the remainder of this section to delve more specifically into the role of international accolades as relays for urban policy knowledge. With regards to the growing number of international

\textsuperscript{90} The idea of a policy as a package, as a singular entity, is a myth in itself, as there is not one exclusive thing called policy. Rather, as a term it can refer to anything from the actually written policy document, to models, modules and guidelines to best practices, and from uncodified policy knowledge to specific responses to sociospatial concerns (McCann & Ward 2012, p. 42).
(mega-)events taking place in cities of the 'global south', I argue that their study as "trans-urban learning network[s]" (Cook & Ward 2011) can benefit greatly from a binocular combination of worlding and policy mobility approaches.

4.2.2 Worlding cities and mobilising policies through international accolades

With reference to a steadily rising and geographically diversifying number of cities involved in the bidding for and hosting of international events, it seems valid to assume they also exert a significant influence on the formation and structuring of interurban policy travel environments. Following Roche (2002), mega-events - also known as major, special or "hallmark" events (Hall 1987) - can be defined as "large-scale cultural (including commercial and sporting) events, which have a dramatic character, mass popular appeal and international significance" (p. 1). From Olympic Games to World Fairs - the staging of both sporting and cultural mass events has a long tradition in city-making. Besides the Olympics, sport-centred mega-events also include different global and regional tournaments in different popular disciplines, the biggest being the FIFA Soccer World Cup, which takes place every four years.

Cultural mega-events can be roughly divided into three categories: The first category includes educational and professional events such as conventions, expositions and summits (Hiller 1995); the second includes traditional events such as popular festivals and carnivals (Getz 1991; Jamieson 2004; Quinn 2005; Waitt 2008); in the third category are institutional cultural accolades and awards, that are bestowed upon a city by an organisation in recognition of its efforts to preserve, display and develop its distinct cultural heritage, the European Union's annual 'Capital of Culture' designation for example. As the World Design Capital accolade can be seen as one of the most recent additions to the third category, it also presents the primary focus for the subsequent comparative argument.

While traditional festivals such as Rio de Janeiro's carnival or Pamplona's Bull Run are inherently place-bound and difficult to recreate elsewhere\(^1\), most of the other

\(^1\) This is not to say that there have been no such attempts. A relevant case in point is Cape Town's recent staging of its own annual 'Rio-esque' carnival, separately from its traditional carnival, which for over a
designations are constantly moving from city to city in fixed time cycles. Thus, most mega-events and international accolades in general are by default transnationally mobile and highly inter-referential, fuelling city-to-city comparison and competition. After all, being recognised as a 'good host' is a desirable mark of distinction for the city's commodifiable "brand identity" (Franke 2002; Evans 2003; Kavaratzis & Ashworth 2005; Dinnie 2011). In terms of embodied practices\(^2\) of inter-city learning, international accolades usually combine both 'event-led' policy tourism, where "policy entrepreneurs" (Hoyt 2006) from previous host cities are invited to share their first-hand experience \textit{in situ}, and 'visit-led' policy tourism, where delegations from the current host city come to inspect the sites of previous eventing success (Jacobs 2012, p. 415). Particularly in terms of cultural accolades as increasingly prominent vehicles of "global cultural brokerage" (Yeoh 2005, p. 955), the spectrum of actors involved in these cosmopolitan relationships stretches well beyond technocrats and business elites to also include "low-skilled, low-income migrant workers; specialists in expressive activities; and world tourists" (ibid.).

Generally speaking, the literature for sport-centred mega-events is considerably vaster than the - albeit growing - body of work on cultural accolades. Two obvious reasons can be discerned: Firstly, top international tournaments are much more vigorously instrumentalised for national(istic) geopolitics (see for example China's Olympic Summer Games 2008, Russian's Olympic Winter Games 2014 or Qatar's World Cup scheduled for 2022). Secondly, compared to cultural accolades, they are much more notorious in their compulsory demands for large-scale, 'brick and mortar'-efforts such as the construction of stadiums and public transport infrastructure upgrades (Gold & Gold 2008; Surborg et al. 2008; Poynter & MacRury 2010; Gold & Gold 2011). These do not only absorb a substantial share of institutional and financial capacities, but also occupy local discourses for many years before and after the actual event is taking place. While the latter

\(^2\) In terms of postcolonial critique, it is important to keep in mind that the embodied practices of policy mobility are of course intrinsically shaped by different ascribed attributes of class, race, age and gender, that in combination create highly stratified and socio-spatially uneven power geometries of policy learning (McCann 2011a, p. 121).
can also be said for any major cultural event, those do not explicitly require expensive and expansive urban upgrading projects\textsuperscript{93}. They do however encourage them, and in many cases cultural accolades have been used as a powerful political tool to legitimise large-scale urban regeneration projects, for example in Glasgow (United Kingdom; ECOC 1990; García 2005), Porto (Portugal; ECOC 2001; Balsas 2004), Barcelona (Spain; Universal Forum of Cultures 2004; Dodd 2008), Cork (Ireland, ECOC 2005; O'Callaghan & Linehan 2007) or Essen/Ruhr Valley (Germany, ECOC and International Building Exhibition 2010; Pachaly 2008).\textsuperscript{94}

Another significant difference between sporting events and institutional cultural designations is their actual eventing period. While even the biggest sporting tournaments only last for about thirty days, cultural awards programming often takes place over an entire calendar year. These different chronologies also affect the event's momentum: while tournaments like the Olympics or the FIFA World Cup are generally seen as a whirlwind "global sport-media-tourism complex" (Nauright 2004, p. 1334) that routinely puts the respective host city into a short but intense state of exception ('Olympic craze' and 'FIFA fever'), the programme of cultural designations such as the 'European Capital of Culture' or the 'World Design Capital' generally comprise of a much higher number and bigger spectrum of events that happen over the course of twelve months, with some attention-grabbing highlights positioned throughout (for a more detailed exemplary comparison, see Table 4 Comparison of key event indicators 2010 FIFA World Cup and WDC 2014').

\textsuperscript{93} World Expos are of course an exception in this regard, as the construction of suitable and well-connected exhibition grounds is a pivotal prerequisite, a fact that severely strained the metropolitan budget of EXPO host city Hannover (Germany) in 2000 (Qinghai 2004).

\textsuperscript{94} In addition, this list indicates a geographic caveat, namely that the practice of urban renewal through cultural award schemes has been championed in European cities. In this regard, Cape Town's World Design Capital process also exemplifies how this practice is increasingly globalised.
Table 4 Comparison of key event indicators 2010 FIFA World Cup and WDC 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>World Design Capital 2014</th>
<th>FIFA World Cup 2010</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Duration of tenure</strong></td>
<td>12 months</td>
<td>4 weeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main administrative scale</strong></td>
<td>Municipal</td>
<td>National</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Preparation time</strong></td>
<td>2 years</td>
<td>6 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mandatory infrastructure upgrade?</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level of corporate sponsorship</strong></td>
<td>Low to Medium</td>
<td>Very High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Application and licensing fees</strong></td>
<td>484,000 €</td>
<td>54.6 million €</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall public costs (estimated)</strong></td>
<td>5 million €</td>
<td>2.5 billion €</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level of programmatic autonomy for host city</strong></td>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>Very Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level of local regulative authority exercised by international awarding body</strong></td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Very High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Wenz 2014, p. 254

Given the long history of urban (mega-)events research (Gold & Gold 2011; Getz 2012), it is curious that studies investigating their role as instances of interurban policy mobility and networked knowledge relays have emerged only recently, and still remain few and far between (for exceptions see Surborg et al. 2008; Boyle et al. 2011; Cook & Ward 2011). This might be due to the fact that research on mega-events has traditionally focused strongly on another form of global mobility, i.e. tourism and the economic, social and cultural effects that event-induced tourism has on the respective host country and its cities (Getz 1991; Hiller 1998; Teigland 1999; Getz 2005, Getz 2008). This is not to say that the political ramifications of catering to a whimsical "visitor class" (Eisinger 2000) have been ignored. However, critical studies on these "politics of bread and circuses" (ibid.) have largely and undoubtedly legitimately focused on unmasking the detrimental effects of top-down governance, the large hiatus between the overstated political claims of social inclusion and economic growth versus the reality of lacking democratic, participatory and redistributive properties, as well as the tendency of mega-events to
exacerbate existing inequalities through "spectacular security" measures (Andranovich et al. 2001; Horne 2007; Pillay & Bass 2008; Cornelissen 2011; Steinbrink et al. 2011).

In consequence, not enough attention has been paid to those inter-scalar processes of learning and knowledge creation, new networks of actor positions, and ad-hoc institutionalisations that cannot be neatly captured within the top-down/bottom-up dichotomies defined by conventional urban governance analysis. A more refined approach is particularly necessary given the shifting and expanding geographies of mega-events: China's growing internationalisation symbolised by its Olympic Summer Games in 2008, South Africa's stint as first African host country for the FIFA Soccer World Cup in 2010 and India's Commonwealth Games in the same year, followed by Brazil's double coup of organising both the Soccer World Cup 2014 and the Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro in 2016 and lastly Russia's Winter Olympics in 2014, all point towards the heightened international attention for emerging markets, particularly those of the BRICS state group. While these sporting mega-events were previously almost exclusively staged in the global North, a new thrust towards countries of the 'global south' can be observed, fuelled by the belief that events are ostensibly effective catalysts for economic growth and development.

Though institutional cultural accolades share this developmental rationale, their 'travel' towards the 'global south' has followed a different trajectory: For one, the geographic expansion of the cultural accolade prototype, the 'European Capital of Culture', and thus the radius of its policy knowledge circuits, is limited by virtue of its institutional funding source, the European Union. However, spurred by the popularity of this particular award scheme as the most prolific "strategic weapon in the cultural arms race" (Richards 2000), other international organisations have started to create similar designations with broader global reach.

In 2004, the United Nation's Economic, Social, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) launched its Creative Cities Network, which was born out of its 'Global Alliance' for Cultural Diversity initiative. The network's mission is the development of international cooperation and knowledge exchange "among cities that have identified creativity as a strategic factor for sustainable development [...] in all regions of the world" (UNESCO 2013, p. 1). The
designation is in line with UNESCO's goal\textsuperscript{95} to highlight and promote the cultural and creative industries as a driver of sustainable growth and social cohesion in so-called 'developing countries', and reflects the international popularity of cultural tourism promotion as low cost policy priority (Barrowclough & Kozul-Wright 2008; Evans 2009).

Since 2004, the organisation has recognised a total of 38 cities across all continents in the seven categories literature, film, music, craft and folk art, design, media arts, and gastronomy (see Figure 4). The basic aim of this accolade, however, is less the creation of a universal set of events - though concerts, festivals, exhibitions and fairs are explicitly encouraged in order to create new opportunities for cultural tourism - and more focused on the creation of interurban partnerships between the designated cities to exchange know-how, expertise and experiences on a global platform.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{members.png}
\caption{Members of the UNESCO's Creative Cities Network}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{95} This can also be seen as a new political frontier for UNESCO itself, as it has been traditionally more focused on traditional culture and heritage preservation, which it supports and monitors via its popular "World Heritage" list. Though the World Heritage label has in some instances also recognised historic urban cultural sites, this accolade is not particularly focused on cities and their contemporary cultural life.
Like UNESCO, the International Council of Societies of Industrial Design (Icsid) as the World Design Capital's awarding body, was inspired by the global rise of the creative imperative: "The evolution of the creative industries, their impact and contributions to the global economy, have helped Icsid to position the WDC project as an outlet for design to be recognised as a significant accelerator in city development" (Icsid 2012). Yet unlike UNESCO, which is a long-standing international governance institution whose members are nation states that have signed and ratified the necessary conventions and treaties, Icsid is a much smaller private NGO that works as an umbrella body for various types of members, ranging from universities to public-private-partnerships, and national design societies to businesses and corporates. It officially launched the biennial World Design Capital project in 2008 in its pilot city Torino, in order to provide "a distinctive opportunity for cities to showcase their accomplishments in attracting and promoting innovative design, as well as highlight successes in urban revitalisation strategies" (Icsid 2012). In comparison to UNESCO's Creative Cities Network, which is more concerned with inter-city capacity building for all creative industry sectors as well as urban cultural policy development, the WDC designation is more focused on promoting design as a cross-sectoral tool for creative city futures, particularly through its six prescribed 'signature events' each designated city is required to host (see box 3, p. 348).

As I will show in chapter 7, the shift from a cultural and creative industry focus to a narrative of design is far more than mere semantics, and needs to be carefully investigated in its conjunction with the strategic governmental repurposing of creativity as a developmental tool in Southern cities. In sum, the ways in which both the Creative Cities Network and the World Design Capital emphasise the role of interurban partnerships and 'best practice' exchange, allow me to surmise that these institutional cultural accolades are an important vehicle for reconstructing the local politics of travelling urban paradigms. Furthermore, Cape Town provides a particularly interesting case, as the idea to bid for the World Design Capital title was conceived in late 2009, amidst the final run up to its stint as official FIFA World Cup host city. Hence, tracing the respective governmental rationales in an *ex post* perspective offers a rare opportunity to see on the one hand, how the two events converge and differ regarding the kinds of transnational urban policy
'solutions' and planning paradigms they peddle, and on the other hand how far the experience of "FIFA's reign" (Haferburg 2011) has been a 'game changer' for local government in terms of how it conceives of, approaches and positions itself within international accolade schemes (see chapter 7.2.2). After all, as Marcuse (2005) astutely reminds us, a city does not compete for an accolade, a city's governmental leaders do (p. 248).

Interesting insights into what kinds of interurban governmental formations can emerge from mega-events are provided by Surborg et al. (2008). Monitoring the different bidding, planning and development stages of the Olympic Games in Whistler-Vancouver, they encountered what they call "a growth machine diaspora" (p. 342, original emphasis). This selectively transnationalised regime is continuously at pains to straddle the demands of both local and external stakeholders, which is why the authors characterise it as "neither purely localized nor as placeless and hyper-global, but as a group of dispersed actors in various selected locales that is bound together through common interests and beliefs in specific forms of urban growth and development; beliefs made more attainable through the vehicle of the mega-event" (ibid.). Two important points can be deduced from their observations: First, that these types of coalitions are not solely bound together by rationalist calculations of economic benefit, but equally by common ideas and shared imaginaries about what constitutes globally successful city-making, and that urban mega-events present a seemingly indispensable vehicle for becoming a 'better quality city' (McCann 2004a).

Second, that in spite of the fact that particularly sporting mega-event bodies strive to implement a rigidly normed protocol in a standardised organisational routine, this does not mean that the local processes amount to little more than a reproductive blueprint scenario, impressed onto the local context by a monolithic outside force (Surborg et al. 2008, p. 354, Vanwynsberghe et al. 2013). Instead, as my analysis in chapter 7.2.2 shows, the 'festivalisation' of urban governance through mega-events (Steinbrink et al. 2011) presents itself as a continuously circulating governmental regime of interurban expertise, multi-local business interests, as well as context-and stakeholder-specific experiences that come together in time and place-sensitive situated networks. And as Myers (2011) reminds us in his comparative note, "[...] taken as a whole, the festivalization of African cities [...] marks the profoundly cosmopolitan, globalized, imaginative, generative, and dynamic character of the continent's 'always moving spaces'" (p. 185).
This relational reading of strategic linkages between local and global, internal and external objectives doesn't mean that coercive practices cease to exist; On the contrary, many studies on South Africa's World Cup experience as well as many of my own research respondents have repeatedly pointed out how national steering capacities were cut down and original local development aims hampered by an immense exertion of external pressure, influence and expectations (Cornelissen 2008; Pillay & Bass 2008; Haferburg 2011; Steinbrink et al. 2011). Also, globally mobile mega-events remain a preferential docking-station to accelerate neoliberalisation and advance ideals of urban entrepreneurialism with the help of powerful, post-political, consensus-driven visions of urban renewal (Swyngedouw 2011; Vanwynsberghe et al. 2013; McCann 2013). Considering this sobering outlook, Horne (2007) poses a pertinent question: "Given all the unpredictability and uncertainties surrounding major international sports mega-events, why do governments and cities [still] compete for the right to host them?" (p. 85).

In recourse to my previous argument, I suggest that if we start rethinking international accolades as instances of worlding and transversal "mooring posts" (Hannam et al. 2006) of globally mobile urban planning paradigms, we might find that one answer lies - rather counter-intuitively - in exactly this unpredictable yet exciting offering of major events as "speculative experiments that have different possibilities of both success and failure" (Roy & Ong 2011, p. xv). Consequently, this allows us to frame them as "world-conjuring projects" (Ong 2011b, p. 1) that encompass ambitious urban imagineering and divergent institutional, political, economic and civic aspirations96. In addition, it opens our view towards the 'social life' of international accolades beyond but certainly not divorced from actually existing processes of urban neoliberalisation (Peck & Theodore 2012).

Furthermore, mega-events have been commonly punted as a significant experience of modernity (Roche 2002; Horne 2007). However, as we see established criteria of Western urban modernity caving and crumbling against our experiences with

96 The value of civic events beyond manufactured consumer experiences can hardly be overstated: "The invention of new civic events can build on needs, desires and dreams, not to create a false sense of jollity or togetherness, [...] but memorable festive occasions in which large swathes of the city participate in person, express their own ways of celebrating or commemorating, and share moments of conviviality" (Bianchini 07.02.2004). According to Lefèbvre (1970), these fêtes are an indispensable part of the urban revolution, as they can disrupt established routines and provide a platform for insurgent citizenship (see also Merrifield 2007; Holston 2009; Lefebvre & Roult 2013).
multiple 'glocal' urban modernities (Swyngedouw & Kaïka 2003), their precarious re-invention in the 21st century metropolis is fundamentally based upon an open-ended loop of speculative trial and error (Roy 2009b). As Ong (2011b) remarks, "tinkering with a spectrum of urban ideas and forms is an art of being global" (p. 12), and the spectacular allure of international accolades has repeatedly proven its power in drawing together a disparate bunch of differently-skilled interurban policy 'tinkerers' and 'elite dreamers' with various vested interests. Lastly, even though the planning of mega-events often seems on the surface like a well-oiled machinery for hierarchical and 'fast' policy learning, it is in fact engulfed and shaped by the messy and often tedious "politics of becoming" (Ponzini & Rossi 2010), which - as I have previously laid out - is the stuff that cityness is made of and through which it is conceived.

At this stage, it is important to mention that this keen interest in the overlapping practices of speculation and citation, experimenting and tinkering, is also what has linked both worlding and policy mobilities to recent ideas about urban assemblage. The broad and at times controversial discussion about this figure of thought and its empirical, methodological and ontological value for understanding contemporary cities has been and still continues to be one of the richest, most prolific and provoking in recent urban geography debates (Collier 2006; Venn 2006; Dewsbury 2011; Featherstone 2011; McFarlane 2011d; McFarlane & Anderson 2011; Russell et al. 2011; Anderson et al. 2012; Farias & Bender 2012; Söderström et al. 2013); so much so that its nuanced depth and breadth can hardly be adequately dealt with in the scope of this chapter. However, a bit like not talking about a proverbial elephant in the room, not touching upon the assemblage discussion could be read as undue omission. Thus, I want to use the remainder of this section to introduce - in due brevity - the most important conceptual pointers, which the figure of assemblage has offered for my study of Cape Town's creative cityness (for different takes on its ontological implications and limitations, refer to Cities, Vol. 15, Nos. 3-4, June-August 2011).

4.2.3 Thinking worlding and policy mobilities through the figure of 'urban assemblage'

According to McFarlane (2011a), assemblage is "increasingly used [...] to connote indeterminacy, emergence, becoming, processuality, turbulence and the
sociomateriality of phenomena" (p. 206), connotations that have proven equally useful for describing practices and processes of worlding and policy mobility. The term itself goes back to the French post-structural theorists Deleuze and Guattari (1987), for whom an assemblage represents a "veritable invention" (ibid., p. 406), made up of "states of things, bodies, various combinations, hodgepodge; but you also find utterances, modes of expression, and whole regimes of signs" (Deleuze 2007). Although some prominent proponents have insinuated that 'assemblage thinking' could also help us generate new ontologies (McFarlane 2011b; Farias & Bender 2012; for a critical take see Brenner et al. 2011), I want to emphasise that within my more humble context of mid-range theorising I have come to understand it more as an empirical and methodological orientation.

Particularly in light of what I have previously said about creativity as a social dispositif (see chapter 3.1), I argue that the notion of assemblage provides a complimentary figure for grappling with the ambiguous governmental dynamics of creativity in the context of Cape Town. Other scholars coming from a similar line of inquiry in trying to comprehend creative city politics in different places, have used an interpretation, for example Prince (2010b, 2012, 2013b), who has put forward the idea of a 'governmental assemblage' as a specific type of research object in an attempt to "highlight the contingency, heterogeneity and complexity of systems of government while allowing for a sense of overall coherence" (p. 878).

Moreover, he stresses that "policy transfer is political and technical" (Prince 2010b, pp. 169; original emphasis), and that its embodied performance takes place in a parallel movement of abstraction and concretisation of ideas. In consequence, an assemblage is more than a 'glorified network', but rather works on the premise that agency is distributed within and throughout different assemblages, urging us to pay careful attention to its non-linear and immanent terms of composition and relational processes of de- and re-territorialisation (Anderson 2012, p. 186; Brenner et al. 2011). Moreover, McCann and Ward (2012) also proposed to use the term as a descriptive trope that "encourages and rewards a methodological openness and flexibility which accommodates the tension between the need to carefully design research projects, on the one hand, and the reality of unexpected connections, mutations, and research sites emerging during the projects, on the other" (p. 43). In turn, McCann (2011b), McCann and Ward (2011b) and
others (Collier & Ong 2005; McFarlane 2011b; Kaika 2012) productively invoked assemblage as an experimental methodological rubric of multi-scalar inquiry, that allows us to trace "travels and transfers, political struggles, relational connections, [...] territorial fixities/mobilities" (McCann & Ward 2011a, p. xv), while at the same time helping us not to lose sight of the speculative practices of localised urban actors who 'deduct' policies from wider flows which inexorably stream between multiple 'close-bys' and 'elsewheres' (McCann et al. 2013; Allen & Cochrane 2007, Allen & Cochrane 2010).

Thus, for my own research and in light of the repeated calls from African urban scholars to unshackle the continent from its prevalent epistemological paralysis, assemblage has become a particularly pertinent empirical and methodological (again: not ontological) proposition for coming to terms with the fact that "Africa like, everywhere else, has its heres, its elsewheres, and its interstices (emplacement and displacement). [...] As evinced by numerous recent studies, the continent we have in mind exists only as a function of circulation and of circuits. It is fundamentally in contact with an elsewhere. As such, it is a space that is not only 'produced'; it is also a space that circulates, that is constantly in motion. One of the more potent ways of disrupting and 'jamming' the dominant imaginings of Africa is therefore to concern ourselves anew with space and with discontinuities, to revisit our topographical imagination when it comes to this vast geographical landmass made up of a multiplicity of social forms and interlaced boundaries that, though only partially connected, are nevertheless entangled in myriad ways" (Mbembe & Nuttall 2004, pp. 351f). In essence, this also reiterates what has already been stressed by Robinson (2011b, 2013) and others (Pieterse 2006, Pieterse April 2013; Simone & Fauzan 2013): That in African cities as much as anywhere else\textsuperscript{97}, there is always the chance that seemingly reproductive policies such as the creative city paradigm, through their multiple and speculative reiterations, end up yielding surprising and progressive outcomes that jar with our preconceived ideas of hegemonic global policy imperatives.

Furthermore, assemblage applied in this heuristic manner also seems fit for adding a vocabulary that can capture certain abstractable, mobile and dynamic policy phenomena and trace - in empirical detail - the different and often contentious practices with which

\textsuperscript{97} As a geographer, I am aware that a certain "territorial trap" (Agnew 1994) lurks behind the often undifferentiated and thus dangerously homogenising reference to Africa. However contemporary postcolonial African scholarship continues to deconstruct, problematise and refract such wholesale imaginaries (Mbembe 2000; Mamdani 2001; Comaroff & Comaroff 2012a).
these "vehicular ideas" (McLennan 2004) are dis- and emplaced as a new socio-political signifiers (Collier & Ong 2005; Grodach & Silver 2013).

Hence, in bringing my argument full circle, my starting point for analysing Cape Town's miscellaneous creative cityness was not to approach it as simply another derivative of a singular, homogeneous or discrete planning dogma, but rather as an entangled multiscalar mesh of socio-political practices - an assemblage - that is at play in continuously making and unmaking the city (Ong 2011b, p. 10). As such, inquiring into the "social life of policies" (Peck & Theodore 2012, p. 23) also opens our view towards the trans-local nature in which political power is both stabilised (assembled) and mobilised (disassembled) through vehicular ideas such as the creative city trope. In trying to make sense of Cape Town's intricate urban governance dynamics, this line of thought has furthermore helped me understand "how and with what consequences urbanism is assembled through policy actors' purposive gathering and fixing of globally mobile resources, ideas, and knowledge" (McCann & Ward 2012, p. 43). But as Alsayyad and Roy (2006), Simone (2004), Holston (2009) and Simone and Fauzan (2013) show, puzzling together the global and the local is of course not only a desire of 'purposeful' policy creation driven by transnational elites, but remains equally an act of active and in its widest sense 'creative' citizenship.

In this section, I have proposed that Cape Town's creative cityness can be theoretically apprehended by applying two overlapping notions - worling and policy mobility - that are captured in the methodological figure of an urban assemblage as specific object of study (Peck & Theodore 2012). The boundaries between these conceptual bearings are however not clear-cut, particularly as their different intellectual proponents continue to engage in critically taking apart and reassembling (sic!) their approaches (Russell et al. 2011; Brenner & Schmid 2014).

In a way, it also seems consistent that in order to understand the city as continuously assembled, we also have to dare and try out new techniques of theoretical and methodological bricolage (see further chapter 6). McCann et al.'s (2013) recent conversation provides such a first attempt as it openly thinks about how worling and assemblage can be productively combined and strategically deployed to advance our understanding of the "contemporary urban-global condition" (p. 581). Though they concede, that many important questions still remain to be asked and further debated - for
example what exactly delineates the political within the respective approaches - they avidly stress the potential of this interlocution for providing a critical language to describe what Roy (2011) has previously called the "citationary structures of 21st century capitalism" (McCann et al. 2013, p. 587; Roy 2011a, p. 329). In order to further expand my theoretical vocabulary for my subsequent analysis of creative cityness in Cape Town, the next section will hone in on how power can be conceptualised within this global inter-city referentiality, by looking at it from the vantage point of governmentality.
"Importantly, the very process of making things stable doesn't entail following a set of rules, formulas or best practices. Rather, it entails shaking things up, playing in larger arenas, and paying attention to new territories and people." (Simone 2010, p. 2)

4.3 Governmentality meets creative cityness

The point that popular urban policies and planning paradigms do not travel across a flat world and are not mobile in and of themselves, but that their sojourn in different localities is shaped by intricate and dispersed power dynamics, has already been driven home in the previous section. Though ideas about how this stratified web of flows and fixtures is effectively governed have already been implied, in this section I seek to thrash out more explicitly how power is inscribed, enacted, controlled and unbound in processes of worlding cities. As Osborne and Rose (1999) points out, "the city has been a privileged site for the problematisation of control in that, within these broiling, rolling, mutating, branching, and reconnecting flows of speed and information, it marks out a concrete field of localisation and concentration where the exercise of government appears potentially possible" (p. 749). In this vein, questions of how to conceptualise urban social order as it is done and perpetually undone have been central to the abovementioned debates on worlding and policy mobilities. Hence, many of its prominent proponents have also frequently evoked concepts of governmentality in order to pay careful analytical attention to the embeddedness of market-oriented forms of regulation (Ong 2007; Roy 2009a; Ward 2011b).

In subsequently discussing selected perspectives on the Foucauldian notion of governmentality - or, colloquially speaking, by rummaging through his proverbial
'toolbox' - I seek to complete my own set of instruments that can assist me in understanding how Cape Town's creative cityness is continuously negotiated through different modes of worlding and episodes of policy mobility. Furthermore, I argue that a governmentality lens can also help me to grapple with the ways in which notions of creativity and design have been strategically evoked and normalised as political-economic rationalities in the production of Cape Town's creative city politics.

However, it is also important to acknowledge a range of limitations that have not least derived from Foucault's own ambiguous use of the term. Thus I will first provide a brief general introduction to the "field of governmentality" (Rose 1999, p. 18), in order to clarify how I intend to make use of the concept. I will then move on to discuss how a 'global' view on governmentality can help to unlock a topological perspective for analysing urban politics through their interurban connections and policy mobilities. Lastly, I seek to critically engage with the perception of African cities as frontiers of governmentality studies, countering this short-sighted view with some pointers as to how governmentality could be productively leveraged as a theoretical lens for understanding contemporary urban governance dynamics in cities like post-apartheid Cape Town.

### 4.3.1 Governmentality - a short introduction and differential positioning

The French philosopher Michel Foucault coined the term governmentality (gouvernementalité) during his 1978/79 lectures at the Collège de France, in an endeavour to develop a new and broader understanding of social power beyond conventional readings of hierarchical and state-centric disciplinary power. Foucault's provocation was to see power not as exclusively coercive and confined to official government bodies, but as socially produced and distributed: "What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn't only weigh on us as a force that says no; it also traverses and produces things,

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98 This section can only provide a cursory review of what is a rather short albeit important section of Foucault's expansive ouevre. For detailed information and critical discussions on his large intellectual imprint across the humanities and social sciences, refer to Rabinow (1991, 1986), Danaher et al. (2000), Gutting (2006) and Lemke (2011).

99 Rose (1999) provides an instructive caveat in recognising that studies that draw on the notion of governmentality are so varied, that they can be seen as "neither a homogeneous school nor a closed sect" (p. 9).
it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network that runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression” (Foucault et al. 2003, p. 307). In an initially epochal reading, this transgression of modern government towards perceiving society as a manageable population meant that the focus was no longer resting exclusively on territorial integrity and restrictive security. Instead, by the beginning of the 18th century, it had shifted towards establishing a policy of the social (Gesellschaftspolitik) through instruments of public health and welfare that were geared towards increasing citizens' productivity (Foucault 2010a, p. 152).

This transition was significant insofar as this art of government now entailed reflexivity towards the actions of the governed (Rose 1999, p. 27), so that to govern was no longer limited to ruling merely by sheer coercive force, but through subtly "structur[ing] the possible field of action of others" (Foucault 1982, p. 790). The idea that enacting power does not "result in a removal of liberty or options available to individuals" per se, but "[…] could result in an 'empowerment' or 'responsibilisation' of subjects, forcing them to 'free' decision-making in fields of action" (Lemke 2002, p. 51) can also be seen as one reason why governmentality has become such a salient approach for the critique of advanced liberal societies. Furthermore, what made Foucault's work particularly conducive for geographic research was his close attention to the socio-spatial production of power and how it is "exercised in a myriad of microlocales" (Rose 1999, p. 48; also Hannah 1997; Crampton & Elden 2009). In addition, the fact that his original analysis focused expansively on cities and the historical transformation of their modes of governance, has made his works even more pertinent for critical urban scholarship (Füller & Marquardt 2010, pp. 91ff).

However, as Füller and Marquardt show, the unfinished nature of Foucault's own conceptualisations of governmentality due to his untimely death, has allowed a broad space for ambiguous interpretation and divergent theoretical projections (pp. 98f). In turn, I recognise that any attempt to apply Foucault's conceptual tenets within particular empirical research contexts does require a carefully differentiated positioning, that recognises the dichotomy between governmentality as a more general theory for analysing

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100 Another reason for the wide-spread appeal of governmentality as a line of theoretical inquiry has been its possibility to break free of the frustrating positivism reigning throughout the social science, and to embrace post-structural ideas without being confined to their strict textualism (Larner & Walters 2004, p. 3).
the effects of power in ordering the social, and its more specific use for framing a specific
historical phase of late-modern, neoliberal rule.

While my analysis tends to lean more towards the latter application of the concept, I want to argue that - particularly in light of creativity as an emergent social dispositif (chapter 3.1) - maintaining a bifocal view of governmentality can be fruitful to capturing both the multi-scalar and embodied technologies of urban governance, as well as the variegated neoliberalisation dynamics. In this, I am taking my cue from Füller and Marquardt (2010), who, in their elucidating analysis of gentrification in downtown Los Angeles, have also grappled with the issue of how to operationalise Foucault's iridescent concept for framing contemporary socio-spatial and political-economic effects of urban transformation. They delineate two common empirical uses of the concept. The first one relates to governmentality as a form of governance beyond the state, which has been prominently championed by (Rose & Miller 1992).

This perspective particularly stresses that political power is produced through the interplay of actors, practices and discourses, which are not necessarily connected to any formal body of government (Rose 1993a). In a motion that has also been described as "cut[ting] off the king's head" (Neal 2004), Foucault thus effectively 'demotes' traditional state entities to one - albeit important - form of social authority amongst many. The second perspective focuses on the idea of governmentality as the "conduct of conductes" (Foucault 1982, p. 789), meaning that effects of power are produced through different forms of both political rule and subjectivity.

As Lemke (2002) points out, Foucault thus provides a more comprehensive meaning to governing as an act, which not only refers to singular forms of public

101 An accurate definition of the widening governmental spheres can be found in Swyngedouw (2005): "Governance-beyond-the-state refers [...] to the emergence, proliferation and active encouragement of institutional arrangements of 'governing' which give a much greater role in policy-making, administration and implementation to private economic actors on the one hand and to parts of civil society on the other in self-managing what until recently was provided or organised by the national or local state" (p. 1992; see also González & Healey 2005).

102 Mckee (2009) rightly notes that the state is by no means made redundant, but that it is reconfigured while still remaining a "pivotal actor in shaping both the conceptualization of the 'problem' and the proposed solution" (p. 470).

103 The term "conduct" was of course carefully chosen by Foucault, as it not only means 'to lead' through technologies of domination, but also 'to behave' as a subject, further structuring the individual field of possibilities through technologies of the self (Lemke 2002, p. 49; Huxley 2009, p. 187).
regulation, but comprised a continuum of control from embodied micro-practices to macro-political discourses on the capital value of human creativity (Lemke 2002, p. 61; Bröckling 2007; Bröckling 2012; Reckwitz 2012). According to (Füller & Marquardt 2010, p. 100), this biopolitical stance, which argues that certain forms of governing are re-inscribed in varying identity formations, also offers the possibility to consider different phenomena of socio-spatial and political-economic urban transformation beyond their discursive representation.

Looking at the intricate processes of worlding and how they are instigated through the mobility of urban policy paradigms such as the creative city, also opens our perspective towards understanding how different practices emerge at the coalface of intersecting and multi-scalar orders of knowledge and power. Particularly in light of the fact that the 'governance beyond the state'-perspective has often been criticised as reductionist, I share Füller's and Marquardt's (2010) proposition that intersecting both perspectives helps us examine the city as a crucible of spatial, body, population and moral politics that need to be considered in conjunction in order to grasp the contemporary rationalities of governance (p. 104). Especially considering that the creative city paradigm constitutes a 'moral political field' (Künkel 2014) that - as I will show in part III - in Cape Town has combined the emergence of new non-state actor positions in local governance processes with emotive calls for self-governance and performances of 'designer subjectivities', it seems appropriate for me to follow their lead in this regard.

Nonetheless, they have also clearly flagged the limitations of much empirical work on governmentality, which displayed a tendency towards over-generalising and homogenising one particular governmental logic, in consequence losing sight of the possibility that both modern and seemingly overcome forms of power can occur simultaneously (ibid., p. 103). This has been particularly true for the way in which many works have presumed a rather linear and discrete progression from liberalism via welfare-ism to neoliberalism as a pre-set empirical typology.

Following Rose (1999), it is however important to be mindful of the fact that "[w]hen studies of governmentality speak of liberalism, of welfare, of neo-liberalism and the like [...] these terms should be understood not as designating epochs, but as individuating a multiplicity of attempts to rationalize the nature, means, ends, limits for the exercise of power and styles of governing, the instruments,
techniques and practices to which they become linked" (p. 28). In this vein, it is important to stress that governmentality is not synonymous with neoliberalisation. Instead, it functions as a conceptual inroad for grappling with the "advanced liberal diagram of power" (Osborne & Rose 1999, p. 738), i.e. as a lens through which to understand how economic rationalities and market-led development logics have assumed a certain hegemonic position amongst contemporary forms of social reproduction (Mattissek 2008, p. 55). This distinction is an important one to make, not least because pertinent questions of how to analytically abstract neoliberal practices from what are always more-than-neoliberal contexts have been recently raised by prominent proponents of 'southern' urban study (Robinson & Parnell 2011; hence I will return to this question of neoliberal governmentality in chapter 4.4). In the remainder of this introduction I want to thrash out some more conceptual benefits I see in using governmentality as a lens for the study of urban politics (see Figure 5).

For one, urban governance dynamics have come into effect through a "governmentalisation of culture" (Ponzini & Rossi 2010, p. 1052; Barnett 2001), and thus constitute social processes that always partially elude formalised institutions of government. As Osborne and Rose (1999) shrewdly note, "the vicious immanence of the city is a never-ending incitement to projects of government" (p. 738). This also suggests why local urban governments - including the City of Cape Town - have been ever more prone to adopt technologies for "governing at a distance" (Miller & Rose 1990), for example through devolving power and responsibility to public private partnerships and growth coalitions, or pluralising and 'autonomising' political agency through measures of new public management and civic participation (Osborne & Rose 1999, p. 749; Swyngedouw 2005, p. 1993; for Cape Town see Miraftab 2007; Haferburg & Huchzermeyer 2014). With regards to citizenship in 'advanced' liberal urban settings, this also means that civic rights are as much imbued with entitlements and claims as they are with duties and responsibilities for projects of urban renewal, regeneration and development (Roy 2009a, p. 168).

In consequence and with regards to my previous argument about Cape Town's creative cityness as a speculative form of worlding, the following quote from Rose (1999) makes a pivotal observation of urban governmentality in a language that has also shaped
much current writing on policy mobilities (see chapter 3.3 & 4.2). He notes: "Programmes and technologies of government, then, are assemblages which may have a rationality, but this is not one of a coherence of origin or singular essence. Foucault suggested that the French legal system was like one of the machines constructed by Tinguely\textsuperscript{104} - full of parts that come from elsewhere, strange couplings, chance relations, cogs and levers that aren't connected, that don't work, and yet somehow produce judgements, prisoners, sanctions and much more" (pp. 276; emphasis added LW). In comparing the art of government to art itself, Foucault drives home two very important points. The first and more obvious one concerns methodology, as he shows that the source of and motivation for governmental power lies in its relationality, "in the ongoing process of generating and then re-connecting various forms of life, relations of space and time, and different actors" (Simone 2010, p. 11 drawing on Osborne & Rose 1999). I deduct from this that just as the mesmerised viewer of Tinguely's phantasmagoric machines can only comprehend their movement through observing the kinetic circuits established through a myriad of visible and hidden conjunctions, we cannot start to analyse urban governance through premeditated, fixed objects like nation states or city councils, but have to trace the circulation of power through the entire socio-economic and political field. This also means that empirical studies that subscribe to the notion of urban governmentality do not reduce complexity but rather generate it, because they will "at times, lead us to institutions, policy programmes, and diplomatic agreements, other times, [they will] point to scientific discoveries, architectural designs, and other more mundane and inconspicuous practices" (Vrasti 2013, p. 53).

The second and probably less obvious point is evoked by the mentioning of an - albeit obfuscated - elsewhere. In his genealogical studies, Foucault repeatedly showed that elements that were to prove themselves central to the formation of local governmental power often emerged from dispersed social events taking place further afield, and whose innovative progeny was subsequently drawn in and incorporated into modern government\textsuperscript{105} (Jessop 2009, p. 66). With recourse to my previous argument, I thus

\textsuperscript{104} Jean Tinguely (1925-1991) was a Swiss painter and sculpturer of the Nouveaux Réalistes. His fantastical, large-scale and 'useless' mechanic structures created from scrap material as a critical artistic response to the uniformity of industrial production and its purported role in social progress made him a key proponent of kinetic art (Hultén & Tinguely 1987).

\textsuperscript{105} In their edited collection The Other Global City Saunier and Ewen (2008) have for example compiled a host of pieces that not only illustrate the institutional legacies of colonial rule, but also show how cities and towns in the colonies were often used as testing grounds for developing new bureaucratic technologies of population control, some of which would also prove effective for governing cities in other colonies as well as back in Europe.
conclude that the art of modern urban governance, or in this sense urban governmentality, is inherently connected to the "art of being global" (Roy & Ong 2011) - and vice versa.

Thus, in order to be able to problematise what I have encountered to be an emergent 'designer governmentality' in Cape Town (see part III), it is important to also keep a multi-scalar perspective in close view. Because as Allen (2009) has shrewdly pointed out, the "topological shifts in the architecture of globalization have arguably enabled corporate institutions and government bodies along with non-governmental organizations, to bridge the gap between here and there in ways which exhaust our geometric descriptions of them. Defined territories, mapped connections, measurable distances, and fixed geographical scales [...] no longer capture much of the way in which power is exercised in an increasingly globalized world" (p. 159). In light of the fact that Foucault-inspired (or so called neo-Foucauldian) governmentality studies have presented themselves as particularly versatile but equally fragmented in straddling various spaces and scales of power, the next section tries to discern what recent advances in 'global' governmentality (not to be equated to or confused with a positivist 'global governance') can actually bring to the table for advancing our understanding of urban politics. In this, I don't only try to continue to carefully weigh the merits of governmentality for understanding processes of worlding and inter-urban policy mobilities, but I also seek to address the more thorny question of governmentality's possible limits as a conceptual frame of reference for understanding emergent creative city politics in postapartheid Cape Town.

4.3.2 'Global' governmentality as a topological perspective on urban politics

That "globalization is producing new geographies of governmentality" (Appadurai 2001, p. 24) is by no means a novel observation. Though some have lamented a relative neglect of the global in governmentality studies (Larner & Walters 2004, p. 5), we can hardly ignore the fact that it has been employed countless times across disciplines as a viable tool for analysing "the multiple and varied agencies acting in concert or in contest to constitute governable domains and spaces along various scales from the neighbourhood to the globe" (Dean 2009, pp. 227f). "Going global" (Yeoh 2005, p. 946) has become not
only a commonplace social imperative, but simultaneously an indispensable technology of urban governance, based on linking socio-political objectives with activities and events far distant in space and time (Rose 1999, p. 18). Thus, 'global' governmentality is not, and for the most part does not claim to be, a new conceptual approach, but rather marks a certain style of analysis and critical ethos (Vrasti 2013, p. 69). Its provocative stance derives not from any new grand theoretical claim. If anything it needs to be seen as a "modest injunction" (Larner & Walters 2004, p. 4) that highlights the need for experimental inquiry and mid-range theorising - a desire that has also been reflected by prominent 'southern' theorists (Ong 2007; Connell 2007a; Comaroff & Comaroff 2012a), and that I myself strongly sympathise with.

In an anti-essentialist and by virtue of its name potentially counter-intuitive manner, a global view on governmentality rebukes any preconceived ideas about what constitutes the global, and is particularly critical of romanticised notions such as an ostensibly universal 'cosmopolitan society' or the idea of cities as 'global villages' (Larner & Walters 2004, p. 2). In turn, 'global' urban governmentality as a theoretical accentuation (note: not as a tool in itself!), foregrounds the globalising practices of urban governance as opposed to a more traditional focus on their representations. This connotation also emphasises the multi-directionality of power, seeing the global as a topological space of circulation beyond its common designation as simply another scale of governance that can be defined a priori (Allen 2003; Barnett et al. 2008). Nonetheless, with globalising governmentalities gaining traction in urban geography, we need to also remain vigilant not to lose sight of the local messiness of empirical actualities through over-generalising certain governmental phenomena (Mc Kee 2009, p. 473).

In order to properly unpack "globalizing urban governmentalities" (Robinson 2011b, p. 28), it is necessary to elaborate some more on the implications of assuming a topological - as opposed to a geometric - perspective on power. According to Collier (2009), topologies of power\footnote{The term originally stems from higher mathematics where it defines an area of study that tries to understand spatial organisation in relation to connectivity, continuity and its transformational properties (Collier 2009, p. 80).} are key in redirecting the focus from the search for and analysis of new governmental discourses and practices towards the ways in which "existing techniques and technologies of power are re-deployed and recombined in
diverse assemblies of biopolitical government" (ibid., p. 79). He builds his argument on non-other than Foucault himself who, in his later works, produced a rich conceptual vocabulary around notions of redeployment, recombination, problematisation, and patterns of correlation to diagnose emerging governmental ensembles (ibid., p. 99).

In geography, the notion of topology has been championed by Allen (2003), who shows how it can help us to sidestep assumptions of fixed proximities, single governmental logics and totalising reaches of power in favour of recognising more relational spatial arrangements\textsuperscript{107}. This means that it is not only about how power puts us into place or frames particular objects, but rather about "the mingled expression of succession and simultaneity, presence and absence, remoteness and proximity, that shapes our experience of power" (ibid., p. 93; see also Belcher et al. 2008). As an example, understanding the ways in which the actions of governments, financial institutions and businesses directly affect different and often distant societies - the latest international financial meltdown being a case in point - or how we collectively deal with globally threatening phenomena like climate change or atomic energy production, could certainly benefit from a topological perspective (Allen 2009, p. 170).

Given this keen interest in mapping these "distant proximities of power" (ibid., p. 166), it is hardly surprising that the topological perspective has also been taken up by scholars who seek to trace the intricacies of worlding and policy mobility as they come to life through "distanciated relationships, direct ties and real-time connections of powerful and not so powerful actors" (ibid., p. 166), that push the city beyond any absolute spatial categorisation. In consequence, studies on 'global' urban governmentality have also stressed the importance of taking into account processes of translation\textsuperscript{108} by means of

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\textsuperscript{107} This process-oriented approach is however not without its methodological draw-backs. Massumi (2002) notes that although we can potentially extract an infinite number of stills from a topological formation, it will always remain impossible to diagram every single step (pp. 134, 184). However, Collier (2009, p. 80) rightfully contents that it is in fact not as much about the infinite multiplication of contingent forms, but that the focus rather lies on tracing the \textit{configurational principles} through which governmental power is assembled.

\textsuperscript{108} Translation between different scales of government has traditionally been a central trope of governmentality studies, as it allowed scrutinising "alignments between the objectives of authorities wishing to govern and the personal projects of those organizations, groups and individuals who are the subjects of government" (Rose 1999, p. 48). In turn, this results in mobile, loosely affiliated networks that are consistently embroiled in multi-scalar negotiations and bargaining processes, fuelled by different social pressures and distortions (Rose & Miller 1992, p. 184). Thus translation is also always an imperfect mechanism of governmental transformation - an "unstable power formation in the making" (Allen 2009, p. 170).
tracing the "language of urban transmission" (Ong 2011b, p. 17) in conjunction with practices of knowledge creation and circulation (Ong & Collier 2005; McCann 2011a; McCann & Ward 2011b).

An empirical illustration of this that is also relevant to my case is presented by (Larner & Le Heron 2004). In tracing the genealogy of benchmarking in its transition from a business technique via management theory to an ubiquitous point on the public policy agendas across the globe, they show how concepts of economic space are reconfigured at a distance through comparative practices (ibid., p. 215). They argue that the ability of benchmarking to translate and assemble measurements and performance indicators of others from close by and far away marks it as a powerful globalising practice: "Being included in calculations, and therefore named as an international competitor, is an instance of simultaneous individualisation at different geographic scales" (ibid., p. 227). What is furthermore important to note is that benchmarking produces spaces and subjects in a highly selective manner as "[i]t redefines core and periphery by linking up those organizations and people understood to have 'value' and discarding the rest. It is a limited and liminal technique in that not everyone can be 'best-in-class' or 'world-class', and it is possible to both enter into and be pushed from these ranks" (ibid., p. 219). Having observed how Cape Town's governance 'elite' has simultaneously used the city's WDC 2014 bid as an opportunity to 'benchmark' their programmes and projects against those of international competitors, while at the same time framing the city as a role model through claiming to provide "design solutions" for a "majority world context" (Interview M'Rithaa 30.01.2012); I concur with their argument.

In general, I share the sentiment that sees a global perspective on governmentality as a prolific approach for analysing "the local potential of global urban policies" (Robinson 2011b, p. 35) and argue that it could indeed provide a productive vantage point from which to understand the relational emergence of Cape Town's creative cityness within broader processes of neoliberal globalisation. However, some unresolved and unequivocally thorny questions remain: On the one hand, has governmentality not been epistemologically conceived and subsequently groomed against the distinct backdrop of

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162) - in which rule does not pass through a horizontal network across a unitary territory, but becomes "a matter of fragile relays, contested locales and fissiparous affiliations" (Rose 1999, p. 51).
liberal Western, late-modern and post-welfare state societies? But on the other hand, would the idea of African cities as a frontier of urban governmentality not be a contradiction to its constructivist, post-structural impetus? Should this not caution us to pause and consider possible pitfalls and necessary adaptations before leveraging it as a tool for the critical analysis of postcolonial 'Southern' and particularly African cities?

4.3.3 [Excursus] African cities as frontiers of governmentality?

"Foucault had a lot to say about power," writes British historian Young (1995), "but he was curiously circumspect about the ways in which it has operated in the arenas of race and colonialism" (p. 57). Like Young, who finds this fact so striking he even goes as far as wondering whether the French philosopher's scrupulous Euro-centrism was some kind of deliberate strategy, many other prominent scholars have pondered what to make of Foucauldian thought - and particularly his ideas on governmentality - beyond the West (Bhabha 1984; Said 1986; Szakoleczai 1994; Pels 1997). Postcolonial studies have been deeply divided, maybe even schizophrenic, in their relationship to Foucault's concepts: On the one hand, non-other than Said, in spite of the fact that his Orientalism (1978) greatly benefited from being read within a discourse-analytical framework, takes it upon himself to point to "the disturbing circularity of Foucault's theory of power" (ibid., p. 179) and its danger of dogmatic reduction. On the other hand, few other theorists have been as widely and fruitfully used as Foucault within postcolonial analysis and its endeavour to unmask dominant Western historicism (Young 1995, p. 3).

This begs the question: Does the fact that Foucault never directly considered biopolitics and governmentality in relation to colonial, imperial and developmental regimes, outright condemn his prolific intellectual concepts as inapplicable for framing questions of power beyond his European epistemological home-base? According to American political scientist Joseph (2010), the answer would be a resounding yes, because in his point of view governmentality could only be applied to spaces that clearly displayed advanced forms of liberalism and democracy (p. 223). He defends his geographic and normative boundaries with the overtly generalising and short-sighted claim that (neo-) liberal progress ostensibly remained few and far between in Sub-Saharan
Africa, an area that to him is marked by little more than despotism and military rule (ibid., p. 238). In consequence, he deducts that governmentality remained an incongruous Western import for analysing 'weak states' whose population had furthermore proven itself as largely incapable of individualised self-conduct or the creation of self-reflexive, monitoring agencies (ibid., p. 238). On the city scale, Watts (2005) has made similarly reductionist comments in delineating an ostensible incommensurability between liberal governmentality and "Africa's problematic otherness" (p. 182) that was expressed in 'weak citizenship' and a convoluted urban form, supposedly epitomised by the overwhelming presence of slums.\footnote{In fact, an array of different authors have already shown how 'the slum' cannot be regarded as some kind of 'Third World' pathology, but instead needed to be framed as a global form (Nuttall & Mbembe 2005; Davis 2006; Huchzermeyer 2011).}

Both these authors not only draw on a very narrow reading of governmentality but additionally perpetuate the widely-held but dangerously foreclosing perception, that non-Western and particularly African spaces are little more than the unwitting victims of their own negligence, incapacity, incompetence and inability (ibid., p. 185). This delirious misconception even prompts Joseph (2010) to ask in dead earnest: "Do we find in sub-Saharan Africa the exercise of power through free and autonomous individuals?" (p. 242) That such arrogant and paternalistic views are not only blatantly ignorant of the multiplicity of different experiences in (urban) African locales, but that their arguments are furthermore detrimental to the project of generating new knowledge orders that are able to grapple with said diversity of societal experiences, has been shown by many postcolonial theorists time and again.

Though I concur, that in its academic popularity, governmentality holds an undeniable risk of becoming a catch-all category as it is often awarded too generously, and that this validates the need to "put governmentality in its place" (ibid., p. 224), I strongly object to the idea that this 'place' could be geographically circumscribed to late-modern, Western societies. It seems to be often overlooked (or conveniently forgotten) that new rationalities of population management and care had also been instrumental in the creation of colonial conquest and rule beyond the 'global north' (Stoler 1995; Scott 1995; Gupta & Sharma 2006; Saunier & Ewen 2008). In her critique of Joseph (2010), Vrasti (2013) concurs in pointing out that his and similar arguments miss the
intrinsic connection between imperial intervention and varied techniques of liberal ordering, that range from subtle "laissez-faire tactics" to overtly "illiberal means" (such as slavery, colonialism, land-grabs, and other more contemporary forms of accumulation by dispossession), to justify liberal ends of civilising, modernising, and bettering its others" (ibid., p. 57; see also Venn 2009). She goes on to argue that even if places like New Guinea, Afghanistan or Arkansas were seemingly falling short or even completely failing to conform to the tenets of liberalism, this would not mean that they were effectively existing outside of the liberal project (Vrasti 2013, p. 64).

Furthermore, it has been pointed out that the creation and management of a more 'docile' and 'productive' population through inserting new technologies of enumeration and forms of expertise have been as much key to the colonial project as the coercive domination of its territory (Larner & Walters 2004; Mckee 2009; Jessop 2009). Hence, the division between disciplinary power and liberal governmentality assumed by Joseph (2010) as a kind of linear progression where the former replaces the latter, has been vigorously rebutted in postcolonial urban studies as well as by poststructuralist scholars more generally (p. 225). Tikly (2003) for example shows that it is not about how neo-liberal rationalities have supplanted other rationalities of government, but rather how they have been articulated in a spectrum alongside competing and at times very contradictory governmental logics (p. 165). This "governmentality-in-the-making" then yields a plurality of rationales "that provide both continuity and discontinuity on what went before" (ibid., p. 166). Gupta and Sharma (2006, p. 292) for example elucidates that in the case of post-independence India, modes of governmentality did not present a singular and sequential transition 'from welfare to workfare' (Peck & Theodore 2001), but rather saw them propagated simultaneously. A similar dynamic can be observed in South Africa, where the ambiguous and evidently strained promulgation of welfare measures alongside market-led development rationales (as opposed to the former being subsumed by the latter) constitutes a characteristic logic of the country's postapartheid 'developmental' local governance (see further chapter 5.3.3).

110 This view is also shared by Pels 1997, who does not see liberal and authoritarian rule as mutually exclusive, but rather as complimentary within the figure of the 'good despot'.

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In the case of Cape Town, a few other scholars working on the city have already been able to evoke governmentality as a theoretical framing for researching its changing socio-spatial orders, economic transformation, and institutional power shifts post-1994 (Robins 2002; Watson 2002). What I seek to foreground through the lens of governmentality in my own research endeavour of understanding Cape Town's creative cityness through its process of becoming the WDC 2014, is how local 'developmental' rationalities and political logics are constructed through tropes of design knowledge and designer expertise. In turn, chapter 8 empirically thrashes out different discursive representations and socio-political as well as spatial practices, in order to trace what I have come to understand as Cape Town's emergent 'design(er) governmentality'.

On a final - rather methodological - note, I would like to touch upon how governmentality as an angle for framing urban politics in African cities also needs to be mindful of the fact, that many empirical studies that made use of the concept tended to emphasise discursive representation over social practices (O'Malley & Clifford 1997; Stenson 2005; Marston & McDonald 2006; Rose et al. 2006; Mckee 2009). However, Osborne and Rose (1999) reminded us early on that "government is not reducible to politics, the economy, or morality: one can never just read off mentalities or strategies of government from the 'stage of capitalism' or the complexity of social organisation. There is always an element of creativity concerning arts of government; the exercise of government entails the application of thought to particular conditions and situations" (p. 737; emphasis added LW). This means that whatever we capture as sedimented discourse in policies, media releases and public accounts of powerful politicians, does not always materialise (sic!) itself in practice, but instead remains "characterized by contradictions, complexities and inconsistencies, a gulf between policy rhetoric, implementation and practices and the fact that outcomes are often partial, uneven and unpredictable" (Flint 2002, p. 621 cited in Mckee 2009, p. 475). These practical limitations of studying local politics in African cities solely through the lens of discourse was also flagged by Simone (2012), who noted: "It is increasingly clear across ideological spectrum and geographical locations that definitions of what works in terms of governance and the methods entailed in getting things to work have more to do with the design of relationships between spaces, institutions and populations than it does with effective discourses - the right words, the right authority, the right participation" (pp. 44f). In turn, power not only lies within discursive authority but is also enshrined in the reign over the practical (un)making of social relationships, which are "articulated via a proliferating maze of opaque networks, fuzzy institutional arrangements, ill-defined responsibilities and ambiguous political objectives
and priorities" (Swyngedouw 2005, p. 1999). As I will further develop in chapter 6, this point is also pertinent with regards to the increasing uptake of globally pervasive policy paradigms by local urban elites in emergent African cities such as Cape Town who consider themselves as being on the cusp of defining the continent's urban future.

In recourse, I concur with Pieterse (2005) that "the conceptual challenge is to adopt an approach that recognises the structuring effect of the economy, bureaucracy and discursive diagrams of power without relinquishing an understanding of the salience of agency" (p. 141). It is in light of this methodological conundrum that I argue that studies concerned with understanding local politics and governance dynamics in African city contexts such as my own can benefit from drawing on governmentality as an additional theoretical lens. This also echoes Robinson (2011b), who noted that "in the wake of a wider Foucault-inspired governmentality literature, we can build on the idea that the processes of policy adoption are as likely to be positive and enabling, creating new opportunities in and for cities, as they might be imposed and prescriptive" (p. 28). What this tells us, is that even if the persistence of certain policy memes such as the creative city provides an unequivocally powerful narrative, local actors will always be involved in weighing them against other concurrent options, and shaping the processes of their translation based on their individual and collective contexts. Hence, policies are assessed, adopted and adapted within a topological space of active appropriation which sees "territorially committed actors" (ibid., p. 35) engage dynamically (and not seldom self-critically) with ideas and practices from within and beyond their particular locality.

In conclusion, I surmise that African cities cannot simply be dismissed as frontiers of governmentality. Quite to the contrary, a 'governmentality lens' can in fact provide us with a viable additional tool to assess both the potentials and limitations of 'Southern' cities in assembling policies from broader interurban networks against the variegated backdrop of global capital circulations (Peck & Theodore 2007). Moreover, applied in conjunction with a postcolonial impetus, 'global' urban governmentality can help us jointly analyse the more mobile as well as the more situated dynamics of internationally meandering policy paradigms, thus allowing us to understand modes of worlding through a relational reading of power that is sensitive to both place and time.
“At the present moment in history, urbanization processes are profoundly shaped by the social relations of capitalism, but cannot be reduced to those relations.”
(Scott & Storper 2014)

4.4 The more-than-neoliberalisation conundrum

In the final part of this chapter, I'd like to draw my theoretical argument to a close by looking at how Cape Town's creative cityness - produced through modes of worlding and global policy mobilities and in turn reshaping the city's local governance spectrum - can be analysed in light of a growing need for and efficacy of a reformulated conception of neoliberalisation (Brenner et al. 2010, p. 206). As I have previously argued, the growing scale and scope of research on 'Southern' urban locales has increased the necessity for theory to respond to the postcolonial urban challenge (Chambers 2006; King 2006), as well as to the globalisation of neoliberal governmentality as a particular genealogic form of contemporary social order.

While I recognise that Foucault's original notion of governmentality extends well beyond many of the narrower political economy readings presented in this section, it is also important to note just how extensively Foucauldian ideas on the construction of social power and technologies of governance have permeated current works that seek to grapple with the dispersed dynamics of neoliberal reforms. With regards to South Africa's turbulent and contested postapartheid transformation, Hart (2008), for example, concedes on the one hand that a neoliberal governmentality lens can bring into view important dimensions of social rule and citizen responsibilisation on different scales of governance that are obscured by orthodox economistic understandings of neoliberalism (p. 689). On the other hand, she convincingly argues that even though South Africa's struggles over the
meanings and political practices of national liberation\textsuperscript{111} are unquestionably bound up with identifiable neoliberal projects and contestations in the post-apartheid era, they also exceed understandings of 'neoliberalism' as class project, governmentality, or hegemony either individually or in combination (p. 693). I thus take my cue from her and others when I see value in de-centring 'neoliberalism' as the generic and singular go-to explanation for urban transformation and local politics in Cape Town (see for example Miraftab 2007; McDonald 2008).

In recent years, the debate around how a critical theorisations of neoliberalism might be re-calibrated has been led with great intensity, resulting in an at times a confusing range of monikers, from "actually existing neoliberalism" (Brenner & Theodore 2002; Peck & Tickell 2002) to "variegated capitalism/neoliberalization" (Peck & Theodore 2007; Brenner et al. 2010), and from "post-/after neoliberalism" (Larner & Craig 2005; Robinson & Parnell 2011; Grugel & Riggirozzi 2012) to "more-than-neoliberalization" (Clarke 2008; Bunnell 2013). It is not my aim to reproduce this debate in depth; neither do I seek to determine the conceptual pros and cons of each individual trope, as this would greatly exceed my theoretical wherewithal. Rather, I am interested in tracing how these varying notions can collectively speak to the question of how we can grasp the urban governance dynamics in postapartheid Cape Town, as they intersect with a fragmented yet globalised neoliberal project. Thus, given this "discontinuous geography of neoliberalization" (Robinson & Parnell 2011, p. 525), this section is deliberately conversational, i.e. geared towards posing some important questions that complicate the matter, rather than aiming to provide conclusive or singular answers.

In their illuminating and detailed analysis, Brenner et al. (2010) talk about what they call "the problematically polysemic status of neoliberalism as a concept" (p. 184), showing how the term became a focal points in different approaches of heterodox political economy research since the outset of market-oriented regulatory restructuring in the 1970s (in Europe). They juxtapose three prevalent notions, namely historical materialist international political economy, varieties of capitalism and (arguably Anglo-Foucauldian)

\textsuperscript{111} "Articulations of national liberation are not just cynical manipulations from above; they carry powerful moral weight and connect with specific histories, memories, embodied experiences and meanings of racial oppression, racialized dispossession, and struggles against apartheid" (Hart 2008, p. 691). Hence, the state of South Africa's national liberation remains a highly sensitive and emotionally charged issue in popular local politics, and thus requires to be considered carefully and with appropriate nuance.
governmentality approaches, and point out their respective contributions and theoretical shortcomings with regards to their capacity for understanding the uneven development of neoliberalisation (Brenner et al. 2010, p. 207).

Though all three notions are already well aware of the pitfalls presented by an orthodox, economistic view that presumes a globally convergent hypermobility of capital, and sees subjects as mere puppets whose strings are pulled by the invisible hand of the market, Brenner et al. (2010) argue that none of these approaches has sufficiently addressed the problem of variegation as "systemically produced geoinstitutional differentiation". They highlight that "it is about the neoliberalization process, not about a self-reproducing, 'regime-like' state of neoliberalism" (p. 208), thus advocating for a relational perspective that is aware of the fact that "the encroachment of neoliberalizing modes of governance, regulatory metrics and socio-institutional practices is necessarily contradictory, uneven, impure and incomplete" (ibid., p. 216; original emphasis).

Furthermore, they astutely argue in recourse to their other prolific works, that the variegated spread of neoliberalisation is inherently reliant on an increasingly interconnected mesh of policy relays in which market-regulatory technologies of rule are reworked as they travel across scales and become re-territorialised in different contexts (Brenner et al. 2010, p. 185; Peck & Tickell 2003; Brenner 2004; Brenner & Theodore 2005; Peck & Theodore 2010a, Peck & Theodore 2010b). Though Peck and Theodore (2007) for example previously pointed out, how much of the early theory work on neoliberalism had suffered from a "predominantly North Atlantic gaze" (p. 766), and was thus privileging certain powerful geographies of late capitalism over more complex and heterogeneous geographies of regulatory emergence, it had since then turned into a veritably and variegated international project that is 'alive and well' across the globe (Ferguson 2010). In consequence, they maintain a rather sceptical stance towards budding notions of postneoliberalism (Brenner et al. 2010, p. 217), while others more enthusiastically embarked on exploring its possible merits (Larner & Craig 2005; Brand & Sekler 2009; Smith 2011; Grugel & Riggiozzi 2012).

Especially postcolonial urban scholars have taken to contesting neoliberalism as the 'common sense' of critical social theory, through providing more nuanced and richly empirical accounts (Holston & Appadurai 1996; Robinson 2003; Sharma 2006; Gupta &

A main reason was, that 'southern' cities have been framed as deficit models of urban neoliberal proliferation - the "mimicking periphery" versus the "creative centre" (Bunnell 2013, p. 12) - with many studies being generally "unable to see through the metaphors of death, disease and toxicity the contours of creativity and resistance that give depth to the 'abominable' geographies" (Chattopadhyay 2012, p. 75). At this stage, it is important to clarify that, similar to the notion of postcolonialism, evoking postneoliberalism is not intended as marking an epochal 'end of an era'. Instead, it is an invitation for propositions of how we can see beyond neoliberalism as a default setting without ignoring that its powerful regulatory technologies continue to shape our social present. In this vein, Clarke (2008) highlighted three important limitations: Firstly, he argued that the concept has become promiscuous as it often traverses rather liberally between Marxist political economy and Foucauldian poststructuralist analysis, in other words jumping back and forth between "neoliberalism-as-hegemony" and "neoliberalism-as-governmentality" (Barnett 2005, p. 10), with many studies including my own research guilty of failing to comprehensively address the thorny issue of their epistemological and political incommensurabilities (Clarke 2008, p. 137). While not objecting to this valid point per se, I would nonetheless reiterate the earlier assertion of (Hart 2008), that either theoretical approach in its respective generic form has remained at best partial in its relevance to understanding the complex struggle of South Africa's postapartheid transition and the competing rationales and practices of its 'developmental' state.

Secondly, Clarke (2008) criticises neoliberalism's proposed omnipresence, as expressed for example in Peck and Tickell's (2002) widely cited premonition that "neoliberalism seems to be everywhere" (p. 380). While neoliberalism as a political-cultural project has undoubtedly received global purchase, it is by no means a coherent universal logic. Rather, it constitutes an inconclusive entanglement of multi-scalar rationalities that always bear the possibility of slippage, meaning that we at least have to consider the possibility that neoliberalism in itself might not always be the main governmental driving force (Ong 2007, p. 5).
What this tells us is that instead of trying to determine an elusive "neoliberalism-in-general" (Peck 2004, p. 395; cited in Clarke 2008, p. 137), we should instead pay closer attention to the mobile and recombinant properties of what I would call a 'neoliberalisation-in-conjunction'. Particularly regarding my aim to provide a relational analysis of Cape Town's politics of becoming the WDC 2014 (see chapter 7), this notion provides an opportunity to flag additional socio-spatial dynamics and governance practices that wittingly or unwittingly exceed popular neoliberal rationalisations in local decision-making. In other words, seeing 'neoliberalisation-in-conjunction' helps us to not automatically revert to identifying any socio-political programme with neoliberal elements as essentially neoliberal.

Moreover, it also keeps us alert to the danger of tautologically assuming an "internal logic of neoliberalism" (Collier 2009, p. 100) that could obscure the intricate, non-linear and sometimes even rogue ways in which social power is exercised and political order is construed (Rose et al. 2006, pp. 97f; also Barac 2011). After all, "it is one thing to identify a project of rule and quite another to presume that it is accomplished in practice" (Hart 2008, p. 690). With regards to my conceptual focus on processes of worlding through the situated negotiation of globally mobile policies, this more process-oriented focus also allows for scrutinizing the ways in which the constituent technologies of neoliberal order are de- and recomposed within interurban knowledge exchanges, with some components inevitably 'lost in translation': "Here the subtle and complex power relations of policy adoption and the unintended consequences of implementation need to be appreciated, as do the many diverse agendas informing any particular appropriations of ostensibly neoliberal policies" (Robinson & Parnell 2011, p. 527).

Robinson's point also leads me to Clarke's third critical assertion, in which he notes that "there is little in the present for which neo-liberalism cannot be held responsible" (p. 138). This omnipotence is problematic, as it tends to over-determine neoliberalism as a precursor of everything and thus precludes the possibility of anything existing beyond neoliberalism as the ostensibly "constant master category" (Rose et al. 2006, p. 98). The apparent menace is that this might be muting emergent debates on the changing roles of government and civil society (Robinson & Parnell 2011, p. 522; also
In addition, this is particularly threatening to postcolonial projects, as their attempts of emancipatory articulations of space, society and subjectivity are once again in danger of being thrown back into the abyss of the agency-less 'other'.

A telling example for this is once again provided by the idea that a 'fast' adoption of certain globally 'hot' policies, such as the creative city paradigm, could be readily assumed as an indicator for the existence of a local policy knowledge vacuum (Peck 2005). In turn, the assertion that certain elite-focused creativity strategies just trickle down into the local context with the singular goal of conjuring a new army of entrepreneurial subjects by extending its disciplinary mores to "every aspect of self and soul" (ibid., p. 767), leaves no room for engaging with local trajectories of transformation beyond condescending assumptions of a somewhat "bastardized neoliberalism" (Brenner et al. 2010, pp. 196ff).

From prepaid water and electricity meters for the urban poor via privatised forms of security, to new practices of metropolitan auditing and compliance mechanisms, South African cities today boast countless examples for market logics having extended into rationalities of rule that were previously heavily regulated under the old apartheid regime (Hart 2008, p. 689). Furthermore, it has been rightly argued that the initially more redistributive and strongly rights-based agenda of the African National Congress has in many instances been perforated or even wholly undermined by the implementation of deregulative practices and free market policies (Bond 2000b; Peet 2002; Marais 2011).

Still, numerous critical urbanists working on South Africa have argued that in many postapartheid cities the dynamics of urban transformation display "far more than the path-dependency of neoliberalization" (Robinson & Parnell 2011, p. 528). This sentiment stems from a deeply rooted dissatisfaction in local scholarship with both deterministic models of neoliberal hegemony that leave little room for socio-spatial agency, and romanticised hopes for the resurgence of civil society (Oldfield 2008, p. 497; also Ferguson 2007; Pieterse 2008; Myers 2011). I want to expand on this conundrum by making two interrelated points.

112 Myers (2011) for example has rightly noted that South African cities "have provided the canvas upon which the most well-known materialist critiques of urban neoliberalism in Africa have been painted, and it has the strongest range of plausible alternative visions of governance given the resources available to its effectively functioning and democratically elected state" (p. 111)
Firstly, as my own observations of how the WDC 2014 project has become emplaced in Cape Town's local governance spectrum illustrate (chapter 7), the way in which local actors engage with circulating global policies is neither a silent obedience nor an inability "to resist the latest metropolitan wisdom" (Gibson & Klocker 2005, p. 100). Though the growing intensity and fierceness of inter-urban competition might make the idea of passive local governance institutions who are seemingly left with no other choice than to engage in high-risk capitalistic projects, an intuitively enticing one, it fails to consider local capabilities and differently calibrated, situated fields of governmental power (Pow 2002, p. 160).

Furthermore, I agree with Parnell and Robinson (2011) that "the personal investment of many officials who benefit from the circuits of policy debate, workshops and stakeholder forums means that enthusiastic and competitive positioning for involvement in the latest international policy initiative promoting neoliberalism does not necessarily translate into its effective adoption or implementation" (p. 527). In consequence, it is vital to recognise that whenever globally pervasive policy paradigms 'touch down', they do not enter into an empty socio-political space. Quite the contrary, they have to navigate an already densely packed 'operational theatre', filled with competing policies (and politicking) in different stages of development, and various propensities for success or failure. After all, Peck (2012) himself lately conceded that 'travelling' policy models lead a transitory, polymorph and 'social' life, as they are typically adapted, not simply adopted (pp. 464, 480).

Secondly, it is pivotal to remain mindful of the fact that the implementation of policy programmes also produces "active, sometimes dissident political actors, who can provide the ground for mobilizations of political society in which marginalized subjects make claims on the state, negotiate entitlements, and contest social hierarchies" (Clarke 2008, p. 143). In consequence, we cannot simply preclude the existence of progressive politics that could potentially contravene neoliberal governmentalities. As Ghertner (2011) convincingly argues in his analysis of urban regeneration politics in Delhi, expectations of real and significant social improvement "can crystallize into new demands

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113 For example, as Geddes (2014) has shown, in parts of Latin America, struggles over local governance have emerged as part of political paradigms that to a greater or lesser degree reject the structural hegemony of neoliberalisation.
and points of politics, threatening to turn the promise of the world-class city into a political demand for world-class citizenship" (p. 301). Other studies have equally supported this stance in their respective inquiries of neoliberalisation as a mutable governmental logic in different "hybrid neoliberal-developmental states" (Bunnell 2013, pp. 10) and their respective cityscapes (for example Ong 1999; Ong 2006b; Ferguson 2010; McFarlane 2011c; Myers 2011; Roy 2011b; Harris 2012; Harris 2013; Sheppard et al. 2013). In a desire to add to this line of scholarship, I argue that the related processes of embedding a creative city logic in Cape Town and governing its politics of becoming the WDC 2014 serve to empirically illustrate the "intensely contradictory blending of neoliberal and extra-neoliberal elements" (Brenner et al. 2010, p. 216) within home-grown 'ubuntu capitalism'. Furthermore, I propose that their analysis can also further our understanding of the plasticity of neoliberal policies and their permeability for competing political rationales and social practices in postapartheid Cape Town, as discussed by Houssay-Holzschuch (2010) and Houssay-Holzschuch and Teppo (2013).

In closing, what can we make of such erratic proliferation, translation and operationalisation of neoliberal discourses and normative practices in different urban locales? I consider Ong's (2011b) deliberations to be particularly helpful in this regard. On the one hand, she sees this divergence of neoliberalisation as the "blossoming of an urban terrain of unanticipated borrowing, appropriations, and alliances that cut across class, ideological, and national lines, even as it depends on the continual meta-practical discursive resedimentation of these boundaries" (p. 5). On the other hand, and drawing on some of her earlier writing, I want to point out that this ostensible loosening of the disciplinary grip is countered by a tightening relationship between government and knowledge generation, letting some of the most robust and potentially controversial governmental interventions appear as pragmatic, apolitical 'technicalities' (Ong 2006b).

114 The ways in which developmental and neoliberal goals are compounded become visible in the divergent state of public welfare. Mckee (2009) explains: "[...] whilst European welfare states have undergone modernizing reforms which extol the virtues of self-help, communitarian endeavour and personal responsibility, in a post-colonial context the state remains obligated to look after marginal groups, albeit with the support of non-governmental organizations. Although post-colonial subjects have never enjoyed a welfare 'safety net' in the same way as their Western counterparts, ironically they continue to receive state assistance at a time when it is being eroded by governments in the West" (p. 480).

115 In the broader South African region, this term has been historically used to refer to humanness as well as to concrete acts of human kindness. In postapartheid South Africa it has also been appropriated as contemporary business management philosophy (Visser 2004; Menegbo 2009; see further chapter 8.2.1).
This gives rise to what has been alternately debated under the label of a 'postpolitical' or 'postdemocratic' condition, in which debate and social dissensus are replaced by technologies of neoliberal urban governmentalities that revolve around consensus, agreement and technocratic accountancy metrics (Swyngedouw 2009, p. 601; see also Nash 1996; Swyngedouw 2010, Swyngedouw 2011; MacLeod 2011). This line of inquiry has also informed the recent call for critical urban scholars to spend less time on diagnosing urban neoliberalism and more time on researching potential pathways for political action and measures of subversion, which might help recuperate the 'properly political' (Davies 2013, p. 13; also Oldfield 2008; Dzudzek 2013). Though I strongly sympathise with this point, I would still argue that the efficacy of contestation is not least determined by the accuracy of urban diagnostics.

In sum, I want to stress that none of these propositions should lead us to outright abandon neoliberalisation as a valuable and powerful rubric of critical urban geography. In the face of persisting structural and distributional inequality as well as new ethno-racial and class-based exclusionary urban practices, this would be preposterous. However, proponents of a 'Southern turn' in urban studies have made a valid point in aiming for a postcolonial interpretation of neoliberalisation that is able to leave the social meaning of policy adoption and adaption open to determination in particular contexts (Robinson 2011b, pp. 28f). Furthermore, from my own practical research experience in Cape Town, I could hardly agree more with Myers' (2011) assessment, that "a great deal which matters to urbanists in South Africa happens outside of a relatively narrow concern with the grand agenda of neoliberalisation, and that careful attention to contestations over governance and its outcomes in South African cities can be invaluable to broader understandings in urban studies" (p. 111).

To conclude, the point of this chapter was not to reduce the remit of neither my theoretical endeavour nor that of postcolonial urban scholarship as a whole to a simplistic question of 'southern' versus 'northern' Theory (writ large). Instead, my aim was to self-consciously and self-critically engage with parochial assumptions embedded in many of the powerful academic narratives that we evoke and apply as explanatory tools on a daily basis (Figure 5). By providing more "situated accounts" (Ong 2011b, p. 10) of how cities like Cape Town are worlded, we might be able to engage African cities on their own
terms and in turn slowly dismantle their epistemological "burden of exceptionality" (Robinson 2008a, p. 89). Overall, however, I agree with Robinson and Parnell's (2011) important caveat that, as an exercise in much needed academic humility, we should always remain vigilant in seeing our requisite theories for what they are: necessarily fallible and thus continuously in need of revision with recourse to our empirical findings (p. 523).

Figure 5 Overview of theoretical framework and integration of concepts,

Concept: LW; design: E. Gooris
Approaching Cape Town

This chapter seeks to provide a concise overview of Cape Town's intertwined historical, socio-political and spatial development trajectories which have shaped, and continue to shape its urban present. In drawing a vivid picture of these intricate dynamics, I am looking to build a solid contextual foundation for the subsequent presentation and reflection of my empirical findings. I start off by briefly explaining what factors render Cape Town a relevant site of inquiry and how it speaks to my key research questions.

After qualifying my intent, I provide - in a necessarily cursory fashion - the most important background information on the city's historic urban developments, as the contested apartheid past still vehemently impresses itself upon all aspects of Cape Town's urban life. Stepping back to look forward also helps to foster a more differentiated understanding of the city's contemporary spatial economy and its evolving political landscape.

Apart from focusing on general patterns of urban transformation, I will also touch upon the most pertinent changes within local government, in connection with broader political, ideological and programmatic shifts that have occurred after the formal end of
apartheid. In this, I will especially draw on the contentious efforts of local government for implementing a developmental agenda alongside growth-oriented programs of deregulation. Like the Cape Metropolitan Area, the encompassing Western Cape Province has been led by the national opposition - the Democratic Alliance (DA) - since the general elections 2009. Given the tension-filled political rivalry between the DA and the African National Congress (ANC) as the country's historic liberation party, it is important to briefly outline the resulting rifts this has created for the relationship between national government and Cape Town's local-provincial urban government.

In order to unravel these governmental dis/connections, I will also briefly portray some of the key urban decision-making and political advocacy bodies, that are formative of the city's signature "stakeholder governance" (Swyngedouw 2005, p. 1995): besides the City Council (CoCT), the Mayoral Committee (MayCo) and the Provincial Government of the Western Cape (PGWC), this includes the public-private-partnership organisation Cape Town Partnership and its various derivatives. In order to grasp the full detail of my subsequent empirical engagement with Cape Town's interurban creative city governance complex, it is pivotal to understand the respective scale and scope of political leverage, core governance programs and - at times competing - public mandates of these different bodies.
"Cape Town is a city that remains at war with itself. It is a war that exists through the silences and in the cracks that allow complete histories and realities to slip through. [...] It feels like a city that is ready to burst with the violent force of the irrepressible realness of its history." (Henri & Grunebaum 2005, pp. 2f)

5.1 Why Cape Town?

The reasons why I see particular value in speaking to current urban theories through an empirical engagement with Cape Town demand some explanation and further qualification. In fact, the city's empirical pertinence is best illustrated in tackling the, at this point seemingly inane, question: Where is Cape Town? Though this query at first appears rather curious, particularly given my training in geography, I will explain why the answer is by no means a self-evident and straightforward one. Because, in spite of Cape Town's clear topographic position at the tip of the continent, few other cities have been so severely at odds with being labelled an 'African city'.

In general, a number of African cities\textsuperscript{116} have received some heightened research attention over the past couple of years, particularly in the developmental bracket of 'good governance', democratisation, global market-integration and, of course, urbanisation dynamics (Myers 2011, p. 104). He rightly observes that this "Africa talk" (Ferguson 2006, p. 2), though, or rather, because it is beleaguered by an "anguished energy and (often vague) moral concern" (Myers 2011, p. 3), has continually missed the opportunity...

\textsuperscript{116} The geography of 'Southern' urban knowledge production remains stratified in itself, as many scholars have focused particularly on capital cities in countries labelled as 'emerging economies' such as Nairobi/Kenya, Lagos/Nigeria and Luanda/Angola.
for recognising African cities "as important loci of global processes or generators of urban stories worth telling and worth learning from" (ibid., p. 6). As I have previously pointed out, this lack of respect for and recognition of African cities as active and significant theoretical relays has propelled the growth of a 'Southern' urban scholarship, which seeks to bring Western intellectual traditions into critical conversation with the epistemologies, rationalities and values of the non-Occidental world (Harrison 2006, p. 319). With reference to Mignolo (2000), Harrison calls this intellectual endeavour 'border thinking' and finds that the best way to support and produce it lies in "think[ing] literally and/or metaphorically from a place, outside the global core, which offers the experience of cross-over, boundary-breaking, and hybridity" (Harrison 2006, p. 333; see also chapter 4.1).

For myself and others, Cape Town has presented itself as one such place, because "[t]his location, manifest in its peculiar form of cultural and social schizophrenia while functioning as a fulcrum between east-west and north-south, offers a compelling vantage point from which to rethink Africa" (Musila et al. 11.07.2011). However, in the same breath, the same authors note, that "questions about how we engage, conceive of and receive Africa in the Cape – and of how the Cape positions itself in Africa – are vigorously argued over across the peninsula with the regularity and ferocity of the south-easterly winds."

And indeed, what has been frequently represented as one of the city's most notable features is its 'un-African' look and feel (McDonald 2008, p. 269). This popular sentiment is repeated incessantly - in the academic as well as public domain, by visitors and locals alike. Yet, personally, I have always felt rather unsettled by this verdict. This stems from the fact that it evidently plays on common continental stereotypes, ranging from stubborn colonial myths of its savage 'Heart of Darkness', via the safari romantics of wild animals and ancient tribalism, to the notorious public slip-ups that have repeatedly portrayed Africa as a country.

If one chooses to deduct an ostensibly 'real Africa' from these popular imaginaries, it seems only appropriate to jump to the conclusion that Cape Town does not fall into the bracket of an ostensibly 'authentic' African city. However, with regards to my previous ruminations on how postcolonial urban critiques have fiercely denounced reductionist
views of Africa as the ultimate subaltern and rejected the tyranny of Western linear development ideals that tried "to shoehorn cities into types just because they reside on the same continent" (Myers 2011, p. 2), it is easy to see such wholesale conclusion for what they are: A display of paternalistic ignorance, enshrined in seemingly innocent\textsuperscript{117} praises of Cape Town as a 'clean', 'civilised' and 'modern' city, i.e. as the ultimate success story of Europe in Africa (Henri & Grunebaum 2005, p. 2). But does contesting these neocolonial and racist sentiments automatically mean that Cape Town should be regarded as a typological variation of an 'African' city? Again, the answer is complicated.

Many knowledgeable experts on Cape Town's urban past and present have been grappling hard with the complexities of situating the city. On the one hand, it embodies and actively strives to maintain a vivid illusion of Europe, which was however, not born from free choice but through a long, violent history of colonial occupation (Western 1985; Bickford-Smith 1995; Western 1997; McDonald 2008). Thus, describing Cape Town as solely an African city would run the danger of disengaging ourselves from the painful history of forced land annexation, the slave trade and imposed cultural amalgamation, effectively silencing people's traumatic experiences with a lasting European impact\textsuperscript{118} that Western (2002) has aptly described as "brutal, death-dealing, totally transformative, and irreversible" (p. 711).

On the other hand though, seeing Cape Town as a city divorced from its continental context further fuels the highly problematic notion of South African exceptionalism, a sentiment that has been vividly critiqued (Saunders 1995; Bekker & Leildé 2002; Mbembe & Nuttall 2004; Leildé 2008; Houssay-Holzschuch 2010). As (Barchiesi 2011, p. 13) aptly argues, South Africa is not a 'Western' society that accidentally happened to sit at the tip of the African continent, though this narrative had been a popular hypothesis used to legitimise the racist apartheid state. Instead, South Africa's and therefore Cape Town's story is not a singular one, untainted by larger continental developments but, quite the opposite. It presents itself as inherently entangled

\textsuperscript{117} That such claims are however far from innocent but instead extremely contested as they effectively obfuscate the mixed ethnic heritage of Cape Town's coloured population has been aptly shown by Western (1997).

\textsuperscript{118} The impact of European planning paradigms on South Africa's major cities - from Ebenezer Howard's \textit{Garden City} to Le Corbusier's ideas of urban modernism - is of particular note here. For a detailed analysis refer to Robins (2002).
with the continent's colonial and postcolonial condition at large. While 'South African exceptionalism' has been actively challenged in the public realm, not least by former president Thabo Mbeki's "African Renaissance" as a political project of Pan-Africanism, its local derivate - 'Cape Town exceptionalism' - seems alive and well in the city's socio-political discourse. From the historic tale of how the city's first authorities envisaged digging a canal to physically separate the city from both country and continent (Worden et al. 1998, p. 24) to current strategic politicking by local government (which is at the same time also the national opposition party) that emphasises Cape Town's 'unqualified' audit results and questionably 'world-class' quality of service delivery - Cape Town is frequently evoked as a 'special case' and in turn leveraged to complicate comparisons with other (South) African cities and their "lesser kind of urban geography" (Myers 2011, p. 4).

Furthermore, this feeling of distinction is also manifest in the city's perceived moral superiority stemming from its often overstated historical tradition of multiracial 'Cape liberalism': "Many Capetonians today still believe that their city was a haven of ethnic harmony and integration before 1948. They believe that segregation was only imposed on the city from the outside, by the dictates of a National Party government in Pretoria" (Bickford-Smith 1995, p. 63). However, Bickford-Smith confounds this perception in referring, for example, to the forced segregation of non-white city dwellers and their relocation to the suburb of Ndabeni in 1901, due to the so called 'sanitation syndrome' of the white populace, which associated the presence of non-white people with the prevalence of the bubonic plague and other diseases (Swanson 1977). Though multi-racialism has been comparatively strong in the Cape prior to 1948 and the City Council heavily opposed the local implementation of the dreaded Group Areas Act, delaying its execution by seven years (Saff 1998, p. 85), genuine efforts of racial integration and equality remained partial and confined to a limited number of social activities, neighbourhoods and outspoken individuals (Worden et al. 1999, pp. 127ff). Thus, McDonald's (2008) pungent judgement

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119 Both Cape Town and Johannesburg have on various occasions and in different ways celebrated themselves as 'world-class African' cities, thus unwittingly confirming a certain 'unworldliness' for the rest of the continent's cities. This aspiration is clearly rooted in a belief for 'European standards' as the signifier of worldliness: "After all, until very recently, Johannesburg described itself as the largest and most modern European city in Africa" (Mbare & Nuttall 2004, p. 361).
120 There is a bitter hypocrisy to this fear, given the fact that in 1713, a smallpox epidemic, brought in by European settlers, virtually eradicated the indigenous Khoi- population (Worden et al. 1998, p. 44).
rings somewhat true when he writes of "a smug, white liberalism that permeates all manner of activity in Cape Town - from the pedantic treatment of non-white store clerks, to a suburban sense of entitlement, to policies that keep the poor 'in their place'. Cape Town smacks of a privileged elite that feels it has little to apologize for, while at the same time suggesting it has all the answers for future development" (p. xviii).

In light of this complicated relationship, it is worthwhile to recall once more the benefit of seeing Cape Town as having historically been embroiled in numerous, dialectic processes of worlding: In this, we are able to acknowledge that some of Cape Town's features, such as its demographic, economic and cultural profile\(^{121}\), are indeed historically distinct in comparison to adverse national, continental and even global urban dynamics. But at the same time (and as hard as certain city officials try to negate this), the city's past, present and future is not absolutely exceptional and thus cannot be separated from the transformative power of these inter-scalar processes and globalisation dynamics as they unfold. Hence, thinking both from Cape Town and through its evocative urban identity struggle also provides an intriguing perspective for grappling with the intricacies of ongoing processes of worlding. After all, it is through tracing these productive intersections of idiosyncrasies and commonalities in Cape Town's \textit{creative cityness} that I hope to add to a better understanding of urban governance processes in other African cities and seek to contribute to the epistemological quest of 'Southern' urbanism.

A last important caveat for researching Cape Town's present urban dynamics is that though the urban legacy of apartheid as a powerful and inherently spatial regime of oppression still continues to shape the city, it should not be reduced to its past (Elder 2003). Many South African scholars have in turn criticised overtly materialist readings for their grim assumption that nothing has changed since the end of apartheid and that change will continue to falter as a hegemonic neoliberal regime relentlessly reinforces historic patterns of segregation (Nuttall 2004). In this, they avoid the inevitably messy task of recognising incremental urban change and accounting for moments of transformation that have taken place: "For not all that happens in South African cities is purely about

\(^{121}\) In his seminal book \textit{Outcast Cape Town} (1997), Western provides a detailed historical account of the making of coloured identities in the Cape and their ambiguous status as a classified social group wedged in between 'white' and 'black' during the apartheid state. In his later work, he extended his studies to African migration to Cape Town, tracing the cities further "change in complexion" and expanding its local "\textit{continuum} of phenotype" in the divided city (Western 2002, pp. 711f; original emphasis).
overcoming apartheid inequalities or reproducing its race-cum-class division; there are also new constellations of ideas and practices" (Houssay-Holzschuch & Teppo 2013, p. 53). In consequence, I second Rogerson and Robinson (1999), who have argued that South African society and economy can no longer be pigeonholed as a special case of interest to a group of scholars with narrow interests in racism or the construction and destruction of apartheid. This goes along with developing a form of "double consciousness" (Harrison 2006, p. 326), which no longer sees the South African city, and particularly Cape Town, as solely a paradigm of division but also as a new and vibrant topology of possible urban futures

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Thus and in closing, I want to stress, that regardless of its complexities and often maddening level of incomprehensibleness, I have come to value the city as a pertinent point of departure for what Nuttall (2004) has astutely called 'writing the now': For one, this demands us to work out what remains of the past and how we can relate to and trace it in the present. But at the same time, it also urges us to thrash out our relationship to that which has not happened yet, "the world of aspirations, the fictions with which people fill the future" (ibid., p. 732). As a first step on this path, I now turn to some historic vignettes in order to provide a picture of Cape Town's most momentous urban development trajectories.

122 Again it is Robinson (2008a), who provides a valuable word of caution when she writes that we of course need not lose sight of ongoing fragmentation, inertia and erasure as prevailing features of South African urbanity (p. 91).
5.2 Cape Town's past in the present

5.2.1 Cape Town's early days

Though the Cape saw its fair share of Portuguese, British and Dutch expeditions weathering the unpredictable wind conditions of False Bay throughout the sixteenth and early seventeenth century, it was only in 1652, that a permanent refreshment station was established on its shores \(^{123}\). That year, Jan van Riebeeck, the designated colonial administrator of the Dutch East India Company arrived and established *De Kaap*, swiftly proceeding with its fortification (Wilkinson 2000, p. 195). As the first area of European settlement in Southern Africa, Cape Town is, to this day, often referred to as the 'Mother City' \(^{124}\). However, for centuries already, the peninsular had been inhabited by Khoi-San pastoralists, whose cattle grazing routes crossed the mountain ranges into the Karoo desert and who, on occasion, traded hides and meat with passing seafarers. According to (Saff 1998, p. 82), apartheid mentalities (*apartheid* from Afrikaans, literally referring to the 'state of being apart') can be traced back to these early days, when settlers planted bitter almond hedges as physical barriers of separation between themselves and the indigenous Khoi-San herders. In fact, "[…] many parts of South Africa, including Cape Town, practised forms of segregation in the nineteenth century and generated racism. They can all, correctly, be offered as providing precedents for aspects of apartheid" (Bickford-Smith 1995, p. 67).

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\(^{123}\) I will only provide a general overview of Cape Town's most important historical moments, for a more detailed and richly-illustrated account, see the two volumes of Worden et al. (1998, 1999).

\(^{124}\) This moniker is widely used and is a staple reference in Cape Town's city branding and marketing campaigns. However, according to Grunebaum (2007) its naive and unreflected use obliterates Cape Town's contested history as a city built on slavery and violent colonial dispossession and cultural erasure.
As a colonial trading post, the city quickly became embroiled in slave trade and as farming in the shadow of Table Mountain expanded; some of the slaves from East Africa, Madagascar, Ceylon, Bengal and the East Indies were also bought by local free burghers who had been given arable land to provide fresh produce for the passing ships. However, the general mixing of the different groups was neither controlled nor prohibited and sexual contact between male burghers and female slaves was common, with mixed children being born continuously and mostly out of wedlock. Nonetheless, race was not a determinant for social status as Worden et al. (1998) explain: "Some free blacks were property owners and some free whites were paupers. There was no absolute racial division of labour" (p. 69). This is however not to say that race played no significant role, as racial prejudices formed a part of the early everyday life. The influx of European settlers - often themselves threatened minorities like the French Huguenots - took a particularly large toll on the Khoi-San population, due to both, acts of war and violent dispossession, as well as the introduction of fatal diseases such as smallpox, causing several severe epidemics. After losing to the British forces in the Battle of Blaauwberg in 1806, the Cape became a British colony, with the colonial administration seizing formal possession in 1814. As slavery had already been called into question in the imperial heartland, it was not long before it was also formally abolished in the Cape Colony in 1834. It is often forgotten, that South Africa's urbanisation was intimately linked to slavery, not only through the physical exploitation of human labour but also regarding land evictions and property development: The blood money the British Queen paid to slaveholders for releasing their subjects was largely used as capital investment for constructing Cape Town's downtown, on land stolen from the Khoi-San population\(^{125}\) (ibid., p. 102, see also Mabin 1992).

In 1854, the Cape colony was granted a representative government, with Cape Town as the capital. Around the same time, with the discovery of diamonds in Kimberly/Northern Cape and some years later gold in the Midrand, a major mineral rush set in, further spurring migration to the cities, particular Johannesburg, which became the country's biggest agglomeration in the beginning of the 20th century. Nonetheless, the

\(^{125}\) To this day, the restitution of land to descendants of Khoi-San heritage remains a greatly contested issues, particularly because current land rights legalisation still prevents them from lodging claims on land lost prior to the 1913 Natives Land Act (Everingham & Jannecke 2006). This has frequently led to conflict situations arising between claimants evicted from their homes during apartheid and Khoi-San community groups who also claim ownership of the land originally taken from them by colonial settlers.
majority of South Africa's population remained rural or semi-rural, living on farms on the city's fringes. After the Anglo-Boer war (also known as the South African war) that pitted British troops against Afrikaner battalions from 1899 to 1902, the Union of South Africa was established in 1910, linking the so called Boer republics in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State to the colonies in the Cape and Natal. Cape Town was designated as legislative capital and Pretoria as administrative capital, a government structure in place to this day. In terms of municipal administration, Cape Town's local government had been de jure non-racial in both vote and office throughout the 19th century (Bickford-Smith 1995, p. 71). However, white monopoly over municipal offices was secured through different measures such as high qualification requirements for councillors or the introduction of multiple votes for property owners in 1893 (ibid.). In 1900 eleven different local governance authorities existed, eight of these merged into the City of Cape Town in 1912. However, with consistent population growth, more suburbs grew into independent municipalities over the following decades, leading to constant amendments to the administrative landscape.

At the turn of the 20th century, Cape Town - in spite of this administrative multiplicity - had already conducted several rounds of "municipal improvements" which included many 'modern' amenities such as a professional bureaucracy, water-borne sanitation and efficient drainage (Worden et al. 1998, p. 227). This infrastructural development was however not limited to tabs and pipes but also included segregated human settlements, with the first township for non-Europeans established in Ndabeni as a hygienic 'emergency measure' against the alleged spread of bubonic plague. Mbembe and Nuttall (2004) trace the roots of this "sanitation syndrome" (Swanson 1977), which became a firm meta-narrative of apartheid governmentality, back to the urban reformist movement of the 19th century, "when the problems facing cities were conceived of as diseases of the social body. For these diseases to be cured, society had to be constructed as a tangible and governable object. Its population had to be policed. As far as Africa is concerned, such ways of seeing the city have determined the nature of urban policies, most particularly in South Africa. [...] Here, race became the critical nexus between the body politic, the creation and distribution of wealth, and systematized human degradation" (p. 353). In line with the increasing currency of rational planning ideals across

126 These eight municipalities were Claremont, Green Point and Sea Point, Kalk Bay, Maitland, Mowbray, Rondebosch and Woodstock.
different colonial cities in Africa (Home 2013), Cape Town's haphazard growth was gradually displaced by systematic planning and 'slum control' with the introduction of comprehensive land use zoning regulations in the 1930s, which also included the construction of a 'model native village' in Langa (Wilkinson 2000, p. 196). In addition, we can also find an early antecedent of 'travelling' urban development paradigms in the development of Pinelands and parts of Maitland following Garden City ideals - an urban planning model originally developed in the United Kingdom by Sir Ebenezer Howard (Worden et al. 1999, p. 145).

Building on the Native Land Act of 1913, which had already divided the Union's land between the non-white majority and the white minority, leaving only a mere 13% of it as 'native reserves' (later called bantustans) to the black African population, the Natives Urban Areas Act, as well as the Pass Laws were passed in 1923. This escalated the measures of segregation enforced by the white government, giving them the power to regulate migration to the urban centres, removing so called 'surplus blacks' that were unable to find work or did not qualify for living in the cities on other grounds.

Though Western (2002) identified the Cape's white population as 'evolutionary' racists, that harboured a firm belief in the Victorian civilisation mission and assimilation ideals, the National Party's proposition of a segregative 'apartness'-policy won increasing sympathy from the 1930s onward (p. 712). However, Cape Town was recognised as a particularly challenging case, as a significant non-racial franchise persisted in the city's central and local government (Bickford-Smith 1995, p. 70), and three hundred years of racial intermingling had resulted in over a third of the population living and working in mixed "low grade residential districts" (Scott 1954, p. 348) such as District Six, Observatory and Woodstock. When the ultra-conservative, Calvinist National Party under D.F. Malan was voted into office by a narrow margin in 1948, they immediately set out to terminate, once and for all, what they perceived of as an unruly and unnatural racial mixing through enforcing a draconian regime of total apartheid as the new law of the land.
5.2.2 Cape Town under apartheid

It is worth emphasising again that the National Party did not invent the idea of what they euphemistically called 'separate development', but they merely codified, enforced and systematised a whole host of already common local policies and practices. As a National Party member sternly remarked in 1948: "Apartheid is nothing new. Apartheid is the policy that has been applied in South Africa ever since Jan van Riebeeck landed there three hundred years ago" (cited in Worden et al. 1999, p. 156).

In 1950, two of apartheid's major legal pillars were passed in close succession: First, the Population Registration Act, which prescribed a broad classification of the population into three main groups, namely European (later renamed 'White'), Native (first renamed 'black' and subsequently 'African') and coloured (further divided into Indian, Cape Malay and Griqua) (Christopher 1997, p. 312)\(^{127}\). The notorious Pass Laws, which required every person classified as non-European to carry a pass book at all times and produce it on demand, were rigidly reinforced on this legal basis.

Second and intrinsically bound to the former was the Group Areas Act, which inscribed apartheid's regime of socio-spatial engineering by designating different neighbourhoods as exclusive to housing one of the respective population groups. The ideal apartheid city\(^{128}\) (Figure 6) housed the white population in the most favourable parts of the city, with Indians as the only population group tolerated in the adjacent suburbs. Rail and road infrastructure as well as heavy industry and natural barriers were used (or in the currently fashionable rhetoric 'designed') to create additional buffer zones between the white neighbourhoods and the coloured and black African townships on the city's periphery.

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\(^{127}\) Racial terminology remains a thorny issue in postapartheid South Africa. While it is important to point out that they are malicious social constructs and by no means objective, racial classifications remain an integral part of political analysis in the country (McDonald 2008, p. xx). Hence, I have chosen to use the terminology of the time where applicable and within the contemporary part of my analysis revert to the official ethnic grouping used by Statistics South Africa, i.e. African, coloured, Indian/Asian and white.

\(^{128}\) Cape Town featured some exceptions from the generalized model. For example, the inner-city area nowadays known as the Bo-Kaap was the only area in the country exclusively zoned for the Muslim 'Cape Malay' community. This ethnic label had been constructed in the late 1930s by 'Afrikaner Orientalist' I.D. Du Plessis, who also lobbied for its absorption into planning policy (Jeppie 01.01.1987). Elsewhere in the country, 'Cape Malays' were settled into coloured group areas (Christopher 1997, p. 315).
Figure 6 The model Apartheid city

In 1953 these two laws were joined together by the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act, which became known as 'Petty apartheid'\(^\text{129}\). Due to the way this act declared public facilities, from buses to beaches to park benches, as reserved for 'Whites only', segregation could now be pursued with obsessive thoroughness (Worden et al. 1999, p. 169). Over the next four decades, the relentless and forceful pursuit of these laws had dire consequences for all South African cities, with over 1 million hectares of urban land being rezoned in racial terms between 1950 and 1991 (Christopher 1997, p. 311). However, it was Cape Town in particular, that came to experience the full wrath of apartheid's urban planning ideal, finally turning it into the country's most segregated city by 1985.

At first though, Cape Town's comparatively liberal City Council vehemently opposed the implementation of the Group Areas Act, successfully fending it off for seven years, until the Cape's first Group Areas were proclaimed in 1957 (Saff 1998, p. 85). Cape Town was under the particularly close watch of the national government, as president PW Botha regarded the Cape as a safe white homeland (Worden et al. 1999, p. 128), envisioning it as a prototype for the South African city that was to demonstrate apartheid's "positive planning measures of control" (van der Merwe 1981, p. 105). In terms of its population, Cape Town was already diverging from the national average: "Although Black Africans made up perhaps three-quarters of the national population, in Cape Town they composed only about 15%; Whites approached 30%, Coloureds 55%" (Western 2002, p. 712). This make-up was further entrenched through the declaration of the Cape Province as a Coloured Labour Preference area, which - aided by the strict enforcement of the Pass Laws - constrained black urbanisation and confined the remaining black African population to the townships of Langa, Gugulethu and Nyanga within the city's municipal demarcation (Saff 1998, p. 83).

\(^{129}\) Though the name makes it sound rather inconspicuous, this law and its strict regulation of public space was as central to the apartheid system as the Pass Laws and the Group Areas Act (Houssay-Holzschuch & Teppo 2009, pp. 354f). Hence, it is little surprising that one of the ANC's earliest campaigns against the system was the so called 'Defiance Campaign', in which black African people were called upon to seize their right to the use of public amenities.
Though in comparison, the coloured population was thus somewhat privileged over the African population - a situation which created deep social rifts and bitterness, even within families that were torn apart by arbitrary reclassifications - they were still carefully kept apart from the white population. A racist narrative was spun in public as well as academic discourse, with Scott (1954) for example proclaiming that Cape Town was the "oldest permanent white settlement in the southern hemisphere" (p. 347), assuming that "as soon as Coloureds gain a foothold in a street, Europeans evacuate in the mass" (Scott 1955, p. 151). That this was a malicious misconstruction to naturalise apartheid could be seen in the differing reality of Cape Town's District Six: As the first port of call for migrants of all ethnicities, the mainly coloured area on the fringes of the CBD was also home to about 8000 working-class white Afrikaners in the 1950s (Worden et al. 1998, p. 251). Thus, residential integration remained a feature of District Six and similar neighbourhoods such as Woodstock and Mowbray, which became known as 'grey areas' (Bickford-Smith 1995, p. 76). With areas such as Woodstock and the former District Six nowadays constituting the focal points of local 'creative' place-making (see ch. 8.2.5), the term 'grey area' has also become frequently used as a positive marker for historic cultural diversity and urban integration.

However, in the heydays of apartheid this dense inter-racial mingling, a stone's throw away from Cape Town's 'modern' city centre, which had been further expanded through 200 hectares of reclaimed foreshore land, was a visible thorn in the side of the local administration (Davies 1960). Thus, in 1966, District Six was rezoned as a white residential area and two years later, in 1968, 65,000 non-white people were evicted with brute force, their community uprooted and their homes razed to the ground (Saff 1998; for a detailed account see Western 1997). Though a few residents were able to find shelter with family in the neighbouring districts of Walmer Estate, Woodstock and Salt River, the majority was removed to newly established townships on the Cape Flats, such as Bonteheuwel and Mitchell's Plain. While District Six remains one of the most infamous

Different interpretations of grey areas exist, with Beavon (1992) taking an ahistorical stance in claiming that they were little more than new post-apartheid slums where people of colour had "illegally taken up occupation" (p. 236). Christopher (1999) however dismisses this claim by showing how grey areas were rather small pockets of integration dating from the pre-apartheid era, where the apartheid government did not complete its agenda of forced removals (p. 302). Later, during the time of transition towards a democracy, these spaces were also the first ones to become officially demarcated for mixed residential integration (Christopher 1997, p. 318).
sites of collective trauma inflicted by apartheid's regime of socio-spatial engineering, and nowadays constitutes the city's most extensive public remembrance process as well as its most contested restitution project (see ch. 5.2.2), District Six was of course not the only site of forced removals. The state removed those classified as non-European from white Group Areas across the peninsula, including Simon's Town, Sea Point, Mowbray and Wynberg, so that by the end of the 1960s, a total of 150,000 people had been forcefully relocated to different townships on the sandy and wind-swept Cape Flats (Pirie 1984; Hart 1988; Christopher 1989; Garside 1993; see Figure 7).

Figure 7 Map of apartheid Group Areas
Source: M. Houssay-Holzschuch (2011)

During the same period, high modernist architecture and planning styles - already fashionable in Europe - were increasingly shaping the face of the city. Especially in the inner city, sites like the Good Hope Convention Centre, the City Council Building, the
Nico Malan Theatre (today: Artscape) and the Naspers Centre, as well as the development of the Foreshore Precinct and the Eastern Boulevard, all presented large-scale, state-of-the-art developments. Interestingly, today a number of these heavy-handed and hostile urban design legacies of the Verwoerdian apartheid era feature prominently in Cape Town's WDC 2014 narrative, from the unfinished highway bridges as the symbol of the bid to projects like 'Future Foreshore', 'Re-Imagining Good Hope Centre' and the 'Design24' competition for remaking the facade of the Naspers Centre (see Appendix F 'WDC 2014 Display'). While the method of critiquing apartheid's socio-spatial legacy through the proxy of its modernist planning models has already had an extensive history in Cape Town's progressive urban scholarship and also constituted a founding logic of the anti-apartheid planning movement in the 1980s, the current WDC 2014 process has certainly revived this debate (Todes 2006, pp. 51f; Watson 2002).
Figure 8 The modernist Naspers Centre calling designers for a make-over

Source: L.W, 2014
Alas, in spite of its intricate system of control, the apartheid government could not contain the work migration of black Africans, mostly from the impoverished rural areas of the Transkei and Ciskei bantustans. While, in accordance with international trends of the time, the wealthy white population was further suburbanising, the city administration also had to give in to the growing migration pressure by establishing the new townships of Khayelitsha (for Africans in 1983) and Blue Downs (for coloureds in 1986). By that time however, the regime was already vastly in crisis, troubled by the riots following the ANC's clarion call to make the townships ungovernable and increasingly isolated through extensive international sanctions. It is important to note that during the 1970s and 1980s local government became the primary battleground for anti-apartheid struggle (Pycroft 1996, p. 234).

The City of Cape Town had been firmly in white hands since 1948 and non-white representation was further splintered between coloured and Indian municipal councils and Urban Bantu Councils (for the black African population) with varying degrees of generally very limited franchise (Heymans & White 1991). However, from the late 1970s, demands for direct representation grew louder alongside a slow crumbling of urban apartheid through successful civic campaigns for non-payment of municipal services and 'rent boycotts' (Maylam 1990). In turn, it was also the local municipalities that were the first sphere of government to loosen apartheid legislation, for example through opening beaches, bus services and other public facilities to all race groups, and who openly lobbied national government for setting a definitive end to apartheid following the repeal of the Group Areas Act in 1985 (Simon 1989, p. 195). As chapter 6 will show, this period has also been particularly powerful in shaping the political consciousness of current decision-makers in Cape Town: not only were numerous prominent members of the current urban governance 'elite' jointly involved in mobilising civic opposition and supporting the struggle for national liberation\footnote{Movements such as the United Democratic Front (UDF) were decisively non-racial and managed to bring together a mix of people across apartheid's institutional colour line (van Kessel 2000). Other influential non-partisan movements included the Black Sash and the Surplus People Project.}, but many of them still identify strongly with and even define their professional practice through their activist roots. Moreover, it cannot be understated how momentous this experience has been for building interpersonal relationships and professional networks beyond sheer party politics (see part III).
Finally, in February 1990, ending several rounds of secret negotiations between Nelson Mandela and the National Party government under newly-elected President FW de Klerk, the ANC was unbanned and Mandela released from prison. However by the time apartheid's legislation was officially repealed in 1991, its socio-spatial ideology of total racial separation had become a manifest and almost all-encompassing reality at the hands of the regime's thorough bureaucrats: In the year of apartheid's abolition, only 8.6% of South Africa's urban population lived outside their own racially defined areas (Christopher 1999, p. 302). It thus comes as no surprise, that apartheid's population categories and their by and large unchanged reflection in the city's spatial composition have retained their power in shaping the country's collective consciousness and that its reversal still remains a tall order, not only for governmental entities but for society at large.
5.3 The spatial, political and cultural economies of contemporary Cape Town

In spite of the fact that the abolition of the racist Land Laws Act in mid-1991 effectively dismantled apartheid's legal architecture, the four years of transition between Nelson Mandela's release from prison in 1990 and his election as first president of a democratic South Africa was a time of great uncertainty that saw the country more than once on the verge of a civil war. It is thus one of Nelson Mandela's greatest achievements as a politician and leader extraordinaire that "in 1994 majority rule was achieved by more or less free elections with more or less no bloodshed" (Western 2002, p. 713). In consequence, the remainder of this chapter will thus focus on Cape Town's urban development as a major city in the young democratic South Africa post-1994. Though I will predominantly focus on issues of local urban transformation, I will also draw on selected national developments and legislation that are necessary for understanding Cape Town's development trajectory within a larger context. Besides providing a concise profile of contemporary Cape Town and its general socio-spatial, cultural and economic

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132 Amongst those watershed moments were the violent clashes between Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and African National Congress (ANC) supporters in Sebokeng as well as the mass killings in Thokoza, Katlehong (both 1990) and Boipatong (1992), in which the South African policy has allegedly also played an incriminating role. The assassination of South African Communist Party leader Chris Hani in April 1993 was another turning point that was followed by serious tensions and riots but also accelerated the negotiations regarding a date for democratic elections that followed just over a year after Hani's death (http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/south-african-major-mass-killings-timeline-1900-2012).

133 Though South African scholarship (including my own) has made frequent use of the term 'postapartheid', it is nonetheless important to provide some qualifying remarks. Elder (2003) has found the notion to be problematic, because it not only tends to over-determine the legacy of apartheid but it equally suggests that 1994 has been a definitive breaking point instead of the start of a slow and ongoing transition process. In sum, similarly to the use of postcolonialism, the term postapartheid in the way I and many others have come to evoke it merely signifies a formal end of a regime, while simultaneously recognising how it continues to affect the here and now.
dynamics going into the twentieth year of postapartheid rule, I will also elaborate on the
city's political realm, its current urban management practice and general policy
imperatives, in order to provide a basic overview of local decision-making structures.
Understanding these is necessary for unlocking my subsequent analysis of Cape Town's
WDC 2014 process and its ensuing 'stakeholder governance' complex.

5.3.1 Population dynamics and desegregation

Particularly given the emotive picture painted by the WDC 2014 bid committee
that Cape Town had been "separated by Apartheid" but could be "reconnected by design"
(City of Cape Town 2011), it is important to understand the city's current geographic
dimensions, its population dynamics and its persisting socio-spatial polarisation.

Figure 9 Urban population growth in South Africa's four biggest cities

Source: Statistics South Africa; design: M. Fleischer

According to the 2011 National Census, Cape Town has seen a population growth of
29.3% between 2001 and 2011, with total numbers hiking from 2.89 million to 3.74
million inhabitants over the course of the decade (City of Cape Town 2011, p. 5; see Figure 9).

This growth has been spurred by both national labour in-migration from the rural areas of the Eastern Cape, where unemployment and lack of educational opportunities remain rife, as well as by transnational influx, particularly from neighbouring countries such as Zimbabwe (Western 2001; Posel 2004), resulting in an overall increase of the African population share from 32% in 2001 to 38.6% in 2011. However, coloured people still remain the city's largest population group, with the still 'racialized' Census split of 2011 stating a share of 42.4%, a decrease from 48% in 2001. The white population has equally declined, now making up 15.7% as opposed to 19% in 2001, while the Asian population remains largely unchanged with a share of less than 2% (City of Cape Town 2011, p. 2).

The Cape Metropolitan Area stretches over 2.461 km² and features an inverted population density, meaning that density rises from the CBD towards the township areas of the Cape Flats, where it reaches its peak between 350 and 450 people per hectare (Wilkinson 2000, p. 198; Turok 14.07.2009; Figure 10). These numbers are most likely to have further increased over the past five years, as recent city statistics have shown a steady growth in the number of backyard dwellers and informal settlements.

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134 As I have previously mentioned, there remains an ongoing debate about the usefulness of such explicitly racial categories in a country that has committed itself to creating a non-racial society. Christopher (2002) points out that the census categories are not only laden with the colonial legacy of enumeration but have also tended to enforce rather than to only observe racial divides (p. 401). On the other hand, many scholars, politicians and activists have taken a more pragmatic approach in accepting and defending the racial categorization as a "necessary evil to ensure redress" (Hammett 2008, p. 652).
With regard to socio-spatial integration, the city remains by and large polarised. Though Cape Town like other provincial capitals has been showing signs of desegregation well before 1994\textsuperscript{135}, bear in mind that South African cities in general are descending from a staggeringly high level of segregation that was politically prioritised and violently enforced over four decades (Christopher 2001, p. 463). Christopher (2001) also noted that the speed of integration differs greatly between the population groups, with the integration of the white population proceeding the slowest, followed by the African population, which integrated faster but still in low absolute numbers. This was primarily related to the slow but steady emergence of a black African middle-class able to afford property in previously white suburbs. In comparison, members of the coloured and Asian groups desegregated at higher rates, due to their previous status as an intermediate group, lodged between African and white settlements (ibid.).

\textsuperscript{135} With the abolition of the Group Areas Act and supporting land rights legislation in 1985, non-white property ownership was officially legalised. In Cape Town, a thriving informal, yet at the time illegal property sales and rental market had already developed in the late 1970s, particularly in so called 'grey areas' like Woodstock, where white real estate agents would often front for non-white tenants (Elder 1990).
As the work of Lemanski (2004, 2006a, 2008) has repeatedly shown, an explanation for the sluggish pace of integration among the white population is a perpetual fear of crime that is used to justify a predominantly racist fear of difference (Lemanski 2004, p. 101). However, as Western (1997) explains in his ground-breaking study, racial prejudice and racist practice are not only confined to the white population, as the Cape's coloured population collectively expressed their fear of black African retaliation by largely voting against Mandela's ANC and for the old National Party in 1994 (p. 353f). Furthermore, in 2008 Cape Town sadly emerged as one of the country's epicentres for xenophobic violence, leaving several foreign African immigrants dead and injured in the majority black townships of Khayelitsha and Dunoon. In light of this and despite the fact that the official political discourse has repeatedly vowed to return the city to its (arguably often greatly overstated) liberal tradition of a tolerant melting pot, the criticism remains that Cape Town still constitutes one of the most racist and socio-spatially least-altered cities in the country (McDonald 2008, p. 9; Turok 2001, p. 2371).

In addition, much like the country's other big metropolitan areas, Cape Town also continues to bear the brunt of structural social challenges, such as high crime and violence, massive unemployment and lack of access to health care, education and economic opportunities for the poor etc. For example, while Cape Town's unemployment rate frequently ranges below the national average, it still lies at a staggering 26.2%, even when only using the strict rate, which does not include the vast number of people who have given up looking for work (City of Cape Town September 2013, p. 34). With job growth mainly occurring in the skilled labour segment, the danger of an ever-more widening social disconnect looms large and further inhibits chances of reducing the city's socio-spatial polarisation.

Nonetheless, giving up on urban integration does neither seem like a political nor a moral option as this would effectively mean abandoning the idea of national reconciliation. That spatial and social transformation are indivisibly linked has already been noted by Christopher (1997), who reminds us that,"[…] the mental heritage of apartheid planning […] will survive for as long as the physical structure upon which it depends" (p. 321).
5.3.2 Cape Town's spatial economy

The idle pace of Cape Town's socio-spatial integration presented above does however not reflect the speed of the city's urban development at large. Particularly within the economic bracket, Cape Town has both transformed and grown substantially since 1994, however in a manner that has intensified rather than mitigated historical social divisions. Particularly with regard to expectations of both inclusive economic growth and broad-based job creation encapsulated in Cape Town's creative city programmes, it is important to understand some of the local economy's main development trajectories.

With the end of international sanctions, increasing foreign direct investments and the country's sudden exposure as much to global trade opportunities as to market pressures, many have argued that South African urban centres have been rapidly turned into cities of advanced capitalism: "Released from the grips of the Apartheid state, the 'free market' has been set loose on existing inequitable urban conditions, consolidating our cities into evermore divided and segregated spaces. No longer only along race but along class lines as well" (Marks & Bezzoli 2001, p. 29). Though there is little doubt amongst economic geographers that income inequalities have further expanded the rifts within South African society, it needs to be reemphasised that class has by no means replaced the factor of race in social polarisation processes (McDonald & Smith 2004; Miraftab 2007; Rogerson 2008, see also ch. 5.3.1). For Cape Town, this means that of its 35.7% of people living below the official poverty line of 3.500 ZAR per month, the majority is still non-white. The provision of health care, housing, education, police and basic services remains the most lacking in majority black and coloured settlements, while the white and Asian population continue to be the best educated and therefore also present the lowest unemployment rates (4.7% and 10% respectively).

However, a recent study by Crankshaw (2012) has found that high unemployment rates amongst Cape Town's African and coloured population (34.5% and 22.6% respectively) cannot merely be assigned to the loss of low-wage service sector jobs. Rather, the city's deindustrialization has led to the professionalisation of the occupational structure alongside persistently high unemployment. Though this has also benefited the largely well-educated white population, a substantial de-racialization of the middle-class can be observed: "The consequence for the racial geography of Cape Town is that the city
is becoming divided into racially-mixed middle-class neighbourhoods and black working-class neighbourhoods characterized by high unemployment" (ibid., p. 836).

According to other recent analyses, this has also led to a widening gap between an "impoverished 'underclass' and the privileged 'liberation aristocracy': a new cadre of non-white, business-oriented elites, assisted by policies of Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), whose interests are closely entwined with those of the ruling ANC" (Hull & James 2012, p. 3; also Freund 2010, pp. 21f). This stark socio-economic division caused by a mismatch of jobs and skills is also expressed in the city's recent Gini Coefficient, which stands high at 0.57, though still ranges below that of other major cities in the country, such as Johannesburg, East London (both 0.73) or Tshwane (0.60) (United Nations 2012, p. 74).

These stark divisions have also been reflected in the city's built environment, where an increasing number of informal settlements stand in stark contrast to 'security villages' and exclusive mall development. A vivid example of the latter is Century City, a millennial mixed-use development scheme built around a mega-mall in the city's North-East. Its eclectic mix of Venetian style elements and other Euro-romantic kitsch, created an alienating, sanitised and exclusionary hyper-reality. Furthermore, the murky politics by which it came about epitomise the urban boosterism of the early postapartheid days, which saw a whole host of missed opportunities for restructuring the city through democratic and progressive urban planning (Marks & Bezzoli 2001, p. 28). However, though the pressure on local authorities to approve and subsidise large-scale private commercial developments has by no means subsided over the past decade, the scale of

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136 In fact, the public and professional critiques lodged against such 'grand solutions', including the realisation that insular and dispersed urban developments only increase the cost of basic service provision, which runs contrary to growing service delivery needs Turok & Watson (2001), have been recently resonated with regards to a proposed satellite town on the city's Northern edge. Similar to the rationale that informed Century City over a decade ago, the Wescape development sought to escape the city's official land allocation and urban planning processes by placing it - against all official long-term development plans - outside the current urban edge and moreover in close proximity to Cape Town's only nuclear power plant. Though the proposal continues to receive high-profile political support, including from the Mayoral Office, an overwhelmingly sceptical public commentary, including from the Mayoral Office, an overwhelmingly sceptical public commentary as well as contestation from within the administration pertains as city officials alongside professional architects, planners and land economists have dismissed the project's scenario as misguided, unsustainable and anti-urban (for a comprehensive analysis see Cirolia 2013). Though it has not been struck off the role and in fact recently overcame another hurdle of approval with the City Council amending its own hard-won Spatial Development Framework (SDF) to change its urban edge (Gosling 14.01.2014), the broad opposition against the Wescape development shows that the local purchase of planned utopias is nowadays limited. In turn, this draws into question the proposed
Century City's onslaught on contemporary architectural taste and inclusive urban design principles has thus far remained fortunately unparalleled.

Nonetheless, in spite of this continued push towards exurbia by both planned commercial developments and unplanned informal settlement expansion (Saff 1998; Lemanski 2006b; Huchzermeier & Karam 2006), Cape Town currently remains an economically mono-centric city, where the CBD and its surrounding areas have retained their economic dominance, while most growth outside the core has been biased towards high-income and formerly white suburbs (Sinclair-Smith & Turok 2012, p. 391), leapfrogging over the Cape Flats via main arterial roads towards further outlying areas such as Somerset West (Turok & Watson 2001, p. 123).

In consequence, both jobs and growth remain concentrated in the city centre as well as the economic sub-nodes in the Northern and Southern Suburbs, reinforcing social polarisation between these areas and the economically deprived Cape Flats, where "[t]he endless rows of cubical starter houses [still] mainly accommodate a population that is still poor, still badly educated, and still African or Coloured" (Houssay-Holzschuch & Teppo 2009, pp. 357; original emphasis, Lohnert et al. 1998; Turok 2001; Bekker & Leildé 2002; Haferburg & Oßenbrügge 2003; see Figure 9)

This lopsided spatial distribution of economic opportunity becomes even more apparent when looking at Cape Town's economic growth patterns since 1994. As South Africa's second largest urban economy, it boasts an annual GDP of 428.843 million ZAR, which has been growing at an average 4% per year, often above the national growth rates (Provincial Government of the Western Cape 2012b, p. 42; see Figure 11).
Almost a quarter of all business turnover is made in the CBD, with the success based on higher-order services such as media, tourism and the FIRE sectors (Finance, Insurance, Real Estate; Sinclair-Smith & Turok 2012, p. 406). In comparison, though the Cape Flats are home to one third of Cape Town's population, the vast area only accounts for a meagre 0.5% of all business turnovers (ibid., p. 404). The situation is further aggravated by the already mentioned skills mismatch, with the highest number of people without a high school degree also concentrated in the former township areas and informal settlements.

In comparison, the highest growth rates have been recorded in the more skill-intensive sectors mentioned above, while the low and medium-skill, labour-intensive manufacturing sector has been largely stagnant after a long period of dramatic decline. During apartheid, Cape Town had been a stronghold of clothing and textile manufacture as well as food processing, both of which however saw significant decline and in turn massive job losses for blue-collar workers due to aggressive competition from Asian producers (Jenkins & Wilkinson 2002, p. 40). In former industrial areas such as Woodstock, only the names of burgeoning creative industry hubs such as 'The Old Biscuit Mill' or the 'Woodstock Industrial Centre' (now called the 'Woodstock Exchange') -
maintained to provide a romantic, artisanal charm to 'creative' consumption (see chapters 2.2 & 3.2) - still hint at the city's historic manufacturing base.

However, particularly due to more specialised small scale wood and metal manufacturing, the sector still contributes roughly a quarter to the city's overall GDP. A sector that has been able to absorb some of the surplus blue-collar workforce has certainly been the construction and civil engineering sector, which had benefited significantly from expansive public infrastructure investments through the first Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP). In Cape Town, the sector has remained strong; both due to the attractiveness of the city to international buyers in general as well as through the large infrastructural upgrading projects in the run-up to the 2010 FIFA World Cup (see Table 4). However, all of these figures need to be read with a certain precaution as Cape Town's formal economy is mirrored by a large informal sector. While the actual scale of this sector is by its very nature ultimately indeterminable, rough estimates locate its share at between 10-20% of local economic and employment figures (Turok & Watson 2001; Friedman 2002).

According to the official data available however, Cape Town's urban economy is deemed comparatively well-diversified and set to continue its growth path, with 65% of future development occurring in the services sectors, namely tourism and hospitality, call centres and business processing (City of Cape Town October 2009, p. 3). What is particularly relevant for my analysis of Cape Town's creative city politics is that local economic development documents have over the past years increased their focus on the cultural and creative industries as a driver of future local economic growth. Already in 2006, the Provincial Microeconomic Development Strategy (MEDS) was amongst the first policies to earmark the sector as a key priority area for investment and development, at the time finding that it employed about 50,000 across the province, most of them in metropolitan Cape Town (Western Cape Department of Economic Development and Tourism & Provincial Government of the Western Cape 2006). While chapter 7 will talk

137 The document is widely regarded as a key document that has contributed to unlocking the political discourse around the local creative economy. Though the department showed great foresight in including the sector during a time when it was at best considered a niche market, the high quality and nuance of the argument stems from the fact that it was drawn up by non-other than Mike van Graan, one of the country's leading theatre playwrights and cultural activists, who was commissioned to contribute in his former capacity as head of the Africa Centre (personal interview, 24 January 2011).
about the making of Cape Town's CCI policy complex and governance arena in more detail, it is necessary to at least roughly outline its place within the current urban economic makeup.

5.3.2.1 Cape Town's creative industries

Cape Town has traditionally seen a steady influx of artists and cultural practitioners, particularly in the craft sector. Not only was craft one of the first creative sectors to receive special political attention through the Cape Craft and Design Institute (CCDI), founded as Special Purpose Vehicle in 2003\textsuperscript{138}, but it is also one of the sectors that is linked closest to Cape Town's thriving tourism economy. Many craftspeople make a living from selling memorabilia to domestic and foreign tourists, in curio shops as well as on popular street markets. As Pirie (2007) notes, here "[c]reative industry extends to pavement workshops and NGO factory outlets where artisans beat, wind and thread 'township' tourist trinkets feverishly in recycled sheet metal, wire and beads" (p. 132).

Though continuously competing with Johannesburg, Cape Town is also regarded as the country's cultural centre, housing the Iziko Museums and their collections including the South African National Gallery and Natural History Museum, as well as the Slave Lodge, the District Six Museum, Robben Island Gateway and numerous other smaller museums and historic memorial sites. Furthermore, the city is able to draw on a rich tradition of theatre, dance, music and carnival, from the Cape Philharmonic Orchestra, the National Ballet, the Artscape Opera and the Baxter Theatre to the International Cape Jazz Festival and the popular Kaapse Klopse Carnival, which is rooted in local slave tradition and celebrated annually as the Tweede Nuwejaar [Second New Year] (Worden et al. 1998, pp. 192f, see Figure 12).

\textsuperscript{138} Though officially launched to the public in 2003, the CCDI was already created two years earlier as pilot project between the Western Cape Provincial Government and the Cape Peninsular University of Technology (CPUT).
Figure 12 Cape Town Jazzathon at the Waterfront and Infecting the City public art performance 2013 at Cape Town Train Station

Source: LW (2011, 2013)
Furthermore, the city is widely considered as one of the world's top film production hubs, boasting a diverse array of locations, numerous production companies, model and crew agencies as well as a large-scale, Hollywood-style studio complex, all working at competitive rates that benefit from a favourable currency exchange rate. Based on a 2006 study commissioned by the Cape Town Film Commission, the sector contributes an annual 3.5 billion ZAR to the local GDP (Provincial Government of the Western Cape 2012a, p. 2). In addition, Bickford-Smith (2010) has shown that the sector also contributes vastly to the construction and international dissemination of a Cape Town imaginary, which falls in line with the common tourist gaze that conceives of the city (or rather of the reductionist image of the inner 'City Bowl') as 'unique', vibrant and cosmopolitan, yet essentially 'un-African'.

Similar to the other service-based local economic sectors yet even more pronounced, the cultural and creative industries in Cape Town are effectively "city industries" (Krätke 2011, p. 9). An inaugural study by the Creative Cape Town Programme in 2008 found close to a 1,000 creative industry entities in the central city area, allegedly making this the highest concentration of creative industries in the country (Cape Town Partnership & Creative Cape Town Initiative 2008; Pirie 2007, p. 132; Figure 13). As of late, Cape Town's CBD as the prime "repository, creator and distributor of considerable inherited and new symbolic capital" (ibid.) has also expanded eastward into the neighbouring former industrial area of Woodstock, with the upsurge in urban renewal efforts and special zoning measures fostering property price hikes and spurring further gentrification (Garside 1993; Kotze & van der Merwe 2000; Fleming August 2011; Wenz 2012; Booyens 2012).
Though there remains a severe lack of quantitative data to further substantiate the scale and economic impact of Cape Town's creative economy (for a rough breakdown see Figure 14), the plethora of political statements, policy drafts, government and private sector programmes, as well as the occasional academic paper all seem to agree that "Cape Town has the basic ingredients of a creative city" (Booyens 2012, p. 53).
With reference to my following analysis, it is however safe to say that since the city's WDC 2014 designation, its creative economy has entered yet another round of development, fuelled by expectations of FDI and GDP growth as well as job creation. All these political hopes are now firmly projected onto an apparently emergent 'design economy' that however is as much illustrious as it remains elusive (see chapter 7). Yet I do not want to pre-empt my analytical argument, which is why I want to use the remainder of this chapter to talk about Cape Town's local institutional make-up and political culture; not least because a basic understanding of key 'drivers', stakeholder networks and decision-making processes is indispensable for grappling with the intricate governmental logics and practises that have lifted Cape Town from a "wannabe creative city" (Ponzini & Rossi 2010, p. 1037) onto the podium of the world's 'design capital'.

Figure 14 Creative industry sectors in Cape Town

Source: City of Cape Town (2011), p. 143
5.3.3 The local developmental state

The recent history of Cape Town's local governance structure has been marked by continuous reform and adjustment. As mentioned above, the phase of political transition and drawn-out state restructuring between 1990 and 1994 was a particularly turbulent one for the country as a whole. Though rapid urbanisation, following the abolishment of apartheid's influx control measures in the mid-1980s had already solicited some political responses like the White Paper on Urbanisation (1986), a clear road map for municipal administration and urban governance only started to emerge after the first free elections in 1994.

National government quickly singled out the local government scale as the primary vehicle for urgently needed delivery of services and in turn swiftly conferred the onus of modernisation onto the country's regional capitals: "The ANC recognised the key role of local government in delivering services and promoting economic development and called for the re-demarcation of local governments with a view to urban integration and democracy, the creation of a single taxation system ('One city, one tax base') and the cross-subsidisation of municipal expenditure. Local governments were to become central to overcoming the backlogs" (Pillay 2008, p. 115). However, this devolution of responsibility to the local state apparatus was accompanied by fierce fiscal austerity measures, which deprived local municipalities of the very resources needed to implement national government's grand transformative visions of reconstruction and development (Hart 2008, p. 681). Similarly, Christopher (1999) aptly noted that the government was lacking both the financial resources and political will to 'undo' the apartheid city on a scale akin to the massive social engineering programme that was required to create it in the first place, thus leaving local administrations caught between a rock and a hard place (p. 307). As McDonald and Smith (2004) shows, national government thus effectively created 'unfunded mandates', which municipalities could not fulfil within the then existing

139 For the formulation of its urban development agenda, the South African government also drew extensively from global trends in urban and regional planning policy (Parnell et al. 2002, p. 85). More generally it can be said that the large-scale institutional reforms post 1994 had certainly increased the demand to learn from international examples.
After the ANC's rise to power, intergovernmental transfers to local government decreased by 85% in real terms between 1991 and 1997, with a further 55% decrease in Cape Town till 2000 (p. 1463).

In consequence, this also provided an early opening for substantial private sector involvement, on the one hand in order to meet the rapidly rising demands for large-scale social housing, infrastructure, health care and other social welfare services, but on the other hand also in terms of policy creation. Though the national socio-economic policy of the time - the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) - with its basic-needs-orientation was presented as a socialist democracy framework, it nonetheless did not shy away from trade liberalisation. In addition, it encouraged private sector investment for local service delivery, a measure that had already been suggested by a high-level World Bank mission to the countries four largest cities in 1992.

Thus in 1996, the year of Cape Town's first multi-party local government elections, national government launched a new macro-economic policy under the name Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR), which widely affected subsequent national urban policy directives. Under its more sternly market-liberal framework, which significantly backtracked from the interventionist Keynesianism of the RDP programme, further state funding was directed to privatisation initiatives such as the Public-Private Partnerships for the Urban Environments (PPPUE) project.

What Peet (2002) pointedly describes as a shift "from growth through redistribution to redistribution through growth" (p. 55) does however not signify a clear-cut shift from a policy of race to a policy of class. Rather, as Hart (2008) points out "the ANC government's embrace of GEAR constitutes a re-articulation of race and class that is also very much part of an activist project of rule" (p. 688; original emphasis). This heritage of social activism can still be found throughout South Africa's political spectrum and its different scales of 'developmental' government. Though many authors have rightfully critiqued the government's highly problematic TINA ('there is not alternative') attitude regarding globalisation, market liberalisation, and structural adjustment (Peet 2002; Bond 2000b, Bond 2003; McDonald & Smith 2004; McDonald 2008; Marais 2011), I concur with Oldfield's (2008) assessment that the overall transformation agenda is by no means a cause completely lost to neoliberalism: "Clearly the state is not a
monolith or a unitary actor. Nor is the post-apartheid state neutral, as liberal readings of the state might argue; or, functional only to capital or to class interests, as a radical critique proposes" (p. 495).

The "experiment" (Parnell et al. 2002) of establishing what is commonly referred to as a Developmental Local Government\(^\text{140}\) (DLG) is a pertinent case in point: For one, because this programme has been continually shaped in both theory and practice through the involvement of some of the leading, most accomplished and critical researchers in the urban development field over its several rounds of consolidation since the late 1990s; and secondly, because its core premises remain indebted to the imperative of a democratic, rights-based social agenda. The White Paper on Local Government (1998) had put the duty of ensuring both the realisation of basic rights and the practical delivery of services firmly on the shoulders of local governance structures, which thus became the designated sphere for fostering a sense of citizenship and social integration in line with the country's progressive constitution (Pieterse et al. 2008; Parnell & Pieterse 2010). Municipal administrations in particular had traditionally had the closest insight into the country's biggest challenges: the creation of sustainable and integrated human settlements and providing relief for the urban poor through inclusive socio-economic development strategies (Pieterse et al. 2008, p. 4). But though the project of building a DLG to overcome apartheid's crippling legacies is generally "infused with much energy and purpose" (Robinson 2008b), even Cape Town as one of the more functional municipalities in the country has not been able to fully comply with the policy's ambitious social vision\(^\text{141}\) (Parnell & Pieterse 2010). This might also derive from local government's ambiguous position as an interdependent state sphere: On the one hand it is supposed to fulfil the role of "primary development champion, the major conduit for poverty alleviation, the guarantor of social and economic rights, the enabler of economic growth, the principal agent of spatial and physical planning and the watchdog of environmental justice" (Parnell et al. 2002, p. 82). Yet on the other hand it remains greatly dependent on both provincial

\(^{140}\) Developmental Local Government is defined as "a local government committed to working with citizens and groups within the community to find sustainable ways to meet their social, economic, and material needs and improve the quality of their lives" (Parnell et al. 2002, p. 38).

\(^{141}\) At this stage though, it needs to be pointed out that advocacy groups such as the South African Cities Network (SACN) have been successfully garnering an increasingly robust role and are substantially influencing local government agendas and urban policy creation (Pillay 2008, p. 109).
and national government to provide capital funding and sound legislative frameworks. "It is in this context" Oldfield (2008) surmises, "that the local state negotiates its relationships in race-, class- and place-specific ways that structure a selective engagement between state and society. The state is not immune from politics, neither is it a neutral player, but rather a site of, an agent in, and a product itself of economic, political and social struggle" (p. 498). In turn, many challenges remain for capitalising on this "potentially empowering policy framework" (Pieterse et al. 2008, pp. 20; emphasis added LW); some of which I have already mentioned and will further elaborate upon in my empirical analysis (see part III).

The important conclusion that can be drawn from this complex mix of socio-political responsibilities is that Cape Town needs to be regarded not only as either a highly segregated or fairly well-resourced city but overall as a 'worlding' metropolis in all its conflicting inconsistency (see chapter 4.2). Thus, in order to make sense of contemporary Cape Town, we need to move away from reductionist assumptions such as the simplistic idea that early Cape Liberalism has merely transmogrified into contemporary Cape Neo-liberalism (McDonald 2008, p. xviii). Instead, I argue that it is important to provide empirically rich and substantiated accounts of the local "plasticity of neoliberal practice" (Houssay-Holzschuch & Teppo 2013, p. 52; see also ch. 4.4). This includes tracing how it has selectively penetrated the local institutional environment, which is in itself contradictory, as both an independent state sphere and as an organisational body in general (Czarniawska 1997; Czarniawska-Joerges 2002).

For example, Jaglin (2008, 2013) provides such a lucidly nuanced account when she analyses the city's multilevel governance of energy provision in practical detail. Contrary to global trends that see an increased deregulation drive in this sector, she shows how Cape Town's municipality strongly resists what it perceives as "a pattern of unregulated differentiation triggered by uncoordinated market strategies" and instead decides to opt for a system of "ordered plurality' monitored through a combination of differentiation and social redistribution under public control" (Jaglin 2008, p. 1905).
5.3.4 Cape Town's urban governance realm

The fact that Cape Town is now run as a single municipal entity is in itself an outcome of thorny multilevel negotiations\footnote{For further details on the politics of municipal restructuring and changing administrative boundaries in Cape Town, also refer to McDonald (2008, pp. 104ff)}. Under apartheid, what was then the Cape Metropolitan Area (CMA) had worked through 40 racially segregated local authorities and 19 separate administrations with a staggering staff number of 26,000 employees (Pieterse 2003, p. 166). In 1996, under the rather complicated power-sharing premises of the Local Government Transition Act (1993), this was condensed into six autonomous 'metropolitan local councils\footnote{These were Blaauwberg, the City of Cape Town, Helderberg, Oostenberg, South Peninsula and the City of Tygerberg.}' and a 'metropolitan council', which were supposed to coexist in a non-hierarchical relationship. However, this only remained a theoretical provision as the metropolitan council was in fact weaker than its sub-metropolitan counterparts and quickly ensuing political rivalry severely limited any strategic long-term planning (Wilkinson 2000, p. 202; Turok & Watson 2001, pp. 123f). The realisation that such a governmental setup, which was in itself highly fractured, could not reunite a fundamentally divided, fragmented and dualistic city prompted the creation of a Unicity Commission in 2000. This statutory body was established to facilitate the transition into a single-tier metropolitan government - the Cape Town Metropolitan Council - which was intended to end political rivalry and finally address issues of competitiveness, poverty alleviation and redistribution across Cape Town's highly unequal urban system in a more effective and holistic manner (Pieterse 2002, pp. 6,15).

Albeit recognising the great need for administrative restructuring and alignment, the Unicity Commission was also aware of the inherent social and political dangers lying in radically changing a running system of service delivery, which resulted in a more gradual approach than proposed for example in Johannesburg\footnote{This deliberately cautious approach has also contributed to the fact that Cape Town is less privatized in comparison to Johannesburg, which sold many public assets early on in the transition (McDonald & Smith 2004, p. 1462).} (ibid., p. 18). Enthusiastically embracing instruments such as City Development Strategies, Integrated Development Plans and partnership-driven forms of urban governance (including City Improvement Districts; Didier et al. 2013), the commission effectively sowed the seeds from which Cape Town's current form of vision-driven and networked (yet not

Today, the Cape Town Metropolitan Municipality is governed by an Executive Mayor, which is appointed by the City Council. The mayor then chooses eleven members of the Council to form the Executive Mayoral Committee (MayCo) (see Figure 15). The City Council as the main legislative body creates and implements by-laws, formulates the Integrated Development Plan (IDP), sets tariffs and collects rates, determines the city's annual budget and ratifies service delivery agreements. It is comprised by a total of 221 councillors, of which one half is elected in their respective wards and the other half is added for proportional representation of the opposition (City of Cape Town June 2011, p. 10). The councillors work through eleven portfolio committees, which address topical issues from utility services to safety and security and from municipal finance to economic, environmental and spatial planning. On occasion, ad hoc committees, working groups and special delegations can also be appointed by both Council and MayCo (see Figure 15).

Figure 15 Cape Town municipal government structure

Source: City of Cape Town (June 2011), p. 11
Though municipalities present the lowest tier of South African state rule, they are increasingly tasked with policy formulation through the drafting of implementation frameworks and development plans. In this, they not only interact and exchange knowledge with national and provincial government departments but often also with other non-state agencies on various scales (Wooldridge 2008, p. 476).

Thus and in spite of its great number of political and managerial staff (currently about 25,000 employees), the CoCT’s policy work is still perpetually supplemented by external expertise. This is an important point to note, especially in relation to determining the city's receptiveness to expert knowledge, and by extension to globally mobile policy paradigms such as the creative city.

Following van Donk and Pieterse (2008), the city's current policy-making environment and the different levels of external input can be divided into four categories: First up are macro policies and city vision strategies such as the Integrated Development Plan (IDP) and the Spatial Development Framework, which are tabled periodically and draw extensively on expert knowledge and established organisational networks throughout their drafting periods (p. 69). The latest IDP (2012-2017) defines five key...
pillars as the political foundation of Cape Town's overall urban development strategy: the opportunity city, the safe city, the caring city, the inclusive city and the well-run city (IDP). Programmatic focus areas subsumed under these five categories include the creation of 'sustainable human settlements', increased investment into developing 'intelligent transport systems', thus fostering a 'greener economy' and offering "high-quality services to all who live in, do business or visit Cape Town", in order to become "known for its efficient, effective and caring government" (City of Cape Town 2014, pp. 1f).

Secondly and based on the principles of these general strategies, there are more pragmatic and technical implementation frameworks, particularly regarding questions of service delivery. While expert knowledge is still strong, politically motivated Council members can also influence the outcomes through their respective portfolio committees. The third and fourth categories are area-based approaches, with the former mostly focused on sub-councils, ward councillors and their interaction with community governance structures, while the latter tackles ad-hoc issues that can flare up rather unexpectedly. Then again, these can also solicit responses from inside and outside the formal governance structures.

Based on the relationships between these four categories of local political deliberation, the authors identify four constitutive tensions in local policy agendas: Firstly between top-down directives and bottom-up initiatives, secondly between technical and political accountability, thirdly between prescription and experimentation and fourthly between horizontal distribution of development opportunities and vertical stratification of institutional priorities (van Donk & Pieterse 2008, p. 72). Especially with regard to my subsequent analysis of Cape Town's urban governance dynamics evolving around its WDC 2014 designation, I argue that van Donk and Pieterse's (2008) typology is especially useful for understanding the dialectic tensions from which local urban politics derive. Moreover, in light of my own experiences in the field detailed in part III, I also strongly support their argument that: "Clearly, these different categories of issues lend themselves to very different networks or coalitions, stakeholder clusters, discourses and value formation. On a broad macro-policy issue where little is at stake in the short term, actors may take a very radical stance to capture the moral high ground, but on issues affecting
their immediate constituencies and/or sponsors, they may be less inclined to radicalism or experimentation if it affects their power bases adversely” (ibid., p. 69).

Another important characteristic of Cape Town's contemporary urban governance environment is its distinctive party politics and coalitions. Though after its transition into a single metropolitan administration, the city (like the Western Cape Province) was initially governed by the ANC, it has been held by its national opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), since 2006. In March that year, DA leader Helen Zille took office, before handing over to Dan Plato in 2009 when she moved into the office as the Western Cape Premiere after the DA had successfully won the provincial mandate in the 2009 general elections. Since then, both the city and its encompassing province have been governed by the DA, with the current mayor Alderman Patricia de Lille taking over from Plato in June 2011. The Western Cape and Cape Town as its largest and most prominent city, have since then become an even more fiercely contested political terrain, as on the one hand the DA perpetually uses both as poster children to merit its claim of being more capable of running the country than the ruling ANC. The ANC, on the other hand, goes to great lengths to rebut such claims by rubbing salt into political wounds such as violent protests against failing basic sanitation delivery in the townships or inhumane labour conditions in the farmlands. However, critics such as McDonald and Smith (2004) have pointed out, that on a day-to-day basis of running the city, both parties have displayed similar policy trajectories, though he also describes the DA as slightly more 'bullish' in its pursuit of commercially-driven urban development (p. 1473).

In addition, many local and international scholars have already argued along similar lines as van Donk and Pieterse (2008), who have noted that "much of the formal political and policy processes in municipalities are stylised and choreographed by repetitive routine." At the same time however, "actors typically know what they can and cannot say; they know when to play the media gallery and when not to; they know how to speak for private interests without saying they are speaking for sectional interests and so

146 Though the relationship between the Western Provincial Government and the City of Cape Town has become much more amicable and cooperative since 2009, the interaction between the two remains shaped by rather ambiguous allocations of power and uncertainty about rights and responsibilities. As both tiers are eager to defend their respective mandates and policy franchises they sometimes assume conflicting positions. In addition, due to its technical service delivery mandate, the CoCT also commands a significantly higher capital budget than the provincial government (Wooldridge 2008, p. 480).
on" (p. 68; see also (Czarniawska-Joerges & Wolff 1991; Czarniawska 1997; Robinson 2011b, Robinson 2013; McCann & Ward 2012). Although I do not seek to delve further into the matter at this point as this would exceed the scope of this chapter, I want to stress that a basic grasp of the local political discourses, partisan lines, professional networks as well as interpersonal relationships between important actors are inevitable prerequisites for understanding Cape Town's politics of becoming the WDC 2014; because, as I will show, the fact that the title has been bestowed upon an opposition-run city in an opposition-led province has given rise to a whole host of "fluid and messy political dynamics" (van Donk & Pieterse 2008, p. 71) that influence different agendas, stakeholder strategies and regime formations.

Apart from the representative political forums such as the MayCo and City Council, another important domain of relational local urban governance are neo-corporatist political mechanisms, namely public-private-partnerships (PPPs) that are sought to compliment the formal work of the local authorities (Stoker 1998; Osborne 2002; Agranoff & McGuire 2003; McCarthy 2007). In South Africa, PPP-models have been particularly strong in the field of local economic development, where they were promoted early on in the transition and throughout all tiers of government to lower the FDI-threshold and accelerate much needed growth and job creation (Rogerson 2010).

Though this instrument has been applied in a variety of urban development projects throughout Cape Town such as the construction of the Cape Town Convention Centre or more recently the MyCiti Bus Rapid Transit Services, it is one particular organisation that has become the local epitome: The Cape Town Partnership. Established in July 1999, prior to the merging of Cape Town into a single administration by the Metropolitan City Council (MCM), the South African Property Owners Association (SAPOA), the Cape Town Regional Chamber of Commerce and Industry, private businesses and sectoral interest groups such as Cape Town Tourism, it was initially a 'rescue mission' to halt inner city decay. Over the past 15 years, the organisation has however evolved in leaps and bounds, shedding its geographically, politically and financially rather circumscribed mandate to become nothing less than a powerful "shadow

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147 This strong position is also evident in the fact that many official documents and media publications refer to the organisations simply as 'the Partnership'.

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local government" (Pirie 2007, p. 128). As the Partnership has also been the most vocal 'early adopter' of the creative city narrative and has been instrumental in conceiving and promoting Cape Town's home-grown rendition, I now want to shed some light on its history, organisational structure, working culture and last but not least its position within the local political spectrum.

5.3.4.1 The Cape Town Partnership: From city improvement technocracy to urban governance power-player

Similarly to other international examples, the idea to create a public private partnership organisation that focused exclusively on Cape Town's CBD was framed by the perception of an urban crisis, followed by accelerated "crisis talk" around physical decay and rampant petty crime (Michel 2013, p. 1014; Boraine August 2009, p. 3). With the dismantling of the Group Areas Act, many poor people had made their way into the cities, which in turn had prompted many affluent whites to relocate not only their homes but often also their business to privately patrolled suburbs and gated communities (Miraftab 2007, p. 606). By the end of the 1990s, more than 200 shops were vacant and property had been widely devalued. However, as the rates had not changed since the 1970s, this resulted in the odd situation whereby it was cheaper to simply close down a building than to find new tenants (Cape Town Partnership 2009, p. 9).

Besides mere property value, inner city patrons had also voiced concern over the growing numbers of homeless people (especially children), which they associated with high crime and general decay of public space. Pirie (2007) accurately captures the situation and sentiments of the time: "Violation of persons and property were among the encounters and experiences reported. Visceral reactions to these episodes are said to have compounded white people's discomfort over loss of political control and cultural hegemony, and their dismay over blurred lines between private and public spheres that are so strongly inscribed in western European urbanism. Evidently, re-appropriation and re-designation of public space from European/modernist to 'African' clashed with the pleasantries of window shopping, strolling, and sipping cappuccino in pavement cafés" (Pirie 2007, p. 127). In the eyes of the City Council, property owners and private businesses, the central city had to be 'saved' through a concerted urban management effort that was also able to better articulate their joint interests (ibid., p. 128; also Didier et al. 2012). This resulted in
the establishment of the Cape Town Partnership as a so called 'Section 21' non-profit company with a board of directors drawn from the affected public, private and civil society stakeholder groups. Shortly after its inception, the Partnership launched the Central City Improvement District (CCID) in November 2000 as a specific urban management vehicle. There has been a plethora of informative and critical studies on different Business and City Improvement District (BID & CID) models (Hoyt 2003; Ward 2007a; Cook 2008, Cook 2008) and Cape Town's CID has seen its fair share of rich and astute commentary (Miraftab 2007; Pirie 2007; Bénit-Gbaffou et al. 2012; Didier et al. 2012; Michel 2013; Didier et al. 2013). I do not seek to duplicate these efforts as my emphasis lies with the more recent and non-CCID related work of the Partnership, but in line with my interest in policy mobility, I'd like to point out, that the CCID is effectively an amalgamation of two models 'pinched' from elsewhere by different stakeholders. One part of the mix was brought in by city official Mile Marsden, who - after travelling to the UK with a City of Cape Town delegation - gave a presentation on the 'Coventry Model', which was later followed by a return visit by two representatives from the UK who talked about the model on site in Cape Town (Cape Town Partnership 2009, p. 13). While the 'Coventry Model' focused more on cleanliness and 'top-up' services, the city also took an interest in New York's model that was more geared towards safety and security, after property manager Theodore Yach - instrumental in creating both the vision for the Partnership and CCID - visited the city and met with former mayor Rudy Giuliani (ibid., p. 12).

While the more partnership-oriented British model was chosen as a role model for the Partnership and guided the creation of a CID (as opposed to an American-style BID), the New York model still informed the specific security strategies of the CCID, including an initial endorsement of 'zero tolerance', which however had to be partly retracted in later years (Cape Town Partnership 2009, p. 14; Boraine August 2009, p. 9). Derek Stuart-Findlay, the former chairman of SAPOA and former head of Old Mutual Properties praised the managerial strength of combining these two approaches in the Partnership's 10 year review: "As a whole exercise, it's a worldbeater: the combination of the Coventry

148 The CTP was however not exclusively informed by experiences from overseas. It also sought input from urban practitioners in Johannesburg, who had gone through a similar exercise already in the mid-1990s.
model (the Partnership) and its interrelationship with the New York model (CID) doing the work is unique. It brings a political power base from the public sector, with the financial strength of the private sector" (Cape Town Partnership 2009, p. 107).

The Partnership's first CEO was Michael Farr, previously the head of SA Tourism and a stern advocate of 'world-class' rhetoric and property-driven urban boosterism (Michel 2013, p. 1021). Under him, the CCID was set up and tasked to run the CBD like a business, which resulted in an accumulated real estate investment of 6.5 billion but also brought political tension as Miraftab (2007) recounts: "Indeed, as manager of the city's most lucrative and revenue-generating area, some referred to him as the 'unofficial mayor of Cape Town'. Resentment of Farr built up within the city council. In 2003, when power in the City government shifted from the DA to the ANC, Farr's openly exclusionist remarks made the newly ANC dominated city government vulnerable" (Miraftab 2007, p. 613).

Yielding to rising political pressure, Farr stepped down and former city manager and ANC anti-apartheid activist Andrew Boraine took over in 2003 (Michel 2013, p. 1026; Wooldridge 2008, p. 475). Not only had Boraine been instrumental in signing the Partnership into existence in his former position, but he also belonged to the more socially conscious group within the Partnership's stakeholder circle, that felt uneasy by mounting critiques levelled against the elitist conduct of the Partnership. According to Miraftab (2007), this informed his intention to 'humanise' the Partnership, shifting its official slogan from that of a 'world-class'-city to the mission statement of 'creating a city for all' (p. 613). Due to his previous experience within the public sector, he also had an intimate understanding of the political culture and thus made it clear that for him "a public-private partnership is not a municipal-public entity, nor is it a business lobby" (Boraine August 2009, p. 5).

Under Boraine, the Partnership's networked governance strategy was further enhanced through a kind of "shuttle diplomacy" that defined his organisational mandate as a translational duty, what he referred to as "playing cupid" between different interest groups (ibid., p. 4). Between 2005 and 2008, he also welcomed new stakeholder groups
onto the Partnership's board\textsuperscript{149}, which now included representatives from the civic, cultural, environmental and educational sector as well as a representative from the Western Cape Provincial Government. He also assumed the position as chairman of the newly founded urban advocacy group SA Cities Network (SACN). Under him, the Partnership adopted its current vision of creating "an inclusive, productive and diverse Central City that retains its historic character and reflects a common identity for all Capetonians" (CTP Annual Report 2008, p. 111). In turn, its mandate became "to develop, manage and promote the Cape Town Central City as a place for all and a leading centre for commercial, retail, residential, cultural, tourism, educational, entertainment and leisure activities" (ibid.; emphasis added LW). Indeed, this new vision also bore a significant shift from a rather hard-handed 'law and order' approach of its early years to a more socially attuned framework\textsuperscript{150}.

With the experienced municipal diplomat Boraine at its helm, the Partnership and its professional secretariat managed to steer clear of the city's otherwise rough and rapidly changing political tides of the time, garnering respect as a non-partisan "development facilitation agency" that commanded "almost universal praise" (Hamann et al. 2009, p. 16; see also Rogerson 2010). This also extended beyond the city and onto the international stage, where it for example received a Special Achievements Award from the International Downtown Association (IDA) for giving the CBD a "new lease on life" (Cape Town Partnership 2009, p. 100). Since then, the Partnership has not only become an established member of the IDA but its management is also frequently invited to present their 'recipe for success' at international urban policy conferences.

\textsuperscript{149} The diversity of the board can, on the one hand, be credited to Boraine's own expansive professional network; he has certainly benefitted from a general shift from company boards as mere oversight committees to boards as an organisation's social capital. This has furthermore been assisted by civil society organisations and NGO's moving from their watchdog positions under apartheid into formal cooperation with governance stakeholders and thus into active delivery roles OECD Territorial Reviews OECD Territorial Reviews: Cape Town, South Africa 2008, 2008, p. 288. I subsequently argue that Cape Town's close-knit 'board culture' has also helped to accelerate the formation of various ad hoc committees and advisory bodies during and after Cape Town's successful WDC bid.

\textsuperscript{150} However, in spite of stepping up its game in the field of social development, aims like "helping homeless people avoid being criminalised" (Hamann et al. 2009, pp. 16f) still remains oblivious to the fact that the very creation of the CCID had enforced the persecution of homeless people in the first place.
By 2008, the Partnership's budget had grown from 1 million ZAR in 1999/2000 to approximately 9 million ZAR (ibid., p. 107), furnishing the organisation with additional opportunities to hire staff and explore new areas of action, for example the creative industries for which it initiated 'Creative Cape Town' as a networking platform in 2006. Nonetheless, the Partnership did not forget to satisfy one of its most powerful core constituencies, the property owners. In a detailed review document published to mark the Partnership's 10 year anniversary, Colin Bird - a property developer and one of the initial founding members - enthusiastically declared: "I love seeing tourists walking around with cameras around their necks; and the hotels going up – that's a sign that people are coming here. Cape Town has become an international brand; when you see letters in magazines with 'Cape Town', they don't need to add 'South Africa'" (ibid., p. 108). Such comments, which deliberately divorce the city from its country and continent, mirror much of the public sentiment which is still held by the majority-white property owners and developers. Therefore it comes as no surprise that the Partnership - albeit its strong public relation efforts and media presence - cannot fully refute the reproach that it still caters primarily to a "visitor class" (Eisinger 2000) in creating a local 'brand identity' that keeps Cape Town's perceived 'African' cityness firmly limited to cultural folklore and curio and reduces citizens in a utilitarian fashion to 'brand ambassadors' and 'cheerleaders' of capital development (Cape Town Partnership & City of Cape Town 2008). And moreover, it only bolsters the already problematic constriction of the 'City Bowl' as a stand-in for greater Cape Town as a whole, thus obliterating the vast areas that have yet to see a comparable level of both political attention and public investment.

Whilst the Partnership under Boraine perpetually repeated its technocratic mantra of simply wanting to "get the basics right", its success also sowed political conflict, as the Partnership was "viewed as taking or getting too much credit for things that the City [government] does" (Boraine August 2009, p. 7). As a response and not least to squelch rumours of power play, the Partnership commissioned an external academic review of its work, which found clear words for its leadership: "The feedback was that the Partnership should remain focused on running its CIDs well; it should avoid taking on too many

151 While the City of Cape Town remains the Partnership's largest funder, it also receives additional project funds from Provincial Government, the National Lottery Distribution Trust Fund and private sponsors as well as from international donor bodies like the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency.
projects from the City and Province, and should stick to its core mandate" (from Clark et al. 2009 cited in Cape Town Partnership 2009, p. 98). The report also introduced new metaphors into the Partnership's official rhetoric, identifying its core mandate as 'steering' rather than 'rowing', thus supporting the Partnership's strategy of incubation as opposed to implementation and direct delivery (Hamann et al. 2009, p. 17).

In reality though, the call for the cobbler to stick to his trade had been long lost on the Partnership, which by 2008 - enchanted and invigorated by its own success, had already embarked on several large-scale urban governance and policy exercises, including the creation of a Central City Development Strategy in cooperation with the City of Cape Town and the establishment of a provincial Economic Development Partnership, for which Andrew Boraine was commissioned as project leader by Provincial Government.

Thus, today the Partnership's governmental reach and aspirations have unequivocally shifted way beyond the narrow confines of the CCID: "Although urban management and development in the Cape Town Central City will always be central to what we do – we are now a focused on facilitating collaboration for partnerships in other parts of the city, province and country" (Cape Town Partnership 2013, p. 3). Furthermore, this programmatic upscaling is also accompanied by a significant change in the Partnership's leadership, with Andrew Boraine handing over the baton to his former managing director Bulelwa Makalima-Ngewana in April 2013 as he concluded his long-anticipated move into the position as CEO of the Western Cape Economic Development Partnership152 (EDP). The impact of this transition can hardly be overstated, as Andrew Boraine's attentive and suave, yet decisive managerial style had shaped the Partnership's work for over a decade.

That the new CEO - a trained town planner - is however determined to leave an equally stark imprint on the organisation is evidenced by her latest series of newsletter and newspaper op-eds. While the newsletters are used as a tool to 're-introduce' the Partnership to its professional constituency, her monthly column 'My urban heart', published in the local Cape Times, serves as an emotive vehicle for marketing the

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152 While the Partnership and the EDP are de jure separate entities, they de facto remain closely linked through joined project and physical co-location in the same office building.
organisation to a broader audience in an often unconcealed self-congratulatory innuendo (Figure 16).

Figure 16 'My Urban Heart' - Column of the Partnership's CEO Bulelwa Makalima-Ngewana in the Cape Times

Source: Cape Times (17. September 2014)

According to Makalima-Ngewana, the Partnership has now entered into its third evolutionary cycle: Starting off with the mantra that "cities are for business" (1999-2008), the focus had already shifted under the realisation that "Cities are for people" (2008-2012). The latest stage moves ahead by declaring that "People are the future" (2012-2018) (ibid., p. 2). Thus, all signs are pointing towards further expansion - both geographically and in terms of the organisation's operational mandate. While the geographical focus had already moved past the boundaries of the CBD in 2008 to include adjacent neighbourhoods such as Woodstock and Green Point, it has now been extended even further to cover the entire Table Bay planning district, including areas such as the former District Six, Langa Township and the Maitland industrial area (see Figure 17).
In terms of its operational mandate, running the CCID has been demoted to the Partnership's 'business as usual'-approach, while it has turned its attention to other more 'exciting' (read: prestigious) projects such as proliferating its CID model further afield in areas such as Woodstock and Hout Bay, creating new public security measures through incubating a public security project called 'Safety Lab' and further developing the city's creative economy through surveys, dialogue forums and their own World Design Capital 2014 projects.

However, as of late the Partnership has also taken it upon itself to respond to critical voices, albeit safeguarded by its own signature way of media spin: "At the Cape Town Partnership, we're an excitable group of people with a future-forward, positive approach. But there have
been unintended consequences to our exuberance and the rate of our success. We never saw ourselves as agents of gentrification or thought of development as a tool for displacement. And yet that is how our work has been seen, and criticised, in some quarters. Looking back, part of our learning has been not to get so caught up in things – in urban upgrades, cycle lanes, cranes on the skyline, the idea of design, pursuit of titles like 'world-class city' – that you forget about people” (ibid., p. 2). Though the promotional rhetoric of a 'world-class' city had been already previously denounced by Boraine (2009), who noted that it did not make sense "to adopt a globally homogenised culture when one of our comparative advantages is our local difference" (p. 12), this does not mean that the practice of 'world-class-ness' has been entirely swept off the table.

Apart from the fact that the mayor and other senior politicians still make use of the moniker to describe certain city projects such as the ostensibly 'world-class' Bus Rapid Transit system, there has also been another, more alarming discursive shift: Instead of pinning the 'world class city'-label solely on brick-and-mortar developments, it is now increasingly used to construct a 'world-class citizenry', whose potential needs to be 'unlocked' and mobilised through new biopolitical technologies of self-actualisation, self-realisation, and self-management (see chapters 3.1 & 4.3).

Furthermore, the euphemistic reference to the organisation's 'exuberant success' only serves to legitimise the Partnership's managerial practises and advocates for its continuation rather than presenting an actual review of its professional conduct. Though the statement's intention might have been a genuine attempt to address issues of displacement and social injustice, it certainly falls short of assuming any real responsibility, washing the Partnership's hands clean in claiming that any negative 'side-effects' were unintended and beyond their control. However, I argue that for one this gravely downplays its central position as key urban management facilitator in large-scale projects like the 2010 FIFA World Cup and the World Design Capital. And secondly, it negates the powerful political network through which the Partnership has gained substantial influence on the direction of Cape Town's local governance agenda over the past decade. Thus, my empirical analysis presented in part III will further unravel the concrete ways in which the Partnership continues to influence and shape Cape Town's local politics of representation and reproduction.
5.4 [Interlude] Grappling with Cape Town's contemporary cityness

As the Partnership is a key player alongside other local urban governance stakeholders such as the City Council and the Provincial Government, it has been important to discuss some of its evolving managerial background and changing organisational ethos. Whilst the Partnership is a central point of reference in my analysis of Cape Town's evolving creative city governance complex, it is important to always remember its embeddedness within Cape Town's fragmented spatial economy. In addition, as I have argued above, it remains important to carefully consider apartheid legacies not simply as historical remnants but as lived experiences of spatially entrenched racism and structural socio-economic inequity that still continue to shape Cape Town's contemporary cityness twenty years after its formal abolishment.

In turn, Turok and Watson (2001) summarises some of the most pertinent challenges that continue to overwhelm the local state's developmental agenda and have vied for urgent attention since the new millennium: "Accelerated economic development is vital to increase jobs and incomes in a more competitive international environment. Substantial investment in social infrastructure and services is needed to meet basic needs and to reduce historic inequalities. Improved housing is required on a large scale to address dire living conditions and continuing urbanisation. Congestion and crises in the transport system demand urgent investment. Fragmented local administrations need rationalisation and more effective management systems" (p. 119). Whilst local government and its partners agree that all these issues deserve their undivided attention and even critics have pointed out that delaying development is not in the interest of national reconciliation (Henri & Grunebaum 2005, p. 5), there remains vast disagreement on how to best address them, with tensions running high between pro-business growth and pro-poor poverty eradication strategies (Xuza & Swilling 2008, p. 265; Jaglin 2008).

In Cape Town this rift is further exacerbated by the pervasive problem of maintaining existing public and simultaneously well-used tourism facilities in the inner city while channelling much needed investment to new developments in the townships. On the one hand, the final years of apartheid were characterised by extensive infrastructural asset stripping due to a lack of maintenance and wide-spread disinvestment. As Pieterse et al. (2008) describes, this backlog still generates massive pressures for restoration and repair but also re-inscribes the tenets of a divided city as "paradoxically the facilities tend to be in areas where the poor do not live but where the
so-called first economy and its participants live, work and play" (p. 17). On the other hand though there is also vast public and scholarly agreement that mass unemployment - often referred to as South Africa's Achilles' heel (Knight & Kingdon 2009) - will only be further aggravated in Cape Town and across the country as long as social housing schemes continue to be constructed on the urban periphery without the simultaneous proliferation of sufficient social welfare facilities and economic opportunities (Lemanski 2008; Huchzermeyer 2011).

It would however be an overtly sweeping statement to say that the local government outlets have not tried, nor that they have not made any progress in tackling Cape Town's poignant spatial legacy of apartheid over the first decade of the new millennium and beyond. Though the early years post-1994 were marred by a weak and fragmented city government, creating a power vacuum that allowed for predatory capitalist developments like 'Century City' to be carried out largely unfettered (Marks & Bezzoli 2001), Cape Town's local urban government has since then been substantially consolidated and has gone through great lengths to regain the reins on its developmental agenda and foster a participatory democracy (van Donk et al. 2008). In fact, writing on local economic development (Xuza & Swilling 2008) notes that the field "bristles with innovative ideas, failed experiments and an emerging cadre of LED managers who have read the manuals, tried every trick in the book and seen all there is to see. There is now a sense that we know enough to make our home brew, and that we are wise enough to keep it simple" (ibid., p. 280). Particularly with regard to the 'cherry-picking' that has come to characterise the engagement of Cape Town's urban policy-makers with the globally pervasive creative city paradigm, the display of an increased confidence in 'home brew' policy concoctions is important to keep in mind (see part III). This observation also resonates with both (Pirie 2007, p. 149), who sees "a discourse and spirit of civic inclusiveness" grow amongst the "institutional agents of transformation" as well as (Oldfield 2000, 2002, 2014; Hart 2008, 2013) who show that, in spite of poor African and coloured neighbourhoods still having few resources and appallingly low levels of service delivery, they do wield considerable political agency, for example in the forms of street committees, organised grassroots movements or spontaneous protest action (see also Bénit-Gbaffou & Piper 2012; Sinwell 2012).

All of this makes for a heavily populated and vibrant yet at times greatly obfuscated field of local 'stakeholder' governance in contemporary Cape Town. While,
according to Swyngedouw (2005), such forms 'beyond-the-state-governance' can provide new inroads for participation and further democratise state-civil society relationships, they remain inherently Janus-faced as powerful actors can also use it for 'short-circuiting' participatory processes and thus separate authority from responsibility and public accountability (Tomlinson 2002, p. 387). And indeed some have argued that in recent years Cape Town's municipal government has increasingly tended to address substantive issues like inequality and social justice in a rather apolitical and technocratic manner, while at the same time being bogged down by trivial political rows and petty party conflicts (Wooldridge 2008, p. 483).

Furthermore, as I will show in the case of Cape Town's WDC 2014 process, the observation that high-profile coalitions, project alliances and ad hoc committees on urban development issues can be assembled and proliferated fairly quickly is indicative of the close connections between the city's well-networked local governance elite, often forged through joint university education or a common history in civic activism. Precisely where the creative city governance complex can be located amid these complicated urban political cross-currents and how its own evolving discourses and practises have in turn shaped Cape Town's contemporary governmental agenda will thus be a key subject of my empirical analysis in part III.
Methodological deliberations on researching Cape Town on the move

Before I am able to go into the empirical detail of my research, it is important to put them into a broader methodological perspective, by weaving together my initial research design with my actual practical experience 'in the field'. While the two are intrinsically connected, their relationship is by no means one of linear 'ideation-to-implementation', but instead marked by discontinuities, impasses and contradictions. However, instead of trying to gloss over these cracks, I have taken the cue of post-positivist scholarship to heart, which argues that laying bare issues of reflexivity, positionality, and power relations is central not only to establishing scholarly rigor, but also to fostering honest social engagement within and beyond the academy (Denzin 1970; Sidaway 1992; Butler 1993; Katz 1994; Rose 1997; Denzin & Lincoln 2005b; Fraser 2012). Drawing on Katz (1994, p. 67), taking such a (self-)conscious stance effectively means grappling with the following set of pertinent questions: What constitutes my field, what delineates me as a field researcher, and what configures and constraints my data under contemporary conditions of globalisation?

These three questions broadly correspond to the structure of this chapter: Firstly, I will introduce my methodological research design based on the idea of looking at the local governmental policy arena through an 'extended case method' (Burawoy 2009; McCann 2011a; Peck & Theodore 2012), followed by a 'thick' narration of my inevitably messier research process. Split in two parts, I will first addresses my own ambivalent positionality, before elaborating on the different segments of my mixed-method study,
which focused on local 'elites' and policy 'experts' as the makers of Cape Town's creative-cum-design city governance.

While reflexivity, as a now basic standard in qualitative research, has done a great deal to debunk the myth of scientific neutrality and to challenge the presumptuous idea of academic knowledge as universal, I agree with Crang (2002) that it has become "something of a shibboleth" (p. 651) which can turn out to be equally problematic in suggesting that though we might not be able to fully know the world, we could at least completely understand our own motivations, intentions and value systems. Particularly feminist geographers have gone through great lengths to point out that all knowledge - including that of the researcher's self - is situated and bound up by socio-political factors of race, class, age and gender, as well as time and historic precedents (Rose 1997; Moss 2002; Larner 2002; Staeheli & Nagar 2002). Yet they don't suggest that we should abandon reflexivity, but "rather than attempting the impossible quest of trying to identify a transparent knowable self, our focus should instead be looking at the tensions, conflicts and unexpected occurrences which emerge in the research process" (Valentine 2002, p. 125). Similar to Ward and Jones (1999), I have come to understand the meaning of "political-temporal contingency" (p. 301) during my own research process, be it through the shifting modes of entry regarding my access to informants, or the ways in which every social encounter has further refracted my already kaleidoscopic and hard-to-reconcile perceptions of Cape Town. Though my studies have taught me early on that cities cannot be known in advance, but must rather be learnt by both the researcher and the researched alike (Jazeel & McFarlane 2010; McFarlane 2011b), it took four years immersed in 'creative' Cape Town for me to really comprehend and successively embrace the idea of uncertainty as a vital research predicament (McFarlane 2008, p. 355).

Hence, relating the ways in which I have gone about producing, collating and analysing my empirical data is at the same time a form of writing my own personal journey as an "epistemic subject" (Calbérac 2011, p. 102). While the following approach can be justly scorned for its omnivorous or at least eclectic nature, it has grown out of a genuine attempt to remain mindful of the fact that any perspective that claims to be relational is by the same token always exploratory, tentative and provisional (Peck & Theodore 2012, p. 28, see also McCann & Ward 2010; O'Callaghan 2012; Jacobs 2012).
"Like people and schools of criticism, ideas and theories travel – from person to person, from situation to situation, from one period to another. [...] the movement of ideas and theories from one place to another is both a fact of life and a usefully enabling condition of intellectual activity." (Said 1983, p. 226)

6.1 [Research design] Follow the policy in place? The value of the extended case method for tracing interurban knowledge dynamics

As previously mentioned, my research approach for catching an empirical glimpse of Cape Town's creative cityness and 'designer' governmentality is heavily indebted to the rich vein of dialogue that has formed between critical urban geography and postcolonial studies over the past decades (Jacobs 1996; Hall 1998; King 2000; Yeoh 2001; Robinson 2003; Larmer 2006; McFarlane 2006; Jazeel & McFarlane 2007; King 2006; McFarlane 2008, McFarlane 2010; Roy 2011a; Roy & Ong 2011; Roy 2011b; McCann & Ward 2011b; O'Callaghan 2012). Recent conversations between proponents who seek to engage with the global mobility of urban policy knowledge and modes of worlding cities have not only displayed common theoretical and epistemological concerns, but have also revealed a closely related methodological agenda for understanding 'cities in a world of cities' (Robinson 2011a; McCann 2011a; McCann et al. 2013; Temenos & McCann 2013; see chapters 4.1 & 4.2). Robinson's (2003; 2006) copious body of work has significantly advanced the 'postcolonisation' of urban geography in conceptualising cities as "both a place (a site or territory) and as a series of unbounded, relatively disconnected and dispersed, perhaps sprawling activities, made in and through many different kinds of networks stretching far beyond [its] physical extent" (p. 763). She and others have derived from this a reinvigorated interest in comparative urbanism, which seeks to find new experimental ways of studying across multiple sites, distilling new joint readings of urban dynamics beyond the crude north/south divide (Ward 2008; McFarlane 2010; Robinson 2011b; Robinson 2011a; Clarke 2012a; Lees 2012; Lemanski 2014).
While I harbour great sympathy for and sustain a keen interest in the "comparative gesture" (Robinson 2011a) for my future research praxis, my inquiry at hand has however taken a different route, as it successively gravitated towards an "extended" (McCann 2011a, p. 121) or alternatively "distended" (Peck & Theodore 2012, p. 21) case study method, which proposes shifting away from merely studying 'sites' to studying 'fields', i.e. the various connections between sites (McCann 2011a, p. 121, drawing on Burawoy 2001, pp. 30f). I have used the word 'gravitate' deliberately to show that rather than having been a conscious and well-informed methodological choice for the latter and against the former pursued from the word 'go', the decision to follow this approach has instead emerged over time. Hence, before getting into the methodological details of the extended case analysis, I want to briefly explain how I came to adopt it.

From my own experience I wholeheartedly agree with Fraser (2012, p. 292), who - based on his extensive fieldwork in South Africa - has argued that we should account for rather than deny the 'thrown-togetherness' of our research, which emerges from the interaction of the purposeful with the accidental. When I started my fieldwork in the autumn of 2010, I conceived of Cape Town as a feasible case study: **feasible** because I had gained previous experience with researching the city's urban development dynamics during my master's thesis project (Wenz 2012), and **case study** because I saw Cape Town as emblematic in the way it was, albeit selectively, buying into the 'hype of creativity' (Lovink & Rossiter 2007), which has already besieged many cities in the global North. While going about my master's thesis research in 2009, I had already noticed the dearth of information (not to mention critical accounts) on how the creative city 'script' was actualised and reinterpreted in urban Africa, albeit the fact that popular policy documents such as the UN Creative Economy Reports had identified the continent's ostensibly burgeoning creative industries as a source of future growth and employment, and were more and more successfully pushing for the creation of a supportive policy environments on the national level.

At the same time, a plethora of critical works had already appeared on how the creative city-cum-creative-class narrative had been used by urban growth coalitions as a 'Trojan horse' (Poetschacher 2010), that carried neoliberal policies couched between stories of creative self-realisation and consumerist 'street-level culture' (Florida 2003; see
ch. 2 and 3). Eager to see for myself in how far budding local creative industry platforms like Creative Cape Town were fitting into this spectrum, I set out to explore "The creative economy as a new factor for urban governance and development in South Africa – The example of Cape Town" (the title of my 2010 PhD funding proposal). While it certainly worked to my advantage that the creative city had been the 'flavour of the month' for city officials and critical scholars alike, I also felt alarmed by the inherent danger of having my work reduced to just another case study\(^{153}\) on a topic about which seemingly very little has been left unsaid. As a visiting researcher at the African Centre for Cities from late 2010 onward, I was first exposed to - or rather 'thrown together with' - ideas of 'southern urbanism', which corroborated my initial hunch that more could and should be made of Cape Town's creative city politics than simply regarding them as yet another blue-print derivative of fast global policies. Hence, I wanted to avoid entering the field with a preconceived set of theories and methodological tools (Walton 1975) that could foreclose the possibilities for unexpected (in)sights and sites to emerge in the process (McCann & Ward 2012, p. 47). Thus, I opted for a rather explorative and experimental style of fieldwork that allowed me to remain mindful of the "political-temporal contingency" (Ward & Jones 1999, p. 301) of local politics.

Indeed, several initial interviews with local governance stakeholders in October and November 2010 revealed that with the dust slowly settling in the aftermath of that year's FIFA World Cup, the Cape Town Partnership was rallying up cross-sector support for bidding to become the World Design Capital in 2014. This project intrigued me, and I chose to monitor its development closely while still maintaining my original focus on the intersections between local governance, creative industries, and the city's latest urban renewal efforts. The big shift occurred in June 2011 when news broke that Cape Town was shortlisted as one of three cities in the running for the title. I returned to Cape Town from Germany shortly afterwards to find my 'field' utterly transformed: While the World Design Capital had previously not received more than a fleeting mention from my respondents, it now took up an ever-larger space during interviews, and was also increasingly discussed in local media outlets, particularly after a panel of international

\(^{153}\) The value of quality single-case studies should however not be underestimated, as they continue to contribute their share to theory work (Flyvbjerg 2006; Yin 2009; McCann 2011b).
judges paid a visit to evaluate Cape Town's bid proposal in situ. In addition, during my time in Germany, I had attended several international conferences, such as the RGS/IBG meeting in London, where I learnt about the heightened interest in global policy mobility and its close ties with postcolonial urban studies in the 'global south', a connection I thus came to revisit more thoroughly. To cut a rather long story short, my case had irrevocably expanded before my eyes: new discourses were flaring up, a string of new stakeholders (and thus potential respondents) continued to appear on my 'radar', and when the city's win was announced in October 2011, I finally abandoned my safe haven of well-researched creative city discourses to belly-plunge into the uncertainty of following Cape Town through its motions of becoming a World Design Capital by 2014.

Having to feel my way into the still fluid and vastly unsettled governmental realm of the WDC process, which now also extended well beyond the metropolitan boundaries, posed a set of new methodological challenges to how I delineated my case. Albeit aware of the fact that "dealing with the local and the global and their intersections remains a peculiar struggle in urban studies" (Surborg et al. 2008, p. 342), I still needed to find a methodological mix that allowed me to account as accurately as possible (and within the linear corset of a written text) for the interurban governance complex and its messy politics which were galvanised in the wake of Cape Town's WDC bid.

Here, the extended case method has come in very handy, as it promotes "a judicious combination of observations, documentary analysis, and in-depth interviews, as a means of probing, interrogating, and triangulating issues around the functioning of global policy networks" (Peck & Theodore 2012, p. 26). In general, the extended case method presents a reflexive model of science "in order to extract the general from the unique, to move the 'micro' to the 'macro', and to connect the present to the past in anticipation of the future, all by building on pre-existing theory" (Burawoy 1998, p. 5). Seeing research as a social intervention, it promotes process-oriented modes of inquiry that are able see social processes as structured fields and engage with existing theories in a dialogical fashion154 (see Table 5). Due to the sensitivity of its regulatory principles towards questions of history and scale, its orientation towards concurrent processes and

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154 This also sets the extended case method apart from Grounded Theory approaches, which Burawoy (1998), Tavory & Timmermans (2009) and others have criticised for their often insufficient engagement with preceding theories.
reconstructive engagement with theory, as well as its openness towards considering adverse power effects in the production of 'scientific evidence', the extended case method has been gainfully applied in many postcolonial research frameworks (Burawoy et al. 2000; Burawoy 2009). As Burawoy (1998) surmises, it is thus "a craft mode of knowledge production in which the product governs the process" (p. 28; original emphasis).

Table 5 The extended case method and the reflexive model of science

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regulatory Principles</th>
<th>Extended Case Method</th>
<th>Adverse Power Effects of Research</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interventionist/'Engaged' modes of inquiry</td>
<td>Extension of Observer to Participant</td>
<td>Domination of context and reification of social hierarchies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Process-oriented approach</td>
<td>Extension of Observations over Time and Space</td>
<td>Silencing or distortion of other voices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structuration of social practices</td>
<td>Extension from Process to Force</td>
<td>Objectification and naturalisation of social forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconstruction of theory through dialogue</td>
<td>Extension of Theory</td>
<td>Normalisation of emerging theoretical categories</td>
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Source: Burawoy (1998), p. 26; adapted LW

Two different variations have been proposed in the literature for researching global urban policy networks as extended cases: the first falls more in line with comparative urbanism propositions, as it starts from a policy phenomenon - for example Business Improvement Districts - and follows it through multiple sites (Ward 2006; Cook 2008; Michel 2013). The other hones in on a specific place in which a certain policy is assembled, while taking into consideration the influence of interurban connections and powerful global policy trends (McCann 2008; McCann 2013). By virtue of my personal research process described above, I have adopted the latter, more modest approach by maintaining Cape Town as my "primary perspective" (Burawoy et al. 2000, p. xii) from which to 'study out' through the different local-to-global strands of the city's World Design Capital process. Though, as Robinson (2011b) has shown in her analysis of different city visioning processes, it is of course virtually impossible to assemble all lines of influence for even one policy as we remain constrained by issues of time, available resources and

155 As a variation of studying through multiple sites it has also been proposed to travel with certain 'policy champions'; for example, Richard Florida and his flock of consultants, to understand how different policy phenomena are paddled across different sites (McCann & Ward 2012, p. 46). This of course poses not only logistical challenges and raises issues of access, but might also run the danger of prematurely singling out a 'puppet master' even though he does not pull the strings of local implementation.
restricted access to certain forms of knowledge or key political players (p. 23). In the same vein, Peck and Theodore (2012) have conceded that both local depth and broad transnational reach are not practically attainable (p. 27). Nonetheless, I would argue that by tracing how a policy is emplaced we can still delineate significant powerful discourses, framings and practices that can in turn reveal a lot about the policy process in question. But what exactly are the methods through which we can understand these specific interurban 'policy ecologies' (Peck 2011b; Borén & Young 2012), that "possess specific institutional, ideational, and ideological characteristics, and each of which can ultimately be seen to possess its own 'social life'" (Peck & Theodore 2012, p. 23, see also Peck & Theodore 2010a)?

On the one hand, it has been emphasised that there is no "fixed methodological repertoire" (Peck & Theodore 2012, p. 24), since a critical investigation of mobile policies explicitly invites experimenting with "theories-in-construction" (ibid., p. 27). On the other hand, this also follows from the fact that theoretical advances have vastly outpaced methodological considerations (McCann & Ward 2012, p. 42; Cochrane & Ward 2012, p. 8). A staple of recent interurban policy mobility studies has however been the triangulation of qualitative interviews and document analysis with ethnographic accounts, in order to get "beneath the smooth surfaces invoked by policy statements, organizational structures, and the post-rationalizations of elites" (Peck & Theodore 2010a, p. 172). This reinvigorated interest in ethnographic methods is however not exclusive to recent policy mobility studies, but has been equally championed by neo-Foucauldian geographers interested in urban-global political economies (Larner & Le Heron 2002; Ferguson & Gupta 2002; Larner & Walters 2004; Larner 2006), and others working towards a more postcolonial geographic research practice (Robinson 2003; Simone 2004; Simone 2010; Collier & Ong 2005; Ong 2006a; Pieterse 2010; Roy 2011b, Roy 2012).

The shared focus lies on "embodied policy knowledges and mutating technologies of government"(Peck & Theodore 2010a, p. 172), meaning that there is an increased attention given to those seemingly menial day-to-day routines, banal techniques and mundane representations - the "back stories of policy presence" (Jacobs 2012, p. 419) - by which a policy is 'made up', emplaced and transformed (Larner 2002; Ward 2006). Furthermore, Roy (2012) has recently argued, that other than just being a set of specific
observational and participatory methods, ethnography also functions as "an orientation, a way of undertaking problematizations of the world" (p. 34). Hence, ethnographic tools enable us to overcome simplistic conceptions of cities as mere 'victims of globalization' (Clarke 2012a, p. 811) by interrogating how globalisation is 'grounded' and 'manufactured' through local practice (Burawoy 2001, p. 158). At the same time, it also serves to disturb, unhinge and remodel our own conventional academic wisdoms (Peck & Theodore 2012, p. 28). In consequence, adding ethnographic accounts to our qualitative 'toolbox' not only affects how we conceptualise our research subject(s), but also transforms our own positionality and subjectivity as a researcher.

Regarding the subject(s) of research, it is useful to look towards critical policy theory, which has argued that in order to assess actual policymaking, we should focus on practises of communication, enshrined in both bodily as well as textual acts of articulation (Freeman 2012, p. 16). What is particularly helpful in order to account for the "political-temporal contingency" (Ward & Jones 1999, p. 301) of local decision-making, is the idea of seeing the process as a continuous set of fallible iterations: "Neither meeting nor document nor previous action prescribes or fully determines the understanding or action which follows from it. The message is made up each time for 'another first time' as it is passed on (Freeman 2012, p. 15)". What ensues is that social practice can no longer be treated as an object that policies are made to regulate, but policies themselves are the locus of articulative practices (ibid., p. 19). But who is exactly moving what within interurban policy circuits? And where to?

In trying to investigate "how urban actors act globally" (McCann 2011a, p. 121), a vast array of monikers has been used to refer to a rather disparate group of policy makers and mobilisers: "idea brokers" (Smith 1993), "knowledge brokers" (Zook 2004), "transfer agents" (Stone 2004), "experts of truth" (Rose 1999), "policy entrepreneurs" (Dolowitz & Marsh 1996; Mintrom 1997), "new specialist elite" (McCann 2011a, p. 114), and "community of practice" (Wenger 1998). Though these terms function well as initial pointers, I agree with McCann (2011a) that we need to identify more concrete and situated categories for studying the interurban processes of knowledge circulation and policy production (p. 111). Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) provide a good point of departure, as they have identified nine main types of policy stakeholders: (1) elected officials, (2)
political parties, (3) bureaucrats/civil servants, (4) pressure groups, (5) policy experts, (6) transnational corporations, (7) think tanks, (8) supra-national governance institutions, and (9) nongovernmental organisations and consultants (p. 10). However, this rough categorisation of different sources of at times concurrent and at times competing 'elite' knowledge needs to be further adapted in order to better reflect specific local network dynamics and "governance cultures" (Healey 2004).

For example, in terms of Cape Town's creative city politics, transnational corporations have certainly been of much lesser relevance than the pool of vocal creative industry sector bodies, while what could be thought of as local policy 'think tanks' have often been less formalised institutional structures but more ad-hoc coalitions on specific development issues forged between local university faculties, NGOs, neo-corporatist governance institutions and selected policy experts. Thus, with regards to Cape Town I argue that it is important to review this typography in light of the five predominant local governance domains in Cape Town, as previously identified in chapter 5: Representative political forums, neo-corporatist political mechanisms, professional advocacy groups, grassroots civil society organisations, and episodes of spontaneous mobilisation (see also box 2 and list of respondents in Appendix C). Regardless of the specific categorisation, the important point remains that all of these groups have the potential to function as relational urban nodes that can strategically draw in knowledge, concepts, practices, schemes and models from elsewhere, yet they are not moving in discrete packages on the back of rational actors, but are rather caught up and transformed in a bounded process of translation (Jazeel & McFarlane 2010, p. 116).

Now, how has this "recombinant character of policies on the move" (Roy 2012, p. 34) influenced my choice of the extended case method as a viable approach for understanding Cape Town's creative cityness? And where are its limitations? Although I have already mentioned the importance of perceiving of global-urban policy as emplaced through both discourse and practice, it is important to reiterate that we cannot simply remain at the level of programmatic announcements, official discourses, and expert citations (Peck & Theodore 2010a, p. 172). Using the relevant example of creative city strategies, (Borén & Young 2012, p. 1805) rightly notes that "these are too often produced for external consumption, in which urban authorities wish to be seen to be 'playing the
game' and which thus reproduce the accepted rhetoric of creativity. In reality, city authorities are not homogeneous entities." Hence, in order to find the connective tissues that bind divergent local policy genealogies and heterogeneous local planning complexes to urban experiences elsewhere\textsuperscript{156}, it is equally important that we closely follow "the everyday practices of both elite and 'middling' policy actors as well as political activists" (Temenos & McCann 2013, p. 354). As the following section will further exemplify, in terms of the methodical mix, this effectively prompts us to engage with a multiplicity of ephemeral, fleeting and contingent sources that are 'cobbled together' (McCann & Ward 2012, p. 49) to set "meaning in motion" (Desmond 1997): Consultant reports, conference manuscripts, podcasts, digital video snippets, social media blurbs, workshop events, board meetings, power point presentations, official speeches, informal chats, media briefings, twitter feeds, glossy brochures, etc. - all of these can and should be used to provide a rich and dynamic narrative of local policy ecologies, and ultimately offer rich insights on struggles over legitimacy and power (Temenos & McCann 2013, p. 351).

Cochrane and Ward (2012) also highlighted this point in stressing that the research being undertaken "involve[s] tracing power, exploring how it is constituted, how equality and inequality are constructed in practice, and through the practices of policy making" (p. 9). All of this supports the idea that through a tailored multi-source and mixed-method approach, which engages the field in a dialogical and non-linear fashion, both our research and writing becomes itself an assemblage\textsuperscript{157} (McCann & Ward 2012, p. 49). However, while this constructivist impetus is a great asset, at the same time it also presents itself as a perennial problem.

In closing, I want to single out two important limitations. First is the issue of time and how we can follow multiple processes occurring on different timelines. Lévi-Strauss (1990) writes that "[t]ravel is usually thought of as a displacement in space. This is an inadequate conception. A journey occurs simultaneously in space, in time and in the social hierarchy" (p. 104). In a similar vein, (Walters 2006) argues for a 'polytemporal' form of

\textsuperscript{156} Peck & Theodore 2012, p. 28 make this point abundantly clear by urging us not to forget the broader political economic context of policy transformation over our fine-grained renditions of local policy experiments, failures, and alternative successes.

\textsuperscript{157} To reiterate my previous argument (Chapter 4.2.3), I am not using assemblage as an ontological category but - following Anderson 2012; Anderson et al. 2012; Roy 2012 and others as an 'ethos' or orientation of engagement that allows for a certain degree of methodological experimentation, for example through thick description and personalised accounts.
studying policies: "Perhaps it is time to stop sorting elements into neat cohorts and epochs, a move which obscures their polyvalence and ambiguity - and start thinking their multiple times. To do this would lessen the hold which apparently inexorable processes and master narratives like 'globalization' and 'neoliberalism' still exercise upon political imagination" (ibid., p. 182). While I greatly sympathise with this idea of sequential and longitudinal knowledge creation on a theoretical level (see also Bathelt & Henn 2014), I personally do not know how to resolve the deriving research-practical constraints.

Peck and Theodore (2012) aptly captured the conundrum: "It is not always possible to 'be there', when in the study of global policy networks there is a constant imperative to also 'be' somewhere else. And since many of these are, in effect, boundless, methodological 'saturation' is practically unattainable" (p. 25). In addition, Temenos and McCann (2013) wittily points out: "Paradoxically, studies of characteristically 'fast' policy transfer need time to fully explore the histories, presents, and outcomes of policy implementation" (p. 352). However, particularly for foreign researchers like myself, time in the field often comes at a premium under the growing pressure of 'business academia', as resources are not always available to attend, for example, important policy meetings or to travel with delegations, limiting the actual scope for following the manifold routes that simultaneously lead into and out of local policy environments.

In addition, while Freeman (2012) demands that "we need to know what was said, agreed, contested, puzzled over, or simply passed over at any given moment, and then how that was invoked in the next meeting or document" (p. 16), I have learnt from my own experiences that this is a rather unrealistic proposition. After all, sometimes one only learns about certain important gatherings ex post (given that they were even publicly advertised and accessible), and other times particular episodes become more important or irrelevant only in hindsight. For want of actual first-hand observation and experience, we then have to settle for a triangulation of minutes, recordings, press releases and oral accounts, to name just some possible archival sources. In sum, our 'critical positioning' within the structures of our chosen field not only depends on our embodied situatedness, but equally on the timing of our inquiry, which alerts us to the "political temporal contingency" (Ward & Jones 1999, pp. 302f) of our research process.

A second problem, which I will discuss further in the following section, is brought about by the level of immersion and social interaction with local network representatives.
As we seek to best fulfil the premise of participant observation, to watch and interact with people on their own turf, in their own language, and showing as much contextual awareness and cultural sensibility as possible, there also lurks the threat of becoming a "network dopester" (Peck & Theodore 2012, p. 25) or a "political huckster" (Majone 1989), who is enthralled by the company of charismatic cosmopolitans and powerful elites. Hence, we need to pay serious attention to the danger that this could greatly compromise the credibility of our argument (neutrality in post-positivist social research is nothing but a romantic illusion anyway), and try countering it with critical reflexivity to mitigate this negative effect of immersion.

However, we also need to acknowledge that in reality one will never be able to fully steer clear of personal entanglements. As for myself, active local participation - in town hall workshops and public forums as much as in glitzy business breakfasts and high-profile Mayoral events - has proven itself as the best measure for gaining a deeper and more holistic understanding of local governance structures and their socio-political intricacies. Here, I take my guidance from Pieterse (2006), that "all theoretical frameworks have their limitations, not least because they tend to frame problems and interpretation in strict accordance with their methodological principles. The task of the reflexive researcher equipped to deal with multiple levels of complexity in the city is to recognise this problem and consciously seek to engage with it" (p. 409). Thus, albeit certain methodological shortcomings, approaching Cape Town through an extended case method helped me come to grips with the "stretched geographies' of policy reproduction" (Jacobs & Lees 2013, p. 1562) while still retaining an ability to provide a 'rich picture' of Cape Town's World Design Capital process as both relational and territorial (McCann & Ward 2010; Ward 2010).
“If you ask me what is the object of my work, the object of the work is to always reproduce the concrete in thought—not to generate another good theory, but to give a better-theorized account of concrete historical reality. [...] the goal is to understand the situation you started out with better than before.” (Hall 1988, pp. 69f) cited in Nagar (2002) p. 184

6.2 [Research process] Conceptualising local ‘elite’ networks and applying mixed methods for understanding Cape Town’s politics of becoming

As the previous section already suggested, recent theoretical advances in policy mobility studies and the ‘worlding’ of cities have also led to a revived interest in understanding the perspectives and behaviours of leaders in business, political and civil society circles (McCann 2008; Prince 2010a; Robinson 2011b; Lowry & McCann 2011; Temenos & McCann 2012; McCann 2013; Prince 2013b; Jacobs & Lees 2013). This jumble of politicians, technocrats, activists, academics, managers, public intellectuals, consultants, and charismatic individuals has been described as increasingly globally mobile and thus more frequently exposed to cosmopolitan urban ideal(s) (Beaverstock 2002; Ward 2010; Edensor & Jayne 2012a). While policy learning has been generally described as socio-spatially uneven and highly selective (McCann 2011a, p. 121), it is exacerbated in the South African context where legal, physical travel is not only restricted by issues of funding, but also by the current global immigration regime.

Hence, the question of who can travel where and at what cost adds another decisive factor that needs to be kept in mind when trying to understand the making of what I refer to as Cape Town's creative city governance complex. In turn, over the course of my research, I have come to perceive of my respondents as proponents of a well-travelled

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158 In practice, this situation also provides an unfair advantage to those South Africans who are still able to claim a European passport based on family linkages and are therefore able to move more effortlessly across the globe.
urban 'elite' that has to continuously navigate the conflicting priorities of globally fashionable policy trends and local political cultures and routines.

I recognise of course that the term 'elite' is highly ambiguous, and particularly conceptualisations relating to how local governance 'elites' "act as patrons or conduits for the realization of policy" (Jacobs & Lees 2013, p. 1563) in African cities remain scarce. Also, I agree with Smith (2006) that it would not only be impossible but misguided to try to divide society along the simple dualism of 'elites' as the powerful and 'non-elites' as the powerless, because "no-one is removed from the effects of power in societies and all those involved in making or influencing important decisions are also affected by the decision of others" (p. 645). Hence, in order to indicate that 'elite' networks need to be understood as situated and relational159, I have resorted to using the term in inverted commas.

Nonetheless, my choice of qualitative methods and the way their application played out in the field remains intrinsically linked to the opportunities and limitations of "studying up" (Ostrander 1993, p. 133), i.e. aiming one's inquiry at relatively powerful, professionally competent, middle-class, highly educated, discursively well-positioned, historically privileged, or otherwise influential, 'linked-in' individuals, as well as to effects of networked agency and shifting conditions of political alliance.

In consequence, I want to first present why I think a focus on 'elite' networks is warranted with regards to my research objectives, followed by some more specific points on framing Cape Town's creative city 'elites', before I move on to discussing the mix of qualitative methods I applied in approaching them. Though this section is first and foremost a critique of my own data generation process, I nonetheless hope it can also provide some pointers for further debate on how a more pronounced focus on local 'elite' networks could add to a more comprehensive framework for understanding urban politics in African cities.

159 This is of course not to say that the need for relational and carefully situated categorisation doesn't extend to other analytical auxiliaries, such as the 'middle class' or the 'urban poor'.

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6.2.1 Why focus on 'elite' networks?

While studying the socio-political, economic and cultural conduct of national 'elites' in so-called 'developing countries' represents a long and prolific research tradition (see for example Nafziger 1988; Higley & Gunther 1992; Bowen 1996; Bond 2000b; Daloz 2003; Bjørnskov 2010), the role of urban 'elite' structures in the making and governance of 'Southern' cities has received markedly less attention. However, notable differences exist: While scholarship on Asian cities has already started to scrutinise the sweeping impact of inter-referential "elite dreaming" (Ong 2011b, p. 17) on local urban development (Ong 1999, Ong 2006a; Yeoh & Chang 2001; Yeoh 2005; Roy & Ong 2011; Ghertner 2011), there exists a veritable dearth of analysis regarding its role in shaping urban governmentalities in African cities.

Three major reasons for this gap can be discerned. While the first two present more general shortcomings of 'elite'-focused research, which I would argue are however compounded in an African city context, the third one is particularly pertinent for scholarship in former colonies and so-called 'developing' countries. Firstly, as this line of study has been championed in both political science and critical geopolitics research, there remains a dominant empirical focus on the national scale as well as on supranational 'elite' networks (Kuus 2004, Kuus 2007; Müller 2009; for South Africa's 'elite transition' see Bond 2000b), though ethnographic work on the sites and practices of local 'elites' and 'expert' circles has indeed grown consistently over the past years (Ward & Jones 1999; Hunter 1995; McCann 2008; Cook & Ward 2011; Temenos & McCann 2012).

Secondly, there are evidently practical limitations related to accessing the upper echelons of power for social research purposes. As Hunter (1995) aptly pointed out, the fact that 'elites' are relatively understudied is "not because they do not have or are not part of existing social problems but precisely because they are powerful and can more readily resist the intrusive inquisition of social research" (p. 167).

The third reason why we still too rarely "study up" (Ostrander 1993, p. 133) is the feeling of moral commitment and responsibility towards the marginalised and vulnerable:
"More privileged classes do not research themselves to any great extent. Rather, there is a panoptic gaze and missionary zeal to 'save' the poor\textsuperscript{160} (Visser 2013, p. 86).

That such a skewed perspective does however also foster a laissez-fair attitude on the other side of the social spectrum has been problematised by Pieterse (26.08.2009), who notes that "developmentalist obsessions tend to focus on the poor and allow the rich and wealthy classes to go about their routine reproduction of urban space outside the analytical attention of scholars, or when they do come into the frame, they are caricatured as rational market actors or exploitative class agents" (p. 5).

What follows is a theoretical and moral imperative to not let African 'elites' go analytically unchecked any longer in their relational practices of urban (re-)production in an unequal world (Crang 2002; Visser 2013). Taking the notion of relationality seriously also means that we must demystify and unpack the black box of 'elite' decision making beyond the contentious dichotomy of formal/informal institutions, in order to make sense of the diverse array of local agendas and entangled governance networks. As Myers (2011) has rightly remarked, "[t]he challenge for African urban studies no longer lies simply or solely with paying more theoretical attention to the marginalized, informal, invisible, spectral, necropolitan or ordinary settings across the cities of the continent - important as this may be" (p. 14). After all, an empirical focus on urban governance routines and administrative mechanisms in 'southern' cities can also help counter the paternalistic and simplistic perception of non-Western cities (and by extension its denizens) as disorderly and unruly.

Furthermore, the experience of colonisation was by no means exclusive to the urban poor but extended to internalisation of colonial rule in the upper echelons of local bureaucracies and administrations\textsuperscript{161} (Sidaway 2000, p. 594). As Simone (2010, p. 19) shows, cultivating local 'elites' through public sector investments was one way in which colonial powers tried to tie different regional and ethnic groups together under one

\textsuperscript{160} Though from my own experience I would vehemently object to Visser's claim that most research on South Africa's urban poor is far from missionary and genuinely engaged, responsive and accountable (just some of many examples Oldfield 2000; Oldfield 2002; Millstein et al. 2003; Huchzermeyer 2003; Oldfield et al. 2004; Huchzermeyer & Karam 2006; Lemanski 2006b; Watson 2009; Lemanski 2006b; Huchzermeyer 2011; Oldfield 2014), I also recognise that some patronising papers with a misguided saviour complex are still brought into circulation (see for example Brunn & Wilson 2013's highly problematic paper using the neocolonial ductus of \textit{terra incognitae} to describe Khayelitsha, Cape Town's largest township).

\textsuperscript{161} A rich body of work on the internalisation of imperialist ideals can be specifically found with regards to the formation of Indian elites under British colonial rule. In \textit{The good Parsi} (1996), Luhrmann for example delivers a revealing account of the identity struggle faced by former Parsi elites in a reordered postcolonial Mumbai.
national state construct, and many of today's local bureaucracies and modes of regulating urban space are part and parcel of a broader "colonial present" (Gregory 1999). Lastly, local 'elites' have also frequently understood and actualised themselves as links to but also interlocutors of modernity, and with a growing middle class in many African cities, the actual effects of these 'worldly' aspirations on city-making need to be pulled more firmly into view (Edensor & Jayne 2012a, p. 10; Roy 2011c).

In summary, I propose that tweaking our sets of methods for gathering more in-depth knowledge on African urban 'elites' represents a new frontier for committed postcolonial research. And indeed, as Schuermans and Newton (2012) already argued, we should not only be thinking about the ethical and political implications of giving a voice to the most vulnerable, but equally about how we can extend these questions to enquiries of influential and resourceful local actors in 'southern' cities (p. 300). If successful, this would allow us to complicate simplistic assumptions about imposed modernities in postcolonial societies, and offer more holistic empirical accounts of and theorisation on situated power relations, emergent practices, and their consequences for 'southern' urbanism (Nagar & Ali 2003, p. 368; van Donk et al. 2008, p. 16; Pieterse 31.10.2008).

6.2.2 Recasting urban 'elites' in Cape Town

In spite of a sustained history in social science research (Lasswell et al. 1952; Moyser & Wagstaffe 1987; Harding 1995; Hertz & Imber 1995), the term 'elite' has not received much substantive conceptual review in recent years and remains "remarkably unproblematised" (Woods 1998, p. 2101) as a social category. While there is no clear-cut definition, the term has often been used as shorthand to identify those officially elected into power (Harvey 2011, p. 433). This overtly positivist reading of power as codified, determinable and hierarchical has of course been extensively challenged within human geography, not least through "the rise of the network society" (Castells 2009; Castells & Cardoso 2005) and the emergence of governance as a key concept for describing power beyond formal state structures. However, many studies still misconceive professional titles and positions as unquestionable markers of power and influence, thus ignoring the intricate web of social relations through which power is actually exerted - or limited (Harvey 2011). In response, I'd like to discuss three points that have helped me recalibrate
my thinking about and empirical approach towards local 'elites' in the context of Cape Town's creative city aspirations.

Firstly, conceptualising urban 'elites' as heterogeneous and embedded within hybrid networks (Parry 1998, p. 2148) recognises that critical knowledge is not always codified, clearly visible, equally distributed, readily accessible, easily dispensable, or exclusive to traditional and reputable social institutions. This also stems from the fact that even those actors we conceive of as having the necessary wherewithal to formally exercise power - for example mayors or councillors - do not have perfect and unlimited access to knowledge and information, even if they would agree to share it with us during our research (Crang 2002, p. 649).

In consequence, we are confronted with an "organizational theatre" (Czarniawska-Joerges & Wolff 1991, p. 529), made up from different "interorganizational action nets […]", wherein city authorities constitute just one point of entry and by no means provide a map of the whole terrain" (Czarniawska 2010, p. 420). While such action nets are mostly feeble at the beginning, they can consolidate over time and galvanise around certain projects or events (ibid.). Apart from being a potential gateway to power and a platform for knowledge exchange, and offering political leverage by association, such action nets can also contribute to new identity formations.

As my subsequent analysis shows, Cape Town's WDC 2014 process can be regarded as a specific 'elite' action net: For one, it has over time shifted the local urban governance realm by setting up new stakeholder bodies such as Cape Town Design and the City Council's internal World Design Capital 2014 Department, thus creating new occupational profiles and career paths for local creative 'elites', especially those capable of translating the event into words, pictures and numbers (ibid., p. 421, see also Appendix D). At the same time, this 'elite'-driven public discourse around the WDC 2014 process has also conjured up the self-styled figure of a local 'design(er) community' that is perpetually evoked for projecting a host of disparate social and political aspirations (see chapter 8.2).

In consequence, the 'elite' I see as constitutive of the local creative city governance complex goes beyond provincial and local government officials, public-private-partnership stakeholders and senior scholars, and also includes key players
of the local creative economy such as sector body representatives, celebrated local designers and artists, public relations professionals and media practitioners, event organisers, curators, studio and gallery owners, architects, etc. (see further chapter 6.3.2 and Appendix C for full list of respondents).

This relates to the second point, that local 'elites' are both susceptible to fashion and at the same time bound by routines and tradition. In her illuminating in-depth study on urban governance in three cities, organisational theorist Barbara Czarniawska has dealt extensively with how policy fashions are created, globally circulated, and locally adapted within and beyond urban administrations. For her, certain 'big cities' such as Berlin, Barcelona and New York, but also 'big corporations' such as Microsoft, have become fashion leaders when it comes to the technicalities of how to run and organise a city (Czarniawska 2004, p. 123). I would also argue that framing political inventions as 'fashion statements' also provides an opportunity for putting certain global hypes such as the 'creative city' into perspective by emphasising its temporal contingency: "Fashion means that many people do the same thing at the same time across space, but fashions also mean that they will be doing something else soon" (ibid., p. 129).

What makes Czarniawska's contribution really remarkable, however, is how she used this metaphor to describe the practices and governmental logics of the local urban 'elites' she studied with great nuance: "For people in high organizational positions who perceive their mission to be that of bringing progress to organizations, to follow what is modern often feels like a duty. However, this obligation is only part of their mission. Their duty is, equally, to protect organizations from what might be a passing fad. One of their tasks is to keep a distance from 'mere' fashion, or to be more precise, to detect fads. Fashion stands for change. But as fashion is also repetitive, in a long-range perspective it stands for tradition, as well" (ibid., pp. 127f). Paradoxically, this makes fashion as much a measure of order and uniformity as it makes it a pivotal yardstick for defining a city's identity and alterity (ibid., pp. 123, 127): "City politicians, administrators, managers and technicians, were looking at their counterparts in other cities - in need, but also in curiosity, openly and surreptitiously, with horror and with awe. [...] Even decisions of deviance ('we will not do this') were always made in relation to another city ('we do not want to end up like London did')" (ibid., p. 122).

This constant internal battle between keeping abreast with global city-making trends while remaining true to a specific local 'style' of doing things also permeated many of my own interviews. Respondents were often very aware that not every global trend
offered a viable solution for Cape Town, and many were at pains to emphasise that in their opinion the WDC 2014 accolade did not make the city a 'fashion victim' but rather supported its claim as a continental trend setter (see chapter 7.2). Furthermore, even if certain aspects of the global creative city discourse seemed to have been absorbed and circulated relatively quickly within the local urban governance realm, their practical translation depended and still depends very much on how they can be retrofitted to work within Cape Town's complex postapartheid *cityness*. This point in particular, questions the accuracy and viability of describing Cape Town's creative city rendition as a 'fast' policy (see further part III).

Czarniawska's observations from her institutional ethnography also resonate with the third and final point: apart from their embeddedness in hybrid networks and being more or less easily susceptible to international policy trends, local 'elites' are also *vulnerable* (Smith 2006, p. 650). Reflecting on her research encounter with local political 'elites' in France, Sabot (1999) notes that those she assumed to be confident and secure individuals were not always so self-assured and even felt threatened by her research interest.

This however does not mean that the researcher is automatically in a position of power, as this would neglect the complex interplay of other social factors such as race, class, gender, age, professional seniority, language proficiency, etc. between interviewer and interviewee. Though this may sound rather self-evident, recognising 'elites' as fallible human beings is important, as it takes us "beyond accounts which refer to organizations-as-actors, to encounter the people who actually do the acting" (Healey 2012, p. 196). For me, the fact that my research subjects are neither autonomous nor simply captives of their organisational culture (Chang 2008, p. 21), and that they "often have several identities and loyalties, which cross-cut how they look at issues and work out how to act in a situation" (Healey 2012, p. 196), has been pivotal for coming to grips with the thick and often confusing web of 'elite' connections, unforeseen personal alliances, and contradictory political actions in Cape Town.

Two issues have clearly exacerbated the need for trying to understand my interview partners beyond their institutional affiliations: for one, a number of my interview partners have repeatedly changed jobs over the course of my fieldwork (see also
individual biographies of key 'stakeholders' in Appendix B). While some remained within the same institution, they were still exposed to different departmental hierarchies and project dynamics. Others chose to cross the (evidently blurry) lines between the public and private sector, taking with them extensive and valuable tacit knowledge on procedures, processes and personal network connections. Apart from this practical reason, another factor has been the arguably bad reputation of South African 'elites' and their tendency to retreat into a technocratic performance management culture in order to avoid politics and social complexity (Myers 2011, pp. 119f; van Donk et al. 2008, p. 17). In the face of highly insufficient service delivery that perpetually fails the urban poor and severely hampers the goal of national reconciliation, damning verdicts come as no surprise. For Swilling et al. (2003) South African urban 'elites' are exploitative on a grand scale as they "build resource bases for a contrived (and parasitic) urban modernity" (p. 244), and Simone (2010) bluntly notes that "[t]he elite are not averse to running cities into the ground as they pursue sometimes perverse levels of consumption" (p. 37). Particularly for Cape Town, some have argued that this already dire situation is compounded by selfish efforts from decision-makers and urban developers "to maintain a sense of 'whiteness', making it [Cape Town] feel familiar to white transnational capital" (McDonald 2008, p. 270).

I cannot and neither do I want to deny these poignant arguments, but during my research I have also learnt how important it is to further differentiate my impressions of local 'stakeholders' and to appreciate the sheer magnitude of their cumulative task of dismantling apartheid's legacy on all fronts (van Donk & Pieterse 2008, p. 66). Even the most confident, experienced and "charismatic individuals" (Larner & Laurie 2010, p. 219) often appeared unsettled by the apparent rifts between their (displayed) personal will to affect change and the inertia of the bureaucratic system, which often reduced them to the role of "middling technocrats" (ibid.). Especially for older respondents who had been heavily invested in the anti-apartheid movement, this slow pace of transformation represented an overtly sore point within their professional identity negotiations.

Furthermore, especially those of my respondents who had crossed over from private creative industry sectors and NGOs to the public sector in the framework of the municipality's WDC 2014 programme, acknowledged how they sometimes felt like
'accidental bureaucrats' (Interviews Perez 19.02.2013, Bush 30.07.2013, Sullivan 11.07.2013). As such, they were often conflicted between fulfilling their binding role as a cock-in-the-wheel and their personal convictions that in order to achieve transformation they have to consistently challenge the status quo as a spanner-in-the-works. This also strongly resonates with Roy's (2012) framing of such ambiguous professionals as "defamiliarised double agents" (p. 37), to denote their ability of holding an active presence within a network of which they are simultaneously critical. Much like Roy and her ethnographic encounters with 'poverty managers', during my fieldwork I have also frequently come face to face with people very similar to myself, particularly through the ways in which their daily work is tied to grappling with Cape Town's contemporary urban development dynamics. In consequence, I have come to understand that an 'elite' status does not always correspond to an 'elitist' attitude, and that particularly some of my senior respondents still explicitly identified with (though arguably not always acting according to) the ideals of the anti-apartheid struggle to create a non-racial and just society (see also Myers 2011, pp. 121f).

Lastly, the central role of Cape Town's universities in the training and thus shaping of local urban 'elite' connections should not be underestimated. The multiple collaborations between local academics, policy-makers and community organisations not only reduce the distance between them but also frequently blurs the lines between these constituencies (Larner 2006, p. 62). This has been repeatedly exemplified by the sizable South African urban planning community, of which the majority has been trained and academically socialised at one of the country's three leading universities (UCT, UKZN and Wits), before moving into key positions in different tiers of government, private development firms or urban activism networks (Watson 2002; Visser 2013, p. 81). Through this form of personal entanglement, even those remaining in academia - often as part of the local critical-left scholarly community (Crush 1993; Maharaj & Narsiah 2002) - at times become complicit in the very processes they are trying to make sense of and critique (Larner 2006, p. 61). In sum, by fleshing out the divergent spectrum of local 'elites' and their capabilities of interacting with the knowledge that gives them power, we are able to see them as more than "blank subjects" or "just automatons of the state, particular disciplines or institutions" (Prince 2010a, p. 883).
Although entering Cape Town's creative city governance complex through the treacherous social rapids of a hybrid, susceptible and vulnerable local urban 'elite' has complicated rather than simplified my research as well as my analysis, it also helped me to empirically grapple with both structural context and local agency in order to tease out the ways in which each helps to constitute the other (Cochrane 1998, p. 2131). In closing, I want to complete the puzzle of my empirical process by discussing how I collected and collated the data on which my argument rests.

6.2.3 Mixed qualitative methods for apprehending Cape Town's creative cityness

Reading the above, it should be clear that there is of course no prescribed procedure for how to approach urban 'elites' (Ward & Jones 1999). In order to be able to foreground the messiness of "actually existing urban governance" (Myers 2011, p. 118) and the 'touching down' of interurban policy innovations already in transformation (Robinson 2011b; Peck 2011b), we must be able to represent them as such (Larner 2006, p. 64). This means finding a feasible mix of qualitative methods to capture the fluidity of both discursive and social practices in spoken and written word, as well as in action (Lees 2004).

Although I have been talking at length about the prominent role of local urban 'elites', I realise that a holistic approach to gathering qualitative data "cannot begin and end with the inhabitants of corner offices, but should seek to capture a range of opinions and perspectives (including dissident views), outsider as well as insider interpretations, together with some understanding of prosaic bureaucratic practice and 'street-level' relations" (Peck & Theodore 2012, p. 26). Thus, in order to understand the complex socio-political processes and practices of how the creative city idea has been continuously folded into Cape Town's postapartheid urban governance realm over the past five years, we need to pay attention to symbolic inscription and discursive re-signification as much as to the 'social life of policies' (ibid., p. 23). Hence, in my explorative fieldwork which has perpetually dragged me into different epistemological directions, I have learnt that in order to address the city as a 'thing in the making', we cannot draw an antagonistic line between the order of discourse and the disorder of practice (Korf 2004, p. 209). While at
the beginning of my fieldwork I was very focused on conducting semi-structured interviews, my empirical scope conspicuously expanded over time. As I was increasingly 'taken in' by the field, I was not only able to collect a vast amount of supporting documentation and visualisation, but also garner first-hand accounts as a participant observer. Retracing this personal empirical evolution, I will first discuss some key aspects of my interview process such as access and rapport, before summarising how my sustained presence at different WDC-related events enabled me to put my interview material into critical conversation with what I saw 'taking place' (see Figure 18 and list of attended events in Appendix A).
Figure 18 Timeline of research process; design: E. Gooris
6.2.3.1 Semi-Structured Interviewing

[Access and Technique]

While it is relatively easy to locate potential 'elite' respondents due to their high public visibility, the challenging part is getting a foot in the door and establishing a trustful relationship (Mikecz 2012, pp. 482, 491; Mullings 1999, p. 340). Of course, as Cochrane (1998) exhorts, being granted access needs much more than simply buying a voice recorder, putting on a smart dress, preparing a witty interview outline and seeking out some research subjects (p. 2123). Not only does it require a certain perseverance to be led past the antechambers, but access is equally conditioned by the politics of the time and place (Ward & Jones 1999, p. 304). Apart from social factors such as personality, class, gender, age, colour and nationality, getting inside the "policy machine" (ibid., p. 306) also depends on the "political heat" (ibid.) of the moment.

It worked to my advantage that I had already conducted my master's thesis research on creative industries as a factor of urban development dynamics in the suburb of Woodstock. I still retained a few contacts in the municipal urban planning department and at the Partnership from that time, most notably with Zayd Minty, then the director of the 'Creative Cape Town' programme and arguably one of the most important protagonists of Cape Town's budding creative city narrative (see biographies in Appendix B and D). Knowing Minty and being allowed to 'pick his brain' about important debates and potentially relevant respondents gave me the lucky advantage of being able to follow the World Design Capital project from its early days and through its various stages of becoming. Nonetheless, this favourable inroad did not make me entirely resistant to 'political heat'. Often, interviews that took place just after the publication of a critical newspaper article or following an official speech were very much framed by the impact of the respective discursive event. Particularly critical were those times in which the organisational set-up, political mandate and budget discretion of the WDC 2014 project were being negotiated between different 'stakeholder' groups. Not only were potential respondents tied up in meetings, but when I was able to get an appointment, their answers were often hesitant and guarded, with some pointing out that they felt uneasy about making definitive statements while things were still 'up in the air', and others asking me to...
treat certain statements as 'off-the-record'. In this, I also came to share Ward and Jones' (1999) observation that it is often "those that link the elite with those charged with implementation that feel they have most to lose by disclosing the truth or making truth-claims in interviews" (p. 309).

Having said that, the fact that my empirical work stretched over the better of three years (see Figure 18) also awarded me the opportunity to cut across the waves of political heat and observe how some of my respondents appeared, disappeared, and sometimes reappeared in a different position within the governance spectrum. While it was often difficult to be granted a follow-up interview, especially with high-profile respondents in official government positions, I still tried to continue the conversation whenever our paths crossed at events, public meetings or even on the street.

Furthermore, what helped me identify and access other potential interview partners was the strategy of asking for referrals at the end of each interview. This kind of 'snowballing technique' (Reuber & Pfaffenbach 2005, p. 151) has proven particularly helpful for reaching 'elite' groups with higher access thresholds, though the onus to keep the ball rolling is clearly still on the researcher (Biernacki & Waldorf 1981, p. 143).

Also, referrals offered an initial indication of personal or organisational alliances or the lack thereof, which in turn helped me understand systematic connections and disconnections within the local governance complex. Despite the fact that by following every lead I did end up with some interviews which later turned out to be less important for my argument, all of them added their share to a more detailed and in-depth understanding of my 'field' at large. And finally, though finding a point of saturation has been virtually impossible given that Cape Town's WDC 2014 project is still in full swing at this point of writing, the fact that over time more and more references were made to people I had already interviewed boosted my confidence that I had spoken to a satisfying number of key stakeholders. Between October 2010 and August 2013\textsuperscript{162}, I conducted 61 interviews with a total of 64 respondents. The first contact was usually established via email in order to introduce not only myself but also my general research interest in a

\textsuperscript{162} Apart from a felt level of data saturation, the end of my interviews in August 2013 was moreover determined by the end of my scholarship-based research funding. However, I still continued to collect topical media coverage in order to keep abreast with the final preparations for Cape Town's year as WDC 2014.
comprehensible manner. If no response\textsuperscript{163} was received within two working days, I would send a follow-up email before trying to reach the potential respondent by telephone.

I usually left the choice of the interview location up to my potential interview partners, for one in order to not inconvenience them but also to ensure it would take place in an environment familiar and comfortable to the respective respondent. Although most interviews were therefore conducted in offices and boardrooms, some conversations were held in coffee shops and private homes, especially those I conducted with consultants, freelance creative industry workers, or persons already in retirement. The length of the interviews ranged between 35 and 130 minutes, but on average they lasted about 50 to 60 minutes. Apart from two occasions, the majority of interviews were conducted in English, and all were captured on a digital voice recorder in order for me to be able to concentrate fully on the conversational flow. In general, I always carried a version of my general interview guideline with me, which I usually supplemented prior to the meeting with a couple of questions that pertained more particularly to the respondent's professional context and affiliation or to current public debates and events (see Appendix B and D).

While the interview guideline was usually lying visibly in front of me, after a couple of interviews I found myself comfortable enough with its contents that I only referred back to it whenever I needed to refresh my memory or to make sure I had not missed important aspects. As such, over time the guideline became more of a memory aid as opposed to a strict structural device, allowing for a more interactive and animated dialogue (Rice 2010, p. 74). Nonetheless, I made sure I ask all my interview partners some key questions such as "What is your opinion on Cape Town's bid for/designation as World Design Capital 2014?", in order to establish a certain cross-referential spectrum of opinions. What nonetheless remained most important for me throughout each encounter was to let my respondents share their views, aspirations and concerns as unfettered as possible. This is of course inherently related to issues of trust and rapport, which I will turn to now.

\textsuperscript{163} Although I usually received positive answers, my request to Icsid's Montreal headquarter for a skype interview about their WDC accolade and their views on Cape Town was unfortunately denied after several rounds of emails, due to the apparently "very small" and "very busy" team. Regrettably, even the interview questions submitted in writing to the communications manager were never answered.
Another important issue for interviews in particular and qualitative research more generally, is how to best establish rapport (Rubin 2012). Like Mikecz (2012), I have found it helpful that many of my respondents had a relatively high public presence, which made it easier to retrieve information on their professional and personal backgrounds, not least through corporate websites or professional online networks such as LinkedIn or Who's Who South Africa. This information was not only useful for 'breaking the ice', but also for specifying and better contextualising my interview questions as well as the interviewee's replies later on. In general, having 'done my homework' and displaying a certain knowledge of the city's formal governance structures, basic procedures, and latest public debates also added to easing the flow of the interview, as I did not have to interrupt my respondents in order to clarify commonly known acronyms or to ask how the spelling of names of public figures and organisations they mentioned. It worked to my advantage that particularly senior 'elite' respondents were used to being asked for their opinion, and were therefore comfortable talking freely (ibid., p. 484).

Their monologues however tended to divert at times from the original topic, sometimes perhaps as a means of avoiding a tough question, but other times in a genuine attempt to offer a 'bigger picture'. Most of the time I did not have to submit any questions in advance, but on a few occasions I was asked to either elaborate on the short research blurb I sent along with every interview request, or share some questions prior to the appointment for preparation and/or vetting purposes. This happened especially with people at the centre of current political heat waves and busy senior politicians. Though I consequently expected those meetings to be meticulously scripted encounters marred by routine performances of political correctness, this was rarely ever the case, as even those respondents who had prepared notes always elaborated beyond their bullet points. One particularly opinionated councillor even put down his notes after the first question and - leaning back into his office couch - admitted that his assistant had prepared them but that he preferred to 'just talk' off the cuff.

In order to establish these levels of trust and build rapport, it was also important to consider how I presented myself to the interviewee (Ostrander 1993; Harvey 2011). While
Rice (2010) regards the "elasticity of positionality" (p. 70) as a field *strategy*, I would rather qualify it as a field *effect* as we cannot always change our positionality in a self-conscious way. Like Mullings (1999), I had little control over how my respondents "interpreted and reacted to visible aspects of my identity such as gender, [age] and race" (p. 344). As such, interviews are co-constructive social episodes during which identities are being constantly re-enacted on both sides (Lee & Roth 2004; Grabher & Ibert 2005).

Consequently, an interviewer's positionality is generally dynamic and evolves significantly over the course of data collection (Mikecz 2012, p. 492; Herod 1999). In my case, the way I was perceived often meandered between an 'insider' and an 'outsider' - often within the same interview: On the one hand, my German accent and my affiliation with a German university immediately flagged me as an 'outsider', yet when I offered personal information at the beginning of each interview to establish rapport and introduce myself, I also made sure I disclosed the fact that I had a long-standing personal and professional relationship with Cape Town (also discernible from my successively adopted 'South African twang').

Of course, it has been repeatedly pointed out that neither insider nor outsider knowledge is true or more valid (Mullings 1999; Herod 1999; Corbin Dwyer & Buckle 2009; Rubin 2012), and neither can we know as what we are perceived at any given moment during social interactions. For me, the point of such "moments of sharing" (Rubin 2012, p. 304) was not to tweak my own image but rather to let my respondents know who the person was to whom they had generously volunteered their time. Also, I wanted to stress the fact that I was not in it for mere 'data-mining' and 'fact-checking', but genuinely interested in getting to know their perspectives. Numerous of my respondents expressed an interest in hearing my 'findings' on the topics of our conversation.

While I always felt a certain discomfort about sharing my opinion, as I did not want respondents to speak into my hearing, I also realised there was a strong demand for reciprocity. As I have already mentioned, the lines between academia and the local governance sector in Cape Town are extremely permeable, and there is a great tendency in local scholarship to produce policy-relevant work. Thus, this generally results in a lot of goodwill to support local research endeavours - even when conducted by a non-South African student like myself - as long as they are not merely extractive and their findings
are made available to the research participants. Hence, denying my respondents' demands for sharing my preliminary insights was not a morally justifiable option for me, though I tried to maintain a certain level of "strategic circumspection" (Peck & Theodore 2012, p. 26) in my replies. Nonetheless, this irrevocably turned me into an active participant in the exchange and evaluation\footnote{Hence, I often could not help but feel like a 'go-between', particularly whenever I realised that certain information I related and assumed to be common knowledge had not (yet) reached my respective interviewee. On the one hand, this speaks volumes about the erratic nature of communication and knowledge exchange in many parts of Cape Town's allegedly 'cooperative governance' and ostensibly 'collaborative partnerships'. Yet, to be fair, keeping up with the very latest policy debates was also not the main job of every one of my respondents, many of whom were part of the planning complex in rather circumscribed pro-bono, voluntary, part-time or project-based capacities.} of existing local policy knowledge and practice (ibid., p. 27), a position which was further manifested through my presence at and participation in a diverse array of WDC-related events and meetings.

6.2.3.2 Participant Observation

The opportunity to become a participant observer is intrinsically linked to my interviews, yet it has also helped me to put the content of these circumscribed interactions into a broader perspective of social practice. As Peck and Theodore (2012) rightly remarks, drawing our findings solely from conversations with demonstrably powerful and charismatic actors makes them prone to effects of "agent inflation" (p. 26), meaning an exaggerated account of foresight and rationality. Hence, in order to mitigate this effect, I decided to not only supplement my interview data with additional documentation and media reports, but actually observe how some of my interview partners acted on their words in the public realm. Such a multi-layered approach was also previously suggested by Burawoy (1998) for his extended case method, where he notes that "the unexplicated, unacknowledged, or tacit knowledge, sometimes referred to as practical consciousness, which underlies all social interaction […] may be discovered through participation, 'doing' things with and to those who are being studied" (p. 15).

In turn, many recent studies on mobile urban policies have also pointed towards the usefulness of ethnographic accounts for cross-examining the data collected during 'elite' interviews with observations of embodied practices of knowledge creation (Larner & Laurie 2010; Temenos & McCann 2012; McCann & Ward 2012; Roy 2012; Jacobs &
Lees 2013). Particularly as we grapple with creativity as a social dispositif of our time (chapter 3.1), it seems pertinent to find ways of researching beyond the "lexical cast" (Whatmore 2006, p. 603).

Lastly, African scholars such as Simone (2004, 2010), Simone and Abouhani (2005), Nuttall et al. (2008), and Boeck (2005) championed in-depth ethnography as a means of grappling with and brilliantly narrating the perplexing diversity and iridescent complexity of city life across the continent. However, while all of this speaks to the fact that the greatest scepticism in (urban) geography about the merits of ethnography as a valid method of data collection seems to have subsided, it also poses new questions about what we perceive as ethnography. Michel (2013) has rightfully remarked that "'[e]thnographic' quite frequently becomes a term for almost any personal engagement with a 'field' and quite complex and consuming methods such as participatory observation are severely flattened" (p. 1018). Thinking from my own German academic 'upbringing', one reason for this certainly lies in the fact that ethnographic methods have until recently been marginalised within German mainstream geographical research and university teaching curricula (Müller 2012; Verne 2012).

Hence, I started my PhD with no comprehensive training on how to apply ethnographic tools. While ignorance is of course no excuse, I only realised the great value of participant observation halfway through my fieldwork, and even then I was vastly clueless about how to systematically go about my observational practices. Thus, despite the fact that I put great effort into being present and continuously engaged, I can at best lay claim to having conducted a form of 'proto-ethnography'. According to an African proverb, "if you want to observe the masquerade, you have to move with it", and with this imperative in mind, I have tried to follow Cape Town's WDC 2014 process through its motions to the best of my abilities, though in a rather experimental fashion\(^{165}\). As such, ethnography became less about the practice of specific methods, and functioned more as "an orientation, a way of undertaking problematizations of the world" (Roy 2012, p. 34).

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\(^{165}\) Hence, I also kept field journals which for the most part resemble 'scrap books', although for some selected events, such as the WDC2014 announcement, I wrote more comprehensive accounts of my respective experience. However, the majority of my event-related data are transcripts of speeches, presentations and Q&A's. Moreover, due to its performative origin, this type of material differs from the type of narratives related in personal interviews.
In the following section I thus want to present the three main 'sites' of my observational and participatory practice.

**[The Fringe]**

Initially, I did try my hand at systematic institutional observation by offering my services as an unpaid scribe in exchange for being able to attend internal planning meetings for 'The Fringe', a then flagship project of the Partnership and stage for many of the WDC bid proceedings (see further chapter 8.2.5). After attending a few meetings with different stakeholders, however, this experiment was gently aborted by my research partners. Again, political heat played a role, as budget negotiations were looming and it was therefore not always possible for the project managers to justify the presence of an academic observer during such potentially controversial meetings. Around the same time, Zayd Minty (then the principal manager of 'The Fringe') introduced me to Steven Harris, the landlord and director of a recently established design co-working space called 'The Bank'. I scheduled an interview with him, firstly because he had been involved in hosting the Icsid judges during their WDC bid evaluation visit to Cape Town, and secondly because his personal history has been entangled with the East City/Fringe area for over four decades. His family's business 'Woodheads' - now run by his brother - was around the corner from 'The Bank' on Harrington Square, and thus he held a great wealth of "intimate knowledge" (Schwegler 2011) on the area's historic development. Coupled with his friendly nature, unrivalled openness for sharing information, and great affinity towards design businesses, he subsequently became known - half in earnest and half in jest - as 'the Fringe's unofficial mayor'. After a long and animated conversation, he offered for me to come and work from 'The Bank' whenever I wanted, and see for myself how 'The Fringe' was supposedly blossoming as the projected 'African Design and Innovation Hub'. I moved my work there the following week and continued working from 'The Bank' for a total of five months.

Though my main focus remained on conducting interviews, as well as on collating and sorting relevant documentation such a policy drafts, press releases, newspaper articles, project reports and brochures, my time at 'The Bank' was pivotal to fostering an
inside understanding of both the 'Fringe' and the wider 'creative' urban regeneration politics that unravelled around it. As the building was home to several design firms (including Steven's own interior design software business) and a self-proclaimed young designer collective, there was frequent and excited talk (some would call it 'gossip') about the latest WDC 2014 news.

Those conversations - often conducted in passing - not only exposed me to different opinions and personal aspirations regarding the WDC2014 project, but also kept me 'in the loop' about the status quo, as most tenants were directly involved in the bidding process and continued to maintain close relationships with key players. Of course, this also made them potential interview partners who were now only a few steps away and therefore comparably easy for me to reach.

Overall, 'The Bank' was a hub of WDC-related and 'Fringe' activities, and I had stumbled right into its midst. Ayim (1994) already pointed out both the value and the apparent dangers of attaining "knowledge through the grapevine", and during my time at 'The Bank' I was always cautious to cross-check certain 'truth claims' and re-interpret the hearsay with additional information from interviews and supporting documents (Reuber & Pfaffenbach 2005, p. 124).

Nonetheless, the opportunity to "hang out" (Geertz 1998) - on a daily basis for an extended period of time - in an institution that was often publicly lauded as a stronghold of Cape Town's elusive 'design community' (an appellation that was in fact often problematised amongst the tenants) provided me with a wealth of tacit, contextual, and intimate knowledge. However, it also confronted me with a number of common yet exceedingly difficult research practical and ethical questions, particularly around how to properly address the growing closeness to and familiarity with informants, and how the development of friendships unwittingly influenced my judgement (Crang 2002, p. 651).

[World Design Capital-related events]

In contrast to my relatively deep and continuous immersion at 'The Bank' and by extension 'The Fringe', my engagement with the official World Design Capital 2014 process was more episodic, due to the simple fact that unlike the former it did not have an
exact geographic location and instead asserted its presence through different events. Between October 2010 and August 2014, I attended close to fifty events (see Appendix A for full list); ranging from the early morning live transmission of Cape Town's WDC 2014 'triumph' directly from the IDA conference in Taipei, broadcast to a small but ecstatic crowd of 'World Design Capitalists' that had gathered in one of the Fringe's trendy coffee shops on an October day in 2011 (see video #6), to various 'Stakeholder Meetings', summoned by the City Council for informing what it perceived to be an eagerly awaiting 'design community' of the next steps in the process and 'how to get involved'.

Figure 19 Invitation for a WDC 2014 ‘business’ and networking breakfast

Source: LW, 2014

In following this history of events while it unfolded, not only did I have the opportunity to observe and later revisit the WDC 2014's 'political life cycle' (Tuma 1993), but the events also offered a platform to reconnect with previous interviewees and approach prospective ones. While it was not possible to keep the conversation going with
everyone, the fact that events offered the opportunity to temporarily inhabit the space of local 'elites' and witness their interactions offered valuable insights about the networked practices of policy-making beyond the official spaces of government (Mullings 1999, p. 344; see Figure 19).

However, with every event I managed to gain access to and attended, I also reminded myself that there was of course a much higher number of events taking place right here and elsewhere that I was not attending and quite possibly did not even know about. Because, as Leitner et al. (2008) shrewdly argue, "[t]he processes, events, and phenomena observed within what we conventionally call cities are never peculiar to, nor are they bounded by, the place within which they may be observed" (p. 4).

[ethnography]

In closing, I want to briefly address a third 'site' of observation which I initially did not even perceive as one but which turned out to be a crucial platform for keeping abreast with Cape Town's creative city politics: the boundless world of social media. While there has already been some substantial debate on the merits of different forms of "online" or "virtual ethnography" (see for example Hine 2008, as well as an FQS Special Issue, Vol. 8, 3/2007), this method remains less explored for urban geography (for exceptions see Cranshaw et al. 2012 and Zhou & Wang 2014).

While a detailed discussion on the opportunities and limits of gathering data on African city-making in the virtual world, as well as the ethical implications of such "electronic eavesdropping" (Clegg Smith 2004), remain a task for another day, the point I want to make is that we should not underestimate the interactive dimension that popular social media outlets add to both interurban knowledge transfer and the formation of local policy trajectories. South Africa has one of the highest numbers of Facebook and Twitter users, with three-digit growth rates corresponding to the cell phone market, as the majority accesses the services from mobile devices (World Wide Worx 2014).

In addition, many prominent South Africans are known to be avid 'tweeters', among them former Cape Town mayor Helen Zille, whose dismissive tweets on the treatment of non-white professionals in Cape Town have more than once sparked
controversial public commentary (Aboobaker 29.12.2011). Further afield, the rise and spread of the 'creative city' paradigm has often been compared to a 'policy meme' distributed widely through the elaborate multimedia presence of Richard Florida and his consultancy kin.

While the social media sphere has remained the most difficult for me to observe, simply because of its fast pace and truncated cipher, following how and what kind of information was shared on Twitter, Facebook, blogs, and through digital newsletters by organisations such as the Partnership, Creative Cape Town, Cape Town Design Network, as well as prominent individuals such as the Partnership's CEO Andrew Boraine or the current mayor Patricia de Lille, still provided some useful and readily accessible indication of 'trending' discourses and professional alliances. In addition, through the monthly "#CityTalk" (a so-called 'tweetchat' hosted by self-proclaimed young urbanist forum 'Future Cape Town'), I was able to follow how some members of the local urban governance 'elite' raised their digital voices and profiles on topics such as 'Designing Better Cities', even during times I was not physically present in Cape Town. Lastly, this line of inquiry also offered a steady stream of rich symbolic representation through postings of photos, video links and info-graphics, which I downloaded and saved whenever possible. In my opinion, especially the visual impact of the videos provides an additional layer for illustrating the different facets of Cape Town's creative city representations, which I will subsequently talk about. Thus, the appendix also features a DVD with a total of 19 video files, and viewing suggestions for each are inserted throughout my analysis in part III.

As I will further elucidate in chapter 7.5, the growing prominence of what I have come to refer to as local '#governance' (read: hashtag governance) has in the end convinced me that keeping a watchful eye on the digital space can be empirically beneficial in spite of its rather "nebulous setting" (Rutter & Smith 2005). In order to provide some transparency on what sources I included in my '#ethnography' (again read: hashtag ethnography), I compiled a list of those websites/weblogs, Twitter feeds and
Facebook pages I visited regularly\textsuperscript{166}, as well as newsletters I subscribed to and received periodically (see references).

In sum, though my mix of observational techniques derived from an evidently experimental process, and thus remains rather loose-knit, non-systematic and incomplete, it has nonetheless been indispensable for me to grapple with the multiple conjunctions between discursive events, embodied knowledge, and governmental practices that perpetually reproduce Cape Town’s \textit{creative cityness}.

6.2.3.3 Data triangulation

After gathering my primary data, it needed to be processed further before I could proceed with its triangulation and interpretation. In terms of my interviews, I transcribed 29 in full and another 10 in large parts, while the remaining 22 were reviewed and only selectively transcribed. In addition, recorded proceedings of 11 events (for example the two WDC 2014 stakeholder forums), as well as selected video podcasts (available on Youtube or Vimeo) were also reviewed and selectively transcribed. The transcription was conducted in verbatim with added comments on important non-verbal aspects of the interview, such as long pauses or chuckles (see DVD attached).

The transcripts were then loaded into MaxQDA 2 data analysis software and examined through an 'open coding paradigm' following Mattissek et al. (2013, p. 163) and Flick et al. (2008, p. 200). Here, codes are created and allocated by successively reading through the text corpus, first in rough \textit{in vivo} codes, i.e. categories directly generated from the conversational language of the respondents. These code groups were then further differentiated and explicated in subsequent rounds of data revision (Reuber & Pfaffenbach 2005, p. 174).

Following Flick (2004), I adopted the idea of data triangulation as a means of looking at my research object by incorporating different data sources (pp. 13f). Thus, in addition to the interview transcripts, another 20 policy documents, 33 speeches by public

\textsuperscript{166} I tried to revisit them at least once a week. However, this would vary according to how regularly these sites were updated. This was often also related to the type and forum where certain information was shared, for example twitter feeds were moving at a much quicker rate than blog posts, which would however often be longer and more in-depth pieces.
officials, and 235 press releases and newspaper articles\textsuperscript{167} were loaded into the software and included in the coding (see Figure 20). Excluded from the software-based coding were publications only available in print, as well as social media snippets. However, selected newsletter features and web publications were included if they could be explicitly allocated to an author (for example the CEO editorials in the monthly Cape Craft and Design Institute newsletter). Generally however, information that could not be technically incorporated was still used for explicating certain unclear categories (Mayring 2003, p. 472).

\textsuperscript{167} The articles were primarily collected from the local daily newspapers \textit{Cape Times} and \textit{Cape Argus}, as well as from the weekly national news magazines \textit{Mail & Guardian} and \textit{Sunday Times}. What unfortunately remained outside of my focus due to lack of language proficiency was the topical coverage of Afrikaans-speaking daily news publications such as \textit{Die Burger} and \textit{Rapport}. The majority of press releases was derived from the City of Cape Town’s communication department, the Partnership, Creative Cape Town, Cape Town Design Network, and the World Design Capital NPC.

Figure 20 Screenshot of data coding using MaxQDA 2

Source: LW, 2014

In line with my post-positivist and latently interdisciplinary methodology, I agree with Bude (2008) that the interpretation and writing down of our findings is akin to art and thus will always remain to a certain extent serendipitous (p. 569). A poststructural interpretative paradigm should thus aim to draw "abductive conclusions" (Peirce 1957), i.e. it should try to achieve plausibility instead of 'objective validity'. Taking this constructivist caveat seriously for translating my codes into writing, I consequently opted for broadly following the dictum of knowledge-sociological hermeneutics as proposed by Hitzler (1997) and discussed for human geography in Reuber & Pfaffenbach (2005, pp.
114f). This process-oriented approach is also reflected by the numerous explanatory interludes and argumentative digressions featured in this thesis.

Overall, this emphasis on relational inquiry also provided the possibility of engaging critically and reflexively not only with the subjective topical interpretations and general worldviews of my respondents, but also with my own positionality. In the concluding section of this chapter, I thus seek to offer some thoughts on my own role in the research process, and how this has influenced the ways and means of my interpretation.
My thesis will be in English,
In the accent you heard on re-runs of friends,
Cym I'm sorry we weren't friends, but I
wanted to keep it professional
I promise I will print it on the whitest paper I can
find,
So they can see the black in your words

[...]
I will bury you in a library,
I hope you will find home there
In this haunted house of quotations
Hanging on the shelves like skeletons."

(original emphasis, excerpt from
"My Summer in Cape Town: or, I Am Sorry for
Using You"
by Alok Vaid-Menon, 13.05.2013)

6.3 [Research ethics] Doing theory from 'the south' as a white European, or: how to slip on the banana peel and accept the fall

In a collection of selected essays, African literary icon Chinua Achebe wrote: "Privilege, you see, is one of the great adversaries of the imagination; it spreads a thick layer of adipose tissue over our sensitivity" (Achebe 1989, p. 149). This section is essentially an attempt to confront my own 'thick skin' of privilege that I wittingly and unwittingly draped around myself over the course of my research, and that has irrevocably shaped the politics of my fieldwork. I am taking my cue from Barnett et al. (2008), who state that considering the ways in which one is privileged or benefits from distant or past events forms an important part of taking responsibility for one's work beyond simply acknowledging a crisis of representation (p. 396; also Madge 1993). Hence the title of this chapter: it is not only about slipping on the banana peel (one's own subjective positionality), but equally about accepting and reflecting on the fall (i.e. coming to grips with what remains marginalised in one's own perspective).
While reflexivity must certainly be a process of self-critique (Rose 1997; Kobayashi & Peake 2000), feminist geographers have furthermore pointed out that all too often reflexivity is limited to examining the identities of the individual researcher instead of broadening the investigation to include intersecting institutional, geopolitical and material aspects of that frame positionality (Nagar & Ali 2003, p. 356, see also (England 1994; Staeheli & Lawson 1994; Staeheli & Nagar 2002).

Particularly for a "footloose researcher" (Nagar 2002) from the West in a context formerly subsumed under the whole-sale term 'Third World' (Sidaway 1992; Madge 1993), this individualistic focus runs the danger of losing the 'bigger picture' of positionality over a self-indulgent dabbling in confessional 'navel gazing' (Mountz 2002) and apologetic tokenism (Patai 1991; Wolf 1996). On the other hand, there remains a paradoxical demand that as critical researchers with postcolonial ambitions, we must slot ourselves into certain preconceived and loaded social categories - in my case 'white', 'European', 'middle-class' and 'fluent in English but not a native speaker'\textsuperscript{168}. However, according to Nagar (2002), this can have the detrimental effect of reducing positionality "to the retrogressive kind of identity politics that allows only 'Xes to speak to X issues'" (p. 183).

While a search for universal redemption would consequently be not only futile but counter-productive, instead of finding a way out of this dilemma we must look for inroads that express our (in)ability to talk across worlds (ibid., p. 179) - or as the title of this section states, we need to not only slip on the proverbial banana peel, but also accept the inevitably ensuing fall! As we cannot simply trade in our Western genealogies for "some postcolonial promised land" (Sidaway 2000, p. 607), we need to grapple to the best of our capabilities with the multiple situated knowledges enshrined in different and often mutually irreconcilable epistemological positions (Larner 1995, p. 187).

Hence, if we seek to write about power and privilege in order to discern who has the ability and capacity to effect change and alternative developments, we cannot refrain

\textsuperscript{168} The politics of language in academic knowledge production are certainly a critical part of my positionality too. I chose to write this thesis in English for both research-practical and research-ethical reasons; for one because most of my primary and secondary sources were in English, and secondly because I felt it would make my work more accessible for and myself more accountable to my research partners. Nonetheless, I do recognise that by publishing my thesis in English instead of German, I also perpetuate its problematic role as hegemonic language of an increasingly neoliberalising academic environment (for more on this issue see ACME Redaktionskollektiv 2008).
from honestly assessing our own respective 'resources' and the spaces for whose analysis we choose to use them (Barnett et al. 2008, p. 395). As Kobayashi and Peake (2000) shrewdly remark: "For white people, this means replacing an inadequate sense of personal culpability with that of a social and historic responsibility for whiteness [...]. It means understanding not only the social locations of 'others' but also of being able to name one's own location" (ibid., p. 400). Getting on with this task of locating myself and my research, I'd like to start by talking about the South African academic environment into which I have been repeatedly immersed over the past five years. What I want to get at is particularly how this experience has sensitised me towards inherent power imbalances and uneven geographies of knowledge production and dissemination, as well as the ways in which I myself am implicated in these dynamics.

6.3.1 Delineating Cape Town as an academic field

It is not long ago, that philosopher couple Achille Mbembe and Sarah Nuttall (2004) spoke of scholarship on and from Africa as struggling against "an epistemological abyss" (p. 349). While this does reflect the deplorable reality for many other countries on the continent, South Africa is comparatively well researched and theoretically substantiated, not least due to its well-funded university system (an unequivocal colonial legacy). In terms of knowledge production, this makes the country not only a regional but a continental hegemonic force, which is why Hammett & Hoogendoorn (2012) rightly notes that we need to keep in mind the complexities of scale (p. 284): While South Africa might still be seen by some as residing on the global academic periphery, it in fact not only constitutes one of the continent's prime research hubs, but its universities are also increasingly sought after for international collaborations and joint scholarship programmes (Figure 21).

In addition, numerous South African scholars - both those working 'at home' or abroad - have reached critical international acclaim. At the same time, however, the distribution of research capacities in the country certainly remains polarised due to the systematic reverberations of apartheid legacies within the academy. In geography, for

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169 This also includes that apartheid itself has become a somewhat 'travelling' theory as it has been repeatedly used by scholars to describe state-sponsored urban segregation elsewhere Abu-Lughod & Abu 1980; Davis 2003; Yiftachel 2009b.

170 For example, it is no small measure that with Sue Parnell and Sophie Oldfield the recently released seminal *Handbook on Cities of the Global South* (2014) was compiled by two senior human geography professors from the University of Cape Town.
example, the large majority of research contributions are made by four historically white English universities\textsuperscript{171}, followed by former white Afrikaans universities (Visser 2007; Seethal 26.02.2012). Though formerly non-white institutions such as the University of the Western Cape (UWC) are increasingly drawing attention by offering innovative and quality courses at lower fees, their research output remains limited due to lower funding that cannot compare to capital reserve assets accumulated by the formerly white universities.

\textbf{Figure 21: Global comparison of publication output and impact factors}

\textit{Source: Oxford Internet Institute (2011); design: E. Gooris}

Furthermore, the largest share of academic staff in geography departments remains white, while non-white scholars only make-up about one fifth in the overall

\textsuperscript{171} Namely, the University of Cape Town (UCT), the University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN), Rhodes University in Grahamstown, and the University of the Witwatersrand (Wits) in Johannesburg.
composition (Sumner 2006). This lack of transformation however doesn't do justice to the genuine efforts made by some departments and individuals towards greater integration, which can be attributed to South African geography's\textsuperscript{172} strong legacy of people-centred approaches, harboured by progressive scholars already well before the end of apartheid (Crush et al. 1982; McCarthy 1982; Rogerson & Parnell 1989; Rogerson & McCarthy 1992; Parnell & Mabin 1995; Oldfield et al. 2004; Mather 2007; Connell 2007b; Hammett & Hoogendoorn 2012, p. 285; Seethal 26.02.2012).

In consequence, and following the radical geography dictum that personal practice is always political (Haraway 1988; Katz 1994; Rose 1997; Butler 1993; Staeheli & Lawson 1994; Staeheli & Nagar 2002; Staeheli & Kofman 2004), South African human geography departments look back on a solid tradition of politicised and engaged scholarship, which often deliberately blurs the lines between activist and academic knowledge (Oldfield 2014). Another strong interface exists between university and local governance circles with "[…] academics who consult for government and sit on the boards of NGOs, policy researchers and consultants who lecture, as well as government officials who occasionally provide academic inputs and supervise students, or who are postgraduate students [themselves]" (Rubin 2012, p. 305).

During my own fieldwork, I came across this form of 'engaged' scholarship on several occasions. For example, a key respondent turned out to also be a registered PhD student at UCT's geography department, and subsequently asked me for feedback on his academic work. Furthermore, many familiar names from local academia would frequently appear in the opinion sections of local media outlets or on the front pages of policy framework studies. This strong public presence of local academics in urban development discourses has certainly influenced my access to the field, as well as the way I was perceived by different interview partners. Though especially the latter depended on whether the respondent has had previous positive or negative experiences with the local academic sector, my interview partners were generally open to sharing their world views with me.

\textsuperscript{172} This should however not annihilate the fact that local and foreign geography's positivistic research tradition contributed greatly to the apartheid project (for example Davies 1960; Adam 1969). For a typology of South African geographers, see Oldfield et al. (2004).
Also, many showed a seemingly genuine interest in my work and held academic knowledge production in high esteem, with an often reiterated trope being that South Africa needed more 'qualified' and 'reliable' information for better fostering 'growth and development' on all fronts. On the one hand, this is a significant difference to my experience within the German system, where particularly social scientists are still often regarded as producing 'intellectual fluff' that is by and large of little concern for people beyond the 'ivory towers'. This situation has also become unequivocally compounded by recent scandals that revealed extensive academic plagiarism and many cases of systematic abuse of doctorates by public figures in high positions, which tainted the reputation of academia at large. On the other hand, I have personally come to feel the tension which public expectations can create in terms of negotiating my own identity between professional integrity and the will to be actively engaged and engaging as a researcher and political person (Parnell 2007).

Though South African geography has generally been lauded for its hands-on, policy-relevant work, this has also raised some concern in the critical wing of the discipline (ibid.). Hammett (2012) for example sees South African geography as drifting towards parochialism and empiricisms, thus losing touch with important international theoretical and conceptual debates (p. 937). Similar concerns are echoed by Pieterse (2010), who writes that "the time is long overdue to launch a corrective effort to rebalance the division of intellectual work between examining the nature of African urban life, i.e. African urbanism, and undertaking policy-orientated research that seeks to address the imperatives of development" (p. 206).

However, while Hammett (2012) lashes out at his peers for not yet having adequately addressed these issues and leaving the field to positivist data-miners, I agree with Lawhon (2013) and Daya (2013) that this is a skewed perspective that lacks humility and ignores recent strides in the field. In fact, both provide solid evidence that South African scholars are developing their own language and are moving towards new theorisations that are both "locally accountable and internationally-relevant" (Hammett 2012, p. 945), as they challenge the entrenched ways in which 'the North' travels as theory while 'the south' only ever manages to slip through as 'raw' ethnography (McCann et al. 2013, p. 586; also Comaroff & Comaroff 2012b).

This has for example put the likes of African Centre for Cities director Edgar Pieterse, UCT's head of geography Sue Parnell, and expat South African UCL professor
Jennifer Robinson at the vanguard of a cosmopolitan geography. Frequently joining forces with Asian and (though comparably less frequently) Latin American scholars, they explicitly question the dominance of Anglo-American scholarship in search for innovative ways of 'theorising back', while at the same time recognising that 'the political' needs to be addressed in more diverse ways that go beyond but nonetheless do not exclude policy-driven work.

Hence, I find Lawhon (2013)'s assessment on point, as it mirrors my own experience: "South African geographers are engaged with their research context – they speak to the public, write articles for local media, their books can often be found in ordinary bookstores and are accessible to and read by non-academics. This goes far beyond the simply assertion of policy-relevance – South African geographers are, broadly put, relevant" (pp. A3). Like her, I feel that much of South Africa's current academic culture, in spite of its problematic history and poignant issues of slow transformation, has provided me with pivotal intellectual and ethical guidance, which opened up new perspectives for positioning myself and my work in Cape Town by continuously holding up a mirror to my own set of presumptions and privileges. Thus, like a pebble ground into shape and continuously dislocated by changing tides, my research developed by shuttling between different German and South African research communities. Both have however instilled in me, within their own situated range of opportunities, constraints and values, and the will to produce richly contextual knowledge that is abidingly committed to the site of one's scholarly praxis (Jazeel 2007, p. 287).

### 6.3.2 Reflections on positionality, accountability and white privilege

One of the key lessons I learnt during my time in 'the field' was that the factual knowledge of geography's origins as a "science of colonialism" (Sidaway 1992, p. 403) is very different from actively engaging with its disciplinary legacy in situ. For one, South

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173 Of course, in a motion of complete disclosure, it is also important to acknowledge my academic socialisation and intellectual 'upbringing' in the Department of Geography at the University of Münster. There, I had been exposed from my undergraduate studies onwards to a range of different geographic disciplines, ranging from more positivist land-use regulation and applied urban development, to critical geopolitics and the field of 'Neue Kulturgeographie' (Gebhardt et al. 2007). As Belina et al. (2009) argued in their elucidating review of the 'geography of critical geography', the growing internationalisation of the discipline has to a certain degree been beneficial in terms of raising the profile of critical thought within German geography (even though they lament the apparent lack of radicality). With Münster as a stronghold of this development, I was fortunate to learn about many of those debates as they happened and engage first hand with some of its principal protagonists. For more on the current state of young critical geography in Germany, see also Schreibwerkstatt; Belina (2007), as well as ACME Vol. 7 (3).
Africa is not only a place of polarised knowledge production, but certain cities like Cape Town have also grown into veritable hot-spots for 'research tourism', as Visser (2013) observes: "Universities such as UCT also have research units dedicated to studying Southern urbanism, staffed by particularly influential and productive scholars. These scholars also have very strong international linkages, which in turn draws foreign-based scholars to Cape Town. As a consequence, Cape Town is a popular academic destination. This position is strengthened by the fact this city is a noted tourist destination and that Cape Town is perceived by these researchers as safer, quieter, and less threatening than Johannesburg and, broadly put, more agreeable to Northern 'sensitivities and sensibilities" (p. 85). While there is no doubt about the efficacy of Cape Town's touristic assets, little is to be won from misreading genuine research interest for the city's urban dynamics solely as guided by essentialist 'northern' sensitivities. Visser's observation still flags some important issues about globalised practices of knowledge 'extraction' and the intricate balancing act between enacting insider and outsider positions.

Volumes have been written about the 'baggage' of either position, yet it still remains a moot point what even makes somebody a cultural insider/outsider and whether it makes any difference after all (Mullings 1999; Ganga & Scott 2006; Sultana 2007; Rubin 2012). Hence, I generally share the sentiment expressed by many post-positivist researchers that 'overseas fieldwork' constitutes a complex space of betweenness, in which individual researcher personalities have to constantly negotiate their identities through an entangled web of social relationships (Butler 1993; Katz 1994; Rose 1997; Schuermans & Newton 2012). However, this complexity of 'playing the field' (Katz 1994) does not release us from our moral obligation to observe certain rules of the game. In order to mitigate the extractive nature of 'overseas research', one of these often repeated rules is to sustain a feedback loop between the researcher and the researched.

However, like Schuermans and Newton (2012), who both also conducted their thesis fieldwork in South Africa, I also found it difficult to maintain the dialogue with my interview partners in Cape Town from abroad, and 'staying in the loop' from my German desk presented itself as a major challenge. As members of local 'elite' networks, my respondents were not constrained by a lack of access to modern means of communication, but by a shortage of disposable time (and at times of course also willingness) to answer my queries.
Keeping the conversation going was however significantly less difficult whenever I was present in the field, as I would meet many of my past and future interview partners at different events or even on the street. This pronounced experience of dis/connection prompted me to use my privileged position granted through a fully funded, three-year long PhD fellowship granted by the German National Academic Foundation, to immerse myself more thoroughly in the field. Through longer stays in Cape Town I was thus able to seize opportunities for observing the performative politics of the WDC 2014 process more systematically. An - evidently desired - side-effect of my immersion was my increased visibility within the 'elite' circles I had chosen to research, which also helped to gradually shed the constricting label of a 'research tourist' (Herod 1999; Mikecz 2012).

However, my genuine efforts should not disguise the fact that this level of perceived mutual understanding and commonality also resulted from a number of shared privileges; though not all of my interview partners were white and thus automatically benefited disproportionately from the structural legacies of apartheid, most of them enjoyed a regular income, were members of the middle-class, and had attended, though not necessarily completed, tertiary education. Though Staeheli and Lawson's (1994) important caveat that "we cannot fully understand others' subjectivities and speak with authority for them" (p. 99) certainly also holds true for research on 'elites', this does not mean that we should not pay increased attention to the ways in which whiteness frames important dynamics of difference and similarity within the research process.

After all, "[t]he recursivity between the whiteness of the social world, as our object of study, and the whiteness of the discipline, as our medium of study, operates to make opaque the whitening process" (Kobayashi & Peake 2000, p. 393). Hence, my "invisible knapsack" (McIntosh 1988) of white privilege has certainly facilitated many points of entry through which I was initially able to impose myself as an outsider on Cape Town's social world as my chosen object of study - even this liberty of choice revealing my privileged position.

Nonetheless, once there, I was also immediately subjected to those local power dynamics and identity politics defined by issues of whiteness. As much as there is no

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174 This also included some highly unsettling encounters with racist mind-sets amongst my interview partners. One respondent for example - white, male and many years my senior - thought it appropriate to illustrate his socially predatory argument by relating his experiences with an allegedly 'inherently lazy

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single formula for responsibility in research (Jazeel & McFarlane 2010), there is also no silver bullet for confronting whiteness within the research process. If there is vast agreement in the literature, it settles on the fact that it always is an onerous and deeply discomforting endeavour. Quite frankly, I myself remain uneasy about and puzzled by many of the ethical dilemmas\textsuperscript{175} that derive from the obvious chasm between talking about issues of research ethics and social justice and acting accordingly while manoeuvring the choppy and murky waters of actually conducting fieldwork (a problem prominently addressed by Cloke 2002, p. 588). For me, one of these has been how to remain able to - bluntly put - 'talk truth to power' when those we identify as powerful and hard-bitten individuals articulate their doubts and vulnerabilities in unexpected ways, thus revealing those contradictory and shifting subjectivities the researcher often reserves for herself (Gibson-Graham 1994; Czarniawska 1997; Kuus 2011).

In turn, for Katz (1994), an engaged researcher must be able to answer to the following set of key questions: "How does the work deploy and confront power - whose power, where, and under what conditions?" (p. 69). As Schuermans and Newton (2012) argue, exposing the practices of the upper echelons of power can however be particularly thorny. They note that "especially in research that aims to reveal the exclusionary nature of the do's and don'ts of the powerful, it can be difficult to find a \textit{comfortable overlap} between the ambitions of researchers, research participants and other stakeholders" (ibid., pp. 300; emphasis added LW). On the one hand, I emotionally relate to the sentiment that one does not want to inflict even minor discomfort on those people who generously spared time to share their inside knowledge and personal experiences, often going out of their

\textsuperscript{175} In Anglo-American geography, much has already been said about the ethics of research (Sidaway 1992; Madge 1993; Cloke 2002; Schumaker & Kelly 2012), with a general agreement on the "imperative that ethical concerns should permeate the entire process of the research, from conceptualization to dissemination" (Sultana 2007, p. 375). Despite their indispensability, questions of ethics have been stubbornly ignored and thus remain gravely unaddressed in German academia at large. This is also evident in the fact that most postgraduate research proposals (except clinical studies of course) do not have to pass the official scrutiny of an ethics commission. This situation is indeed alarming, as Sidaway (1992) has pointed out how this forces people to learn 'on the spot' when they are surprised by the complex ethical and practical difficulties that inevitably surface in every major research endeavour (p. 404). While I do not think that the pragmatic routine of an ethics proposal could've entirely saved me from the moral booby-traps that have struck me in the field, it could've at least flagged some critical issues of which I could've subsequently been more mindful. Hence, I have chosen to discuss some issues of personal responsibility and professional accountability within this section.

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way to offer help, support, encouragement, sometimes even friendship, and who thus unwittingly obliterated what is already a 'line-in-the-sand' (Jazeel 2007, p. 288): the boundaries of what constitutes 'professional' research conduct. On the other hand, however, I find the idea of premising our research on finding that elusive and hardly ever attainable joint comfort zone highly problematic, as it bars us from even seeing the full critical potential of our work, which we have committed ourselves to realise.

While mutual respect and humility must remain the bottom line of good fieldwork (Peake & Trotz 1999; Cloke 2002; Jazeel 2007), I concur with Roy (2006) that we have to step up our efforts to confront intimate questions of expertise, privilege, and benevolence - for others as much as in ourselves (p. 25). She has furthermore astutely argued that "[t]he ethics of postcoloniality is not the ethics of disavowal and refusal" (p. 24), meaning that we must address those difficult questions of responsibility and accountability "not to the victims of oppression but rather to the 'dispensers of bounty'" (ibid., p. 25). While the weight of this task has often raised in me the urge to slip through the back-door and hide behind a wall of distancing abstraction, over time I have learnt to accept these "awkward geographies" (Jazeel 2007) as a result of the "throwntogetherness" (Massey 2005; Fraser 2012) of my scholarship.

Borrowing Sultana's (2007) poetic words, my research has not only been performative (Gregson & Rose 2000) but simultaneously deeply transformative: "The borders that I crossed, I feel, are always here within me, negotiating the various locations and subjectivities I simultaneously feel a part of and apart from" (p. 377). In addition, I know that my work remains radically unfinished for two reasons: Firstly, because "[w]e cannot know everything, nor can we survey power as if we can fully understand, control or redistribute it" (Rose 1997, p. 319), and secondly because the topic of my research remains a "moving target" (McDonald 2008, p. xix). Even though I have travelled along with Cape Town throughout many episodes of its 'worlding' process, my accounts inevitably remain impermanent, fallible "montages" (Denzin & Lincoln 2005a, pp. 4f), imbued with absences and uncertainties (Jazeel & McFarlane 2010).

I have however found solace in Pieterse's (2010) candid words. Talking about his own vast research experience in urban Africa, he writes that "[t]he key is to enter this treacherous zone in the full knowledge that it will lead to philosophical and psychic
heartache, but is an unavoidable journey if we are serious about engaging African futures and prospects on its own terms" (p. 218).
Part III

A topology of becoming – Making Cape Town a 'design(er) city'

In the following chapters, I will present my empirical findings collected over several extended fieldwork periods in Cape Town between November 2010 and August 2013 (see Figure 18). The structure of chapter 7 has been roughly based on the chronology of significant events that have added to shaping Cape Town's politics of becoming a creative city and, more specifically, the designated World Design Capital 2014. It specifically highlights a whole host of concurrent activities, rationales, limitations and practical failures that have - wittingly and unwittingly – impacted on the ways in which global creative city idea(l)s have been grounded, refracted and subsequently merged with other governmental technologies to foster the re-incarnation of Cape Town as the 'first African design capital'.

While I seek to provide a reconstruction that relates the lineages of Cape Town's creative-cum-design city nexus as accurately as possible, I also want to honour the polytemporal and polysemic nature of how different actors "mobilise, enrol, translate, channel, broker and bridge" (Allen & Cochrane 2007, p. 1171) concurrent socio-political development dynamics. Hence, chapter 8 departs from the chronological format in order to allow for a reflection of Cape Town's emergent design(er) governmentality that cuts across concurrent timelines and jumps between different organisational setups and political scales.
I want to conclude my analysis by discussing the case of The Fringe, Cape Town's self-acclaimed "premier African environment for design, media and ICT innovation, creativity and entrepreneurship" (thefringe.org.za). As a close observer of this ambitious WDC 2014 flagship project, I argue that both its rise and eventual demise epitomise the intricate dynamics connected to attempts of rewriting and enacting the globally mobile creative city paradigm in Cape Town's historically contested cityscape.

Overall, my argumentative structure has been heavily influenced by the explorative and processual nature of my empirical research, in which I tried my utmost to keep up with, but inevitably always remained one step behind, the moving socio-political landscape that is Cape Town's urban governance realm (see also chapter 6.2). In consequence, I have come to think of the shape-shifting style of my argument as mirroring the dynamic progression of my research 'object' over the past four years: from a rather circumscribed focus on a handful of cultural and creative industries on the margins of a highly fragmented local economic cluster policy to the emergence of the 'design(er) city' as a significantly expanded, institutionally consolidated and increasingly central trope for local practices and politics of 'worlding'.

Although the city's official journey towards its World Design Capital 2014 title only started with the submission of the bid book, the process is inextricably linked to a whole host of preceding encounters, political ventures and encompassing local governance dynamics dating back to the mid-2000s. Hence, the multiplex politics of the city's current 'World Design Capital-ism' presented in chapter 8 cannot be understood in isolation but instead need to be seen as a cumulative effect of numerous earlier, parallel, often uncoordinated, and sometimes even contradictory efforts made by a multiplicity of actors - established as well as emergent, public as well as private, and individuals as well as organisations. In turn, the following chapter 7 is dedicated to portraying these different stakeholder positions and to reconstructing some of the most influential frameworks and practical points of reference that have played a role in Cape Town's early days of making and governing its creative cityness.
Breaking into the creative city business

When I started my fieldwork in October 2010, a small number of organisations and initiatives had already assembled around the promotion of the creative industries and loosely associated themselves to the unofficial policy meme of Cape Town as a creative city. Many of my respondents were directors of so-called Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs), a specific local public private partnership model, which had been developed by the Provincial government as a tool for local economic development (LED). As I will show below, a divergent group of these "new, formalized vehicles of association" (Simone 2001b, p. 102) have been instrumental in conceiving and invigorating Cape Town's WDC 2014 project, which is why an understanding of this fragmented 'stakeholder' arena is pivotal for unravelling the foundational logics of the bid, which I will turn to in the second part of this chapter (see 7.2f).

Conversely, this first part is primarily concerned with mapping the specific moments of Cape Town's "arriving at" (Robinson 2013), i.e. how different organisations and mobile urban 'elite' professionals drew in and collated different aspects of creative city-making from elsewhere and how these had to be subsequently renegotiated within the complex political terrain of the local developmental state. In line with the call of policy mobility scholars to also consider ruptures and discontinuities of such policy formation processes, I will also discuss a 'detour' in Cape Town's early creative city 'journey', which saw the abrupt dismantling of the only recently established Creative Industry Unit within the Provincial administration. In closing, this section then turns towards scrutinising the role of the Creative Cape Town Programme, which had unwittingly benefited from the Provincial government's turn away from pursuing a creative city agenda. Here, I will also talk about the political prowess of Creative Cape Town's coordinator Zayd Minty, who
has not only been indivisibly linked to making the creative industries governable but whose professional development is furthermore indicative of local 'elite' subject formation within Cape Town's politics of worlding.

7.1 National creative economy policies and Cape Town's creative industries cluster approach

As previously elaborated, Cape Town is commonly represented as one of the country's major cultural hubs (see chapters 5.1 & 5.3). Given the current buzz around the city's cultural and creative industry pedigree and the growing visibility of different local governance bodies in its promotion, a fact which is often neglected is that it was actually national government which first explored the creative economy for the South African context. While in the early years of transition between 1990 and 1996 "the notion of healing through creativity" (Marks & Bezzoli 2001, p. 439) had been promoted by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission as a primary tool for fostering a spirit of national unity, the introduction of the 1996 GEAR strategy started to shift the emphasis from a subsidised arts, culture and heritage sector towards economic growth and job creation through cultural entrepreneurship. Delecia Forbes, the former director of the Creative Industries Unit within the Western Cape Department of Economic Development and Tourism recalls:

"The first plan of action was how to get this country healed and ready and psychologically in shape to be a nation. So that was a good enough argument. But then after five or ten years and the money and the emphasis on other aspects like education and housing and, you know, the drain of the fiscus...[umh] the cultural industries title then was introduced as a way in which you could present the argument where artists also had to take a stand and take some responsibility for their survival, [...] that it wasn't just enough to set up a little dance group and have kids dancing in the township and keep them off the street after school and the government needs to continuously pay for that" (Interview Forbes 18.01.2011).

Building on the White Paper on Arts, Culture and Heritage (1996), the then Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology (DACST) commissioned the report "Creative South Africa - A strategy for realising the potential of the Cultural Industries", compiled in 1998 by the so called Cultural Strategy Group. Given that after 1994, the then newly consolidated government departments were faced with extensive policy reform
needs on all fronts, it comes as no surprise that the task was tackled by bringing in external expertise\textsuperscript{176} and forming a "multidisciplinary consortium" (Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology November 1998, p. 4). Under the auspices of South African arts activist, theatre producer and then chief director of the DACST Steven Sack, a number of international consultancies were drawn into the process, ranging from KPMG and the US-based BDM consulting to the British SQW business support group, with particularly the latter being closely connected to the British DCMS and their cultural and creative industries mapping work. This international knowledge base was clearly reflected in the report's proposed Creative Industries Growth Strategy (CIGS), for example in the recommendation to establish a designated Cultural Industry Development Agency and corresponding funding structure based on the UK's tested public private partnership model (ibid., pp. 51f). As such, the CIGS can be regarded as an early product of international policy mobility and transnational knowledge exchange within postapartheid cultural governance.

The strategy specifically highlighted four creative industry sectors, namely film and television, publishing, music and craft, with the first two already displaying solid economic growth numbers while the latter supposedly offered a low-threshold market entry for small and medium enterprises. Thus, in comparison to other countries on the continent, South Africa was certainly ahead of the pack in attempting to understand its local creative industry value chain, as policy experts have noted (Joffe & Newton 2009, p. 250; Interview Elk 21.11.2012). However, in spite of the expansive catalogue of recommendations and vast efforts to activate local stakeholders, the CIGS prompted little concrete action by national government. One respondent vividly recalls:

"Steven Sack had this whole Cultural Industries Growth Strategy that he rolled out and that actually was beginning to work well, and there were lots of things that we looked at. There was a whole succession of studies that were done, and there was a National Craft Development Strategy that was work-shopped extensively, which has never, ever been instituted; never, ever. And then when he left, that national strategy just kind of

\textsuperscript{176} It has been previously highlighted, that the end of apartheid has on the one hand opened up new avenues for policy advice by major foreign donor bodies, while at the same time providing key roles for former activist and resident intellectuals to collate existing local expertise with global best practice examples (Robinson 2008b, p. 42, see also Bond 2000b; Tomlinson 2002).
This mixture of politicking and enthusiasm for innovative policy production versus the apparent lack of follow-through and implementation is by no means limited to the field of the creative economy, nor is it confined to the level of national government. Rather, it needs to be seen as a central and perpetually reoccurring theme of South Africa's postapartheid political practice (Marais 2011; Habib 2013). Many have argued that this erratic approach to policy implementation is not merely due to a lack of administrative capacities but can be regarded as an institutional legacy of South Africa's negotiated settlement, which opted for incremental transition instead of radical reform. Calling this the "suspended revolution", Habib (2013) identifies inefficient policy follow-through as one of its major effects, arguably caused by a lack of clarity between the different spheres government, corruption, cadre deployment and inadequate resource allocation (pp. 63-70, also Kersting 2012b).

In consequence, and as the aforementioned quote shows, even the fate of high-profile, broad-based or resource-intensive policy projects can often end up depending on the professional networks, strategic acumen and tenacity of a few powerful key 'stakeholders'. While this is an important point for grappling with South Africa's political (dis-)continuities in general, I argue that it also needs to be kept in mind with regards to the genesis of Cape Town's creative city governance complex presented here.

Thus, although the national CIGS process was never taken past its initial conceptual stage, it still yielded a certain knock-on effect: Through the strategy paper as well as the accompanying expert workshops, the process had put the cultural and creative industries firmly on the radar of local and provincial economic development practitioners, some of whom had already dabbled in the promotion of one or another creative sub-sector. Thus, while the process was stalled on the national level, there remained a greater tenacity to continue exploring the creative economy as a field of future political intervention on provincial and municipal scales, namely in Gauteng and the

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As Joffe and Newton (2009) note "[i]ncreasingly, an expanded definition of the creative industries, used in mapping studies in the UK, has influenced the South African community of researchers, consultants, policy advisors and government officials" (p. 238). Hence, in line with international trends of the time, local discourse shifted increasingly towards the use of the term 'creative economy', comprising both the cultural industries as well as supporting sectors.
Western Cape with their respective cultural centres Johannesburg and Cape Town (Guinard 01.01.2012).

Popular playwright, cultural advocate and executive director of the African Arts Institute Mike van Graan concedes: "At a national level and at a provincial level there's probably less inclination towards cultural policy, certainly in implementation. Local governments and cities tend to have a bit more of an interest because that's where they are interested in attracting tourists, in providing a better quality of life for their people etc." (Interview van Graan 24.01.2011). While Gauteng soon teamed up with the British Council and the University of the Witwatersrand to embark on a cumulative Creative Industry Mapping study following the British model (Wits University & Joffe 2008), the Western Cape's approach was comparatively prudent as it focused more on a selected set of sub-sectors, such as film and crafts, with especially the latter being seen as a generator for low-skill jobs in line with its allegedly pro-poor agenda (Interview Dyers 06.12.2010; United Nations 2010).

Such a sector-based approach was very much in line with the official local economic development (LED) trajectory envisioned by both tiers of local government. The Western Cape's LED strategy had been heavily influenced by the work of American economist Michael Porter, whose ideas of cluster-based economic strategies had become "a big fashion" (Interview Elk 21.11.2012) within South African local economic development circles. Furthermore, it was also becoming extensively promoted across the country through best practice 'roadshows' by the Department of Trade and Industry (Gwynne-Evans 20.06.2005, p. 4; Padayachee 2006, p. 206; Interview Johnston 22.02.2012).

In Cape Town, Porter's ideas of enhancing competitiveness and innovation through microeconomic cluster initiatives had first been taken up in 1998 by the Cape

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178 Those coincided with Steven Sack's move from the National Department of Arts and Culture into the position of Johannesburg's local arts and culture department.
179 The UN's list of creative sectors is most commonly used in the South African context and includes: Graphic design, Advertising, Film and Video, Music, Performing arts, Fashion and jewellery, Product and surface design, Industrial design, New media, Publishing, Radio and television, Visual art, Architecture, and Crafts (United Nations 2010).
180 In both 2003 and 2007, Porter was invited to Johannesburg to present his take on South Africa's macro-economic prospects. In addition, his Harvard Institute for Strategy has conducted numerous case studies on local industry sectors, based on his neo-classical approach (see http://www.isc.hbs.edu/econ-natlcomp_resources.htm).
Town IT Initiative (CITI). Initially a fully privately funded pilot project for supporting ICTs start-up companies, the founders (amongst them non-other than Design Indaba's CEO Ravi Naidoo) successfully mobilised broad-based support from business and academia and were in turn able to initiate a formal public-private partnership with both municipal and provincial government, becoming the first so-called Special Purpose Vehicles\textsuperscript{181} (hereafter: SPVs).

Since 2001, the Western Cape has put great emphasis on driving its SMME (Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises) development strategy through a growing number of SPVs (Western Cape Department of Economic Development and Tourism & Provincial Government of the Western Cape 2006). Depending on the study, between 15 to 19 SPVs operate in the province, from the 'South African Oil and Gas Alliance' via the 'Cape Boat Building and Technology Initiative' to the business processes outsourcing office 'Calling the Cape' (OECD Territorial Review 2008, p. 175; Gwynne-Evans 20.06.2005, p. 11). Eight of these SPVs are commonly seen as falling within the creative economy bracket (see Table 6). While six of these creative sector bodies have been initiated by the Western Cape Department of Economic Development and Tourism (DEDT), the visual and performing arts SPVs were created through "co-opting" (Interview Hayes 17.01.2011) the provincial chapters of their respective national networks, resulting in the fact that the Western Cape has a strong lobby in the national arms of both organisations.

\textsuperscript{181} Special Purpose Vehicles are registered under Section 21 of the South African Companies Act and thus do not operate for commercial gain. Conceptualised as a "mechanism that addresses some of [the] deficiencies in fostering strong ongoing relationships between state and civil society" (Minty 2006, p. 32), SPVs are supposed to act as autonomous entities that facilitate the delivery of specific public services (CoCT 2000 Section 14 Manual, p. 12). Their boards generally represent the respective industry and its labour force (at least 50% of board members) as well as provincial and local government departments and specialists on Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), finance and skills development Gwynne-Evans 20.06.2005, p. 11. In addition, university faculties are also encouraged to take up board positions in order to offer "soft' co-ordination and evaluation" (OECD Territorial Reviews 2008, p. 180).
### Table 6 List of 'creative industry' Special Purpose Vehicles

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<tr>
<th>SPV</th>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>CEO/Executive Director</th>
<th>Year Founded</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cape IT Initiative</td>
<td>CITI</td>
<td>Jenny McKinnel* (since 2009)</td>
<td>1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Film Commission</td>
<td>CFC</td>
<td>Dennis Lillie* (since 2011)</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Craft and Design Institute</td>
<td>CCDI</td>
<td>Erica Elk* (since 2000/2001)</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performing Arts Network of South Africa</td>
<td>PANSA</td>
<td>Brian Heydenreich* (2009-2012)</td>
<td>2001</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Nolonzwabo Base (since 2012)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visual Arts Network of South Africa (Western Cape)</td>
<td>Vansa</td>
<td>Peter Hayes* (2009-2011)</td>
<td>2003</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hannah Lewis (since 2011)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Town Fashion Council</td>
<td>CTFC</td>
<td>Bryan Ramkiliwan* (since 2011)</td>
<td>2007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Music Industry Commission</td>
<td>Cape MIC</td>
<td>Peter Theunissen* (2008-2012; Position currently vacant)</td>
<td>2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape Furniture Initiative</td>
<td>WCFI</td>
<td>Bernadette Isaacs (since 2009)</td>
<td>2009</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Personal interviews conducted

In spite of the fact that the range of activities varies considerably between the different creative industry sector bodies, they "[a]ll perform a networking and promotional function" and are supposed to provide "the first point of contact for any sector related enquiries" (Gwynne-Evans 20.06.2005, p. 12). Besides establishing a new interface between the public and the private sector, SPVs also added a new platform for cooperative governance between the municipal and the provincial level. As an OECD report remarks, "the Municipality of Cape Town, although it is not responsible for innovation policies, contributes to SPV funding and participates in SPV governance" (OECD Territorial Reviews 2008, p. 172). Though the SPVs receive state funding, they
are both able and obliged to generate additional financial support from the private sector as, contrary to their public sponsors, they are not bound by the rigid regulations of the Municipal Finance Management Act (2003, Act No. 56).

However, this setup also supports the political rationale that in the long run the respective industry must assume the main financial responsibility for their respective SPV, as government "has no long-term responsibility or funding commitment to the SPVs" (Gwynne-Evans 20.06.2005, p. 10). As I will further elaborate below (ch. 7.1.3), this non-committal funding behaviour coupled with an increased emphasis on self-entrepreneurial market-logics has led to serious financial insecurities for many of those SPVs that represent traditionally subsidised sectors of cultural production, such as visual arts and performing arts (Interviews Heydenreych & Muspratt-Williams 08.12.2010, Hayes 17.01.2011). In comparison, other SPVs with a greater focus on readily commodifiable and 'tradable' cultural and creative goods and services and in turn a larger financial support base in the private sector (like CITI or the CTFC) were less existentially dependent on public funding182.

Though the Cape Town IT Initiative formally constitutes the oldest 'creative' SPV, it is in fact the Cape Craft and Design Institute (CCDI), which is most widely recognised for pioneering this parastatal model for the local creative industries. Moreover, its institutional genesis, which I will discuss in the following, not only vividly illustrates this gradual shift of political rationale from social towards economic development but also provides pivotal insights into the emergence and consolidation of Cape Town's creative city governance complex and increasing 'design mindedness'. This also includes highlighting some important concurrent developments which in turn illustrate the grounding of the creative city paradigm as a cumulative effect of dispersed initiatives rather than a comprehensive, preconceived policy import.

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182 This is however not to say that they were not negatively affected by public funding cuts, particularly in terms of covering their operational costs (Interviews Ramkiliwan 08.11.2011, Theunissen 01.12.2010).
7.1.1 Cape Town's cultural politics before the bid: the Cape Craft and Design Institute (CCDI) leads the way

In general, one of the provincial government's key principles for creating SPVs had been to find reliable "network brokers" (Gwynne-Evans 20.06.2005, p. 9) in order to overcome existing tensions, either within the respective sub-sector, between industry and government or sometimes even within local government structures. In the case of the CCDI, the then Head of Economic Development and Tourism in the Province, Dr. Laurine Platzky, who later became the Province's overall Deputy Director General, had taken note of the national CGSI and the way it promoted craft as one of South Africa's priority creative industry sectors (Interview Platzky 21.02.2012). Back then, craft was mainly perceived as a supplement of tourism as it produced a range of curios for Cape Town's growing visitor economy as Erica Elk, the CEO of the CCDI problematizes:

"[...] in those early days, the focus on craft, [...] it was very supply-driven, in fact quite welfarist-driven, sort of social development, and there was this idea that, that craft was...you know... it was a good place for job creation and income generation because there were low barriers to entry because the skill required to make product was, is very "low". I'm saying [this] in inverted commas 'cause I think that is the sort of myth" (Interview Elk 21.11.2012).

At the same time, Mel Hagen, known as one of Cape Town's vanguard 'design activists', had been working on a proposal to advance product development within the craft sector in her role as the dean of CPUT's Design Faculty. Apart from receiving great attention from Sack and his national Department of Arts and Culture, her proposal also linked in with Platzky's efforts of devising an institutional strategy for promoting craft in the Western Cape (Heathcock August 2000). The trio of globally oriented 'elite' professionals was completed by Erica Elk, a trained fine artist turned land activist, who had been "peripherally involved or aware of the Creative Industries Growth Strategy" (Interview Elk 21.11.2012) and its special attention to craft. In 2000, Platzky's office commissioned Elk to conduct a scoping study for the craft sector and based on these findings supported Hagen and Elk in drawing up a business plan for establishing a local Craft Institute. However, given Hagen's professional background as a designer, she insisted on an expanded concept:

"...in doing that business plan I was very meticulous about ensuring that design had a presence, so it became the Cape Craft and Design Institute. And even before we'd finished the business plan, [the national
[department of] Arts and Culture had given us money, had given us, I don't know, two and a half million [ZAR] over three years, which is peanuts really, but it was amazing. I found it very scary; I thought we'd have to search for money and suddenly it was being thrown at us before we'd even finished and developed the concept fully, and the Province, of course, gave money as well. So we set that up in 2001”(Interview Hagen 08.02.2012).

Though especially in the first decade of the CCDI's work, the inclusion of design remained largely semantic and less programmatic, this was to gradually change, firstly through the establishment of the Fringe Design and Innovation District around the CCDI office headquarters (see chapter 8.2.5) and secondly through the WDC 2014 bid, rendering Hagen's approach one of great foresight and in turn strengthening her position as a respected 'design activist' (Interviews Elk 21.11.2012, Hagen 08.02.2012, M'Rithaa 30.01.2012). In 2001, Elk took up her post as director of the CCDI, a position she still holds today. Not only does this make her the longest-serving creative industry SPV manager but it has also undeniably provided a considerable level of organisational consistency and institutional memory to her organisation, strengthening its professional networks and agenda-setting prowess. Over the years, several studies have singled out the CCDI as the prime example for successful microeconomic sector development through public-private partnership, as it has managed to regularly engage with different tiers of government, small and medium enterprises as well as academia on equal footing for a vast portfolio of projects which ranges from civic support programmes for female craft producers to the high-level negotiations as the primary author of the Western Cape Design Strategy (Western Cape Department of Economic Development and Tourism & Provincial Government of the Western Cape 2006; Joffe & Newton 15.12.2007, pp. 102f; OECD Territorial Reviews 2008; Provincial Government of the Western Cape 18.09.2013).

Thus, spurred by the early success of the CCDI, there was a significant push towards developing more creative industry sector bodies, adding a total of six more to the fold between 2002 and 2009. This was accompanied by a flurry of supporting public sector activities: In 2006, following its Micro-Economic Development Strategy, which had prominently asserted that the creative industries were a future growth sector and thus
warranted targeted government support\textsuperscript{183} (Western Cape Department of Economic Development and Tourism & Provincial Government of the Western Cape 2006), the provincial Department of Economic Development and Tourism established a designated Creative Industry Unit.

Though the Creative Industry Unit's portfolio was effectively only responsible for liaising with five of the sectors - namely film, craft, music, visual and performing arts - the remaining ones - IT and fashion (and later also furniture) - still fell under the same directorate. As then chief director of Trade and Sectoral development Jo-Ann Johnston explains, this was because "[w]e understood […] that effectively it's the synergising of all of them that creates the enabling environment as opposed to them as an individual thing" (Interview Johnston 22.02.2012). It needs to be highlighted that, for some time already, Johnston and her office had been running a personal advocacy drive for the creative industries within her department, based on her own professional experience abroad.

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This example of interurban policy learning is notable for two reasons: For one, because it provides a personal illustration of how the professional experience of globally mobile senior government practitioners can function as a gateway for policy trends from elsewhere, which then have to be continuously renegotiated within a local institutional

\textsuperscript{183} On the national level, the debate was also reanimated, this time by the Department of Labour which commissioned a report that explored the scale and scope of job opportunities on offer within South Africa's creative economy (Joffe & Newton 15.12.2007). And finally, the Department of Trade and Industry also intensified its collaboration with different creative sector bodies in order to strengthen the export of South African cultural and creative products (Interview Elk 21.11.2012).
context. Secondly, because Johnston's experience speaks against the often too readily assumed omnipresence of Richard Florida and the "spectre" (Novy & Colomb 2012) of his creative class that has been prominently raised within critical creative city literature (see ch. 3).

Let me elaborate: Although a handful of my respondents have made use of the term creative class and some high-profile politicians such as MayCo member Grant Pascoe have gone on record bolstering their political decisions with reference to well-known buzzwords of Floridian origins such as the 'three T's' of talent, technology and tolerance (Interview Pascoe 09.10.2012), I have found that - unlike in many US-American and European urban contexts - Florida's ostensible siren song has not penetrated Cape Town's local urban development discourse and political practice to any greater practical extend. For me, the explanation for an absence of such a decisive "Florida moment" (Peck 2012, p. 464) is twofold: For one and contrary to the hegemonic evangelical allure often ascribed to the creative class, those few practitioners who had engaged more thoroughly with Florida's ideas when they had emerged in the early 2000s had quickly realised that there was a stark mismatch between its conceptual premises and their lived experiences with the challenges of a developmental postapartheid state. For example, in 2004, a local designer commented in a public talk held at the 7th Design Indaba: "Let's for a minute bear in mind the relevance of this talk of the creative class to the realities right here at home. You can't eat ideas. Bridging the digital divide won't create a roof in itself. What's different here at home, is that instead of using our creative talents to buy more time to have more leisure or freedom as in the 'West', the challenge is to use the abundance of time that we have, that is, our vast labour resources, to creatively develop massively productive solutions using [...] appropriate technologies" (Haast 24.11.2004).

Moreover, as I have already implied (see chapter 2 and 3), in contrast to Florida's copious and ill-defined indexes, the UK's more pragmatic creative industry 'toolkits' had gained comparatively bigger local purchase within South Africa's rather technocratic local government. I argue that two general reasons for this can be invoked: Of course, for one it can be credited to the path-dependency of British imperialism that has unequivocally shaped many of South Africa's bureaucratic systems, which in turn remain particularly receptive to UK policy 'solutions'.

184 From amongst my respondents, only former Creative Cape Town Coordinator Zayd Minty, former Cape Town Partnership CEO Andrew Boraine and former Accelerate Cape Town CEO Guy Lundy made explicit reference to both Florida and his concepts.
Secondly, it can to a certain extend also be regarded as a result of proactive advocacy on the side of the British Council, the UK's main cultural diplomacy vehicle. As a purveyor of Foreign Direct Investment (the UK is also South Africa's biggest FDI source market with 33% of all FDI revenue Provincial Government of the Western Cape September 2013, p. 11), the British Council has been remarkably present throughout South Africa's biggest cities, acting as a knowledge broker, policy adviser and funding agency, for example in offering substantial support for local creative industry mapping studies (for a practical example, see Wits University & Joffe 2008).

In the case of Cape Town however, these factors were combined with and amplified by Johnson's professional experience as part of the South African diplomatic corps in London during the time of 'Cool Britannia'. In turn, I argue that her internal advocacy was an important factor for tipping her department in favour of the British model, which was further corroborated following a study visit by a British Council/DCMS delegation to Johnston's recently established Creative Industries Unit: "[...] we have had some people from the British Council that work in the UK to come and look at our programmes and they were quite amazed and found us quite far ahead in our thinking and our development in spite of only having started very recently. Our unique circumstance and our unique historical circumstances give us a kind of cutting edge in terms of what we got to work with. [...] That whole brand which is South African or which is Cape Town is unique, it has its own elements besides the geographic and the thing of the location but just our cultural history and our diversity and our social history and our political history gives us all kind of unique selling points in the world" (Interview Forbes 18.01.2011). Forbes' statement not only recalls an active episode of interurban knowledge exchange, but furthermore, it also mirrors an important sentiment that was also repeatedly conveyed by the majority of my interview partners: This is, that Cape Town was confronted with an ostensibly 'unique' set of postapartheid development challenges, which were not only prohibitive of any wholesale adoption of global policy 'solutions' but at the same time constituted a productive point of distinction on which to build Cape Town's own creative city narrative. As the Partnership's Andrew Boraine has for example also noted: "[...] going back to your Manchesters of the world - where the city council together with business, they can buy a ballet company from London and transport it to Manchester and just have a global cultural product move. There is no way we can ever compete with that and we shouldn't try to. Our success is we are doing it in the Cape...

\[\text{185} \] With reference to chapter 5.1 it needs to be noted that such sentiments however also add to the persistence of a problematic South African exceptionalism as political rationale.
Town style that's unique, that's quite laid back, where there is good social atmosphere - a good mix I think" (Wenz 17.12.2008). This comparison to the 'Manchesters of the World' can be read as a personal gesture of inter-referentiality (Ong 2011b), where a highly mobile yet territorially committed urban actor like Boraine is able to use his experience with, and knowledge of urban developments elsewhere as a sounding board for positioning his own context.

Furthermore, what both previous statements highlight is the epistemological importance of assuming a relational perspective when approaching local iterations of globally pervasive policy phenomena such as the creative city paradigm. Because, as this section has sought to discuss, their local uptake is as much structured by international consultancy networks, popular trends and institutional path-dependencies as it is shaped by personal histories, moral convictions, professional expertise and lived experiences of local decision-makers and other 'elite' actors.

In sum, up to 2009, a whole host of creative industry-related activities had come into existence and had gained public traction. Hence, numerous respondents, who have been actively involved in the above mentioned processes, recall this time as one of relatively firm political alignment and multi-level, cooperative governance (Interviews Johnston 22.02.2012, Minty 05.01.2011, Dyers 06.12.2010). Speaking about this period as the "golden days" of local creative city governance, Forbes elaborates: "[...] there was a point where the national department was also really interested in creative industries, [the Department of] Arts and Culture and the DTI [Department of Trade and Industry] at the national level were all embracing it. Then the Province was, Local [Government] was, and the ministers and the public servants were all in sync and were all helping each other and it was having a good old run, so to say. It couldn't have been better. But it had to...it went chrrrrr [emulating sound of descending plane] and then it crashed" (Interview Forbes 18.01.2011). The institutional and socio-political dynamics that were responsible for setting a rather abrupt end to these 'golden days' are worthwhile to unravel, as they add to a more nuanced account of globally 'travelling' urban development paradigms, which also take into account potential detours, discontinuities and power shifts.
7.1.2 Creative city detour

What Forbes has likened to a crashing plane had indeed been nothing short of a political about-turn that markedly shifted existing power balances within local creative city politics - in hindsight away from formal government programmes and towards neo-corporatist network mechanisms such as Creative Cape Town. So what had happened?

In the aftermath of the 2009 general elections, the provincial Department of Economic Development and Tourism had seen a change in its top leadership and with a new acting head of department also came a new programmatic direction and accompanying intra-departmental structure. "The new head of department came in with a really different approach and essentially he said: 'you are not going to work in the way you work - [the Creative Industry Unit] is going to now be called Commercial Arts and Entertainment"" (Interview Dyers 06.12.2010). While the Creative Industry Unit had operated under the department's 'Industrial Sector Development'-chapter with great autonomy, in its new dispensation as 'Commercial Arts and Entertainment' it was now reduced to serving as a mere support structure for the creation of additional tourism revenue in the run-up to the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa. Though it needs to be said that particularly craft had been known for its strong and apparently beneficial link with tourism (Interview Elk 21.11.2012), this did not uniformly apply across the other creative industry sectors. Quite to the contrary, many of the affected SPV directors and prominent cultural policy experts were highly sceptical about this reform. For one, because it severed established working relationships and institutional memory and secondly, because it reduced their 'creative' constituencies to mere handmaidens of a visitor economy that was already felt to be overly emphasised as the ultimate economic growth panacea in spite of plummeting tourist numbers in consequence of the 2008 global financial downturn (Interviews Theunissen 01.12.2010, Dyers 06.12.2010; see also ch. 3.2).

Mike van Graan, who had conducted the widely-cited creative industries study for the Western Cape Micro-Economic Development Strategy (MEDS), criticised: "It shows you where their minds are. Instead of tourism being there to support the creative industries they see it now as a sub-sector of tourism" (Interview van Graan 24.01.2011). For Forbes
and her colleagues, their narrowed-down remit coupled with the radical change of purpose and direction constituted an incommensurate set-back which led to their collective resignation, thus accelerating the already swift dismantling of their unit (Interview Dyers 06.12.2010, Forbes 18.01.2011, Johnston 22.02.2012). While Dyers and Johnston took up new positions within the department and continued playing a role within local creative city governance through their involvement as partners for the Fringe (see ch. 8.2.5), Forbes left to work as an independent cultural policy consultant.

In hindsight though, the abrupt end of the provincial Creative Industries Unit is just one, albeit vivid case in point for local government's "very ad-hoc approach to cultural development" (Interview Minty 05.01.2011) at the time, as well as for the strong role played by individual charisma, vision and network influence (or lack thereof) as a determining factor in local governance performance (see ch. 5.3.4 & 6.2). Asked whether the creative economy was still on the local political radar in spite of these recent changes, van Graan replied: "So you know it comes and goes in waves, depends on who the drivers are … so it's not sufficiently embedded within the minds of politicians or political parties for it to be there in a sustained way. It's very dependent upon whose vision happens to prevail at a particular time depending who's the leadership of the department […] so you constantly are in an educational mode where you are treating and training people who come in with the most basic understanding. They don't start where you ended with the previous person, they start where you began with the previous person so in that way ya it's a bit frustrating and it does depend very much on the vision and the energy and the drive of the person who happens to be heading up these things either politically or in terms of a bureaucratic revision that they are responsible for" (Interview van Graan 24.01.2011). Van Graan's observation also speaks to (Freeman 2012)'s performative reconceptualization of policy-making as a "wave-like phenomenon" (p. 18), with policy concepts and programme ideas reverberating through different institutional echo-chamber where they can either find a sympathetic ear or fade away unheard (see chapters 4.2 & 6.2).

In general, the irritation with fragmented and opaque formal governance structures that speaks from van Graan's statement has been a common thread in many of my interviews with SPV directors and cultural policy experts. Their unanimous critique
particularly related to the point that unforeseeable changes and organisational inconsistencies on both municipal and provincial levels frequently resulted in a lack of accountability regarding previous project agreements and funding commitments, in turn negatively affecting the level of trust between the different public and private actor positions. As Design Indaba founder Ravi Naidoo comments: "So the problem has been [...] that I've been here for sixteen years but it hasn't been the politicians that have been there for sixteen years. And I think the real issue has been consistency, there hasn't been a consistency of policy, and there hasn't been a consistency of relationships. So even when you create a relationship and you built trust and you deliver, the person is not there the following year. Then you start again from ground zero, re-presenting your credentials, say who you are, building trust again and the following year that person is not there" (Interview Naidoo 26.01.2011). This issue was occasionally exacerbated, through both inter- and intra-departmental struggles over budget distribution and occasional spats between the two tiers of local government, which in some cases even led to - albeit short-lived - withdrawals of already committed funds ¹⁸⁶ (OECD Territorial Reviews 2008, p. 226).

In all fairness, it however needs to be mentioned that problems of accountability were by no means exclusive to local public administration bodies but equally presented themselves within some of the SPVs - a prominent example being the temporary closure of the Cape Town Film Office (later renamed Cape Film Commission) in 2003 due to its investigation for serious financial irregularities and mismanagement ¹⁸⁷ (Jager 2003).

¹⁸⁶ A widely publicised example has been the withdrawal of CoCT funding for both the Design Indaba and Cape Town Fashion Council in September 2012 (one month before the official WDC announcement). The letters had apparently been sent in error and were hastily retracted, followed by an official statement of the City Council apologizing for the confusion and reinstating the funding for both organizations (http://www.capetownpartnership.co.za/funding-secure-for-design-indaba/).
¹⁸⁷ This has also been the only time in which a government official directly took charge of a creative industry SPV (Gwynne-Evans 20.06.2005, p. 10).
Without wanting to further delve into each individual case, it can be said that the seven creative industry SPVs fared rather differently in their respective public-private-partnership roles. Individual leadership issues aside, the emergence of 'strong' and 'weak' SPVs (see Figure 22) was also a consequence of more fundamental governmental shifts away from subsidised arts and culture towards creative entrepreneurship, and towards economic growth numbers as the ultimate measurement for overall social development. As Melanie Mahona, Deputy Director of the newly created 'Commercial Arts and Entertainment Unit' remarks: "It's about how to help create jobs - the commercialisation of the arts. Creating jobs, making sure that people are employed not just trade, trade, trade and money ploughed in. It is about jobs. It's not about social development. It's about commercialisation of it. It's about rents and stakes" (Interview Mahona 17.01.2011) This rationale mostly affected public support for those SPVs, which represented traditionally subsidised arts and culture sectors, namely PANSA, Vansa and, to a certain extent, CapeMIC. In comparison these three "little ones" only received sector development funding, as opposed to the "big ones"
- CTFC and CCDI - which also received additional project funding, particularly for market development and entrepreneurship workshops (ibid.).

The former director of VANS A, Peter Hayes, explained this governmental technology as follows: "Our relationship with the Department of Economic Development and its part of their drive with us and with PANSA is creating sustainable citizens to pay tax basically. They don't actually have an interest in how you get to create as long as your creativity is selling and you can you know buy groceries and buy a house and add to the economy" (Interview Mahona 17.01.2011). And even for Erica Elk, whose CCDI benefitted from this political rationale as it "ticks all the rights boxes in terms of economic value" has also felt a downside of this economic normalisation: "…everything is turned into, you know, 'What is the economic value and how do you become sustainable?' and I think there's definitely an argument to say that some aspects of creative production need to be subsidised" (Interview Elk 21.11.2012). Of course, this rift between a decreasing attention for arts and culture as a tool for social development (and in the case of South Africa national 'healing' and reconciliation) as opposed to an increasing self-responsibilisation of artists as "culturepreneurs" (Lange 2007) for the benefit of the broader knowledge economy is by no means exceptional but rather mirrors trends in many other cities touted as 'creative' (McRobbie 2002, 2006, 2009; Markusen 2006; Markusen et al. 2006; see also chapter 2).

Thus, the point I wanted to make with respect to the case of Cape Town is not the sheer existence of this arguably lamentable disjuncture. Rather, I want to show that albeit its dominance, the adoption of this entrepreneurial logic has neither been straight forward nor uncontested within a fractured local government complex that commonly seeks to assert itself as part and parcel of a developmental state. As, for example, Councillor Grant Pascoe emphatically reminded me: "Whatever our policy says, it [our actions] must be based on the development component of it. Because that's what we are, we are a developing organisation, we are a developmental local government you know?" (Interview Pascoe 09.10.2012) As I will show, while the WDC 2014 bidding process has been instrumental in accelerating the discursive amalgamation of developmental and entrepreneurial governance logics under the tag line of 'developmental design' (see ch. 7.3), this governmental process had already been well underway before. This also
underpins the argument of (Didier et al. 2013), who - in their comparison of BID processes in Cape Town and Johannesburg - have shown how these adaptive dynamics of variegated neoliberalisation have been increasingly characteristic for developmental urban governance.

A final observation that has also supported this point for me has been the comparatively minor role of the municipal government, specifically the CoCT's Department of Arts and Culture, during the early days of the creative city governance complex\textsuperscript{188} prior to the WDC 2014 bid. While numerous international case studies have shown how local cultural departments often act as central 'co-authors' of creative city 'scripts' (Peck 2005; Markusen & Gadwa 2010; Grodach 2012b), in Cape Town the Department of Arts and Culture found itself increasingly marginalised within the shifting local governmental logics.

Though, as an avid custodian of the so called 'grant-in-aid'-scheme\textsuperscript{189}, the department on the one hand provided sought-after sponsorship for different community arts interventions and cultural neighbourhood events, this was increasingly seen as a 'hand-out' that created little more than financial dependencies and was ultimately failing to support a broader creative city vision (Minty 14.05.2010). In return, this growing criticism was met by the department's senior staff with a mixture of defiance and scepticism: Asked for their role within promoting the supposedly burgeoning local creative economy and whether their department referred to the creative industries within their work, project manager Lesley Truter promptly replied that they were "not playing there" and her director Albert Webster agreed: "No, we are community development. Look how creative industries tend to be living within the whole economic development side of things rather than community development and social development" (Interview Truter and Webster 22.01.2009).

What clearly emerged from this interview was that the growing focus on creative industries within the local governance discourse was regarded as being severely at odds

\textsuperscript{188} As of late however, the local Department of Arts and Culture has started to significantly increase its presence within local creative city-making for two reasons: For one, in August 2012 non-other than former Creative Cape Town director and Fringe manager Zayd Minty crossed over to the public sector to take up the position as new Manager of Arts and Culture. Shortly afterwards, the CoCT and the Provincial Government also finalised their negotiations on a Protocol Agreement, which now grants the City full autonomy in arts and culture programming (p. 15).

\textsuperscript{189} Grant-in-aid funding is an official financial governance mechanism used throughout all tiers of government. On a year-by-year basis, registered non-profit organisations focused on sports, social and cultural development can apply to obtain project-specific support from respective government departments.
with the department's broader developmental mission, which mainly evolved around youth education and 'community empowerment'. As both respondents readily admitted, the growing emphasis of 'culture as economy' only added to the department's already existing crisis of legitimacy within a local government paradigm that was increasingly demanding to see a return on its investment in the form of growing GDP and job numbers. Webster sombrelly declared: "There's a lack of respect for the department. Not just Arts and Culture but also the whole Social Development [Portfolio], there's a complete lack of respect for us. Nobody takes us seriously" (ibid.).

Similar to Peck's (2012) assessment of Amsterdam's late-capitalistic creative city politics however, I would concede that there remains a need for further differentiation: While the statement could be read as simply supporting the claim that cultural policies have been entirely consumed by economic policies, this is in fact as much an exaggeration in the case of Cape Town as Peck has found it to be in the case of Amsterdam. Instead, what can be repeatedly derived from interviews with both cultural and economic development practitioners is that both political fields have been equally "inflected in the direction of a vision of creative competitiveness" (Peck 2012, p. 467).

In sum we can deduct that up to the year 2009/2010, Cape Town had already gone through several motions of becoming in trying to actualise itself as a creative city. However, with a range of different creative industry SPVs finding themselves in various stages of organisational maturity, a provincial government that in its intensifying drive for 'World Cup readiness' had turned its creative industry programmes into tourism support vehicles and a municipal Department of Arts and Culture that was "not in the frame of reference at all" (Interview Dyers 06.12.2010) due to its own internal struggle for political recognition, it can be concluded that the official creative city governance complex of the time at best presented itself as a fragmented and fickle construct. Hence, with "an absence of someone taking a very definite lead role" (ibid.), this begs the question: how then did the city come to compete for and subsequently even win the World Design Capital 2014 title a mere two years later?

190 This lack of institutional cohesion was furthermore exacerbated by significant changes within the local political landscape of the time, which saw mayor Helen Zille (DA) move into the office of the Western Cape Premiere, following the ANC's loss of the Western Cape in the 2009 general elections. In consequence, her successor Dan Plato (DA) was only left with two short years in office, before being replaced by the current mayor Patricia de Lille in the 2011 municipal elections.
7.1.3 The political prowess of Creative Cape Town…

At this point, I'd like to finally turn to the decisive role of the Cape Town Partnership and its Creative Cape Town programme. Officially launched in 2008, the initiative derived from previous work done by the Partnership in 2006, which had focused specifically on re-imagining Cape Town's historic City Hall as a cultural hub for the Central City. According to Zayd Minty, Creative Cape Town's first coordinator, "[The Partnership's CEO] Andrew Boraine had seen growth in the creative industries and was interested in how inclusive memorialisation could help to build bridges" (Creative Cape Town 29.3.2012) To recap, as a former city manager and founder of the South African Cities Network, Boraine's opinions on urban development issues carry considerable weight within local public discourse (see ch. 5.3.4) and coupled with the Partnership's reputation as a powerful relay for new urban management idea(1)s and practises, Creative Cape Town quickly assumed the primary "rallying role" (Interview Methvin 26.01.2012) for the local creative city narrative. As Boraine states: "We have recognised that understandings of culture often vary amongst city stakeholders. Many people think culture is simply about art and entertainment, and so we have to work hard to convince them of the important role culture has in the global knowledge economy" (Boraine August 2009).

In contrast to the creative industry SPVs and their sometimes rather parochial sector development missions, Creative Cape Town perceived itself from the beginning as a promotional platform for the entire creative economic spectrum for which it aims to provide "regular and structured opportunities for networking and information sharing" (Cape Town Partnership & Creative Cape Town Initiative 2009, p. 3). One respondent even proclaimed that "it's a pity that there's no equally strong government agency entity [sic!] that can command the same sort of respect [as Creative Cape Town]" (Interview Dyers 06.12.2010). Overall, Creative Cape Town's raison d'être was also inherently defined by the Central City Development Strategy's191 goal to "promote Cape Town as a

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191 The CCDS is an urban visioning process, jointly conducted by the Partnership and the City of Cape Town.
creative destination and as a cultural hub of the south” (Cape Town Partnership & City of Cape Town 2008, p. 39).

However, this suggested large remit was actually limited in two important regards: Firstly, though its name implies a city-wide sphere of action, just like it is the case with its institutional 'mothership' the Cape Town Partnership, Creative Cape Town in fact constitutes a misnomer, as operational geographical focus is limited to "building a vibrant creative milieu in the Central City" [ibid.; emphasis added LW]. This replication of apartheid's divisive socio-spatial patterns (see chapter 5.2) has unfortunately also been reflected in the majority of Creative Cape Town's programming which was either located in the 'City Bowl', the Fringe or the only allegedly inclusive social media space (see chapters 7.1 & 8.2.5). Secondly, in spite of the fact that Creative Cape Town swiftly grew into one of the Partnership's mainstay programmes, during its first five years the initiative was essentially run by only one full-time staff member - its coordinator Zayd Minty.

Based on my findings, I argue that the organisation's rapid ascent to one of the city's most recognised expert capacities and discursive nodes with regards to creative city-making cannot be understood without considering the charismatic persona of Minty. Furthermore, a cursory exploration of his professional vita also provides an inroad for understanding some of the more general dynamics of ‘elite' subject formation within Cape Town's local creative city politics, as many other individual 'stakeholders' are sporting equally multi-faceted development patterns (see Appendix B; for the importance of considering subject formation in urban politics of worlding refer to Hoffman's (2014) analysis of urban professionals in China).

7.1.4 … and its role as a translational space for creative city logics

Similar to many of his peers in Cape Town's local urban governance 'elite' who launched their careers in the early 1990s, Zayd Minty (born 8. November 1966, originally hailing from Durban) also started out in the field of social and anti-apartheid activism (see chapter 5.2.2). Between 1993 and 1996, he was the director of the Community Arts Project in Woodstock, a civil society-driven adult education centre, which had fostered the democratisation of the arts since the late 1970s through providing accommodation,
training and studio facilities for non-white artists, thus building an artistic platform in support of the anti-apartheid struggle, and later for national healing through the promotion of multi-racial expression (Hagg 2010; Lochner 2012).

After this, he was employed by two of the country's most well-known contemporary history museums, the Robben Island Museum (1997-1998) and the District Six Museum (2003-2005). All throughout, he also continued his work as a consultant and curator for several public art projects (Minty 2006), was engaged in the establishment of Vansa, registered for a PhD at the University of Cape Town and authored a widely-read position paper on "Culture and the Right to the City" (Minty 2008), before Boraine called on him to head up Creative Cape Town in 2008.

In sum, Minty's illustrious career for one provided him with vast practical experience in cultural management as well as a profound research knowledge pertaining to the latest global trends in culture-led urban regeneration (and their critique!). Moreover, it had also furnished him with an intimate grasp of Cape Town's cultural-creative 'elites' as well as with an extensive personal professional network, on which he was able to draw in his new position at the Partnership (Interview Minty 05.01.2011). Hence, it is unsurprising that whenever I posed the question to my respondents, which organisation they associated most with the rise of the creative city discourse in Cape Town or whom they would identify as a 'key driver', not only was Creative Cape Town frequently mentioned but more often still it was explicitly Zayd Minty in his individual professional capacity. As one respondent put it: "Zayd, I think really has a big weight on his shoulders because he really is probably the last free independent voice that can speak for both private sector and government, you know?" (Interview Dyers 06.12.2010).

This should by no means infer that he is the sole 'editor' of Cape Town's creative city 'script', but it does support the argument that his professional experience coupled with Creative Cape Town's mandate of communicating the creative city paradigm to the whole spectrum of local urban governance stakeholders, established Minty as a key translator of and advocate for urban cultural policy as an area which he saw as in need of urgent policy intervention: "So if you talk to policy makers who might talk about creative industries and you really push them they actually don't understand the broader issues. They don't understand any of the debates internationally, they don't understand the context locally, and they can't bring the two together that well because they just don't get it. There actually aren't many people who can translate it for them properly and
there is no money to make this policy work happen and become strategy in any real way so it's always very stop-and-go" (Interview Minty 05.01.2011).

In spite of what Minty and others repeatedly lament as the generally sluggish pace of local political circuits, his time at the helm of Creative Cape Town can nonetheless be regarded as a decisive and activity-laden period within the formation of the local creative city governance complex. Apart from launching two publications - a monthly email newsletter and the glossy Creative Cape Town Annual - and establishing a responsive internet presence in various social media spaces, one of Minty's first endeavours was to establish the 'Creative Clusters' forum. This quarterly gathering was aimed at providing an informal networking platform for the city's creative industry practitioners but swiftly came to double as an increasingly powerful public echo-chamber for local creative city visions. Initiated in 2008 under the broad and by now rather hackneyed theme "Re-Imagining Cape Town", the forum asked several distinguished guest speakers such as Design Indaba founder Ravi Naidoo, architect Mokena Makeka and communication specialist Porky Hefer to share their vision for Cape Town and its creative economy. In hindsight, the forum's 2009 theme constituted nothing less than a Promethean forerunner of things to come, as it asked: 'Is Cape Town a design city?' (see Figure 23). This particular podium, hosted during Design Indaba - Cape Town's annual gathering of international 'creative' expertise - provided a prime platform to discuss the feasibility of a local WDC bidding proposition in a casual atmosphere while testing the waters in terms of garnering support from an array of potential "circulators" (ibid.). In general it is important to note, that many people who have been prominently involved in Cape Town's WDC 2014 journey have also taken to the stage during at least one 'Creative Clusters' meeting. While these sessions were discontinued in 2011 after Minty started to focus fully on the Fringe (see chapter 8.2.5), it can be argued that they have played an important role in the initial emergence of local political advocacy for self-enterprising 'creative' practitioners.
Furthermore, in light of broader technocratic shifts towards more calculative forms of government, Creative Cape Town also recognised the pervasive power of developing its "calculative cultural expertise" (Prince 2013a). In a move to quantify Cape Town's cultural and creative acumen and to render them as intelligible fields for government intervention, it conducted the city's first Creative Industry Mapping survey (Cape Town Partnership & Creative Cape Town Initiative 2008). Even though the survey was limited to the CBD, it is a nowadays commonly cited truism that Cape Town (sic!) is home to over 1.000 creative businesses (City of Cape Town 2011; Interview Winde 14.02.2011) and its 'confetti map' (see Figure 13, p. 202) has become widely reproduced to underpin Cape Town's creative city claims. As Prince (2010a) has shown in the case of creative industry mapping studies in the UK, though the accuracy of such statistical representations must be drawn into question, they still provide a general sense of certainty to the existence of their examined 'object' (p. 787). Hence, it can be said that the enumeration of Cape Town's creative industries has also contributed to making them governable.

192 Though the first survey had been initiated in 2005 by the Partnership before the official launch of the Creative Cape Town Programme, the updated 2008 version is the common point of reference. Furthermore, while the provincial government had already released two previous expert reports, these had however only collated existing data from individual sector studies van Graan 2005a; van Graan 2005b. Creative Cape Town's survey of the Central City (!) thus represented the first cross-sectoral creative industry mapping document.
In sum, if we now compare the idle and by 2009 increasingly faltering support by both tiers of local government as well as the ensuing frustration amongst the 'creative' sector bodies to Creative Cape Town's visibility, agility and vast network of collaborators\textsuperscript{193} it is not surprising that its profile (and by extension that of its institutional 'mothership') were rapidly raised. While a few creative practitioners were openly critical of Creative Cape Town's growing role "as doorman to the City" (Levinsohn June 2011), the majority of my respondents also readily admitted that the Partnership was often their first port of call for sharing information and scoping out the political viability of projects they were envisaging and for which they needed local government support. As one cultural practitioner explained: "At least you know with the Partnership, I mean they've issues inside the Partnership as well as an institution and how they work and what they are able to do but they are much more light on their feet! And they can make decisions, they can pull people together, they are collaborative, they take on other people's ideas. [...] they don't have a heavy-handed, bureaucratic approach to things" (Interview Methvin 26.01.2012). And another one adds: "I tend to send the information more to the Cape Town Partnership and to Jo'burg rather than to the City [Council] just in case you know the Partnership can take it up and in relationship with the City they can kind of drive it" (Interview van Graan 24.01.2011).

This again exemplifies the powerful gate-keeping of the Partnership as a decisive and comparatively approachable governmental 'go-between' that not only shapes local discourses by disseminating information through its vast professional network but is also regularly called upon as a match-maker by private practitioners and government officials alike. However, amongst the general public this elevated status also fuelled stubborn misconceptions about both Creative Cape Town's and the Partnership's place within the formal urban governance structure, as Minty laments: "So people from outside, they don't quite know whether we are a government body - I have seen certain things were people think we are some kind of government agency and we're not really, [...] I think for the general person out there I don't think it's that apparent what it is. I mean most people seem to think we're local government\textsuperscript{194}" (Interview Minty 05.01.2011)

\textsuperscript{193} Besides regular meetings and project partnerships with CapeMIC, the CCDI, WCFI and CTFC, Creative Cape Town also worked closely with government, especially with the two former Creative Industry Unit's managers Johnston and Dyers on the East City Design Initiative (see ch. 8.2.5).

\textsuperscript{194} One should however not think that this confusion was completely unwarranted and entirely undesired by the organisation. Quite to the contrary, as since its inception, the Partnership had consistently strived to expanded its political profile from a technocratic urban management entity to a fully-fledged local "shadow government" (Pirie 2007). Thus, in order to fortify its standing as a powerful local governmental capacity to
Moreover, Minty's indivisible personal union with the Creative Cape Town office was also not without its difficulties, particularly when he left Creative Cape Town in 2011 in order to take up his new position as the manager of the Fringe Design and Innovation District: "I think for people I work with I'm attached to it as a brand but the people out there maybe less so, which is good. I mean, it shouldn't work like that but how it functions is not that easy. I mean personally I don't have a strong team that I can say to: 'now you carry forward things, is there somebody who can take over?' I don't have that, I didn't have that resource before. [...] The big issue is understanding policy. There isn't [sic!] a lot of people that understand what policy is and understand the broader situation. What's going on with Province, what's going on with National, they don't understand that. Then it's understanding the players, and I mean it's a lot of work it takes to get to know that. I've been fortunate that I've learnt that through a whole series of chance things. I didn't go in saying 'I must learn this in this way' - it just happened. So then to find other people to take that is not that easy" (ibid.).

This personal reflection shows just how intimately linked Creative Cape Town as an organisation has been to Minty's personal charisma, expertise, experience, convictions and professional network between 2008 and 2011. On a theoretical note, it however also highlights the way in which I have come to understand him: As an exemplary 'defamiliarised double agent', described by Roy (2012) as someone squarely "positioned within the apparatus and yet able to forge moments of subversion and [self-]critique" (p. 37). What will emerge throughout the following chapters though is that Minty's prominent position as a 'spider in the web' that is the local creative city governance complex did not end with his Creative Cape Town tenure. Quite the opposite, considering how instrumental he has also been in initiating both the WDC 2014 bid and the Fringe, he remains vastly entangled with Cape Town's evolving creative-cum-design city politics.

be reckoned with in its own right, a certain level of uncertainty about its institutional affiliation did indeed provide the Partnership with the strategic advantage of being able to play with its political (dis)association. 308
7.1.5 Interlude

In this section, I have sought to provide a synopsis of the most important role players and governance processes that have underpinned Cape Town's nascent creative city-making efforts. Though under individual scrutiny many of these divergent programmes, 'stakeholder' positions and partnerships may appear as little more than haphazard and short-lived fads which were continuously unsettled by organisational instability and engulfed by popular political uncertainty, it is their multiple and often unforeseen points of convergence through which we are able to encounter the early lineages of Cape Town's creative city governance complex.

In this, it is important to recognise that there is neither a unique point of origin nor a single champion but rather a multitude of different and newly emerging interest groups, neo-corporatist organisations and individual 'elite' professionals which have gradually joined and - at different points in time - influenced the local circuits of creative city discourse and governance practice. Most notably, the growing number of creative industry SPVs has unequivocally broadened the institutional spectrum and provided a breeding ground for early creative city visions. However, it needs to be reiterated that - by virtue of its mixed origin from top-down programmes (as in the case of the CCDI and CapeMIC) to bottom-up initiatives (as in the case of Vansa or the Cape Furniture Initiative) - the SPV 'terrain' never constituted a level playing-field of urban governance. Instead, it needs to be understood as a stratified spectrum of often incongruent and sometimes competing actor positions. Animated and drawn together by Creative Cape Town as a key intermediary, they have nonetheless played an important role in constituting the local creative industries as a collective field of governmental intervention for the local 'developmental' state.

With regards to local urban governance structures, the analysis furthermore highlighted that it is also pivotal to consider early programmatic failures and discontinuities, for they too have influenced institutional trajectories and tacit knowledge. In the case of the now defunct Provincial Creative Industries Unit, its dismantling did not only strengthen the public position of concurrently evolving neo-corporatist governance vehicles such as Creative Cape Town. In addition, it also left an internal legacy of experienced and well-networked managerial and senior staff within the Provincial government's LED department, who were actively seeking new ways for remaining
involved in Cape Town's creative city-making. This was made possible for one through offering funding for the development of the Fringe (see chapter 8.2.5). Secondly and of importance for the following section, senior professionals like the head of the former Provincial Creative Industry Unit Jo-Ann Johnston were called upon as members of the WDC 2014 bid committee in their expert capacity as creative city 'knowledge brokers' (see Figure 30). With this in mind, I will now turn my attention towards this accolade and how it became 'emplaced' in the Cape.
In order to get an impression of the early WDC 2014 bidding advocacy and rationales, please watch video #1 – #4 on the accompanying DVD.

7.2 The World Design Capital 2014 bid

After having explored, how the globally pervasive creative city trope had initially come to gain a foothold within Cape Town's local urban governance sphere, I'd now like to turn towards the city's bid for the title of World Design Capital 2014. Based on the following findings, I argue that the WDC 2014 bid and ensuing designation have played a crucial role, both in fuelling the local creative city discourse and in significantly expanding the practical scope for creative urban policy fixes (Peck 2005). At the same time, I also want to provide insights into the rather speculative and fluid nature of the project, which - through becoming a platform for a divergent range of 'elite' actors - has also provided unforeseen opportunities for slippage and alternative debates on Cape Town's urban future.

However, before delving into the particularities of Cape Town's bidding experience it is important to take a more general look at the World Design Capital award scheme and to explore some of the key logics that underlie the city's growing penchant for what I call 'urban pageantry'. Here, I will specifically hone in on the institutional path-dependencies that I argue can be traced between Cape Town's role as a major host city during the 2010 FIFA World Cup and the succeeding bid for the WDC 2014 title. This will then be followed by further unpacking the genealogy of Cape Town's WDC 2014 bid story, including its main narrative, its introspective and "extrospective" (McCann 2013) politics of worlding as well as the new-found design mindedness of local governance actors as a form of "elite dreaming" (Ong 2011b, p. 17). In the form of an excursus, I also
want to problematise what I have observed as an emergent practice within the WDC 2014 process, namely the growing tendency to use social media outlets for engaging an ostensibly ‘general’ public through what I call ‘#governance’ (read: *hashtag governance*). Keeping with the chronology of the process, this chapter will conclude with a close reading of events that encompassed Cape Town's official designation as WDC 2014 in October 2011, before Chapter 8 will pick up on the specific politics that ensued.

### 7.2.1 What is a World Design Capital?

First launched in 2008 in the Italian city of Torino, which functioned as a pilot, the accolade has since been awarded biennially by the International Council of Societies of Industrial Design (Icsid) to provide “a distinctive opportunity for cities to showcase their accomplishments in attracting and promoting innovative design, as well as highlight successes in urban revitalisation strategies” (Icsid 2014, p. 6). Over the course of one calendar year, in addition to seven pre-set 'signature events', the designated city produces an individual programme of design-related projects. Previous title holders include Seoul in 2010 and, most recently, Helsinki as WDC 2012. By Icsid's own account, the global rise of the creative city narrative has additionally propelled the popularity of the award: “The evolution of the creative industries, their impact and contributions to the global economy, have helped Icsid to position the WDC project as an outlet for design to be recognised as a significant accelerator in city development” (ibid., p. 13). As we know, by 2008, banking on local creative industries to provide new urban development impulses was hardly an innovative approach in and of itself. Rather, what Icsid was able to tap into and still continues to capitalise on with its award scheme is the ever-growing propensity of many cities to jostle for international attention through engaging in what I call 'urban pageantry'.

This practice of showcasing a city's 'body' (natural beauty, infrastructure, administrative service capacities etc.) and 'soul' (local cultural tradition, artistic scene, political participation mechanisms etc.) in an emotive and publicly celebrated "race for the right face" (Creative Cape Town 26.01.2011) has been traditionally linked to

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195 The inspiration for this term came through one of my interviews, in which my respondent remarked that Cape Town too often came across "as being a ditsy beauty queen", too overtly focused on "spectacular beauty" and "enchantment". To him, this however obscured other facets of the city's "personality" such as it being a "business hub" (Interview Naidoo 26.01.2011).
sport-centred mega-events such as the Olympic Games or the FIFA Soccer World Cup. While being named an official Olympic or World Cup host city is still commonly regarded as one of the biggest (and apparently most lucrative) global endorsements for a city, the often overburdening public costs, unpredictable social repercussions and rigid regulatory corsets of these accolades present increasingly sore spots for potential applicants (Pillay et al. 2009).

Furthermore, the respective bidding processes either have to be principally driven by national government (in the case of the FIFA World Cup) or at least need to involve the national level in terms of financial securities (in the case of the Olympics). In turn, this has strengthened alternative urban award schemes that are within direct reach of city governments, particularly in the field of arts and culture. Inspired by popular examples such as the European Capital of Culture, the WDC as a "city promotion project" (Icsid 2014, p. 6) provides a sought-after yet, compared to sporting mega-events, more affordable 'badge of honour' for local urban policy-makers. However, unlike its European role model, on top of the costs for compiling a winning bid campaign, the WDC comes with an additional price tag of 635,000 CAD\textsuperscript{196} (approx. 6 million ZAR) in submission and administration fees as well as costs for staging the six prescribed 'signature events' (ibid., p. 35).

From having Table Mountain listed as one of the "World's New Seven Wonders of Nature\textsuperscript{197}" in 2012 (City of Cape Town 03.03.2012), via a plethora of tourism-related accolades, including leading the New York Time's annual destination list (City of Cape Town 12.01.2014), to being designated as the "World's Earth Hour Capital" by the World Wide Fund for Nature in March 2014 (City of Cape Town 28.03.2014), Cape Town's penchant for urban awards\textsuperscript{198} has evidently increased over the past three years. While accolades, prizes and titles appear to have successively seeped into the city's urban

\textsuperscript{196} This is broken down in a 10,000 CAD$ (98,000 ZAR) non-refundable application fee, 25,000 CAD$ (245,000 ZAR) administration fee for shortlisted cities and 600,000 CAD$ (5.8 million ZAR) hosting fee, payable in three instalments over 3 years (Icsid 2014, p. 35).

\textsuperscript{197} This accolade however sparked considerable international controversy as its 'owner', the "7 Wonders of Nature Foundation" was accused of demanding cities to pay inflated marketing and licensing fees (Milton 10.11.2011). Cape Town's tourism agency and other government outlets (including the national Minister of Tourism) nonetheless continued to vocally support the competition, calling on citizens to vote for Table Mountain and secure the title.

\textsuperscript{198} The City Council even maintains an official "Achievements and Awards" webpage, accessible here: https://www.capetown.gov.za/en/achievementsandawards/Pages/default.aspx
governmentality, I want to argue that there is a particularly strong and interesting set of path-dependencies that exist between Cape Town's stint as a 2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup host city and its designation as World Design Capital 2014 (see Table 4, p. 131). As I will show, the ambiguous lessons taught by the World Cup experience have been instructive for many political connections, rationalities and modes of governance that have given rise to the local WDC project as the latest iteration of the local creative city planning complex.
The World Design Capital – Figures and Facts

The World Design Capital is awarded biennially by the International Council of Societies of Industrial Design (Icsid), a non-profit organisation based in Montreal, Canada. Founded in 1957 with the objective to "protect and promote the interests of the profession of industrial design", it now forms an integral part of the International Design Alliance (IDA), an umbrella organisation for different design disciplines. The winning WDC city is traditionally announced during its biennial summit.

The World Design Capital designation was first awarded to Torino in 2008. Later winners were Seoul in 2010 and Helsinki in 2012, with the designated city for 2016 being Taipei.

The WDC Organisational Structure is split into two levels: WDC Programme Management responsible for the overall development, promotion and management of the WDC brand internationally (Icsid) and the WDC Project Management in charge of development and implementation of the local events (host city). The host city is obligated to stage seven signature events:

- Signing ceremony
- New Year's Eve of Design
- Design Gala
- International Design Policy Conference
- International Design House Exhibition
- Design Week Forum
- Convocation Ceremony

The newly established independent Cape Town Design NPC acts as the local implementing body, assisted by a selected board, a curatorial panel as well as an international advisory committee. They have jointly identified four official themes to guide Cape Town's WDC programme in 2014:

- "African Innovation. Global Conversation"
- "Bridging The Divide"
- "Today For Tomorrow" and
- "Beautiful Spaces. Beautiful Things".

Additionally, the City of Cape Town employs its own WDC 2014 programme department, which is run under the formal institutional auspices of the Tourism, Events and Marketing directorate.
"The 2010 FIFA™ World Cup gave us the platform to overturn our reputation from a no-go zone to a must-go zone."
(Alan Winde, Western Cape Minister of Finance, Economic Development and Tourism in City of Cape Town (2011), p. 374)

7.2.2 Joined at the hip - from FIFA World Cup 2010 to World Design Capital 2014

Between June and July 2010, Cape Town alongside eight other South African cities, hosted the continent's first FIFA World Cup tournament. The resulting "festivalisation of urban policy" (Steinbrink et al. 2011) has provided a rich empirical seam for critical urban studies and South Africa's World Cup experience has loomed particularly large in light of the growing trend of staging international mega-events in the 'global south' (Cornelissen 2004; Pillay & Bass 2008; Alegi 2008; Haferburg & Steinbrink 2010). While much of this rich work has comprehensively addressed the socio-material, spatial, representational and economic legacy of the South African World Cup, there remains a certain gap regarding the effects of its governmental legacy, i.e. how the collective institutional memory created amongst local policy-makers and emergent 'elite' governance networks has shaped subsequent development patterns.

While, as I will show, much of Cape Town's WDC 2014 process evidently involves great levels of "extrospective governance" (McCann 2013), meaning that elite actors legitimise their decisions by drawing on 'innovative' examples from elsewhere in the world, the following analysis also reveals how it has been equally shaped by episodes of intro- and retrospection as individuals and organisations review, adjust and defend their actions in light of antecedent local events. While certain path-dependencies emerge - specifically when considering the temporal alongside the spatial scale as demanded by
(McCann 2003) - these relational processes we encounter as the 'back stories' of policies are at the same time deeply iterative, incomplete and thus non-deterministic (Jacobs 2012, p. 418). Hence, instead of seeing the WDC 2014 simply as the continuation of the 2010 World Cup by other means, we need to carefully untangle the continuities and discontinuities between these two events as they have derived from layered and overlapping social processes of negotiation and knowledge diffusion - or as one respondent has put it: "it was almost like one of those sort of osmosis-sy things. A number of things happened at the same time that put this [the WDC] onto the radar" (Interview Burton 05.08.2013).

A first blip on this proverbial radar appeared in February 2009, when shortly after Icsid had successfully concluded its WDC pilot in Torino (Italy), the organisation's executive board held a meeting in Cape Town, where it was hosted by the Design Institute199 of the South African Bureau of Standards and CPUT's senior design faculty. During this gathering, Icsid officially announced that it would continue its WDC programme and informally indicated that it would be favourably inclined towards supporting a bid from a developing country city in the near future (Interviews M'Rithaa 30.01.2012, Snaddon 15.02.2013). This evidently sparked the imagination of CPUT's design faculty dean Prof. Johannes Cronje and his colleagues, who in their capacity as both design practitioners and educators, saw the award as a prime opportunity for expanding global market access for local craft and design products that could in turn create jobs for their graduates and provide greater reputation for their niche discipline (Interview Snaddon 15.02.2013). Shortly after the meeting, Cronje initiated a discussion about Cape Town's bidding prospects with Zayd Minty at Creative Cape Town (Interview M'Rithaa 30.01.2012). Considering the programmatic context of the time, it needs to be mentioned that this conversation happened concomitantly to the establishment of the East City Design Initiative, in which both Creative Cape Town and CPUT's Design Faculty were already acting as joint stakeholders (see chapter 8.2.5). Hence, this offered the singular opportunity of presenting the Fringe and the WDC 2014 bid as a mutually beneficial and effective package deal to local decision-makers, whose capacities and resources were stretched rather thinly less than a year before the World Cup kick-off.

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199 Adrienne Viljoen, in her capacity as managing director of the SABS Design Institute, had already served on Icsid's executive board twice for two successive 2-year periods (1995-1999 and 2003-2007). Later, she also acted as an avid supporter of and unofficial advisor to Cape Town's bid committee, which she had also helped to select.
Nonetheless, there was a growing sense of urgency in terms of defining the city's development trajectory past 2010, particularly as public criticism around the event was rife, ranging from the contested location of the stadium\textsuperscript{200} to the heavy prohibitions of informal traders in public spaces, and from the displacement of the urban poor to the resistance of the taxi driver associations against the Integrated Rapid Transit transportation scheme (Haferburg & Steinbrink 2010; Haferburg 2011; Pillay et al. 2009).

Albeit the prospects of unifying citizens to "celebrate Africa's humanity" as the official World Cup slogan promised, local governance practitioners were also becoming increasingly aware that this would only temporarily suspend the critical voices, which would quickly resurface in a wake of post-tournament dejection fuelled by unfulfilled growth expectations and unabated financial qualms about the future maintenance of Cape Town's costly stadium\textsuperscript{201} precinct. It was within this ambiguous environment of anxious expectancy that the Partnership fielded the idea of bidding for the WDC.

As the then Managing Director of the Partnership Bulelwa Makalima-Ngewana explains: "...we realised that Cape Town needs the next big thing. And that next big thing should be around creativity and innovation. So we already decided in 2009 that we should be bidding for the World Design Capital" (Interview Makalima-Ngewana 21.02.2012). However, it still needed to prove to both their local governance peers and the general public, why the WDC would not just be the next best but indeed the next big thing. On the one hand, the Partnership's foray spoke into the hearing of those local governance practitioners, who had already been looking for ways to build on the platform of the World Cup in terms of international marketing and branding (Interview Makalima-Ngewana 21.02.2012), as well as to ensure a continued use of the (venue) infrastructure it had left behind (Interview Lundy 09.02.2011).

Just like the Partnership, in the run-up to the World Cup many actors had come to understand that they were able to amplify their respective strategic visions for the city "by

\textsuperscript{200} The geographical location of the stadium was one of the most pervasive and controversially debated questions during the entire World Cup planning period. For a detailed discussion of the local politics around Cape Town's selection venue sites (Bob & Swart 2009).

\textsuperscript{201} Though the stadium is considered one of the city's key assets, its operating costs have amounted to over 436 million ZAR since the financial year 2009/2010, with a return of only 92 million ZAR. In connection with the ballooning costs during its construction, several companies have been found guilty and fined for unlawful tender collusion and price fixing (SAPA 08.05.2013).
building them into the impetus of a mega-event" (Interview Burton 05.08.2013). This particularly referred to the much-evoked power of deadlines and shared accountability to independent structures outside the country, which had strengthened professional 'elite' networks through establishing a greater need for collaboration between different tiers of government, line departments as well as public and corporate players (Zille 14.10.2010; Interviews Makalima-Ngewana 21.02.2012, Johnston 22.02.2012). As the WDC 2014 bid book would later phrase it: "Leading up to the 2010 FIFA World Cup there was considerable behind-the-scenes visioning processes within our tourism agencies, in business circles and around urban nodes. Through this process a shared vision for Cape Town emerged, of an inclusive, innovative, entrepreneurial, sustainable and African City" (City of Cape Town 2011, pp. 78; emphasis added LW).

Moreover, 2014, the year of Cape Town's envisaged WDC tenure, would not just present any deadline. Marking the 20th anniversary of South Africa's young democracy, it was emotively presented as nothing less than "an opportunity to reflect on where we've come as a nation, a city, a community and how we'd like to design our future" (Creative Cape Town 2011-11-08). As Lianne Burton, former communication strategist for the Partnership, eloquently phrased: "You know the stuff we started doing during the World Cup is the way the world is moving, those competencies, the ability to deal with messiness, to iterate, to not have a fixed sense of how things are gonna end up, to be comfortable with learning - all of that is what the World Design Capital can continue to give us" (Interview 05.08.2013).

Burton's sentiment of the World Cup as important learning exercise was shared by the majority of my respondents, though not always in such exclusively positive terms. While many pointed towards the opportunity to use WDC for reframing the city's World Cup infrastructure (especially the highly contested stadium) as a 'design asset', many also saw it as a platform to seriously interrogate derivative failures and mishaps of the local World Cup governance process that they did not want to see repeated. This particularly pertained to the tacit acceptance of FIFA's notoriously autocratic behaviour, which had by and large 'steamrolled' local democratic procedures to the detriment of local decision-makers, who ended up hamstrung in their own administration while having to

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202 It is significant that according to Cornelissen (2008) extending domestic goals to the international sphere and linking internal and external policy objectives has also been a distinct characteristic of South Africa's national World Cup orientation (p. 488).

203 A very poignant and heavily criticised example of this has been FIFA's contested 'security architecture', which included the alteration of city by-laws without public comment as well as the establishment of 24-hour special courts, "which ensured the speedy prosecution of offenders […] in a country infamous for lost dockets and long pre-trial periods" (Berg et al. 2013, p. 86).
bear the brunt of their citizens' discontent. As one respondent aptly commented on this disenfranchisement: "There was more a hype than anything and also the elite mentality of the FIFA where they actually dictate terms...They are just like using your country as a backdrop but it actually is just business for them, it doesn't matter where they are" (Interview M'Rithaa 30.01.2012). Though Icsid was occasionally referred to as 'The FIFA of design', such tongue-in-cheek comments wittingly overstated the organisation's regulatory capacity and modes of engagement. In fact, several interviewees pointed out that Icsid was itself still in a learning phase regarding its relatively young award scheme: "I think they've been very surprised by the popularity of World Design Capital, this is only the 8th year. So they are learning as well and they have been very open about that. They want to have a partnership approach to everything rather than a legalistic parent-child approach to it, which is very welcome" (Interview Makalima-Ngewana 21.02.2012).

Hence, from the very beginning, proponents of the WDC were at pains to present the award as qualitatively different from the 2010 World Cup, not only in terms of its comparatively lower costs for purchasing Icsid's corporate logo and branding rights but more importantly regarding the room to manoeuvre it offered local authorities for defining their own year-long programme beyond the seven prescribed signature events: "One of the great strengths of the bid is that the city which wins does so on the basis of great ideas that help redesign that city rather than necessarily being similar to design cities like London or New York. This is unlike the World Cup bid, an opportunity for the city to remake itself" (Creative Cape Town 2010-05-24). In other words: the WDC 2014 bid presented a prime platform for worlding the city by design!

Another interviewee even proclaimed that the WDC was not "a mega-event but a mega-initiative" (Interview Burton 05.08.2013), thus emphasising that 'design' could be looked at from more serious angles than the World Cup, which was essentially about sports and entertainment. However, though this freedom of discretion in defining one's own terms was seen as one of the accolade's greatest assets, it simultaneously presented one of its biggest challenges. While the Soccer World Cup had been easily communicable for all intents and purposes, the meaning and ostensible benefits of the WDC award had to be more vigorously articulated to the public and local decision-makers alike, ever more so because both groups were increasingly preoccupied with the approach of the former.

In turn, the chance to travel to the then reigning WDC 2010 Seoul for a first-hand experience presented itself as a decisive opportunity for the bid lobby. A small delegation of policy brokers consisting of Makalima-Ngewana, Burton (then still marketing manager...
of Cape Town Tourism) and Alderman Felicity Purchase (MayCo member for Economic Development and Tourism) had been seconded by the executive mayor to represent Cape Town at the inaugural World Design Cities Summit in order to officially sign the 'Seoul Design Declaration'. Burton's recollection of this trip provides a vivid account of both the practises and possible consequences of such ephemeral interurban knowledge exchanges:

"It was before the World Cup, we were ready to welcome the world and let's just hop to Seoul to look at our next big thing. So it was really interesting! Cape Town signed the...there was a declaration for the cities that committed to using design to make the cities a better place for their citizens. And that really, at that point we decided, we definitely, definitely want to bid. And it was good because Felicity Purchase went on behalf of the City [Council] and [she] was surrounded by First World, Third World, somewhere-in-between world, mayors, very senior politicians who were all taking design very seriously, who were all standing up and talking about how much it has already done to make their cities function better. So it really made it tangible. And just... it had gravitas. So it was, I think, three days of millions of sessions, I mean sometimes going on in tandem and we had to split up but there was just a total sense of 'this is not just notching up another award for the super model [Cape Town]'... [chuckle] this is seriously a game-changer. And an investment, a real investment in a tool that can help us to shape the city that we want. [...] So she [Felicity Purchase] came back and I think her message was mainly: wow! The most dynamic cities in the world are taking design very seriously. And not just the developed world! The developing world, the developing world, it's East and West, it's North and South you know? It was a huge cross-section. So I think that...I mean that got the City [Council], I mean even before the World Cup to say, 'ok, we're happy to bid'."

Drawing on Roy and Ong (2011), what Burton describes can be best understood as an exemplary episode of worlding. The social flurry of an international conference spectacle with its myriad of policy workshops, best practice reports, case study sessions, expert roundtables, award luncheons and chance encounters reportedly provided Cape Town's delegation with ample inter-referencing opportunities. Furthermore, the close-up encounter with Seoul as a 'model' design city opened up new frontiers of speculation and aspiration for the Cape Town envoys (Goldman 2011). Thus, the smorgasbord of citations, allusions, comparisons and competitions - the "actually existing comparative urbanism" (Clarke 2012a) - held two important insights for Burton and her fellow 'policy tourists': Firstly that following the example of Seoul and re-framing design as a socio-technical multi-purpose 'tool' expanded the notion's reach and relevance well beyond late-modern, post-industrial centres of the West and into the broader 'global
south'. And secondly, that Cape Town - the already award winning 'super model' - should not be left behind but instead lead from the front. In consequence, this embodied experience of collective "elite dreaming" (Ong 2011b, p. 17) became an important decision aid that finally tipped the scale in favour of wanting to join the fold of international 'design cities'.

In consequence, shortly after returning from Seoul with reinvigorated enthusiasm and confidence, the Partnership submitted its formal application to the City Council, asking for an official mandate and financial support to pursue the bid on behalf of the local executive. Endorsed by Purchase through an animated report of her experience in South Korea, the application was successfully passed and 2 million ZAR allocated in public sponsorship (Cape Town Metropolitan Council Resolution C 14/05/10). While, in comparison to the exuberant spending on the World Cup, this presented a much more cautious fiscal commitment, some of my respondents still perceived it as a leap of faith. That the Council was willing to allocate a budget in spite of the greatly escalating World Cup expenditure and the vociferous public critique thereof, was also interpreted as a vote of confidence for the Partnership as the project's main facilitator. They in turn welcomed the Council's arm's length approach, as sizable public funds also promised greater freedom of discretion in involving the private sector: "We also made a promise during our bidding process that this designation will not be on at the back of taxpayers because taxpayer have already paid for the FIFA World Cup. We are not asking them to pay for this Design Capital designation. So it's important that the money that the City [Council] puts forward as seed funding is leveraged through private sector support. Otherwise it becomes extremely expensive and it becomes unnecessarily public sector focused when it needs to be balancing both sides" (Interview Makalima-Ngewana 21.02.2012).

In turn, after political support for the bid had been secured, the Partnership turned its lobbying efforts towards the private sector and design-affectionate parts of civil society. In late February 2011, the Partnership broached the subject of entering Cape Town into the WDC competition at the 13th Design Indaba\footnote{This week-long international conference for high-profile design practitioners and primary national marketplace for local designer goods and services had in and of itself been a key narrator of Cape Town's design story and its founder Ravi Naidoo has been unequivocally referred to as a pivotal gatekeeper for the sector (see also ch. 8.2.1). Furthermore, his company Interactive Africa managed South Africa's successful World Cup bid and acted as official government liaison on behalf of FIFA (www.interactivafrica.com).}. In an interactive stand - installed in cooperation with Cape Town Tourism - it asked visitors the (evidently highly suggestive) question 'What makes Cape Town a Design City? ' and prompted them to
scribble their responses right onto the surface of the display (see 'WDC 2014 @ Design Indaba' collage in Appendix F). The intention of this 'collaborative' exercise was to "build a tribe [sic!] of passionate World Design Capital 2014 supporters, local creatives and opinion makers to take the city's bid forward" (Creative Cape Town 2011, p. 50).

In another move as the now 'designated driver' of the bid, the Partnership canvassed its extensive network for reputable individuals to form part of an official Bid Committee that could lend professional credibility, expert advice and social legitimacy to the project. Apart from Makalima-Ngewana, Minty and Burton (meanwhile having been appointed as the Partnership's new brand communication consultant), the final committee consisted of another twelve well-known urban and local economic development practitioners (for full list see Appendix D). These had already been closely connected to the Partnership and amongst one another through parallel projects such as the Fringe (Figure 36).

At the same time, the majority was also intimately involved with World Cup-related operations, for example Dr. Laurine Platzky, as the Provincial Government's Chief World Cup programme coordinator or architects Luyanda Mpahlwa and Mokena Makeka, who served on the stadium's technical oversight committee and the 2010 Arts and Culture task team respectively. These antecedent network connections provided the WDC committee members with a sense of familiarity, professional credibility and mutual trust. At the same time however, the fact that only weeks remained to kick-off also created a difficult bottleneck situation for the project. As Makalima-Ngewana explains: "when we started the bidding process we were already in the last phase of preparing for the FIFA World Cup. So we had these two big things happening at the same time and availability and time and capacity was really at a premium at the time. So we pushed and pushed and pushed and worked with whoever was available and [uhm] in fact we only started putting together the bid book in earnest at the beginning of 2011. And we were already left with two to three months to submit. So a whole lot of work had to be done and we couldn't consult widely" (Interview Makalima-Ngewana 21.02.2012).

In spite of these constraints, the Partnership was nonetheless able to submit a 465-pages strong book to Icsid's Canadian headquarters in the final days of March 2011. During its official handover to the then executive mayor Dan Plato, he explicitly

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205 As one respondent rightly noted "the World Design Capital was a really good rallying point but it drew very particular creatives, very spatial creatives i.e. furniture design, architecture, you know that kind of creative" (Interview Methvin 26.01.2012).
welcomed the bid as "part of a broader vision to position Cape Town as a leading global
city and to build on our World Cup success" (City of Cape Town 30.03.2011). From a
technical standpoint, the document honoured Icsid's application requirements and entered
Cape Town as an official contender alongside 56 other applicants from 24 different
countries\textsuperscript{206}. Following its submission however, comments by bid stakeholders and local
media quickly revealed that this bright-yellow tome was regarded as more than just a
means to an end: Not only had the process brought a whole host of influential actor
positions together (again), but the end product also provided a powerful discursive
framing device that reinvigorated many of Cape Town's foregone creative city claims by
incorporating them into a novel design city trope. In order to understand the nature of this
vision and how it came to increasingly percolate Cape Town's urban development
discourse and governance practice, the following takes a closer look at Cape Town's
'Good Book' of design.

\textsuperscript{206} Not all applicants were known but some that were mentioned in local media statements included Beijing
and Bilbao (Creative Cape Town 2011, p. 52).
"If 'design' is becoming the centre of our interest, and if the question of design is taking the place of the question of the idea, then the ground is beginning to shift under our feet." (Flusser & Cullars 1995, p. 53)

7.3 Designs on development?

While the previous argument has been primarily focused on unpacking the socio-political lineages of Cape Town's WDC bid, this section will focus on the emergence of design as an ostensibly indispensable tenet for imagining and producing Cape Town's urban future. As I will show, the bid book has played a decisive role in shaping the local discourse around design as a novel imperative for city-makers and citizens alike and thus constitutes a rich empirical seam for analysis. Before I can however turn to this, some general remarks about defining design (or rather the impossibility thereof) are necessary.

"'Designer' as an adjective has come to connote prestige and desirability, while 'designer' as a noun has come to connote celebrity. Because of the prestige and mystique socially accorded to creativity, design adds exchange value to products, conferring a presumption of quality even though, like the emperor's clothes, this quality might not be apparent to the observer," (p.4) writes Knox in the opening passage of his illuminating book *Cities and Design* (2011). Having first gained currency in the era of industrial mass manufacturing and consumption as both a maker and marker of value, design in the current 'age of creativity' (see chapter 2) has come to occupy a central position as "a crucial component of modernization, a product and carrier of modernity, and a central tenet of Modernism" (ibid., p. 16). As such design functions as a powerful idea for the production of the social: "It takes part in organising businesses, industries, and world systems; it is a socio-economic marker differentiating classes through ideas like 'taste' and 'quality'; it is a

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207 For an etymology of design refer to Flusser & Cullars (1995). For a broader discussion of its philosophical bearings see further Flusser (1999).
cultural force creating meaning and identity through the symbolic economy of consumerism; ultimately, it is in essence an organising, ordering structure for society, and it is growing in political and economic prominence as it both directly and indirectly shapes our experience of life, our values and norms, our desires and needs" (Milestone 2007, p. 177).

That his words deeply resonate with the assessment of many cultural theorists regarding the societal omnipresence of a creative imperative shows just how inherently co-constitutive the notion of design is to the contemporary dispositif of creativity and vice versa (see chapter 3.1). After all, design and creativity are both mutable cultural logics that - as power-laden and normative "vehicular ideas" (Peck 2012) - feed of each other and can thus be jointly mobilised and emplaced. Nonetheless, in order to understand the specific allure for Cape Town's creative city planning complex in adopting a design-focused narrative, it is important to spell out some nuances.

While both build on the general capability of the human brain to produce new meanings, forms and imaginations, creativity is neither necessarily conscious nor rational. In comparison, for design as "the process that links the desirable with the possible" (Knox 2011, p. 38) these are essential preconditions. In consequence, design has also been defined as the nexus between art and technology, and thus as an inextricable premise for value creation and identity formation in the knowledge economy. At the same time however, design is less and less confined to the mere (mass-)production of objects and symbols. In a sanguine 21st century blend of art, science and technological innovation, design has been picked up as a form of practical research as well as an autonomous epistemic discipline (for design as a nascent culture of knowledge production see Mareis 2011). Like art, design offers aesthetic enchantment while, like science and technology, it is simultaneously heralded as "the pre-eminent solution to all the complex and difficult conundrums of modern life" (Milestone 2007, p. 177). In other words, what makes design so compelling is, firstly, the proposition that it can make beauty and utility mutually attainable and, secondly, that it is a process imbued with notions of scientific rigour and objectivity. With regard to Cape Town I argue that widely used descriptions of design as a 'methodology', a 'tool' and a way of 'thinking' are important signifiers for this technocratic understanding of design as reflective and purposeful.

However, one of the greatest tensions in defining design derives precisely from the question of its expedience. As a driving force behind the production of global brands,
images and commodities it is undeniable that design thrives in the temples of global consumption, thus acting as a stabilising agent of our prevailing political economic system (Knox 2011, p. 36). Though this imperative of 'design for desire' still constitutes the mainstream discourse and practice, according to South African critical design theorist Borland (2011) a growing paradigm shift can be observed amongst practitioners, who increasingly focus on the idea of 'design for need'. As Borland - in quoting a prominent design curator - shows, the global financial crisis and with it a heightened awareness of the polarised distribution of global net-wealth has also left its mark on the field of design: "Ninety-five percent of the world's designers focus all of their efforts on developing products and services exclusively for the richest ten percent of the world's customers. Nothing less than a revolution in design is needed to reach the other ninety percent" (Polak 2007, p.18 cited in Borland 2011, p. 24)). Though in his elucidating dissertation Borland carefully deconstructs and ultimately refutes the claim that "design for development is a 'revolutionary' break with the mainstream practice of design" (ibid., p. 25), his analysis also provides a striking testimony to its symbolic power in popular discourse: "The notion that simple, small-scale designed objects can have a high impact on large-scale problems of the developing world, with which they are often associated through spectacular statistics, is promoted by producers of these objects and conveyed largely uncritically to the public by design institutions and the press. That approaches which are still in prototype, or have not yet demonstrated their large-scale impact, are celebrated, indicates the symbolic appeal of such objects and approaches – they are successful at arousing interest in ways that go beyond their efficacy in the field" (ibid., p. 23).

In an exaggerated reading, what he aptly describes is a process of reciprocal image cultivation: By putting itself into the service of development, design is able to shrug off its air of exclusivity and commodity fetishism, while development by design is fashioned as an expertise and technology-driven approach for finding the optimal 'solution' to a 'problem' - preferably in an empowering experience of 'co-creation' with the affected 'community' as 'client' and future 'user'. As Cape Town's WDC bid shows, this normative

Through the example of the PlayPump, a technology that camouflages a water pump as a children's roundabout, Borland 2011 depicts how this developmental design 'solution' succeeded in garnering Western media and donor support in spite of its abject failure on the ground in the rural areas of South Africa and Mozambique. Though he does not explicitly establish this theoretical link, his vivid account of the PlayPump's perils provides great empirical evidence for the disenfranchising effects of neoliberal developmentalism (see for example Escobar 1995; Smith 2008; Power 2005).
conjunction of 'design as development' and 'development as design' has offered ample possibility to mobilise a range of discursive politics and deliberative practises.

7.4 "Live Design. Transform Life" - The bid story

A prolific empirical inroad for unpacking the local discourse on design/development is provided by Cape Town's official WDC bid book. Drafted by the Cape Town Partnership and Creative Cape Town in collaboration with members of the local bid committee and additional volunteers from the design sector, the content of the book has been developed to support the injunction of its title: 'Live Design. Transform Life'. As the introduction states: "The case studies contained in this Bid Book are tangible expressions of this theme and demonstrate how Cape Town is today becoming a design-led City [sic!] committed to meeting the challenges of development and transformation. Through this commitment, our ultimate goal is to achieve a sustainable, innovative, inclusive and more liveable African City rooted in the strengths of our people and communities" (City of Cape Town 2011, p. 2, original emphasis).

As per Icsid's competition requirements, the book is structured around 44 questions that range from more general queries about logistics, financial management and physical infrastructure to design-specific issues such as design infrastructure and education (Q 16 & 19-21), neighbourhoods that display the prowess of local design (Q 31-32), the size, representation and international recognition of different design sectors (Q 33-41) as well as profiles of leading design practitioners (Q 26). In addition, the content has been structured around three interrelated aims: to rebuild, reconnect and reposition Cape Town by design (ibid., p. 5).

These three sub-themes are also evoked in terms of linking the notion of design to the city's recent past. In a historicising spin, apartheid is turned into "an era of designed inequality and control" (ibid., p. 6, original emphasis) and a number of examples are given for how design - more as an implicit practice than a discrete discipline - has played its role in the institutionalised racism. "Graphic design was used to separate people by embedding apartheid legislation into visual representations across the City [...] Education systems were designed around

209 The following analysis is based on the publicly accessible abridged version of the bid book.
210 Many of the designers listed in response to this question have become familiar names over the course of my research as they have taken up positions for Cape Town Design NPC, the WDC's curatorial panel, the board, the CoCT's WDC 2014 department or the CTDN.
racial policies based on keeping black people inferior [...] The media was tightly controlled, with blatant propaganda on television and film designed to sow division and instil fear [and] Industrial design was largely geared towards creating a self-sustaining "state" as well as to protecting the country against the threat of an uprising" (ibid., p. 6, emphasis added LW). In turn, forced spatial separation and socio-economic disconnection are portrayed as the result of deliberately 'bad' and exclusionary designs that not only barred people "from making their own contributions towards a better City [sic]" but "also made the country a pariah in the eyes of the world and excluded it from many opportunities to engage in the globalising economy" (ibid., p. 78). Thus, the compelling bid argument continues, design needs to be rehabilitated from its role as a handmaiden of apartheid in the eyes of both local and global audiences. And what better symbolic gesture could there be to accelerate this process then receiving an international accolade during South Africa's landmark year of 2014? As one of the bid book's key authors explains: "2014 is not any odd year for South Africa or for Cape Town, it's the 20th anniversary of our democracy. I think that really counts in our favour. [...] From a constitution which was 'thought architecture', which is a leading piece of 'design thinking' in the world, to every step thereafter, we've designed a democracy!" (Transcript video #2)

Overall, through this emotionally charged narrative, the meaning of the WDC is presented as going well beyond that of a mundane "city promotion project" (Icsid 2014, p. 6). Instead, cast as "a vehicle for reconstruction" (City of Cape Town 2011, p. 6) it becomes a collective moral imperative to rectify the failures of the past by beating design at its own game. In the words of Andrew Boraine, former CEO of the Partnership, this also entails a new responsibility to actively consider design in all aspects of everyday life: "Design not just in terms of confining it to the professional design community but that each and every discipline needs design thinking. So when you talk about integrated design, it's not just architecture and urban design and industrial products and environmental design...together, it's about design leadership in politics, design leadership in government, design leadership in business and design leadership in civil society and communities" (Wenz 17.12.2008). In this reading, the WDC bid becomes nothing less than the basis for a new social contract that naturalises design sense and sensibility as inter-subjective markers of socio-political capital.

To explain this rather abstract idea of 'design leadership' in practical terms and illustrate that it is already applied (though arguably rather implicitly) across the Cape metropolitan area, the bid book lists a variety of public and private projects that have
sought to tackle issues of postapartheid (urban) development. While a detailed discussion of each individual project would exceed the scope of this chapter, I want to briefly mention a few popular case studies, which have been frequently used as points of reference by WDC 'stakeholders', leading politicians and local media as 'supporting evidence' for the "transformative power of design" (WDC 2014 05.02.2013). In keeping with the narrative logic of the bid book, the examples are sorted under their respective chapter title.

"Rebuilding Communities"

- **VPUU** *(City of Cape Town 2011, pp. 341–345; Figure 24)*
  
  Featured as the first case study and arguably one of the city's most well-known projects, Violence Prevention through Urban Upgrading (VPUU) is an international partnership project between the City of Cape Town and the German Development Bank (KfW) located in Harare/Khayelitsha. It seeks to prevent crime through strategic environmental design interventions and create safe public spaces in between a network of multi-purpose community centres, which also double as venues for different social schemes such as early childhood development, gender-based violence prevention and neighbourhood watch programmes. The project is continuously monitored by different civic groups, local university scholars and international funding partners, who seek to use it as a model throughout Cape Town as well as other cities of the 'global south'. Since its inception it has been said to have reduced crime in the area by roughly 30%, even though these numbers have also been the subject of political grandstanding (Ndenze 04.05.2011).

- **10 x 10 Low-Cost Housing Project** *(City of Cape Town 2011, pp. 346–349; Figure 24)*
  
  In 2008, this project emanated from a design competition held by Cape Town's Design Indaba Exhibition. Pairing five teams of one local and one international architect each, the brief was to produce an innovative 'solution' for housing the urban poor. The winning design by South African Luyanda Mphalwa uses sandbags as main building material and it is said to not require any tools or advanced construction knowledge. While ten houses were built in Freedom
Park/Mitchells Plain following the competition, there has not been any broader roll-out of the design as the unit prices still range above the national allocation for low-cost housing developments. Omitting this crucial point, the bid book confidently asserts: "Not only will some of Cape Town's most impoverished families benefit directly, but the project seeks to stimulate wider debate and creative thought around the delivery of low-income housing" (ibid., p. 348).

![Image of Rebuilding Communities](image)

**Figure 24 "Rebuilding Communities" – The 10x10 Low-Cost Housing Project (above) and VPUU (below)**

*Source: City of Cape Town (2011)*

"Reconnecting Infrastructure"

- **Integrated Rapid Transit System** (IRT) (ibid., pp. 357–361)
  In 2007, the City of Cape Town passed an Integrated Transport Plan and started to develop its concept for a local Bus Rapid Transit System in an interurban learning
exercise\textsuperscript{211} based on South American best practice examples. Funded by both national government and the City of Cape Town, the first routes of the MyCiti bus network were rolled out in time for the 2010 FIFA World Cup and have been successively extended since. Though this initiative to make public transportation more affordable, effective and safe was welcome, especially in light of the fragmented and unreliable transport network that existed previously, the system's implementation has been accompanied by a range of controversies. Amongst other aspects, criticism has been levelled at the City Council for building the first routes towards the airport and middle-class neighbourhoods in the Northern Suburbs instead of prioritising township areas in the Cape Flats as well as regarding the fare collection system that rules out the use of cash.

- **Dignified Places Programme** (ibid., pp. 366–371)
  The Dignified Places Programme derived from the municipality's 1999 Spatial Development Framework. It focuses on the design and construction of new public spaces in disadvantaged neighbourhoods in order to improve accessibility, quality of public amenities and human dignity. Most notably, it is also the product of internal lobbying by spatial planners and urban designers within the municipal administration to recognise the need for creating a positive sense of place for people across the city (Southworth 2003). The programme received new impetus prior to the 2010 FIFA World Cup, but while the majority of upgraded inner-city spaces remain well used and serviced (particularly the bid book examples Jetty Square and Pier Place on the Foreshore), many outlying project sites have greatly deteriorated due to vandalism and lack of maintenance. Furthermore, in some areas, the project has been met with criticism by informal traders, who feared additional regulation and potential displacement.

- **Cape Town Stadium and Green Point Urban Park** (City of Cape Town 2011, pp. 373–379; Figure 25)
  Under the headline 'A new place for all Capetonians' (ibid., p. 373) the city's new-built 55,000 seater stadium and its adjacent park also feature in an extended case study. Strategically omitting the greatly contentious issue of overrunning

\textsuperscript{211} For a detailed exploration of this peripatetic planning circuit see Wood (2014).
public costs prior to the 2010 Fifa World Cup, the stadium is lauded for its low carbon footprint and internationally acclaimed design form, provided by German 'architects' GMP. The surrounding Green Point Park has seen a major landscaping intervention and now hosts a biodiversity garden, a 'Khoisan-inspired' set of huts as well as two playgrounds, several picnic spots and other recreational equipment.

Figure 25 Aerial photograph of the Cape Town Stadium
Source: LW (2009)

"Repositioning for the Future"

- Design Indaba (ibid., pp. 383–387)
Design Indaba is a Cape Town-based international design conference and exhibition that has been running for the past 16 years. The bid book states that "Design Indaba has changed the face of design in South Africa. Its vision is that creativity can fuel an economic revolution in South Africa" and goes on to note that "[t]he event's target market has increased from young 'hipsters' from the advertising industry to a mix of senior and middle-management marketers, design practitioners, students, academics, and overall growth in attendance from the corporate sector" (ibid., pp. 383f). While chapter 8.2.1 will provide a more thorough analysis of the Design Indaba, these quotes already suggest the market-liberal and entrepreneurial logics enshrined in the event's idea of design as economic value-creation (see photos Appendix F).
• **The Sustainability Institute and Lynedoch Ecovillage** (ibid., pp. 392–397)

This non-profit trust has been established by well-known academics Mark Swilling and Eve Annecke and works in close relationship with the University of Stellenbosch. Combining theory, applied research and lived practice, the institute lies at the centre of the Lynedoch Ecovillage, "the first ecologically designed, socially mixed intentional community in South Africa" (ibid., p. 392). Though located in Cape Town's neighbouring municipality Stellenbosch, it is featured in the bid for two strategic reasons. For one, by partnering with the second most important municipality in the province, the WDC bid expands its local economic development ambit through including the wealthy Cape Winelands and its internationally recognised research and development facilities. Secondly, like Cape Town and the Western Cape in general, Stellenbosch too is governed by the Democratic Alliance (DA). As the country's strongest opposition, the party has perpetually sought to use the Western Cape as a showcase of its governance style to support its contestation of the national leadership. Thus, sharing the political spoils of a successful WDC bid between Cape Town and Stellenbosch is also regarded as a validation of the DA's Western Cape government as a whole.

While these projects provide an overview of the broad range of different initiatives chartered under Cape Town's emergent design(er) city narrative, some common features can be discerned. Firstly and rather unsurprisingly, the listed initiatives all fall within at least one of the broad target areas of the global creative city paradigm, namely individual subjects, creative milieus, infrastructure enhancement and place branding (Dzudzek & Lindner 2012, p. 6). Secondly, in terms of their formal organisational structure, the majority of these projects are public-private partnership ventures. This is not surprising, considering that the bid books compilation was overseen by the Cape Town Partnership, which sees itself as the paragon of local collaborative governance (see chapter 5.3.4.1).

In turn, the bid book's language is also dotted with some of the Partnership's signature turns of expression such as the notion of 'reconnecting town and township' (City of Cape Town 2011, p. 13; also (Cape Town Partnership December 2011; Interview Makalima-Ngewana 21.02.2012). Thirdly, most of the public infrastructure projects mentioned are official legacy projects of the 2010 FIFA World Cup, which is not only due
to the lingering afterglow of the event during the time the bidding commenced but equally related to the fact that many of the bid book contributors had occupied key positions in planning and managing the global sporting spectacle (see previous chapter). Thus, the bid book also provides a platform to legitimise even the more controversial projects such as the Cape Town stadium and the BRT system by celebrating them as concrete symbols of the last time the city had garnered global attention. And fourthly, virtually none of the project descriptions fail to latch onto the pervasive language of green economic development, 'smart growth' and sustainable urbanism in a motion to emphasise that the bid is not only about commercial products. Rather, it is intended to spawn "social innovation for the public good" (City of Cape Town 2011, p. 13) and thus support the city's five key strategic urban development targets (see ch. 5.3.3). In turn, the bid book constitutes - in the words of later Cape Town Design CEO Alayne Reesberg - a "catalogue of capability" (Interview 19.06.2013).

Seeing the document as a catalogue provides an interesting figure of thought that illustrates another important purpose of the bid: that of a prime international branding and modelling opportunity. As an American news feature rightly observed: "While the award celebrates a narrative that is inherently South African - the social issues and designed responses are rooted in the very specific experience of transitioning from the system of apartheid - the city's planners have taken great care to frame Cape Town's success as a model for African cities" (Scobey-Thal 23.07.2012). This image of Cape Town as a vanguard city certainly comes through strongly, for example when it is confidently concluded in the book that in terms of design infrastructure and the diversity of the sector: "[…] Cape Town is the undisputed leader in South Africa and arguably on the continent" (City of Cape Town 2011, p. 118). Thus, the idea of Cape Town as a 'model city' certainly constitutes a key political rational, as I will further elaborated in an instant.

Before I can however move on to analyse the array of political rationalities and governance logics enveloped in the official bid story, I want to conclude this section by looking at the bid book not as a policy document but rather in its other representational function: that of a socio-material object of political aestheticisation (see chapters 2.3 & 3.1). In highlighting some of the socio-spatial and performative practises that have evolved around the bid book, I argue that an added understanding of its material culture
also provides a more holistic account of what (Peck & Theodore 2012, p. 23) have described as the 'social life' of globalising policies.

The hand-bound limited edition was produced by local visual communications studio 'Design Infestation', who subsequently received a 'Bronze Loerie' - South Africa's most prestigious advertising award - for creating the winning publication with its signature 'brand language'. However, the reason why I have come to talk of it as Cape Town's 'Good Book' of design (another respondent also referred to it once as the 'Holy Grail') relates not only to its prophesying parlance and distinct imagery but equally to its material presentation: Propped up like an altar bible on a pulpit, it was displayed on top of a custom-made wooden pedestal (see video #7; photos in Appendix F). The location of the pedestal was equally deliberate: The interested public was invited to peruse the book at the {field office}, the first coffee shop-cum-design gallery in 'The Fringe - Cape Town's Design and Innovation District'. In exchange for rent alleviation, the owners of the {field office} had not only agreed to be the first 'anchor tenant' for the Fringe but also allowed their space to double as an informal WDC supporter information centre, including a wall-to-wall mural of the bright yellow WDC bid logo and key slogans that acted as the backdrop for the bid book display (see photo below Figure 26).
Figure 26 World Design Capital supporters at the {field office} on the morning of the WDC 2014 announcement

Source: LW (2011)

Subsequently, the {field office} was also used as the official venue for various key bid-related events, such as the early morning live broadcast of the announcement and the first press conference shortly after the win. The public attention spawned by Cape Town's official designation as WDC also fostered another interesting kind of policy mobility - that of the bid book itself. To house the wooden pulpit and its literal 'design icon' had turned into an 'honour' and - like a challenge cup - it was passed around from the {field office} to other design-minded businesses in the Fringe, most notably the Bank, a local design collective that widely celebrated its 'host'-status on social media. While this account relates a rather short and ephemeral episode of socio-spatial production, it nonetheless illustrates and supports a recurring argument of contemporary policy mobilities literature: that we need to see policies as "themselves relational, drawing on and shaping relations between people, places and objects" (Prince 2012, p. 328). In consequence, this should also prompt us to not only pay empirical attention to the actual
words on paper but also to the interpersonal relationships and socio-material artifacts that are arranged around them.

### 7.3.1 Worlding by the book

Following this cursory overview of the bid's main narrative I now want to turn towards the contingent spectrum of longings, aspirations and idealisms it has conjured. In recourse to chapter 4.2, I argue that the WDC bid can be best understood as a discrete episode of worlding Cape Town. To recap: As Roy and Ong (2011) have shown, world recognition is no longer premised on the ability to emulate Western urban prototypes but on the will of cities to experiment with 'home-grown' ideas, distinct urban profiles, political styles and aesthetic forms that are able to "symbolically re-situate the city in the world" (ibid., p. 13). Thus, in exchanging the singular concept of world city-ness for the multifarious notion of *cityness* (see chapter 4.1), we are able to trace "the mix of speculative fiction and speculative fact in worlding exercises as practitioners aim to build something they believe is for the better" (Ong 2011b, p. 12).

Cape Town's WDC 2014 bid provides a particularly pertinent analytical inroad in this regard: Firstly, because it has allowed a wide array of 'elite' practitioners to speculate aloud about the city's possible urban futures and engage in the "craft of scalar practises" (Fraser 2010), i.e. the use scalar discourses for drawing new connections between the local and the global. Secondly, because following the global attention garnered during the 2010 Fifa World Cup, the WDC accolade once more provides a prime opportunity for different actor positions to grapple with the contentious issue of how Cape Town relates to itself as an African city (rather than just a city in Africa), as well as to posture their global visions as an emotive counter-narrative to the still overwhelmingly negative representation of the continent. And thirdly, because it has in turn been increasingly used as a lever to promote Cape Town as an emerging 'model city', not only for urban Africa but the 'global south' at large.

Concurrently to these 'extrospective' elite logics however, the bid book has also lend itself to what McCann (2013) has called "introspective politics of persuasion" (p. 14). These commonly seek to generate popular support for new policy programmes by both
informing and educating local populations about its ostensible international merits and potential social benefits (ibid., p. 22). With regards to Cape Town's WDC bid book, I would furthermore argue that it fulfilled two additional tasks within these introspective politics: For one, it made the rather abstract, modernist idea of 'design' locally intelligible by re-articulating it as an agent of urban integration and development within a starkly divided post-colonial and post-apartheid context, thus opening it up as a field of socio-political possibility to a broader array of actors. And secondly, it kick-started the subsequent governmentisation of the designer as an emergent yet increasingly influential actor position within Cape Town's local urban development discourse and practice. As many of these points have become even more pronounced with the organisational progression and institutional consolidation of Cape Town's WDC programme, I will further elaborate on them in chapter 8. For the remainder of this chapter however, the analytical focus remains firmly drawn on unravelling the different practical meanings, political rationales and governmental logics embedded within Cape Town's official bid narrative.

Though the bid book does not explicitly make use of the terms 'global city' or 'world city', aspirations in this regard are articulated in abundance, especially in the section on 'Repositioning Cape Town for the Future', which features many of the well-worn truisms from the phrasebook of urban policy boosterism. For example that by the year 2040 Cape Town will be "one of the greatest cities in the world to live, work, invest and discover. A place of possibility and innovation with a diverse urban community and all the opportunities and amenities of city life within a natural environment that supports economic vibrancy and inspires a sense of belonging in all" (City of Cape Town 2011, p. 380). Particularly in conversations with local politicians and business lobbyists, I have heard this rather unoriginal parlance of neoliberal "cultural imagineering" (Yeoh 2005, p. 947) repeated many times over, either by the former coupled with the angst-burdened reminder that if Cape Town refused to compete, it would be left behind (Interview Pascoe 09.10.2012) or - with a more positive spin by the latter - that the WDC could finally drive home the point that calling Cape Town a global African city was not meant as an oxymoron. "The thing that strikes me though about World Design [Capital] is that it's an opportunity for us to position and African city as a global city at the same time. So no one disputes that London got fantastic design but everyone sees London as both part of the UK and Europe but also as part of the globe. So when I think World Design Capital Cape Town 2014 I
think fantastic, it's an African city but it's a city which also has a great opportunity to position itself as a city of solution-thinkers and global players" (Interview Whelan 11.03.2013).

As already noted in chapter 5.2, this parochial and simplistic idea of Cape Town as more advanced on the seemingly linear trail of social evolution than the rest of the nation and furthermore hamstrung by the dead weight of an entire continent's bad reputation remains a rather popular mind-set amongst some of the urban elite. South African anthropologist Suren Pillay has shrewdly captured this deeply schizophrenic relationship when he writes: "For us in Cape Town, what does it mean to be aware of location? One response here recognises our national location as a kind of lament. Our African location is the name of a backwardness marked by how far it doesn't correspond to the ideal. In the Cape this becomes trickier, because we think we are the developed, holding fort and surrounded by the encroaching undeveloped. The rest of the country is going to pot, or potholes, but we are doing alright. We have a university in the Cape that calls itself a world class African university. Of course, we also have a city that proclaims itself a world class city in Africa. I wonder if it is the world, as in most of the world, or if it is the world, as in the Euro-American world? [...] So world class is a clever way to sneak in the sentiment that we are in Africa, but we are up to European standards" (Pillay 07.06.2011, see also Garuba 07.06.2011).

While I agree with Pillay's astute observation, I would however argue - following Roy (2011c) - that in terms of the WDC project it is necessary to look at the world class label in less absolute and more relational terms (p. 260). For one, the city 'elite's active interurban knowledge exchanges and policy 'window-shopping' in Asian cities such as Seoul and Taipei clearly disrupts Pillay's constrictive gesture towards the 'Euro-American world' as Cape Town's singular point of reference. Because, rather than being yet another exercise in bowing to an elusive and preconceived world class icon, what speaks much louder from Cape Town's WDC bid is the desire to be recognised as a class of its own and to become to the African continent what Singapore has long been for urban Asia: a model city (Zolo 2001; Yeoh & Chang 2001; Huat 2011).

Furthermore, even urban brand managers - undeniably the key advocates of the world city trope - have realised that simply proclaiming something as world class does no longer constitute anything to write home about. Rather, what really draws global attention - and attention is undeniably the hard currency all branding experts deal in - is the power of a good story. And as the CEO of Cape Town Tourism - "the official tourism agency for the City and custodian of Cape Town's brand" (City of Cape Town 2011, p. 316) -
remarked during a press meeting, the WDC bid even offers Cape Town the chance to add a new captivating thread to its storybook.

"Like the World Cup, the WDC allows us to tell Cape Town's full story. And in a world were stories have become unique selling points rather than the place, it's a wonderful opportunity beyond the well-known fact that we are a place of incredible natural beauty. But a place that is a real city in transformation. And the kind of city of the future that the world is yearning to know more about. The world is very tired of so-called perfect places that aren't actually perfect, in any case scratched underneath the surface. But our advantage is that we are a city on the move and we are using design and innovation also to design solutions to the issues that face all of us. So it's a bold move to claim that space as it kind of challenges your brand at the tip of the African continent, to say that we are a city of the future. We might not be significant in terms of size, numbers, the kind of budget we have to compete with the world, but we absolutely have an incredible story to tell. [...] In a world that's craving real solutions, Cape Town becomes a microcosm of solutions driven by design and innovation. [...] The fact that cities are now the prisms through which countries are viewed is a huge opportunity for Cape Town to reshape what the world thinks of us. [...] These opportunities don't come along every day and we have to make them count, we've got to - as a city that doesn't have a lot of other resources - we got to use these platforms very very wisely, boldly, not arrogantly but with great confidence" (Du Toit-Helmholdt, event transcript, 01.11.2011).

In other words, what emerges from Du Toit-Helmholdt's statement is the idea that instead of trying to catch up to some global city gold standard, Cape Town - in leveraging all its 'imperfections' - should itself become the pacesetter, a model for 'solving' seemingly universal issues of human development by design. Though from her perspective, 'Africa' still represents the definite antithesis to popular perceptions of design and innovation, it is not anymore merely reduced to a lament but instead regarded as an indispensable part of Cape Town's design city claims. After all, what affirms the sincerity of 'socially responsive designs' better than the authoritative voice of those directly affected? Or in the emphatic words of the Partnership's Makalima-Ngewana: "A win for Cape Town is a win for Africa. An international spotlight on Cape Town's contribution will highlight Africa's contribution to cutting edge transformative design and will also pique the interest of the international design community, allowing us to play host to the world, yet again" (Creative Cape Town 31 March 2011). Considering the at best ambivalent at worst hostile ways in which Cape Town has historically grappled with its continental location (see chapters 5.1 & 5.2), this wholehearted embracing of Africa as the new frontier of developmental design constitutes a significant turnaround.
To a certain extent, this modified geographical imagination also has to be contextualised in light of broader geopolitical ground shifts for the country, namely its admission into the folds of the BRICS grouping. The growing international recognition paid towards these five emerging economies - particularly defined by China's rapid growth - has been further amplified by the global financial crisis and the widespread civic protests that firmly inscribed the popular slogan of 'We are the 99%' into the global political lexicon. This seductive idea of being at the vanguard of an ostensibly changing world order build around the notion of an empowered and seemingly egalitarian 'majority world' has also permeated Cape Town's WDC narrative as the following explanation made by a bid committee member illustrates: "However, we should look at the possibility of Cape Town winning not just in terms of us being in a developing country but, rather, as us being part of the 'majority world'. Cities that have won in the past were those that are part of the developed world - and yet those cities form less than 10 percent of the global population; they are part of the 'minority world'. Far more relevant today is where design is heading for the other 90 percent. The entire global trend in design today is changing towards socially conscious design and we are already, as a city, in complete alignment with this. In many ways, our bid could be seen as a template for bids in the future. We speak on behalf of the 'majority world' with a powerful voice that resonates across the globe" (M'Rithaa in Creative Cape Town Annual, 2011 p. 54).

However, for Cape Town to be able to become this credible ringleader of design for the 'majority world' it has to actively assert what it previously vigilantly eschewed: its African city status. In consequence, as the previous statements have aptly illustrated, the WDC bid is thus regarded as a key lever for rekindling these severed continental ties in both discourse and practice. A most recent example has been the recognition of *Kenya Creative Week* in Nairobi - modelled upon Creative Cape Town's annual event by the same name - as an official WDC project (#WDC551). However, what also filters through this newfound Pan-African urbanism is that a heightened level of extrospective governance has become a somewhat critical factor for local politicking: In using the WDC bid to claim a leadership position for Cape Town amongst developing country cities, the DA-led local government by the same token also attempts to showcase the efficacy of its provincial and municipal governance. This governmental desire is well captured in a quote from executive mayor De Lille's 2012 Budget Speech, where she concludes: "Cape Town is a South African city and proudly so. We have the same legacy as other metros. But where we differ is how we plan for the future. Cape Town will not be one of those cities vaguely remembered. We will be
leading the charge over the coming years, especially as we develop and grow with other mid-size cities, especially those from the developing world" (De Lille 2012). Referring to Cape Town as a 'mid-size city' in spite of its population exceeding 4 million inhabitants can be understood as an important governmental trope: In refuting the label and accompanying pathological imaginaries of a 'mega-city', Cape Town's urban future is positioned in a qualitatively different (and ostensibly superior) register than that of its local and continental competitors such as Johannesburg, Lagos or Nairobi.

In addition, what also needs to be mentioned is that the submission of the WDC bid book in mid-2011 coincided with local government elections across the country. Although the DA was re-elected with a majority, Cape Town's top council position was handed over from Dan Plato to the current mayor Patricia de Lille. As several of my respondents have noted, in taking over political patronage for the WDC bid from Plato, de Lille was also handed a prime opportunity to build her public profile and assert her political (op-)position both locally and internationally. The fact that she promptly latched onto this personal branding offer strongly resonates with international findings that show how mayors increasingly tend to attach themselves "to carefully chosen, branded policy initiatives and idealised collective identities" (McCann 2013, p. 12, drawing on Pasotti 2010) up to the point where they themselves turn into a brand.

At the same time however, a majority of my respondents - from business lobbyists to design professionals and even from mid-level municipal employees to local councillors - have flagged this possibility of (party-) political exploitation as one of the bid's biggest possible impediments. For example, as the CEO of the Cape Town Fashion Council warned, narrowing down the remit of the award to the fulfilment of political agendas would also impact negatively on its reputation with design professionals. "If 2014 becomes political in any kind of way it's going to lose its effect, it's going to lose everything that is has because designers are not political animals. [...] If it does tend to happen it's going to lose a lot of traction and it's going to lose a lot of confidence in the design community as well, I'd say" (Interview Ramkiliwan 08.11.2011). In a similar yet more nuanced vein, the chair of the WDC bid committee also spelled out how the bid's central promise of urban transformation and integration was not only conducive but also turned the project into a potential target for party political hijacking. She explained: "There's also this need to separate politics from the project. Even though the ambassadorial face needs to be the political face [...] it’s a very tenuous and very delicate relationship but
it's important. But also don't forget that in South Africa in 2014 it's going to be provincial elections. The one thing you don't want is for this to become a provincial...what you call it...a platform where politicians campaign. Because of the way we have themed the bid it lends itself very nicely to a political campaign. Because everyone, I mean any other political party wants an integrated city, they want a city that has moved beyond an apartheid city. They want to ensure that the solutions that are used in terms of resolving issues that are really complex issues that those solutions are effective - costly, in terms of cost - but also that they are design-related. And if you solve for example the housing problem through design as a politician you have it made. So there's just a natural link there that is also extremely problematic but if it's handled well, it can work" (Interview Makalima-Ngewana 21.02.2012). With regard to this clearly discerned issue of possibly overbearing political interference, the majority of my respondents emphatically stressed that in the case of a win, the WDC programme needed to be run by an independent body in order to shelter it from the unyielding grindstones of South African popular politics.

While I have now at length spoken about the different "extrospective elements" (McCann 2013, p. 18) of the WDC 2014 bid, I want to conclude this section by highlighting how the bid book has simultaneously served as a platform for more introspective interlocution. For one, I argue that it has occupied a key discursive role in turning the rather inaccessible notion of design into a locally intelligible and ultimately 'governable' social field. An initial step in making design 'tangible' has been to transform the image of an ostensibly thriving local design sector from "speculative fiction" into "speculative fact" (Ong 2011b, p. 12) through measures of enumeration and quantification. Though the bid book does not contain any original data, the editors together with the bid committee laboriously tracked down and collated - in what one responded referred to as "detective work" (Interview Burton 05.08.2013) - a range of existing quantitative and qualitative information from disparate public and private, local and international sources.

212 What only a few of my respondents were aware of at the time was that this was equally in the interest of Icsid, which had just amended its award regulations in response to previous mishaps in Seoul. During the South Korean city's tenure as WDC, the local mayor Oh Se-Hoon had made the WDC programme his administrative priority. However, he became increasingly criticised for spending 450 million USD on a Design Plaza by international 'starchitect' Zaha Hadid while simultaneously downsizing government services and limiting the use of public space (Lee & Hwang 2012, p. 2817). Soon after the end of Seoul's year in the spotlight, Oh Se-Hoon was forced to step down after losing a referendum over his opposition to provide free lunches to all of Seoul's school children. His argument of budgetary constraints had not resonated well with a citizenry that had been increasingly alienated by his large-scale investments into designer flagship projects during the WDC year (Sang-Hun, 25. August 2011).
For example, it quotes a 2008 OECD Territorial Review report alongside a variety of local economic impact assessments from design-related events to different creative industry sectors, as well as key official planning documents such as the Spatial Development Framework (SDF) and the Integrated Development Plan (IDP), in turn condensing this multitude of fragmented data into discrete paragraphs nestled in between a plethora of aesthetically pleasing figures, maps and photographs. Consequently, for many of the experts invested in the process, it represented more than the sheer fulfilment of Icsid's formal competition requirements but simultaneously provided a powerful tool for persuading key decision-makers and the local population at large of Cape Town's creative prowess. According to bid committee member and design scholar Mugendi M'Rithaa, "[it] was the first time that Cape Town actually audited its creative assets in the sense of how many designers do we actually have in this place? Can we really claim to be a design city? You look at all the other designated cities, you look at Seoul, you talk about LG and Samsung, you can see their brands have a very clear design link, you look at Torino, you see FIAT [...] So we had to start by looking at what we actually could claim to be design assets and we immediately realised that what we could lay claim to is having the highest concentration of creatives in the country, over a thousand they discovered over a thousand! It was quite impressive. Because even us in Cape Town were hardly aware that we had that rich pool of creative talent. So that was the most important contribution to start with. That we had a document that for the first time mapped the creative landscape within Cape Town. That told us we have got so many interaction designers, so many industrial designers and here we are talking about what we refer within Icsid as the expanded field of design. [...] And so that for me is the biggest contribution irrespective of even if we had not won" (Interview M'Rithaa 30.01.2012).

Considering Creative Cape Town's previous efforts (see chapter 7.1.), the bid book - contrary to M'Rithaa's view – was not the first attempt to measure the expanse of the local 'creative landscape'. However, what his statement aptly attests to is the potential of such preceding creative industries enumeration projects to act as a kind of 'self-fulfilling prophecy'. Particularly the much repeated truth claim that Cape Town has the 'highest concentration of creatives in the country' can be identified as a mutated derivative of Creative Cape Town's earlier mapping studies, which had found and popularised the 'magical number' of 1.000 creative industries operating in the central (!) city. Thus, through re-articulating creative industries as part and parcel of an 'expanded field of design', these preceding creative city-making efforts are rather seamlessly incorporated into Cape Town's budding design city script. Another point that filters through M'Rithaa's
description is the way in which the WDC competition cultivates practices of global inter-referencing or - as Clarke (2012a) has termed it - "actually existing comparative urbanism". A case in point is how - in contrast to its predecessors Seoul and Torino - Cape Town is identified as lacking a world-spanning presence through high-tech industries and global consumer brands that could qualify it for the WDC 2014 title.

However, through reinterpreting design as an essential and ostensibly universal component of human development, the city's economic, social and spatial development problems are converted into its biggest 'design assets'. That this developmental design imperative is also inherently founded on the truism that 'necessity begets ingenuity' is vividly illustrated by another design professional and bid committee member, who explains: "Cape Town has many faces. On the one hand, it is among the most beautiful cities in the world. On the other hand, the legacy of the past created many social problems. While nothing is superficial about Cape Town's beauty, the ugly side is also in-your-face. It is these two extreme conditions that make Cape Town a great incubator for design, motivated by South Africans' resilience and persistence in the face of challenges. This is evidenced by all the inspiring projects that have been captured in our World Design Capital bid book" (Tsai in WDC 2014, 26.10.2011).

Yet, though the bid book's 'design challenges' ostensibly pertain to every single citizen, their 'solution' calls to plan a rather specific group of actors: the design community. While chapter 8.2 focuses in greater detail on Cape Town's emergent design(er) governmentality, it is important to recognise the bid book's role as its constitutive ideological manifesto. As a press release on the book's official submission emphasised, it presented "not just an application" but "a 'forward-moving' plan of action for design initiatives, dedicated as it has been to demonstrating how designers can play a fundamental role in meeting the challenges of socially responsible design" (Koblitz 05.04.2011). This perception of the bid book as a public clarion call for local creative professionals to seize their newly bestowed collective agency has also been echoed by local design scholar M'Rithaa, who - in the same publication - is quoted by saying: "Even though we have thousands of people engaged in creative industries in the city, to date there has been no collective vision. The bid process gives us a common platform for acknowledging design as an asset and is a massive catalyst to align creative narratives" (Koblitz 05.04.2011). In addition, as much as the WDC sees itself as a city promotion project, it also needs to be kept in mind that it’s awarding body Icsid forms part of the International Design Alliance, arguably the biggest formal
representation for design professionals. Nonetheless, as I will subsequently show, this formal institutional allegiance is by no means the only way to explain the fluid boundaries between the promotion of design as a multipurpose 'tool' and designers as the ones holding the user manual.

In conclusion, this section has sought to unravel Cape Town's emerging design city script (sic!) through the empirical lens of its official WDC bid book. In capitalising on the growing popularity of 'design for development' across the globe\textsuperscript{213}, the bid book provides a compelling storyline in support of Cape Town's award aspirations. Particularly central in this regard has been the emotive argument that the city's apartheid legacy is essentially a consequence of 'bad design' and could therefore be best rectified by design. On a total of 465 pages, the bid book presents a broad array of public and private organisations, places, projects, businesses, events and initiatives in support of its main tag line "Live Design.Transform Life" and the three aims of 'rebuilding', 'reconnecting' and 'repositioning' Cape Town. As the analysis has shown, the hand-bound bright yellow tome can be regarded as a hybrid artifact as its socio-political narrative has been furthermore invigorated by its semiotic status as a design object. While the subsequent chapter will continue to further unpack the intricate worlding dynamics around Cape Town's WDC 2014 project, the bid book has already provided some interesting insights into how the city seeks to establish itself as a global 'model city' with original 'policy exports'. Drawing on McCann's (2013) framework, I have furthermore sought to take into account both extrospective and introspective politics as co-constitutive elements of such local modelling aspirations. From an extrospective stance, the positioning of Cape Town as a ringleader of cities in a 'majority world' through the designation as WDC has been particularly noteworthy, alongside the ability of the award to provide a conducive platform for local "mayoral brand politics" (Pasotti 2010). In terms of introspective politics, efforts to persuade local decision-makers and the general population of the 'transformative power' of design were particularly driven by the portrayal of Cape Town as a place of great need and thus great design ingenuity, or to use a popular design phrase: a problem looking for a solution. In sum, the WDC bid process not only injected a

\textsuperscript{213} A number of design objects have received prominent roles in development programmes, for example the 100 dollar XO laptop for "One Laptop per Child"-Campaign and the "LifeStraw", a pocket-sized portable water filter. For more examples see Borland (2011, pp. 14f).
particular idea of design for development into the local urban governance discourse but at the same time, it also catapulted the figure of the designer from a niche existence into the midst of local urban politics. The next section thus turns towards the question how this process has been further shaped through Cape Town's win of the title.

7.3.2 The winning streak

With the timely submission of the bid book at the end of March 2011, Cape Town had officially thrown its lot into the competition. In spite of the fact that this only marked the first part of a two-tiered assessment process, the general atmosphere among the bid proponents was already victorious. "Even if we don't win, we cannot lose" (video #2), the title of an ardent talk held by the Partnership's communication strategist Lianne Burton shortly after the submission, aptly captured the dominant sentiment of the time: a mix of pride that those involved took in the final product and relief that they had managed to concluded the process in spite of tight time frames and limited financial resources.

On the 21st of June 2011, Icsid shortlisted Cape Town alongside Dublin and Bilbao as a final contender for the title of WDC 2014. For all three cities, this meant that they would soon be visited by an international judging panel for a final in situ review of their respective bid propositions, with Cape Town's inspection scheduled from the 24th to 26th of July 2011\(^{214}\). While, according to an official City Council brief, the visit was mainly said to serve as an assessment of the bid's technical validity, including administrative support, financial commitment, touristic capacities and private sector sponsorship, it was nonetheless stressed that it was equally important to show "the passion of the people" (City of Cape Town 10 May 2011). Therefore, over the course of three days, the judges were not only subjected to a tour of Cape Town's 'design assets' but also addressed by a whole host of official dignitaries such as newly elected mayor Patricia de Lille, Western Cape Premiere Helen Zille and struggle icon Archbishop Emeritus Desmond Tutu, who all came out in strong support of the project. While the majority of the presentations were held in the city centre, the judges itinerary also included visits to

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\(^{214}\) Due to the fact that I was not present in Cape Town during the time this visit took place, I am relying on secondary sources concerning this event. As official documentation has however remained relatively thin, I am not able to take this episode of inbound 'policy tourism' into further analytical account. Nonetheless, I am including a cursory overview for the sake of continuity.
the bid book case study sites - VPUU project in Khayelitsha, Design Indaba's "10x10 Housing Project", presented by its architect and local bid committee member Luyanda Mpahlwa, and Stellenbosch's Lynedoch Ecovillage - in order to flesh out the bid's "Live Design.Transform Life"-theme (see photos in Appendix F). A particular emphasis was furthermore placed on the Fringe - Cape Town's first 'Design and Innovation District' - as a WDC 'flagship project', which included showing off the District Six Museum and the newly-opened Fugard Theatre alongside the {field office}-coffee shop and the recently launched design collective 'The Bank' as two budding co-working spaces for local 'design talent'. Right next door, the CTDN in association with Design Indaba had organised the by far largest event of the judge's tour with over 500 people piled into the Assembly, a well-known night club, to listen to a keynote speech on Cape Town's design acumen by Ravi Naidoo, CEO of Cape Town's premier design fair. Asked about the way in which the bid committee had approached this adjudication visit, bid committee chair Makalima-Ngewana recalls: "[...] we also understood that we were really up against really renowned cities with a lot of money and we didn't have a lot of money. And the only way we were able to make sure that Cape Town punched above its weight was to ensure that Capetonians make as much noise about the process as possible in the city. And because a lot of Capetonians are bloggers, you know, they are tweeters etc. etc. we used that to galvanise support behind the bid. [...] The 'find your yellow'-crowd just grew and grew and the kind of noise that Cape Town made as an African city ensured that the judges could not not pay attention" (Interview Makalima-Ngewana 21.02.2012). What she refers to as the 'find your yellow'-crowd relates to the Partnership's social media campaign, which urged people to show their public support for Cape Town's WDC bid in the digital realm by snapping a picture of something in the bid's official colour and sharing it on twitter using the hashtag '#findyouryellow' or on the official Facebook page 'CT4WDC'. Though from the very start of the bid, several members of its committee had used their direct access to both conventional and new media outlets for putting design into the public realm for example through local newspaper op-eds, Cape Town's shortlisting and the subsequent visit of the Icsid judging panel greatly amplified the social media echo. That this has gone from strength to strength ever since cannot be understood without considering the penchant of Cape Town's political, economic and cultural elite for engaging each other on popular social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook. Consequently, I argue that Cape Town's WDC process as an elite-driven urban governance project has been particularly
prone to what I have come to refer to as local 'governance' (read: 'hashtag governance'), a phenomenon that requires some further explanation.

Video #4 gives a glimpse of the Pre-Announcement Party and also sets the scene for the following sections. Please find it on the accompanying DVD.
7.4 [Excursus] "#WDC2014 is the first word in innovation @CoCT" - governance and mediatised politics of the WDC

In spite of the fact that a rapidly growing number of people across the globe find it hard if not nearly impossible to imagine their daily life without popular social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook, comparatively little scholarly attention has thus far been paid to critically exploring the role of social media in urban governance\(^{215}\). Though I was vastly ignorant of this topic in the beginning of my research, I have grown increasingly aware of its importance through closely observing Cape Town's politics of becoming the WDC 2014. The organisations involved in running the WDC programme as well as the officials who support it have positioned social media as a central pillar of their public participation strategy surrounding the project. The substantial personnel and financial resources allocated to creating an intricate system of hashtags and hyperlinks has been justified by the widespread belief that the numbers of 'followers', 'shares' and 'retweets' constitutes a viable proxy for public participation, political deliberation and global engagement.

While the broader impacts and implications of these "emerging, fan-like forms of engagement with mediatized politics" (Wilson 2011, p. 445) go well beyond the analytical scope of this thesis, I nonetheless want to use my empirical observations to raise some red flags that should be considered in future research on Cape Town's digitalising urban governance. In particular I seek to problematise two issues that are frequently omitted in the local WDC project's celebration of social media as harbinger of "electronic democracy" (Kersting 2012a): The first considers the existing digital divide in South Africa and the second relates more generally to the disjunction in new media politics between the evidently growing ability to speak and the simultaneously shrinking possibility of being heard. In light of these issues I argue that we need to more carefully interrogate assumptions about the participatory democratic benefits of new media.

\(^{215}\) While a sizeable body of literature on 'smart cities' and 'e-governance' exists, this often remains limited to questions of technological optimisation. However, the work of Castells (2001) and particularly his latest book in which he analyses the role of new media technologies for social organising should urge us to pay critical attention towards the role of such mediums in contemporary city-making Castells (2012).
technologies, especially as they become increasingly instrumental in Cape Town's local politics of worlding.

From 'Join the Conversation on Twitter' to 'Follow us on Facebook' - not a single WDC event I attended failed to be bookended by these participatory mantras of the digital age. The audience is consistently prompted to 'share their thoughts' either via a designated event hashtag or via the global #WDC2014 thread as well as to please spare a 'like' for the respective Facebook fan page (see '#governance' in Appendix F). At some events, the speakers on the podium even presented in front of an interactive backdrop that came in the form of a projected real-time twitter feed which automatically updated the latest 140-character blurbs on the respective #topic, thus creating a feeling of direct political voice. Indeed, some of Cape Town's urban governance elite were early adopters of virtual self-publishing platforms. For example former city manager and long-standing Cape Town Partnership CEO Andrew Boraine for many years ran a widely-read blog chronicling his takes on Cape Town's urban future. However, it has more recently been the growing popularity of the micro-blogging service Twitter that has animated many local decision-makers to share their opinions with an ostensibly global audience.

According to a recent study, South Africa already has the largest and most active cohort of Twitter users on the continent and with the continuously expanding opportunity to access the internet via cell phones it promises to grow even further (Parker 26.01.2012; see also Figure 27).
In the Western Cape, high-profile politicians who have ventured into the emerging field of political blogging (Pole 2010) have included both the mayor @PatriciaDeLille and the Premiere @helenzille. Even a number of controversial and unfavourable twitter spats have not deterred politicians, activists, cultural practitioners and other public figures to increasingly take to twitter for voicing their opinion and engage each other in more or less topical public conversations (Aboobaker 29.12.2011).

In June 2013, Cape Town Tourism - the city's official marketing arm - was even handed an international award for the best overall use of social media, specifically due to its success with hosting (i.e. sponsoring) four international travel bloggers, who engaged their vast following through the hashtag #LoveCapeTown, allegedly garnering "36 million Twitter impressions" in three weeks (City of Cape Town 15.08.2013).

Within Cape Town's WDC process, social media engagement has played an important role from the very beginning. This is partly because @ctpartnership and its subsidiary @CreativeCT as institutional drivers of the bid have, for a number of years already, put great energy into expanding their media online presence. A strong belief in
the political power of the World Wide Web is exemplified by the organisation's 2012 Annual Report which provides a detailed list of social media growth for its different projects. Among other declarations, this report states that Creative Cape Town's 'Facebook community' had doubled in size over the course of a year to 10,500 fans and that its twitter following of 7,000 made it "one of South Africa's most influential Twitter accounts" (Cape Town Partnership December 2012, p. 35). Secondly, what gave additional impetus to the WDC's social media drive was the fact that the majority of bid committee members were also avid micro-bloggers, who perceive their twitter handles as intrinsic part of their political agency. What is commonly inferred by local decision-makers when it comes to justifying their social media activities is the idea of a two-way conversation; while these mediums promise a forum to educate and activate a broad support base from potential corporate sponsors to individual volunteers, this 'general public' simultaneously receives the opportunity to feed their own ideas back into the process, thus creating a sense of "mediated immediacy" (O'Sullivan et al. 2004). For example, in an article titled "10 easy ways to support our creative industries", the author endorses this popular logic of digital activism or "clicktivism" (Karpf 2010) by prompting the reader: "Next time you have the opportunity to bend your politician's ear, tell them about investing in South Africa's creative industries to bolster the country's economic growth and get our country up to speed with the 21st century creative economy. In fact, tweet @helenzille or @PatriciadeLille now!" This belief that the immediacy of social media will "amplify the political voice of ordinary citizens" (Hindman 2009, p. 6) is also deeply embedded within the WDC campaign as the following press digest illustrates: "The power of partnerships - and what World Design Capital will ultimately mean for Cape Town - amounts to nothing without you. So get involved: Visit the World Design Capital 2014 stand at Design Indaba to answer the question: What does design need to solve for you? Email your name, organisation, contact information and details of how you'd like to be involved in World Design Capital 2014 - as a project, event, sponsor or volunteer - to the email address: yourwdc2014@capetown.gov.za [...] Follow and participate in the conversation on Twitter through @CapeTown2014 and learn more about the power of design on our Facebook page" (WDC 2014 29.02.2012). This statement is only one of countless examples that create an overall impression of the WDC 2014 project as offering ample opportunity for

216 These include the bid committee chair Bulelwa Makalima-Ngewana (@darksjokolade) as well as former Accelerate Cape Town CEO @GuyLundySA, CPUT lecturer Mugendi M'Rithaa (@MugendiM) and prominent architect @MokenaMakeka to name just a few.
direct democratic engagement. Other expressions that were also frequently used with similar missionary zeal included terms such as 'co-creation' and 'participatory design', with the CEO of Cape Town Design inferring that the WDC process was simply "too crowd-sourced to fail" (Interview Reesberg 19.06.2013).

Apart from being seen as most attune to the networked practises of creative production, the strong focus on social media as opposed to traditional broadcasting measures was also argued to be more cost-effective and less parochial as it offered additional opportunities to reach international audiences. Already during the bid, the idea that the world - and most probably the Icsid judges - had their virtual eyes on Cape Town occupied the minds of some bid proponents. Urging her audience to make use of their digital voices was the Partnership's communication strategist Lianne Burton, who argued: "I believe strongly that in the age of social media and the web, these judges will be inundated with wonderful and inspiring World Design Capital bids from all over the world. They'll google 'World Design Capital' and they will see what is happening in the virtual world. And if what they see are hundreds of blogs and people are marching in the streets as the CPUT lecturers did, with their buttons on, saying 'we care about this, we're behind this', they see lots and lots of op-ed pieces, they see media support, they see an African bid with the backing of everybody, it could swing the vote! I feel really strongly that people are looking" (Transcription video #2). Ong (2003) has already shown how the virtual presence of "cyber publics" in 'distant lands' can affect local discourses and socio-political responses, concluding that "the rise of digitalized publics means that people with limited access to the Internet are less powerful in affecting distant events than those connected to websites" (p. 94). Though Ong's argument focuses on the topic of Chinese internet-based diaspora politics, I nonetheless argue that her observations on power as defined by online access and digital literacy are equally significant for problematising some of Cape Town's digital practices around its WDC accolade.

That the presumed virtual presence of a design-enthusiastic 'cyber public' was indeed a considerable factor for local decision-makers is exemplified by the large sum of 1 million ZAR, which the local implementation agency Cape Town Design invested into building its official website. Within this so-called 'interactive design engine', the over 450 WDC-related projects could be found online via individual hash- and geotags that were cross-referenced with different social media platforms. Explaining this investment, the CEO of the company argued: "You know 99.9% of the people who are interested in World Design
Capital Cape Town won't come to Cape Town. So we are aware of it that there's a global audience there and we have to meet them in a digital world" (Interview Reesberg 19.06.2013). While for most WDC 2014 proponents the 'offline' success of their respective projects was seen as inherently linked to a strong online representation - and in the case of certain crowd-founding initiatives perhaps really depended on it - some criticism ensued about the dominance of web-based communication and participation offerings.

While some were generally weary about an "information overload" that could drown out the most important messages (Interview Lillie 16.01.2012) other lamented the truncated style in which information was conveyed and contextualised. Local journalist Lin Sampson - in her overall sceptical and at times scathing review of the WDC project - remarked: "The same words - curate, hub, initiative, inclusive, conversation (usually between inanimates), silo, vertical information, embedded - are shuffled like a pack of cards. A splattering of hashtags adds gravitas. There are some useful-sounding ideas, but I kept finding myself in glossy cyberspace, among photo-shopped pics of things yet to be built" (Sampson 23.02.2014). While the WDC's cumbersome language is certainly a stumbling block for broad-based public participation, these critiques miss a much more problematic point: the underlying assumption of an immediate causality between social media engagement, greater citizen participation and enhanced local democracy and development, apparent in the project's official communication practises.

While I do not seek to challenge the general potential of technological innovation and digital communication to enhance democracy and enable more inclusive development, I argue that these benefits are often too quickly assumed and too readily celebrated as universal rather than being problematised for their socio-cultural conditionality and highly uneven spatial distribution (Odendaal 2006, p. 32, also Pejout 2004; Schlozman et al. 2010; Kersting 2013). As of late however, a number of geographers and critical GIS scholars haven taken up the task of theorising what they respectively refer to as "neogeography" (Haklay 2013), "new spatial media" (Elwood & Leszczynski 2013) and the "geoweb" (Crampton 2013; Leszczynski & Wilson 2013).

Their spectrum of critical engagement with an evidently variegated digital society includes both new materialities and emergent participatory practices of web-based (geographic) information and ranges from the representation to the political application (and often appropriation) of digitalised knowledge (Gilbert 2010; Haklay 2013; Burns 356
Although a detailed discussion of this emerging transdisciplinary field would clearly exceed the scope of the research at hand, I am taking the overall growing attention for this new realm of knowledge politics as a validation for my critical interest in Cape Town's burgeoning #governance. Thus, I now want to briefly highlight two points that both contextualise and challenge the ostensible spread of 'digital democracy' - in Cape Town and South Africa at large.

The first point pertains to the persisting digital divide in both Cape Town and South Africa more generally (Odendaal 2006). On the one hand, also in South Africa, metropolitan areas are places of greater digitalisation and city governments are increasingly resorting to online tools in trying to enhance the effectiveness of public information, service delivery and civic participation (Baldersheim & Kersting 2012). The City of Cape Town has over the past couple of years put great efforts into upgrading and spatially extending its digital network infrastructure, including large capital investments into high-speed fibre-optic cables and new ICT access points in township areas through its 'Smart Cape' policy. Nonetheless, it also officially acknowledges that there remain vast gaps not only in physical access and capacity but also in terms of affordability and training (Odendaal 2006, p. 43).

Gilbert (2010) has referred to this ability to use ICTs services as "technological capital", arguing that it was a form of social capital and as such influenced by numerous factors such as "the gendered and racialized nature of urban labour markets, residential segregation. School systems, and the availability of services - public and non-profit - such as libraries and community technology centres" (p. 1011). In spite of this plethora of different influential socio-spatial, economic and political variables, the common stereotype remains that existing gaps in ICT use were greatly related to age and that the younger generation automatically grows up as "digital natives" across the board.

Researchers from the University of Cape Town have however reached a different verdict in their studies: "Instead of a new net generation growing up to replace an older analogue generation, there is a deepening digital divide in South Africa characterised not by age but by access and opportunity; indeed, digital apartheid is alive and well" (Brown & Czerniewicz 2010, p. 357). Even though they acknowledge that the increased use of mobile devises to access the internet might have a mitigating effect on this in the future,
their current data still shows "that people who suffer social disadvantage are much more likely to be disengaged from ICTs than the socially advantaged" (ibid., p. 364). This also supports the critical hypothesis that many social media participation tools, touted for their open access and social inclusiveness, often end up being "weapons of the strong" (Schlozman et al. 2010) that enforce rather than mitigate 'offline' inequalities.

Apart from these socio-material and infrastructural constraints, the second point I want to problematise is the general perception of the internet and particularly social media outlets as the great equaliser, which ostensibly offers a political voice to all its users (Pejout 2004). As this is obviously a rather general debate, I will only highlight the points relevant to Cape Town's budding #governance. As Prior (2007) has shown, the rise of the internet has brought with it a move towards what he calls "post-broadcast democracies". While the users evidently find themselves in a high-choice media environment in which they can both contribute and consume information at their own discretion beyond formal broadcasting services, Prior also argues that this had led to sharp differences in how different social groups engage with political content. A clear advantage is given to people who are both skilled and motivated to seek out political information, while those unacquainted with the medium or uninitiated into the new terms of engagement grow increasingly detached, resulting in greater inequality of political knowledge and ultimately agency (ibid., pp. 255f).

In consequence, though the internet might have levelled the political playing field in certain and unequivocally important ways, it has also created new divisions and exclusionary mechanisms (Hindman 2009, p. 5). In his elucidating book by the same title Hindman (2009) further debunks this Myth of Digital Democracy, using extensive empirical data from recent online election politics. His most important point is that there remains a great difference between speaking and being heard - a pertinent point that is all too often glossed over in most normative debates about political voice in our digital age.

While the rise of the internet has indeed offered new channels for citizens to air their ideas, concerns and opinions and has mobilised greater civic participation, he shows that the link between the ability to speak and the possibility of being heard are considerably weaker in online spheres than they are in almost any other area of political life. Furthermore, a particular divisive role in this regard is played by blogs, which though...
still seen as representing the views of ordinary citizens increasingly constitute a "new elite media" (ibid., pp. 16; 102).

Thus, he contends that contrary to popular claims that celebrate the radical openness of the world wide web, it is far from non-hierarchical (ibid., p. 18). Instead, he identifies the internet as a space of multiple intersecting hierarchies created through practises of information filtering and elite gate-keeping. He explains that "[t]his hierarchy is structural, woven into the hyperlinks that make up the Web; it is economic, in the dominance of companies like Google, Yahoo! And Microsoft, and it is social, in the small group of white, highly educated, male professionals who are vastly overrepresented in online opinion" (ibid., p. 19). In light of these striking, co-constitutive hierarchies we are left with no other option but to seriously question the internet's naturalised propensity for radical democratisation.

Though Hindman's findings are explicitly constructed against &S.-centric data and certainly require further empirical qualification to pertain to both online and offline realities in South Africa, his argument in combination with the other points presented above provide important and critical indications for assessing the communicative practises of Cape Town's WDC 2014 project. What emerges as particularly problematic is the underlying assumption of its many proponents and local social media evangelists that a strategic emphasis on digital communication and social media networks is if not the only than at least the best way forward for achieving greater participation of and direct engagement with the ordinary Capetonian (an idealistic sentiment that is also mirrored in South Africa's national argument for greater ICTs investment as Pejout 2004 has shown).

Conversely, in spite of a greater availability and use of cell phones by previously disadvantaged groups to access information and interact online, studies still show that the local digital divide is alive and well (Mphidi 2008; Fuchs & Horak 2008; Brown & Czerniewicz 2010), thus presenting a substantial impediment to such noble pluralistic claims. In addition, we also need to consider that the use of cell phone network services is comparatively costly and pre-paid phone cards are still much more prevalent than monthly contracts. Thus, 'airtime' is a limited and precious resource for many but especially the urban poor, meaning that having a 'smart phone' does not always automatically translate into being digitally connected.

Furthermore, the fact that on a daily basis we are confronted with an insurmountable barrage of information to choose from has for better or worse pandered
the success of a few popular opinion-makers that are able to digest this information into 're-tweetable', 'likable' and 'shareable' packages. Hence, to again paraphrase Hindman (2009) it does not only take substantial skills and motivation to seek out information in cyberspace but it demands even greater levels of both to become a sought after source of information (p. 142). Within Cape Town's mediatized WDC 2014 politics this point is especially salient considering that many project 'stakeholders' have invested substantial amounts of economic and social capital into shaping and augmenting their public social media profiles, turning them into increasingly crucial and powerful instruments of local political advocacy.

In consequence it can be deduced that the WDC's #governance has not automatically led to a greater diversification of political voice as commonly asserted but if anything has amplified the voices of a local digital 'elite' that is well-accustomed to web-based cultures of interaction and modes of hyperlinked participation. Many of these actors are also professionally connected with one another outside of the world wide web, thus turning social media outlets into yet another layer through which to strengthen already existing interpersonal connections. This emergence of an "enclave dialogue" (Kersting 2013, p. 270) supports Sassen's (1999) earlier argument that digital spaces and virtual networks are always partly embedded in actual societal structures and power dynamics, with its topography continuously weaving in and out of non-electronic spaces (p. 62).

From my point of view, the issue is however not merely the online replication of Cape Town's urban governance elite structures. Rather, it is the danger that all of this seems to strengthen a rather self-referential culture of reproduction instead of realising the promise of honest engagement with disparate views and adverse opinions. This also supports Kersting's (2013) observation, that many participatory online instruments nowadays display a tendency for being less about political deliberation and dialogue and more about the demonstrative construction of identity (p. 270). Thus, on the one hand, this argument suggest that such mediatised 'elite' politics of like-minded people talking amongst themselves stabilises the kinds of postpolitical governance arrangements criticised by Mouffe (2005), Swyngedouw (2009) and others. On the other hand though, the digital realm may still be the place in which we could witness the powerful resurgence
of the properly political as the social media echo of inherently spatialised struggles such as the 'Arab Spring' or Istanbul's Gezi Park protests have vividly illustrated (Castells 2012; Kersting 2012a; Zuckerman 2014; Farro & Demirhisar 2014).

Although, particularly regarding the WDC 2014 project's social media bias, Cape Town's geocoded cyberspace has thus far displayed anything but such radical revolutionary tenets, as the importance of social media outlets for realising urban political agency continues to grow, so may their potential for fostering a more agonistic pluralism (Mouffe 1999). While this and other questions around the social, political, economic and spatial effects of digitalising urban governance certainly remain the subject of much future study, this excursus has sought to exemplify that directing our analytical attention towards the emergent materialities and network dynamics of Cape Town's budding #governance can yield further insight into the local processes of worlding.
Cape Town's title win and the joyous celebrations on both sides of the globe are captured in video #6 and #7. Video #5 features short interviews with some of Cape Town's key WDC 2014 proponents and #8 shows the mayor's acceptance speech.

7.5 '…like the dog that caught the car'

With their visit to Cape Town, the Icsid judges concluded their evaluation tour of the three final contestant cities and the announcement of their decision was scheduled to take place during the annual conference of the International Design Alliance in Taipei at the end of October 2011. An indication that the competition had by then reached the top of the new mayor's agenda was the fact that she personally led a high-profile delegation to the global designer summit. The personal experiences that some of these delegates shared provide a rich account of how such "policy tourism" (Cook & Ward 2011) firstly provided a prolific platform for interurban diplomacy and engagement with globally mobile knowledge and secondly acted as an important sounding board for affirming their collective "elite dreaming" (Ong 2011b, p. 17). The resulting high level of excited anticipation was however not confined to the travelling urban governance practitioners but equally permeated local media campaigns and live events that were organised around the official announcement. In turn, I want to conclude this chapter with a brief account of this dynamic episode as it provides an important magnifying glass for understanding the intricate practises and imaginaries deployed in worlding Cape Town by design.

While the adjudication visit had once again affirmed the bid stakeholders' conviction that though "Cape Town may not have Bilbao's design assets or Dublin's locale, or for that matter China's financial resources" it had a "strong story to tell" (WDC 2014 29.02.2010), there was great confidence yet no ultimate certainty that the city could outbid its Northern competition. Hence, Cape Town's WDC team remained sternly focused on beating the project's drum both locally and abroad. As mentioned above, social...

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217 Besides the mayor Patricia de Lille the tour group consisted of the following prominent bid 'stakeholders': Mayoral Committee Member for Tourism, Events and Marketing Grant Pascoe, Western Cape Chief Director of Economic Development and Tourism Jo-Ann Johnston, Mayor of Stellenbosch Alderman Conrad Sidego, the Cape Town Partnership's CEO Andrew Boraine and Managing Director Bulelwa Makalima-Ngewana, Cape Town Tourism Communications Manager Skye Grove, the chairperson of the Cape Town Design Network Michael Wolf and WDC bid committee member Luyanda Mpahlwa.
media played a decisive role in ostensibly 'globalising' the debate, especially since the majority of Cape Town's official conference delegation was committed to broadcasting their Taipei experiences via their personal and institutional webspaces.

What provided me with particularly rich insights into the relational mobilisation and selective re-contextualisation of global policy knowledge was a series of short video interviews that Cape Town Tourism communications manager Skye Grove had conducted with each delegate about their personal experiences in Taipei and subsequently published on Cape Town's official bid website (see video #5). In essence, what filters through their different accounts is how such international conferences work as "trans-urban policy pipelines" (Cook & Ward 2012, p. 137) through facilitating comparison with other cities, encounters with new ideas and relationships with other municipal delegations (Temenos & McCann 2012; Clarke 2012a). While Clarke, based on his assessment of urban partnerships between British cities and cities in the 'global south' - has however argued that in such relationships policy transfer usually extends from North to South and follows largely imitative rather than cosmopolitan patterns (Clarke 2012a, pp. 806f), the video diaries of Cape Town's WDC 'stakeholders' provide a more nuanced perspective. While I do not want to rule out (partial) imitation as one possible effect of such international policy-maker encounters, the individual responses of Cape Town's WDC delegation overwhelmingly express a strong collective desire to not simply appear as the inert receiving end of global urban policy 'solutions' but instead to be recognised as an emergent supplier. For example, when asked to reflect on meeting her Taiwanese counterpart during the IDA conference, mayor de Lille noted: "There's certainly a lot to learn from the international community. I think our unique circumstances in terms of our own historical history [sic!] and background and the divides of the past and bringing spatial development to deal with the years of the divided past of South Africa will be a challenge for us. And therefore it's important to learn and like all cities in the world, we do face urbanisation on a big scale...how to deal with that? My interaction with the mayor of Taipei has been very friendly. The city is very clean, efficient transport, very very low unemployment, very environmental-conscious. [...] And we'll be going to a special exhibition that they won a first prize, world prize, for the kind of environmental things that they're doing so we'll be learning from that. Also the Foreign Affairs office, our own representative here from South Africa also had interaction...

218 In realising the growing international attention paid to cities and the possibilities this offered for mayors to distinguish themselves within a global urban governance sphere. De Lille had also appointed her own External Relations Task Team soon after her election.
with them and everybody is ready to stand and help. But they also recognise at the same time that Cape Town is a world city and that they can also learn something from Cape Town” (de Lille, video #5). A similar impression is echoed by the Partnership's Andrew Boraine when he states: “We are forging partnerships with a whole lot of cities, we are getting exposure to what is put on display at the Taipei World Design Expo - some amazing ideas there that we can take back to Cape Town and what I've also realised is that we can be really proud of what we've done so far over the last couple of years. We are up there with the rest of the world and it's always reassuring to come to a big global meeting like this and realize that we have as much to share as to learn”. Like Clarke (2012a, p. 797), I also take my cue from McFarlane's (2010) notion of 'comparison-as-learning' (p. 726) when I identify the comparative gesture in both statements as simultaneously following a 'strategy of critique and alterity'. While de Lille points towards the ostensibly 'unique' historical circumstances of Cape Town that aggravate its urban issues, she is equally quick to claim that possible responses can be both learnt from elsewhere and taught by the city's own governance experiments.

While Boraine's statement resonates in a similar vein, it illustrates a second point, which has however been neglected by many contemporary urban policy mobility scholars: that opportunities for comparing notes with other cities are as much valued for the new lessons, trend reports and policy fragments that can be taken home as they are for providing much-desired self-affirmation to urban governance practitioners. A reason for this may be the fact that international gatherings like the IDA are often geographically and socially far removed from the immediacy of local politics and power dynamics and thus offer a relatively safe space for more nuanced self-praise and self-critique. For example, while some Cape Town delegates felt that their governance approach was "on the right track" (Bulelwa Makalima-Ngewana) or "very much within the theme of our times" (Michael Wolf), others also clearly spelled out its abject shortcomings, for example in dealing with informal settlements and meeting even the basic needs of many urban poor in the city (Grant Pascoe, all video #5).

In spite of such multifarious individual self-reflection, what nonetheless remained unchallenged was the delegation's unanimous consensus about 'design' as the next frontier of urban (governance) innovation. Like the previous visit to Seoul which had been leveraged as a political decision-aid for the bid (see chapters 7.2 & 8.1.2), the trip to Taipei offered yet another opportunity to justify this rather speculative financial and
political investment. Particularly the chance of bringing the new mayor into direct contact with the cosmopolitan 'design gospel' seemed to have yielded the desired effect as one observer recalls: "I saw with my own eyes an 'enlightened' mayor who sparked with enthusiasm when coming out of the conference sessions, even before Cape Town was announced World Design Capital 2014" (Formula D Interactive 13.08.2012). Though there is of course no way of telling if this state of 'enlightenment' would have lasted had Cape Town not received the coveted accolade, de Lille's acceptance speech certainly shows that she embraced the idea of design as a powerful "discursive glue" (Lees 2004, p. 102).

In her address she noted: "The World Design Capital bid process and title have helped to bring different initiatives together and have made us realise that design in all its forms, when added together, creates human and city development. [...] [this] designation gives cities like Cape Town additional motivation to actively think of transformative design in development plans. We look forward to learning from other cities that are using design as a tool for transformation, including past winners Torino, Seoul and Helsinki and our fellow short-listed cities, Dublin and Bilbao. [...] In 2014 we will truly mature into a broader international course of cities adapting to new realities and in so doing we will contribute to the quality of life for our city and the larger body of knowledge that aids urban development internationally" (de Lille, video #8). Apart from presenting design as a new rallying point for both intra- and inter-city governance, what the second part of de Lille's statement clearly expresses is the wish to use design as a technology for mobilising Cape Town as a global urban development model. If Vancouver and Singapore have managed to stand in for 'green' and 'sustainable' urbanism (Hoffman 2011; Huat 2011; McCann 2013) and Bilbao and Barcelona encapsulate cultural regeneration and creative city-ness (Dodd 2008; Gonzalez 2011; DEGEN & GARCÍA 2012), then Cape Town - in de Lille's reading - could soon be setting a new global 'design(er) city' standard - especially for emerging urban centres in so-called developing countries. And as the WDC award simultaneously continues to promote design as a new global criterion for producing city hierarchies, Cape Town as "the first African city to be named World Design Capital" (video #8) would almost automatically come out on top. After all, as Beauregard (2003) has fittingly pointed out: "superlatives and 'firsts' are rhetorical devices that prepare the reader for a theoretical move - the assertion that the city is a paradigm. Not just unique or exemplary, the city being discussed contains and portends the future" (p. 184). However, while these grand
aspirations are always most clearly spelled out in such moments of victory, the next chapter will take a closer look at the intricate and ambiguous governance processes that ensued.

In this chapter, I have tried to provide an enlivened genealogy of Cape Town's creative city politics in the build-up to its designation as WDC 2014. Prior to the bid, the political terrain around the creative city agenda had been rather fragmented. Between a number of creative SPVs with very different organisational concepts, funding sources and political acumen and Creative Cape Town as intermediary rallying point, Cape Town's creative city narrative was held together by a rather thin 'discursive glue', basically made from formally inserting the creative industries into municipal and provincial local economic development (LED) policies. Although this set-up always remained rather volatile and was characterised by ongoing institutional reshuffling and internal power struggles between different local governments entities, it nonetheless sowed the seed for the WDC's 'elite' action network to emerge. To borrow a line from Prince (2010b): "Like bricks taken from one fallen building and used in the construction of another, the creative industries concept became a constitutive element in another assemblage" (p. 180), in my case the WDC 2014 bidding process!

And again similar to Prince's (2010) observation, the drivers of this process were those actors that were less ideologically tied to the idea of 'traditional' cultural industries and heritage and closer to the Floridian interpretation of the creative economy as a mixture of technology, innovation, and of course design, interlaced with aspirations of urban renewal and international exposure. As I have shown, these aspirations had also been fuelled by Cape Town's role as a major host city for the 2010 FIFA World Cup, as many proponents of the WDC 2014 bid had been intimately involved in 'priming' the city for the global sporting spectacle. Thus, as much emboldened as cautioned by the experience but in any case well-versed the organisational tenets of a bidding process, a group of "territorially committed actors" (Robinson 2011b, p. 35) set out to script Cape Town's design story. As I have shown, the resulting bid book was more than just the formal fulfillment of competition requirements but instead represented a crucible of worlding aspirations that continue to occupy the minds of many local decision-makers.
The political weight of the bid book can hardly be understated, given that it provided both empirical spadework and political legitimacy for the recently launched Western Cape Design Strategy (Provincial Government of the Western Cape 18.09.2013). Overall, the WDC bidding process has brought a range of 'elite' actors together and has also spurred a range of international inter-referencing opportunities, in which Cape Town delegations were able to 'benchmark' their city against the experiences and actions of other municipalities across the globe. Furthermore, by emphasising Cape Town's apparent 'vanguard role' as the self-declared speaker for design in and from a 'majority world context', the organisers have clearly displayed a desire to turn Cape Town not into yet another carbon-copy 'world class'-city but instead to position it as a 'class of its own'. As the next chapter will however show, this confident "elite dreaming" (Ong 2011b, p. 17) stands in stark contrast with the iterative processes of actually defining the tangible meaning of the accolade for Cape Town and having to create the appropriate 'stakeholder' structures to govern it.

Before I move onto this topic, a final observation in closing: When Icsid president Marc Breitenberg declared Cape Town as the winning city during the last conference session, this was not only followed by a veritable outburst of joyous celebration in Taipei (where the delegation fell into a spontaneous rendition of the South African anti-apartheid struggle song *Shosholoza*; see video #6) but simultaneously in Cape Town. Here, approximately 150 bid supporters, local media representatives and curious observers (including myself) had gathered at 6am at a trendy 'pop-up'-design store/coffee shop suitably named the {field office}, having followed the invitation by the Partnership to hear the final announcement live (see video #6 'Celebrating Cape Town's WDC title').

The atmosphere was riveting as the crowd - overwhelmingly dressed in tones of yellow - was fixated in nervous anticipation on the proceedings taking place in a dark auditorium halfway across the world via a shaky, makeshift internet stream provided by the mobile camera of one dedicated delegation member in Taipei. The haphazard and transient ways in which this momentous discursive event for an instant connected two different locales - the 'here' and the 'elsewhere' - provided me with a trenchant experience of the dialectic practises of worlding.
Figure 28 Celebrating Cape Town's WDC 2014 title (see participant observer in top right corner)
Source: Cape Town Partnership (2011); LW (2011)
Because, when I found myself amongst an ecstatic crowd in a sea of yellow balloons and paper streams (see video #6), one bid committee member brought the crowd down with a rather fitting allegory when he proclaimed: "Right now I feel a little bit like we are the dog that caught the car!" Capturing the mixture of collective excitement and confusion in the room about what this accolade should, could and would effectively mean for Cape Town, his confessional comment provides an antithesis to the "smooth surfaces" often invoked by policy statements and the "post-rationalizations of elites" (Peck & Theodore 2010a, p. 172). In consequence it also reminded me that as much as we imbue political strategies such as Cape Town's WDC project with logics, agendas and rationalities, they also remain inherently speculative, performative and contingent. With this dialectic relationship between the purposeful and the accidental firmly in mind I now want to turn towards the governmental aftermath of this fateful day.
"We are World Design Capital" –
The next level of worlding Cape Town

Following its official announcement, the news of Cape Town's WDC title generated a strong media echo across the country. For example, like the majority of local publications, the daily Cape Argus newspaper dedicated its front-page headline to the 'World's capital of design', including a symbolic juxtaposition of Cape Town's futuristic central city skyline with an unnamed township scenery, in an aim to visualise the bid's promise of overcoming apartheid's legacy of socio-spatial division (see Figure 29).
Official congratulatory notes were also submitted by the Western Cape's Premiere Helen Zille (DA) as well as by Paul Mashatile (ANC), the national Minister of Arts and Culture, who - like an overwhelming share of the general public - still struggled with the correct denomination as he welcomed Cape Town's appointment as the 'Designer City of the Year' (Department of Arts and Culture Republic of South Africa 16.10.2011). This again calls to mind an important distinction of the WDC: Unlike well-known sporting mega-events like the Olympic Games or established cultural awards like UNESCO's World Heritage titles, the World Design Capital is not (some advocates would add: yet) widely known beyond the professional constituency of its awarding body Icsid. Hence, while the bid committee had put great effort into creating a credible story-line to justify...
why Cape Town deserved the title, actually clinching it meant that its ostensible benefits had to be unpacked for the as of yet 'uninitiated' majority of the population.

Without wanting to pre-empt my following argument, it can already be noted that even though after the win the idea of design was evermore emphatically articulated as synonymous with the ultimate goal of building a 'better' and more 'inclusive' Cape Town, the actual translation of this elusive notion into a publicly acclaimed vision of urban development proved to be a more cumbersome and ambiguous process than initially anticipated by many of the bid's 'elite' proponents. The problem of enrolling the broader population into the WDC 2014 project was certainly aggravated by the rather limited international and virtually non-existent local awareness for both Icsid and its accolade, which presented a rather low-hanging fruit for critical journalists who could rightfully ask why the municipality was paying 3.6 million ZAR in licensing fees for a title that few people had even heard of before (Sitole 28.10.2011; Sampson 23.02.2014; Babb 01.04.2014). Nonetheless, apart from these few dissenting voices, most media features compared the city's WDC 2014 'honour' to its preceding World Cup 'success', in turn reproducing the usual smorgasbord of popular socio-political, economic, and spatial development expectations that had also been inscribed into the bid promise of transforming Cape Town into a more 'liveable' African city 'by design'. With reference to the growing visitor numbers recorded in previous WDC cities, some lauded the award as an opportunity to increase Cape Town's brand proposition within the cultural tourism segment, while others pointed to its potential for generating new public infrastructure investments, increasing economic growth and fostering job creation.

However, what was furthermore perpetually stressed alongside these common truisms of 'creative' urban development was the idea that local government itself should and could in fact be transformed by implementing 'design thinking' (Brown 2008), an approach that begs further critical investigation. Consequently, while the previous chapter has provided a genealogy of how the idea of creativity had initially become grounded in Cape Town's local urban development discourse and successively became transmogrified into a design imperative, this chapter will now depart from this chronological approach in order to unravel more cross-cutting institutional dynamics that came to foster the rise of local design(er) governmentality after Cape Town's official designation as WDC 2014.
For this analytical purpose, I argue that design needs to be understood as an "intellectual technology" (Rose & Miller 1992, p. 178) that is deployed in flexible and malleable ways within divergent processes of political deliberation. Thus, when I refer to the local institutionalisation of design I am not only talking about the creation of formal organisations and regulatory mechanisms, but furthermore about design as a stabilising factor for mutual expectations, strategic aspirations and networked interaction (Bathelt & Glückler 2014, p. 341, see also ch. 4.2.1).

In turn, this chapter hones in further on how design has been made 'governable' by tracing the practical mobilisation and re-ordering of different 'stakeholder networks' under the emergent rubric of an 'African design(er) city'. This label deliberately implies a double reading: While the 'design city' - as the previous chapter has shown - alludes to the successive adoption of the WDC 2014 project as a platform for 'elite' socio-political imagineering and claim staking, the 'designer city' specifically refers to its associated politics of identity formation. In other words, the latter - as one of the focal points of this chapter - considers how 'the designer' has become construed as an "expert subject" (Roy 2012, p. 37) in Cape Town's contemporary public discourse, and thus how a cosmopolitan community of 'creative subjects' has been strategically invoked as an indispensable macro-actor of urban governance (see ch. 3.1).

As Ponzini and Rossi (2010) have shown in their study of creative class politics in Baltimore, macro-actors can be described as 'networks of agency' in which heterogeneous subject positions are 'enrolled' in a common but contingent project of normative creative city-making through "politics of association" (p. 1048). These politics of association are characterised through the opportunities they offer for individual self-identification and self-affirmation and the ways in which they are able to conjure a collective sense of belonging to and responsibility for certain urban policy goals (ibid.).

In consequence I argue that Cape Town's WDC 2014 process has provided a prolific source for such politics of association. Through its strong emphasis on 'participatory networks' and 'co-design' it has gathered a range of divergent and - in the case of 'the designer' and the 'design community' - novel actor positions under the banner of urban innovation and transformation. Yet the following analysis also shows the ways in which this emergent 'design imperative' has been incorporated within the local urban
governance sphere are not only diverse but often contentious. Because, as Rose and Miller (1992) remind us, while "the complex of actors, powers, institutions and bodies of knowledge that comprise expertise have come to play a crucial role in establishing the possibility and legitimacy of government" (p. 188), the claims of any particular expertise are always provisional and thus remain open to contestation and dispute, not least deriving from the designated 'expert subjects' themselves.

Thus, in order to understand the emergent governmental terrain, the following analysis will proceed in three steps: For one, to be subsequently able to unravel the WDC 2014's relational politics of association, it is first of all important to tease out the vast array of new urban governance arrangements that have been created following the win of the title. Ranging from ephemeral events such as the 'WDC stakeholder forums', via semi-formal, transitory 'interim committees' and 'task forces', to the eventual institutionalisation of formal organisations such as the implementation company Cape Town Design and the CoCT's internal WDC department (see Figure 30), this has been a dynamic process of experimentation with various modes of 'governance beyond-the-state' (Swyngedouw 2005).

Figure 30 WDC 2014 governance progression and final setup
Source: LW; design: E. Gooris
As Swyngedouw and others before him have argued (Jessop 1998; Pierre 2000), such polycentric and pluralistic forms of state-civil society interaction are becoming ever more pervasive in cities across the globe, even though their rescaled terms of engagement are often only seemingly more horizontal and equitable. With regard to Cape Town's WDC 2014 project, it is thus important to pay close attention to the kind of actor positions that have been created, strengthened or weakened through the growing propensity of local government for engaging with the idea of design. This also explicitly includes the new interurban networks that are being forged through the connection with previous as well as future WDC cities.

The second step focuses more specifically on the 'design community' as an emergent yet heterogeneous macro-actor through juxtaposing the emblematic examples of the Design Indaba, the Cape Town Design Network and the CoCT's internal WDC 2014 department. On the one hand, these three organisations have, each in their own ways, been instrumental in shaping the politics of association that have given rise to the 'designer subject' as an ostensible harbinger of 'innovative' and 'creative' urban policy 'solutions'. On the other hand, a closer look also reveals that this celebrated 'community of practise' is not monolithic but represents a range of divergent personal and collective interests as well as ambiguous and at times even contradictory governmental rationalities, which need to be carefully untangled (see ch. 4.3). These three examples furthermore resonate broadly with the continuum of political articulations identified by Dzudzek and Lindner (2012) in their case study of performing the creative city script in Frankfurt (p. 12): the identification of synergies and the leveraging of equivalences (Design Indaba), the ability to stabilise the general project while still retaining an (albeit limited) ability to formulate antagonisms (CTDN) and the resulting demand to balance these contradictions in governing practice (CoCT's WDC department).

In closing, the third step then turns towards the limits of Cape Town's creative-cum-design(er) city nexus by looking at the contestation around 'The Fringe - Cape Town's Design and Innovation District'. In spite of being almost inseparably connected to the WDC 2014 as one of its flagship programmes and promoted through a strong public-private-partnership backing, this urban regeneration project, which started concurrently to the WDC bid in 2011, has nonetheless been retracted only two years later.
Although the discursive 'failure' of the Fringe is first and foremost a context-specific example for how local history can be successfully wielded as a powerful tool of socio-spatial struggle against neoliberal place-branding exercises in post-apartheid Cape Town, I nonetheless argue that this example also provides a glimpse into the possibilities for subversion, alternative imaginaries and counter-hegemonic politics in the African design(er) city.
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Figure 31 Timeline of World Design Capital 2014 organization and institutionalisation

Source: LW; design: E. Gooris
"Design - if you get it, no explanation is necessary, if you don't no explanation is possible."
(Knox 2011, p. 12)

8.1 From designing urban governance...

As stated above, the purpose of the first part of this chapter is to unravel the mechanics of Cape Town's WDC 2014 governance following its official designation. More specifically, it is about showing how the emerging design impetus has affected the performance of local politics and restructured urban governance engagements through drawing in new 'stakeholders' and mobilising a divergent array of network dynamics. In trying to be mindful of the process' "political-temporal contingency" (Ward & Jones 1999, p. 301), the structure of the chapter remains necessarily episodic as it maps the shifting political terrain by honing in on a selected number of events that have provided pivotal platforms for political claim-staking and the successive governmentalisation of design (see Figure 31 and Appendix D).

A week after the {field office} coffee shop had been flooded by an elated crowd of enthusiastic bid supporters, it also hosted the first official post-win press conference following the return of Cape Town's official WDC 2014 emissaries from Taipei. While the meeting was full of exuberance, the 'stakeholders' present\(^{219}\) also tried to give some, albeit vague, pointers regarding the road ahead. A strong focus was again put on reiterating the bid's Pan-African, as well as, 'southern' model city agenda at large by claiming that the delegation did "push not just Cape Town on the map, not just South Africa on the map…we were there as an African delegation and we were very proud to be there as an African delegation. [...] So in bringing the World Design Capital to Cape Town, we are able to focus global attention on significant issues that don't just touch the

\(^{219}\) Speakers included Andrew Boraine and Bulelwa Makalima-Ngewana (both Cape Town Partnership), Mariette Du Toit-Helmoldt (Cape Town Tourism), Jo-Ann Johnston (PGWC), Mugendi M'Rithaa (CPUT/Icsid,) and Conrad Sidego (Mayor of Stellenbosch), with the latter mockingly declaring himself as the delegation's "supporting cast" (Sidego, event transcript 1.11.2011).
lives of fellow Capetonians but are relevant issues throughout the globe, particularly the developing South" (Boraine, event transcript 1.11.2011). By the same token, however, Boraine also emphasised that it was not only about 'extrospective' governance when he noted that "[i]t's not just about putting yourself on the map for your external marketing and targeted visitor audiences and things like that. That's half the challenge, the external, the other half is internal" (ibid.).

Figure 32 Cape Town Partnership CEO Makalima-Ngewana at the first WDC 2014 media briefing
Source: LW, 2011
In general, the 'stakeholder panel' was at pains to emphasise that they wanted the accolade to be perceived as more than just 'a year of events'. Rather, the win was framed as an opportunity to support both existing public projects, as well as official long-term city visions like the City Development Strategy or the Provincial Government's 'Future Cape' process by developing 'design-minded' strategies and policies together with an extended 'stakeholder network' (Johnston, event transcript 1.11.2011). In their characteristic manner of pre-emptive local diplomacy, the Cape Town Partnership representatives were particularly eager to stress that the process was to ostensibly strengthen cooperative and horizontal forms of urban governance on all fronts. Boraine confidently proclaimed: "I think we should see this as a coalition, as a network of networks. Let's not try to run rival or parallel processes, let's reinforce the existing consultation processes an engagements" (Boraine, event transcript 1.11.2011). Makalima-Ngewana ended the press conference on a high note by adding that "it's time right now for us to sit down and design this process together with the stakeholders" (Makalima-Ngewana, event transcript 1.11.2011; emphasis added LW; Figure 32).

While the press conference provided a comparatively detailed recap of the bidding process as well as the delegation's Taipei experience, it remained deliberately vague on the concrete organisational set-up, as behind-the-scenes negotiations around the 'deliverables' of the Host City Agreement as well as the principle institutional 'driver' of the implementation process had just commenced. To manage this sensitive process and its accompanying flare of political longing from a variety of governance stakeholders, the City Council brought in Evan Rice, a senior consultant from the Johannesburg office of global management firm McKinsey, as an interim manager (see Figure 31).

While the press conference was a great display of unity and common purpose by the major bid 'stakeholders', there nonetheless ensued some disagreement about who should take institutional ownership of the process. As the Partnership had been both the initiator and biggest force behind the bid, there was initially a clear expectation that it would continue to drive the process. This was however complicated by the fact that the Host City Agreement had to be signed by the city's official governing body, i.e. the City Council, which thus had to take both legal and financial responsibility. However, the prospect that the City Council could take charge of the process (especially leading up to 2014 as a national election year) did not bode well with civil society organisations like the Social Justice Coalition, who took this as an opportunity to lambast the City Council for its tarnished track record in terms of involving and recognising the wishes of poorer communities (Interview Silber 17.02.2012). With setting up the Cape Town Design NPC as an independent body, this conflict was however - at least formally - resolved.

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While his main task as an expert authority was to negotiate the Host City Agreement with Icsid, thrashing out the formal rules of engagement and prospective institutional mechanisms, he also quickly became the first port of call for both incumbent and prospective 'stakeholders', who approached him with an array of disparate agendas. As Chris Whelan, CEO of business lobby group 'Accelerate Cape Town' remarked: "What we are seeing is that there's a fair amount of different interests. Cape Town and South Africa have been divided so there's people trying to drive an inclusion agenda, saying we should do things in Khayelitsha, Mitchell's Plain... there are other people who say we should do things for business, people like myself. There are people saying we should position Cape Town in the eyes of the world, other people say we should use the opportunity to focus only internally what we can fix in Cape Town. I think one of the biggest challenges is trying to align all of those different - I say political but it's not party-political, but the different agendas, the different paradigms that people are driving is very challenging" (Interview Whelan 11.03.2013).

Against this spectrum of competing rationales, Rice perceived himself as both an 'objective' and 'neutral' mediator, given that he had just relocated to Cape Town for this specific job opportunity. As he explained: "So I mean the other kind of benefit almost by default here is [that] I've actually only just moved to Cape Town. So for me this is about getting involved and making a contribution and meeting people and as a result I don't actually have any links to the history of who's been involved and positioning things. [...] I don't actually have a vested interest in any particular answer so I am coming in here and trying to make it as objective as possible. Stick to the facts and then once we have got the facts and say these are the models available we can say, alright, these are the models that we've got here" (Interview Rice 15.02.2012).

Thus, apart from the technical and legal arrangements, one of Rice's major tasks also included the organisation of the first public "World Design Capital 2014 Stakeholder Forum". Described as a tool for "generating excitement" while at the same time "managing expectations around time and money" (ibid.), the main idea of the forum was to provide a stage for enrolling a multifarious group of actor positions into Cape Town's 'design(er) city' project - not least professional designers themselves: "What we need to do is to get guys [sic!] to engage between their private little worlds of fun, cool, hip and real city problems" (ibid.). This mobilisation-cum-responsibilisation of design professionals would emerge not only as a key narrative during said 'stakeholder forum' but - as this chapter will proceed to show - as a guiding governmental logic of the WDC 2014 process at large. Thus, inspired by Foucault's proposition to focus on power relations through the micro technologies of action and communication that bind different actors together in
certain time-space constellation (Foucault 1980a, Foucault 1980b), I now want to focus on the first 'stakeholder forum', which took place on the 28th of February 2012.

Held on the day before the official opening of the annual Design Indaba conference, one of the CTICC’s largest auditoriums was filled to the last seat with local media, bid 'stakeholders' and supporters, City Council members, proponents of the local 'design community' and an 'informed' general public, who had all followed the mayor's invitation for "shaping our vision" (Official Mayoral Events Invitation, 13.2.2012) around the accolade. After the day's MC - non-other than Ravi Naidoo, the Design Indaba's charismatic founder and arguably one of South Africa's most renowned 'design gurus' (see also chapter 8.2.1) - had introduced the "hashtag of the day" (#WDC2014), Mayor Patricia de Lille was first on the podium to deliver a slightly peculiar performance in a cajoling homage to the "present leaders of the design community" in the audience (Event transcript, 28.2.2012). She joked: "getting into the spirit of design and creativity, I am going to try something a little different today in an attempt to present to you in a Pecha Kucha format, which may well be a first for a politician…20 slides in 20 seconds each…wish me luck!" (de Lille 28.02.2012).

Although this presentation style condensed the content of her speech to a proverbial elevator pitch, two of her statements would nonetheless come to entail significant programmatic consequences for her own administration. Firstly she stated, that she "would like City officials to relook [sic!] our processes to ensure that design is considered in decision-making and to engage designers on the key challenges of the day" (ibid.), and secondly she made the promise that "[w]e certainly are going to make sure that each and every one of the 111 wards in Cape Town has got a World Design Capital 2014 project [...] and that's why I have all the subcouncil chairs here this morning and the Mayoral Committee members, because it's going to be their function to take this out into each and every ward. [...] And when we announce the budget for the next financial year, which will be the 1st of June, I'll be making announcement of an increased ward allocation allowance so each of the previously disadvantaged wards will also be linked to the WDC award and use design to transform people's lives" (Event transcript, 28.2.2012). That the mayor had indeed been serious about taking designers to task or rather about "giving designers their day in Cape Town" (ibid.) as architect Luyanda Mpahlwa put it during his forum presentation, became evident three months later. In the beginning of June, alongside the official announcement of additional ward project budgets, the mayor appointed an acclaimed local design professional as the
municipality's official WDC 2014 programme director. Richard Perez, an industrial designer who also holds an MBA from UCT's Graduate School of Business had previously been the CEO of local design company '…xyz' and was chosen from over 100 applicants for the position (Jooste 01.06.2012; see Appendix B).

While chapter 8.2.4 will tackle the work of Perez and his team of fellow designers - which also includes the arguable mammoth task of delivering on de Lille's promise of 111 'ward projects' - in more detail, it is important to already highlight its overall governmental implications. I argue that inviting an acclaimed 'design expert' to assemble a team of like-minded professionals that is then embedded into official bureaucratic structures and tasked with conducting a comprehensive internal review of local government's own 'design principles' can be read as a first significant step towards what I have come to call design(er) governmentality. I argue that this notion revolves around the dialectic relationship between design as a new "intellectual technology" (Rose & Miller 1992, p. 178) within Cape Town's urban governance realm and 'the designer'/the 'design community' as new 'elite' interlocutor of urban development trajectories. This desire of local decision-makers to enhance government processes 'by design' also falls in line with Rose's (1993a) argument that liberalism inaugurates perpetual doubt about the effectiveness of policies and the efficacy of government and thus generates the powerful imperative "not to govern more but to govern better" (p. 292; see ch. 4.3). Furthermore and in borrowing from Hoffman's (2014) recent ideas about 'elite' subject formation as an important locus of urban political analysis (p. 1584), I argue that Cape Town's WDC 2014 process has fostered the emergence of 'the designer' as a new expert authority that seeks (yet often struggles) to combine (neo-)liberal technologies of power with more collectively oriented, 'developmental' ethics and logics. Yet before I can move towards problematising some selected processes of 'designer' subjectivation in the second part of this chapter, I first want to conclude my analysis of how design has become effectively emplaced as a precept of Cape Town's urban governance discourse and practice through negotiating its WDC 2014 title.
8.1.1 The evolution of 'stakeholder-based' authority in the WDC 2014

This takes us back to the 'stakeholder forum' event, where de Lille was followed on stage by bid committee member and locally renowned architect Luyanda Mpahlwa. Again, his address was testimony to the rather speculative nature of the process when he - in claiming to speak on behalf of the 'design leadership' ostensibly assembled in the room - emphatically thanked the mayor for allowing "these crazy people called designers to convince the City [Council] to give money and to bid for something where nobody knew where it was going" (Event transcript, 28.2.2012).

While his speech mainly sought to introduce Icsid and the basics of its WDC project, he also reiterated de Lille's clarion call to support Cape Town's 'design(er) future' when he prompted the audience in an almost evangelical manner: "Let's come out of this 28th of February forum, reawakened in our determination, our collective determination to demonstrate our readiness for this [WDC] challenge. And I think we can dazzle the world once again as we did during 2010 [FIFA World Cup] and this time it will be design that is determining the agenda of Cape Town to becoming a global African city" (Mpahlwa, event transcript, 28.2.2012). Again, Mpahlwa's statement highlights two of my previous points: Firstly, it once more illustrates how the 2010 World Cup experience is leveraged as a strong means of decidedly positive argumentative reinforcement for legitimising 'extrospective', accolade-driven urban development agendas; yet secondly, it also shows how worlding aspirations are not merely driven by the ubiquitous promise of 'global city-ness' but rather by a desire to appropriate this label by evoking an - arguably elusive – 'African' cityness. In consequence, the WDC 2014 then provides the necessary 'discursive glue' for binding these seemingly antithetical aspirations together and positioning Cape Town as the primary model city to represent this emergent urban register (see chapter 7).

Overall, the furore of design enthusiasm sparked by the 'stakeholder forum' was certainly amplified by the usual media frenzy revolving around the annual Design Indaba (see ch. 8.2.1). In order to leverage this attention, apart from the forum the interim WDC 2014 team (with the institutional backing of the Partnership\textsuperscript{221}) had also installed its own

\textsuperscript{221} While the legal mechanics of the WDC 2014 process were still being negotiated, the CoCT had signed a short-term memorandum of understanding with the Partnership, who was tasked with maintaining some
promotional stand at the three day-long public expo. With its walls entirely made up of yellow pencils and post-it notes, the display not only gave an introduction to the aims of the local WDC 2014 rendition but also sought to symbolise ‘interaction’ and ‘crowd-sourcing’ as the allegedly guiding ‘design principles’ of the project. Visitors were asked to write down their answer to the question "What does design need to solve for you?" onto the post-its provided and pin their reply onto the wall of the stand (see photos 'WDC 2014 @ Design Indaba' in Appendix D and video #12).

Queried about the message of the display, one of the bid committee members exclaimed: "It sends a strong message that the City wants the 2014 World Design Capital process to be as inclusive as possible. Design can be intimidating to some - we want to bring it down to earth and make it accessible and fun!" (Future Cape Town 05.03.2012). That the sheer placement of the stand into the exclusive and glitzy exhibition environment of the Indaba made a mockery of this noble aim was however too self-evident, thus quickly prompting some of the project's proponents to emphasise that the stand was a modular installation that could easily be set up in other parts of the city (Field transcript, 29.02.2012; Interview Makalima-Ngewana 21.02.2012). That this has remained a mere declaration of intend is only one part of the problem. The broader issue - as already pointed out in chapter 7.5 - certainly relates to how such well-choreographed participation mechanisms create a powerful illusion of direct political feedback loops, while they in fact merely serve to stabilise a postpolitical consensus around design as the normative harbinger of 'good' urban development.

However, while a veritable flurry of excitement had been sparked by the fresh prospects of becoming an internationally acclaimed 'design(er) city', which was also mirrored in the respective local media coverage, the months following the 'stakeholder forum' and the Design Indaba were marked by comparatively little public communication. According to numerous respondents, this was mainly due to the rather lengthy legal exchanges in negotiating the official Host City Agreement and defining the mandates, rights and responsibilities of the signatory parties. As one of them recalls: "Ja…so…apparently also part of the slow down last year was due to the fact that…they media momentum and consulting with the former bid committee which has been turned into the 'Interim Advisory Board' (Figure 31; Appendix D).
[the City of Cape Town] were negotiating the Host City Agreement and they had been burned so badly from FIFA, that there were clauses that were...being debated about between the lawyers in Montreal and here and that's what slowed things down" (Interview Whelan 11.03.2013).

The experience with FIFA's rigidly enforced governance regime left a vivid institutional memory (or in this case: a throbbing scar), which in turn informed a rather cautious handling of the case by the CoCT's legal team. But, according to some other respondents, at the same time Icsid itself was also reviewing the tenets of its accolade scheme in light of its inexperience in dealing with an 'African' city setting. "The process in the beginning has been...it's been a different situation where the three previous capitals have been First World capitals. We are the first developing country [sic!]. [...] It's a very different environment and the first part of this [process] has been trying to just set up the appropriate relationship with the governing body Icsid, to make sure that it is appropriate for a developing country. And that has been the hardest thing, to try and make sure that ... because they'd never thought about that, and they can't, because they've never had a developing ... they haven't had the experience before. This is the experience which will improve that company, and improve the accolade, the process of the World Design Capital, to try and understand, okay, we're not dealing with Helsinki, we're dealing with Africa [sic!]") (Interview Hefer 13.03.2013). In turn, it is important to stress that establishing the local governance foundations of the WDC 2014 process was perceived by the majority of my respondents as a process of mutual learning, rather than a regimented handing-down of policy prescriptions (Interviews Johnston 22.02.2012, Burton 05.08.2013, Snaddon 15.02.2013).

As asked about his experience of negotiating with Icsid, another respondent concisely remarked: "Again, the learning is two ways. It's not just that the rest of the world teaching us things but we can teach them things as well" (Interview Whelan 11.03.2013). This statement not only presents yet another claim of confidence in Cape Town's future as an ostensible 'model city', but at the same time it also defies the idea of 'fast transnational policy transfer', as a process in which external actors allegedly ride roughshod over local governance regimes (Peck 2002a).

While - as the previous remarks on FIFA have unequivocally shown - this can and should of course not be completely dismissed, it also needs to be noted that Cape Town's
comparatively tough approach of meticulously probing, querying, and amending Icsid's Host City Agreement can be seen as an example for a 'not-so-fast' policy process. In relating this observation back to theory, this should again remind us that 'worlding cities' are made up from a peculiar mix of 'mass' and 'elite' dreaming rather than imposed visions (McCann et al. 2013, p. 585, see also ch. 4.2). This also means that we must take into consideration questions of situated agency, local autonomy and how both might come to bear in unforeseen ways.

At the end of June 2012, after four months of lengthy behind-the-scenes negotiations, the Host City Agreement was eventually adopted and duly celebrated with an official 'Signing Ceremony' and gala dinner, attended by executive members of both Icsid and the City of Cape Town, as well as other bid support groups (see video #13 and #14). What filtered through strongly in Mayor de Lille's emotive acceptance speech was the idea that design presented a favourable tool for further advancing her overall agenda of decentralisation and increasingly network-based urban governance, which would also be able to transgress the city's formal administrative boundaries. She proclaimed: "Design is not about central planning. It is about networks that jointly make up an attitude, an approach and a direction. The product of those networks combined is what will transform this city. We sign on behalf of those partners. And we sign on behalf of the people of Cape Town. Above all, we sign for a new way of thinking, one that sees opportunities, not obstacles, challenges not dead-ends, and the roadway for other cities to follow in building a better future" (Icsid 29.06.2012). While the signing ceremony marked Cape Town's official acceptance of the title, it still had a way to go in terms of putting the required implementation mechanisms in place.

Thus, the event also saw the launch of an official call for board member nominations, in order to determine a group of people to provide 'expert' oversight to the new WDC 2014 governance body. Chosen by a 'multi-sectoral selection committee', the 14 members of the board included representatives from all three tiers of government, delegates from business and academia as well as well-known 'creative' professionals (Figure 33 and full list of names in Appendix D).

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222 A specifically contested point concerned the use of Icsid's official 'black circle' logo as opposed to Cape Town's open-source yellow 'supporter logo' which had gone 'viral' during the bid campaign. The issue was settled by allowing further non-commercial use of the yellow 'supporter logo' but asking Cape Town Design as the official implementation agency to refrain from actively promoting it (Cape Town Design September 2013, p. 13).
With the board in place, the local implementation agency Cape Town Design NPC (non-profit company) was then launched in November 2012, with its CEO Alayne Reesberg hired shortly afterwards in December 2012 (see Figure 31). Reesberg, who had started her career in South Africa's UN diplomatic corps and later came to work as a senior manager at Microsoft, had been head-hunted for the position from Johannesburg, where she had been working as a consultant in the mining sector (see Appendix B). Although her previous relations to the design sector had thus been spread rather thinly, her internationally honed expertise in both peacekeeping and corporate management as well as her professional network were seen to offset this lack of direct 'design expertise' (Creative Cape Town 05.02.2013).

Tellingly, when I asked her about her previous relations to design, she prominently quoted her experience of living and working in different 'global cities' as having provided her with the necessary wherewithal: "I've lived in a lot of cities world-wide and [uhm] I sort of understand the broad topic of what makes a liveable city. It's that mix of what you can do during the day and the night and how a city embraces you - or not. So I've lived in New York and I've lived in London a lot [uhm] and those are all...and Seattle! All cities who have hugely invested in city assets, in city experiences, in - you know - authentic city events, authentic city initiatives" (Reesberg 19.06.2013). Without wanting to over-interpret this statement, I would nonetheless argue that it speaks to how the globally mobile urban 'elite' is - alongside their professional encounters - also shaped by
their personal experiences with cities elsewhere, in turn leading people like Reesberg to become self-acclaimed authorities on international urban development dynamics by virtue of their cosmopolitan living and employment patterns.

Alas, with Cape Town's reign as WDC 2014 less than 12 months away, Reesberg had to "hit the ground running" (ibid.), both in terms of assembling her team and in producing a designated programme that would transmit 'the core message' of the project: "And the core message of this thing and I don't know that it's applicable to other cities but the core of this thing is empowerment of the citizen - to take that solution statement into your own hands. Not wait for design policy to happen, but ask how can I make sense of this? There are NGOs, there are designers, there's competence, there's capability - let's fix it! So it's a very empowering moment in the 20th year of democracy you know? So I think, I really do think that there's something sexy around that" (ibid.). In other words, not only was the emerging design imperative supposed to provide a new 'sexiness' to the doldrums of postapartheid transformation, but Reesberg's reading of 'empowerment' also reveals an important governmental logic which has been reiterated by many other respondents: That design can be effectively wielded as a tool for 'fixing' the city through instilling a self-entrepreneurial spirit in its citizenry and spreading a positive '(design) can do'-attitude in support of broader 'developmental' goals. While there is arguably a great need for encouraging active citizenship, my trouble with this narrative lies in its one-sided emphasis on mobilising self-improvement and deregulated DIY-citizenship as opposed to simultaneously encouraging 'empowerment' in a more rights-based sense, i.e. supporting the ability of the population to hold public institutions accountable and to challenge the status quo through emancipatory politics (Mckee 2009; Barchiesi 2011).

However, one specific group of actors, which was certainly firmly pulled into the local urban governance domain by this undergirding logic of social activation and developmental volunteerism, was those broadly identifying themselves as design professionals. This was exemplified by the strong response to the call for a curatorial panel, which was launched together with the first of two consecutive calls223 for public project proposals during the second 'WDC 2014 stakeholder forum' in December 2012 (see Figure 31).

Although this communicative event was significantly less well-attended than its first edition, it still drew an audience of about 150 people to the City Hall. Here, the mayor

223 The call for proposals ran from January to March and from May to July 2013.
and members of the newly-established Cape Town Design board were both reflecting on the past months and trying to map out the organisational road ahead by announcing the four guiding themes\footnote{224} for the WDC 2014: 1. "African Innovation. Global Conversation", 2. "Bridging the Divide", 3. "Today for Tomorrow", and 4. "Beautiful Spaces. Beautiful Things" (Event transcript 13.12.2012, Figure 34). The project proposals submitted were supposed to speak to at least one of these themes and were to be reviewed by a curatorial panel of design experts, which would then select successful applications together with Cape Town Design as well as the also newly-appointed international advisory committee (see Figure 31 and Appendix D).

![Figure 34 WDC 2014 project themes](image)

Source: Cape Town Design (2013)

This process was also presented as being in line with local government's official goal of using the WDC 2014 process for further breaking down what it perceived as "the artificial barriers between the public and the private sector" (de Lille, event transcript 13.12.2012), and "to start engaging externally with expertise that lives outside the city\footnote{224} These themes were furthermore explicitly intended to align with the city's five official 'Strategic Focus Areas', which it had defined in its Integrated Development Plan (2012-2017; see also chapter 5.3.4).
administration" (Perez, ibid.). That in the case of the curatorial panel 'expertise' was however defined more by personal attitude than by professional attribute, filtered through in Erika Elk's presentation. The head of the CCDI and _Cape Town Design_ board member stated: "We are looking for people who include the following expertise: design practitioners, educators, community development practitioners, people from the public service, the public sector who are involved in process planning, creative thinkers, innovative thinkers, people who are networkers, solution-seekers, and some pragmatists too. [...] We are not looking for people who are coming in with their own interests and their own agenda, we are actually looking for people who will take a bigger picture view" (Event transcript, 13.12.2012). While from this perspective the call appeared to be rather open, what significantly narrowed the circle of candidates was that the process did not allow a direct application but worked on the basis of peer referrals. Nonetheless, the turnout of applicants was reportedly high, leading to the appointment of 38 curators whose professional day-to-day life related in one way or another to conducting, supporting, using, teaching, promoting or governing 'design' (for full list of curators see Appendix D).

These curators where then tasked with reviewing a total of 1253 project submissions, from which 463 projects would eventually be selected and recognised as part of the official programme. While a deeper look into the individual projects and how these penned out over the course of 2014 certainly forms a central part of any future research on the topic, my own empirical time-line stops with the announcement of the curatorial panel in March 2013. However, with merely nine months left to the 'New Years Eve of Design' that would mark the official beginning of Cape Town's year-long showcase of its design(er) prowess, it is suffice to say that this whole host of new actors and institutions hastily immersed themselves into the necessary preparations. Apart from delivering the official programme in September 2013 and making arrangements for the respective signature events planned over the course of the following year, this also included an urgent drive to find additional sponsorship to top up the 40 million ZAR public funding support provided by the CoCT (Cape Town Design September 2013).

While a discussion of this process is a task for another time, I want to conclude this section by critically reflecting on the complex dynamics of 'designing' Cape Town's 'stakeholder-based' WDC 2014 regime, which I have sought to unravel above.
8.1.2 Problematising the 'stakeholder-based' governance mechanisms of the WDC 2014

In this, I am particularly drawing on Swyngedouw (2005), who has astutely shown how such "emerging innovative horizontal and networked arrangements of governance-beyond-the-state are decidedly Janus-faced" (p. 1991). While, like him, I agree with the general idea that the proliferation of more horizontal and polycentric regimes of 'governance-beyond-the-state' can potentially foster more participatory forms of political decision-making, I have also found it important to reconsider the making of Cape Town's WDC 2014 governance in light of his critique. What he identifies as particularly problematic is that models of "horizontal, non-exclusive and participatory (stake)holder-based governance" are often idealised as harbingers of basic democracy and thus remain by and large impervious to difficult questions of power (ibid., p. 1995). In turn, Swyngedouw highlights four specific issues, which I argue are also pivotal for problematising Cape Town's emergent stakeholder-based governance (ibid., pp. 1999–2001).

The first point relates to the co-constitutive relationship between **entitlement and social status**, with the former being often conferred upon actors who have already reached a considerable level of the latter, resulting in a reproduction of 'elite' circuits of urban governance (see also Swyngedouw et al. 2002). In reviewing the overwhelmingly high-profile membership of the different WDC 2014 committees, task teams and boards that have been established since October 2011, we can find that this also holds true in the case of Cape Town. While only a couple of civil society actors were enrolled over the course of the process (and selectively at that), the majority of WDC 2014 proponents had been selected based on their already eminent professional merit and involvement in academia, local government, public private partnerships or business lobby groups (see Appendix B and D).

Consequently, the second issue then relates to the interrelated questions of **representation and accountability**, as the rule regimes by which people or organisations are assigned the privileged status of a 'stakeholder' are often tacit, nontransparent and thus

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225 Although the original paper has divided the following into six separate issues, many of them are closely interconnected, which is why I chose to discuss some of them in combination.
exclusionary. Although in some instances during the WDC process there have been attempts to establish some forms of institutional 'checks and balances' (for example with the selection committee of the Cape Town Design board), most of these remained themselves *ad hoc* entities, which were also quickly dissolved after fulfilling their designated task. Moreover, any desired representativity was in my view severely compromised by the decision to base the application for suitable candidates on peer-nomination and personal referrals, thus providing a considerable advantage to people with professional 'network capital'. Also, as Swyngedouw (2005) rightly laments, "accountability is assumed to be internalised within the participating groups through their insertion into (particular segments) of civil society (through which their holder status is defined and legitimised)" (ibid., p. 2000). This point is especially salient with regard to what I alluded to above as Cape Town's emerging design(er) governmentality.

Through it, the figure of 'the designer'/the design community' and its collective agency has been greatly inflated to become the epitome of Cape Town's 'problem-solving capacity', a reductionist (and also internally contested) view, which is additionally aggravated by farming out the evidently complex and highly contentious process of redressing apartheid's legacy through framing it as a 'design(er) challenge'. According to Swyngedouw and others (Hajer & Wagenaar 2003), this linguistic recoding is also a telling sign for a crisis of legitimacy, which haunts many of these governance constructs that are aware of the fact that they only partially represent the broader civic constituency they seek to speak and - most importantly - govern for. Particularly in light of the current debate around the rise of postpolitical modes of urban governance (see for example Paddison 2009; Swyngedouw 2009; MacLeod 2011; Swyngedouw 2011; Clarke 2012b), it is important to note that projects such as the WDC 2014 function as important discursive nodes for hegemonic image constructions (such as 'the designer' as the symbol for a 'greener', 'better', 'brighter' urban future 'for all'), which in turn makes it increasingly difficult to challenge or look for viable alternatives.

The fourth and final point relates to the question of geographic scale of governance and how the ability to effortlessly jump between them - for example due to previous professional and personal experiences with 'global elsewheres' - affects the distribution of power within multi-scalar networks. As I have already shown in numerous
previous examples - from the encounter of senior provincial government representative Jo-Ann Johnston who had been instrumental in 'grounding' the creative industries narrative in Cape Town, to Cape Town Design CEO Alayne Reesberg's cosmopolitan urban citizenship claims - scale jumping seems to constitute a rather effective strategy for asserting one's professional credibility, social power and opposition against the national political trajectory within Cape Town's 'elite' governance circuits (see ch. 5.3.4 and 7.1).

Furthermore I would argue that this strategy becomes ever more central with the surge of 'interurban diplomacy' in the wake of Cape Town's WDC tenure, which the following excursus will briefly touch upon. In conclusion, I want to argue that these four points should neither be read as a wholesale dismissal of the entire process nor as a vilification of certain individuals who have dedicated much time and effort to something they sternly believe in. Nonetheless and particularly with regard to the officially declared strategic objective of the WDC 2014 project to "build inclusive relationships and bridge divides between communities, institutions, industry, South African cities and across the continent" (Cape Town Design September 2013, p. 9), these caveats should certainly inform a more cautious and (self-)critical approach towards their current 'stakeholder-based' governance mechanisms.
"It is a moment for us to see design as a new measure for the status of Cape Town in the world community of innovation-driven, design-led global cities."
(Luyanda Mpahlwa, event transcript, 28. February 2012)

As an illustration of Cape Town as a host of international delegations, please refer to video #13 and #14, which depict the official WDC 2014 signing ceremony.

8.1.3 [Excursus] United by design - The WDC 2014's interurban diplomacy

This section is essentially an extended annotation to and discussion of the map below (Figure 35). In it, I tried to depict the numerous interurban connections which have been sparked through Cape Town's WDC 2014 process. As I have sought to show in chapter 3.3, it is important to consider the increasing international mobility of urban development paradigms such as the creative city within the broader context of an expanding terrain for intercity diplomacy and global mayoral politics (Jayne 2012; Acuto 2013; Barber 2013).

In addition, with the growing geographical reach of local governance authorities, there has arguably also been a new upsurge in efforts to produce 'best practice examples' which can then be presented and actively marketed to the members of a continuously expanding global municipal network (McCann 2004a, McCann 2011a; Moore 2013; Vainer 2014). Moreover, I have argued that the production and circulation of such "discursive truth claims" (Moore 2013, p. 2371) has also been part and parcel of urban worlding processes, not least in Cape Town at the dawn of 'design(er) city governance' (see ch. 4.2 & 7.1).
Although, as the map depicts, the WDC 2014 process has certainly fostered a plethora of new international connections, it is also important to acknowledge that international lesson-drawing and comparison is by no means a new practice within the city's postapartheid urban governance realm. Conversely, particularly in light of the pressing need for a substantial institutional and democratic make-over in the post-1994 era, local decision-makers have been indefatigably circuiting the globe, as one respondent explained: "You must remember that the years of isolation in this country meant that a lot of people in power have not travelled. It's literally that simple. But [over] the last ten years our mayors and politicians are now travelling around the world! They are visiting other cities, they are going to Taipei, they are going to New York, they are going London, they are going to Madrid, and they are going to Istanbul. People are suddenly realising, 'hey hang on, we are actually a little bit behind'. And I think the recognition and analysis and the precedent from other cities that have used creativity to transform their economies suddenly made South Africans wake up" (Interview Makeka 15.02.2012).

Regarding the use of such strategic cosmopolitanism by key WDC 2014 stakeholders, the organisation that has displayed and communicated its penchant for learning from global elsewhere most persistently has certainly been the Partnership. One of its practices, which I would like to highlight in this regard, is its regular invitation and
public hosting of international urban development luminaries. From Nick Leon, head of Design London and senior consultant to @22 Barcelona, to Danish architect and public transport 'guru' Prof. Jan Gehl, and from the Times Square Alliance's Tim Topkins to the public space 'champion' Fred Kent, the Partnership has consistently sought out and brought in arguably acclaimed foreign experts to share their experiences and reflect their professional principles against the backdrop of Cape Town's 'development challenges' during talks, site visits and workshops (Creative Cape Town 24.05.2010; Cape Town Partnership 15.08.2012, Cape Town Partnership 30.05.2013). Frequently, the turnout of local politicians, business people, urban development practitioners, academics and NGOs representatives who follow the Partnership's invitation to such events is considerably large. Though this, of course, does not say much about the actual 'learning curve' produced by these often ephemeral encounters with external expertise, what I have nonetheless found quite indicative in terms of their agenda-setting power has been that some key tag-lines would often resurface within the broader local urban development discourse (however aided to no small extent by the Partnership's own PR machinery).

What this however clearly shows is that scale-jumping is being actively deployed as a political strategy within Cape Town's urban governance realm (Smith 2008). More specifically, I would argue that re-scaling has become a prime tactic for senior local opposition leaders who seek to present their city as the very antithesis to what they regard as the dismal development trajectories in the rest of the country. That the WDC 2014 title has been wielded as a potent device for, firmly dissociating Cape Town from national development dynamics on the one hand and promoting it as a "benchmark" for other aspirant "majority world cities" (Interview M'Rithaa 30.01.2012) on the other hand, has been aptly illustrated by the mayor. As she explained in her speech in front of the 2013 Design Indaba Buyers Breakfast: "Nationally, there seem to be increasing pressures on us. We are experiencing slower growth than anticipated and nowhere near the rate required to add the amount of jobs our national economy requires. In some places, the compact between business, labour and government appears to be more strained than at any other time in the recent past. We also know that old trading patterns, especially with and within the rest of the African continent, are shifting. Considered together, these factors add to compound challenges facing the country. And yet, here in Cape Town, we have never been more confident. That is because we know that our performance is not necessarily tied to these national indicators. Cities are forging their own paths in this world. [...] Indeed, the major engines driving the world forward will
be what are today regarded as mid-size cities. This energy will be matched with the new dynamic of the developing world realising its potential. Together, this represents a dramatic change in the way the world's economy functions. It is a new story for the world and it is a story in which Cape Town will be a major character. That is one of the reasons why we are honoured to be the World Design Capital for 2014" (City of Cape Town, emphasis added LW).

On another note, apart from heightening the internationalisation of Cape Town's 'mayoral politics' more generally (Beal & Pinson 2013), becoming part of the 'WDC club' has furthermore created a host of new interurban connections, some of which certainly blur the boundaries between different scales of governance as well as the public and the private sectors (Acuto 2013, p. 117). For example, through its relationship with previous title-holder Helsinki, Cape Town's WDC 'stakeholders' not only learnt about their WDC governance model, but they also 'inherited' some private sector sponsorship (Nokia, Phillips) (Interview Makalima-Ngewana 21.02.2012), established a new official partnership between the design faculties of Aalto University and CPUT, and hosted a high-profile knowledge exchange event around the official hand-over called "Helsinki meets Cape Town" (7-10 November 2012, Cape Town), which was funded by the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Since then, other foreign national ministries have sponsored similar exchanges, such as Taiwan (for the exhibition 'Made in Taipei' during the 2013 Design Indaba) and the Netherlands. The latter even appointed its own WDC 2014 programme director within the local Dutch General Consulate and sponsored a three-week long programme of events in a specifically custom-built venue called the "Department of Design".

While a more in-depth analysis of these budding multi-level, interurban networks and specifically their practices of knowledge exchange and their political power dimensions remain the topics of future research, this excursus has sought to illustrate the emergent interurban diplomacy of Cape Town's WDC 2014 process. In sum, while such international city partnerships had already featured within Cape Town's local governance realm well before its designation as WDC 2014, I would nonetheless argue that this accolade has certainly added a new basis for international urban comparison on which local governance 'stakeholders' were able to further increase both the frequency and scope of Cape Town's global intercity encounters.
A feeling for different designer subjectivities and the way these are imagined and broadcast is provided in the videos #15 and #16. Videos #16 and #17 were filmed during the respective design workshops and depict some of the 'designerly' practices deployed. Video #19 gives a small visual impression of the Fringe – Design and Innovation District and its target group.

8.2 … to design(er) governmentality

While so far my argument has revolved around how the "idea of design" (Milestone 2007, p. 175) has come to reshuffle Cape Town's contemporary urban governance discourse and practice around the notion of a more 'creative' African city, I'd now like to direct my attention towards a slightly different analytical angle. As the previous section has already indicated, the WDC 2014 process has strategically invoked 'designers' as the new linchpins of urban transformation and local governance reform. In the words of one respondent: „Designers must be at the decision table […] Informed city officials and smart city decisions are the product of multiple advisors [sic!] - and design professionals should be part of that advisory group" (Interview Lundy 09.02.2011).

In turn, this section is both about how 'designers' have become interpellated as 'expert' subjects in local governance processes, and about the arguably divergent and ambiguous ways in which these subject positions have been practically performed within Cape Town's urban politics. The idea that urban politics can be approached by looking at processes of subject formation has been recently advanced by (Hoffman 2014), who - influenced by Foucault's writings on governance of the self and others - argues that we should not take political actors for granted but instead investigate "how modes of self-regulation become political problems" (p. 1576). In addition and very important for the analysis at hand, I argue that Hoffmann's proposition can also be leveraged for advancing a more holistic understanding of worlding and global policy mobilities, because it is premised on a topological perspective that sees power as 'stretched' across
space and thus allows us to trace how it is embedded in situated practices and social identity formations (ibid., p. 1577; also Amin & Thrift 2002; Massey 2005).

Though it has been previously emphasised that design is a culturally embedded process of socio-material (re-)production and as such "structured by and through relationships of power" (Milestone 2007, p. 178, see also ch. 4.3), critical urban scholars such as Knox (2011) have lamented a certain evasiveness on the part of self-proclaimed ‘design professionals' when it comes to problematising the political implications of their vocation. He observes that "designers tend to distance themselves from 'hard' political and economic objectives by emphasising their status as artists engaged in the production of aesthetically and socially meaningful form" (ibid., p. 48). Thus, and very much against popular claims, he argues that 'designers' are often systematic conformers rather than radical reformers, as the incremental logics of their 'design solutions' often tend to stabilise the status quo, instead of fundamentally challenging current societal orders (ibid., p. 36). In addition, the popular tendency to fetishise design as an apparently universal, rational and post-ideological practice also needs to be seen against the larger background of what has been described as a rampant postpolitical condition in urban governance, commonly characterised by technocratic 'solutions' and pragmatic consensus building to the detriment of more radical and insurgent politics (Haughton et al. 2013, p. 221; also Swyngedouw 2009). Thus, it might be said that the idea of design has certainly presented itself as both an autonomising and pluralising formula of rule that fits squarely into the set of advanced liberal governmentalities (Rose & Miller 2013; ch. 4.3).

However, and as the following will show, the notion of 'design' as well as the new-found political agency of 'designers' have also been actively claimed as a new rubric for social action in Cape Town. As such, the WDC 2014 process can also be seen as having provided an evidently contested template for different actor alliances to produce alternative imaginaries and moments of subversion that wittingly or unwittingly challenge the dominant 'design(er) city' narrative (see ch. 8.2.5).

In turn, the following seeks to provide a glimpse into these complex dynamics by looking at three distinct social intermediary organisations in which 'designer'

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226 Using the example of the British Punk movement, Knox (2011) has furthermore argued that design can also divert the critical energy of oppositional movements by making them forfeit their 'raw power' through being turned into the latest fashion (p. 7).
subjectivities have become actualised and its professional agency has been shaped. The first one is the annual Design Indaba conference and expo, a private non-profit venture whose founder Ravi Naidoo has been anything from tireless to notorious in his quest to raise the political profile of Cape Town's creative economy for the past 20 years.

The second, more recent arena for the affirmation of professional 'designer' advocacy is the Cape Town Design Network, a semi-formal interest group that has been directly born out of the World Design Capital bidding process and has since established itself as the voice of the local design 'community'. At the same time, the organisation also tried to push the envelope of 'transformative design' beyond local 'elite' circles by partnering with social movements such as the Social Justice Coalition to address the failure of service delivery for the urban poor.

The third and final institution, that also vividly depicts the conflictedness of performing designer subjectivities within the local governance realm, is the newly established WDC 2014 programme directorate. Here, a small team of designers has been embedded into the city's expansive public service machinery, where they have been tasked to follow two objectives: First, to instil 'design thinking' into the rather heavy-handed local bureaucracy, and second to 'empower' the local citizenry, especially in previously disadvantaged areas, to engage with issues in their neighbourhood in the framework of participatory 'co-design' workshops.

Although these empirical vignettes should by no means be construed as an exhaustive definition of local design(er) governmentality, I argue that they nonetheless provide a rich picture of the tensions unfolding between design as an emergent political rationality and its role as an embodied governmental technology (see ch. 8.1).

After all, as Rose and Miller (1992) have famously argued, it is especially the investigation of these intricate inter-dependencies of power, through which "we can begin to understand the multiple and delicate networks that connect the lives of individuals, groups and organizations to the aspirations of authorities [...]" (p. 176). Thus, and in closing, this chapter will hone in on a moment of popular contestation levelled against the Fringe, Cape Town's self-proclaimed 'Design and Innovation hub' and arguably the socio-spatial epitome of Cape Town's dominant design(er) city narrative. In spite of the Fringe's powerful institutional backing and great discursive force, none other than the
well-known District Six Museum has been able to re-appropriate the register of design-led transformation in order to challenge and ultimately derail the project, in turn offering a sterling case of design subversion by design diversion.
"A designer is an emerging synthesis of artist, inventor, mechanic, objective economist and evolutionary strategist."
R. Buckminster Fuller (1969)

8.2.1 Design Indaba - "A better life through creativity"?

The first example I'd like to talk about is arguably one of the city's most eminent design 'institutions' and as such has been instrumental in putting the idea of design as a political rationale on the 'mental maps' of local decision-makers. Founded in 1995, only one year after the formal end of apartheid, the Design Indaba (isiZulu for conference; matter of concern) has grown from a small gathering of 200 delegates into the country's largest creative industries convention. It now hosts almost 3,000 delegates from across the world and reaches a multiple thereof through simultaneous broadcasts across the country. TED-talk inspired presentations by both local and international creative luminaries have traditionally formed the heart of this annual conference event.

Over the years, its declared goal to showcase the allegedly boundless possibilities of "A better life through creativity" (the event's payoff line) has led to an expansion of activities that nowadays include a film festival, a music circuit, several venture capital pitching sessions, high-profile business 'Dine Arounds', local design competitions, and a three day trade exhibition for designer products and services from across the African continent. Launched in 2004 with a total of 40 exhibitors, this Design Indaba Expo has become the second mainstay of the programme alongside the conference and now features over 400 stands, which in 2013 drew a whopping 60,000 visitors. In addition, the organisers have also created their own powerful multimedia machinery: for several years they have published a glossy quarterly magazine, administered a busy internet portal, and recently launched a smart phone app that has apparently already been bought out by a German IT company. Thus, in presenting itself as "a multi-tiered experience that now

227 The list of invited speakers usually features prominent international names in architecture, interior, product, interaction, fashion, and/or graphic design. However, in working with a rather post-disciplinary design concept, the Indaba has already hosted a broad range of creative practitioners, from fine artists and photographers to fragrance and food designers.
incorporates other events, media, education, training, activism, advocacy and business development” (City of Cape Town 2011, p. 119), over the years Design Indaba has become a powerful voice within the local creative city discourse as well as an important ‘place of pilgrimage’ for a cosmopolitan ‘design community’ to actualise their collective professional identity.

With regard to the relationship between Design Indaba and Cape Town's 'design(er) city' narrative, the following two points give a first indication of their intimate interconnectedness: For one, the annual Design Indaba Expo has perpetually provided a physical, intellectual and symbolic 'home' to the WDC 2014 project as well as to virtually all its key 'stakeholders' - from the Partnership, Creative Cape Town and the Fringe to the numerous creative industry SPVs and local design-related university faculties - by hosting their official stands, panel discussions, graduate shows and prototype presentations. In consequence, it has not only functioned as a prime discursive event, which greatly added to forging a "design consciousness" (Interview Naidoo 26.01.2011) amongst local decision-makers and Cape Town's urban 'elite', but at the same time it also provided a heavily mediatised stage upon which the designer subject has been incessantly celebrated as an indispensable role-player for Cape Town's urban future.

A second important aspect in this regard is the influential position of the Design Indaba's charismatic founder Ravi Naidoo. A trained physiologist who later earned his MBA from the University of Cape Town, Naidoo and his company 'Interactive Africa' are widely lauded as pioneers of the local creative economy and indefatigable champions of Cape Town's creative city claims. That Naidoo is both a co-founder and long-standing board member of the Cape IT Initiative (CITI), one of the Western Cape's biggest creative industry SPVs (see ch. 7.1.1), provides further testimony of his personal entanglement with the genealogy of Cape Town's creative city politics. Over the years, Naidoo's vociferous expertise has also received international recognition, as he was called upon as part of the British Council's Cultural Leadership programme or as a jury member for the INDEX:award, one of the world's most prestigious and affluent design prizes. Within the

228 Especially in light of the strong path-dependencies between the current WDC 2014 and the 2010 FIFA World Cup (see ch. 7.2.2), it is also more than a mere side-note that 'Interactive Africa' acted as the main marketing force behind South Africa's successful bid to host the prestigious soccer tournament.
framework of Cape Town's WDC 2014 governance, he also serves as an eminent design expert on Icsid's International Advisory Council.

In sum, it is thus unsurprising that numerous statements by fellow designers, politicians and the media have praised Naidoo's role as the "elder statesman of South African design" (Mpahlwa, event transcript 28.2.2012), and that of his brainchild, the Design Indaba, as "a massive global force in putting Cape Town on the design map" (Interview McKinnel 11.03.2011). Some media outlets even suggested that he has been almost single-handedly responsible for the "meteoric growth of the cultural industry in this country" (Berman 16.09.2014). While my argument thus far has of course suggested a more multifarious genealogy, it is hard to negate that Naidoo has acted and continues to act as a central knowledge broker and 'design(er)' advocate within Cape Town's urban governance regime. As a prominent architect remarked during the first WDC stakeholder forum "[W]e cannot think of Cape Town without Design Indaba. It has made it easy or easier for Cape Town to actually present how it relates to design" (Mpahlwa, event transcript 28.2.2012). This suggests that both Naidoo and his event can be regarded as active relays for translating and positioning the idea of design as a new urban governmental precept. Hence, the following will further hone in on two interrelated questions: Firstly, what sets of socio-economic and political rationales, norms and values are actually folded into Design Indaba's particular design imaginary? And secondly: What are the specific relational and representational practices that accompany this process?

8.2.1.1 Between ubuntu capitalism…

"Design Indaba was born from the upsurge of confidence in South Africa's post-1994 future with a vision that the creative shall inherit the earth" (Design Indaba 2014) reads just one of the countless pithy slogans that are part and parcel of the Indaba's uncanny self-perception as the ostensible vanguard of creativity in Cape Town, South Africa and beyond. According to Andrew Boraine (former CEO of the Partnership), the event has been particularly prolific in terms of providing a platform for the commercialisation and global marketing of local design produce: "Not just looking at it in a romantic way, saying 'oh that's
nice bead-work, well done', which is a real stereotype. It's actually taking [...] functional objects and someone coming up with a good design and bringing that product to market and marketing it globally and creating income and jobs and employment and foreign exchange - that is what it's about" (Wenz 17.12.2008). For him as for a majority of my respondents, the much hailed 'transformative' power of design mainly manifests itself through the well-known neoliberal imperative of measurable economic growth. At the same time, however, the emergence of a (South) African design economy has been accompanied by a decisively emancipatory language. As its local benefactor Naidoo stresses, the reading of the creative economy as a factor of future GDP growth on the continent should not be regarded as simply another imperial 'hand-me-down', courtesy of the Washington Consensus: "Since the days we started and pioneered, every liberal itsy-bitsy thing has been because we have the fundamental belief that the creative dimension, that innovation and design can lend such value to this economy, such value to Africa. It has never been part of the toolkits, it has not been part of the patronising crap you read and learn about at the IMF or the World Bank (Interview Naidoo 26.01.2011).

Naidoo's bellicose comment strongly resonates with the popular 'Africa rising'-discourse that promotes the continent as the next frontier of consumerism and economic growth by marrying the process of marketisation with notions of Pan-African pride and post-colonial liberation rhetoric (Mahajan 2011). For South Africa, this hybrid development has been aptly described as "ubuntu capitalism" (Visser 2004); critical (McDonald 2010), which alludes to the appropriation of a culturally embedded local value systems in order to meet growing imperatives of (market-)value creation. According to (ibid., p. 143) the notion of ubuntu is nowadays promoted "as a home-grown management philosophy" by academics, business leaders and politicians alike to stress self-help and individual responsibility as vital building blocks of a postapartheid society.

That this reading of ubuntu also penetrated the WDC 2014 discourse is indicated by one of its leading proponents, who remarked during a podium discussion: 'We often talk about ubuntu as 'I am because you are'. In my opinion it's good, but it's also passive. I think the one I subscribe to is 'I participate, therefore I am'. Until people start participating in creating their lives of themselves, their homes, their families and their own

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229 Ubuntu can be broadly translated as a communitarian philosophy that builds on the notion that 'people are people through other people'. However, different translations exist and many debates about its ontological status ensue. See McDonald (2010) for an overview of different interpretations and Ramose 1999 for further philosophical discussion (pp. 140f).
McDonald however rightly concludes that such notions of empowerment also "dovetail with many of the larger ideological objectives and disciplining mechanisms of neoliberalism" (p. 146).

In consequence, the Indaba's proposition for "Designing in the Spirit of Ubuntu" (Strauss 02.03.2012) seems equally prone to such neoliberal fallacies by assuming a 'natural' and harmonious relationship between entrepreneurialism and democratic participation as well as between economic growth and redistribution, instead of realising them for the contested sites of struggle and dissent that they are. After all, Naidoo confidently describes himself and his fellow designers as nothing less than "commercial activists with a sociopolitical conscience" (Winkler 01.11.2001).

That this interpretation of 'designer subjectivity' also bodes particularly well with the governmental rationales of the local 'developmental' state was aptly captured by the high-profile recognition extended towards the Design Indaba by both politicians and private businesses. As the WDC 2014 bid book for example noted: "The event's target market has increased from young 'hipsters' from the advertising industry to a mix of senior and middle-management marketers, design practitioners, students, academics, and overall growth in attendance from the corporate sector" (City of Cape Town 2011, p. 384).

As a case in point, WESGRO, the provincial government's trade and investment agency, has over the past years sponsored numerous networking events for international buyers and leading design practitioners, which also regularly featured high-ranking politicians such as the premier, her ministers or the mayor as keynote speakers. During its 2012 edition, the Western Cape government prided itself to be "the only one [Province] to prioritise design as a key economic tool to drive future growth and job creation" while equally hailing design "as a tool to build stronger communities and promote democracy" (Wait 05.04.2012). Advanced-liberal technologies of enumeration (Dean 2009; Rose & Miller 2013) also played their part in affirming the government's conversant trickle-down logic: According to continued economic impact assessments - commissioned by Naidoo and conducted by UCT's Graduate School of Business - Design Indaba added a total of 1.3 billion ZAR to the GDP between 2009 and 2013 and a multiple thereof in combined media value (Standish April 2014). These numbers became widely cited as proof that designers...
were more than "itinerant hedonists" (Peck 2005, p. 766), but in fact - through ventures like the Design Indaba - "played an important role in increasing trade into the Western Cape, to create jobs, and reduce poverty and inequality" (Wait 05.04.2012).

Nonetheless, I would argue that it has not only been the Indaba's ability to quantify its economic success that bolstered its socio-political legitimacy. Telling from Naidoo's personal accounts, I propose that it has equally been the event's ability to add to the 'worlding' of Cape Town by providing a prolific communicative platform for mobilising the city as a paradigmatic role model and harbinger of design 'solutions' from and for the 'global south'. He recalls: "Previously we weren't part of the discussions, previously design used to be on a London-Milan-Tokyo-Paris kind of axis and all of a sudden it's becoming a bit more of a multi-centred world and it's a script that we've been chiselling away for the last sixteen years, putting Cape Town onto that agenda and putting forward Capetonians as exponents of design and bringing international people so that they can see it and they can go back as ambassadors and talk about it in front of our international media partners etc. [...] But we think the content we have is universal. And all of this content is relevant [...] to two thirds of humanity. It's relevant to all of South America, it's relevant to most of Africa, and it's relevant to most of Asia. Because we are looking at creativity, design and innovation in an emerging economy context and two thirds of the world is in emerging economy contexts (Interview Naidoo 26.01.2011). Naidoo's views are furthermore in line with previous suggestions that the powerful governmental allure of creativity and design cannot solely be explained through their prospects for economic revenue, but rather through their ability to be used as emotive links between economic rationalities and processes of identity formation and affirmation (Lewis et al. 2008, p. 45).

For example, a local journalist relates how she experienced her Design Indaba visit as a veritable rite of passage: "The enduring theme of Africa and development carried through to young design talents and established names alike. [...] It felt as if we were a group of initiates to a cult – a design cult – as we emerged ready to face the world again, transformed into believers of the power of developmental design... and sustainability" (Berman 16.09.2014). Likewise, one of my respondents - a young councillor - also described (though with less emotional exuberance), how his first visit had left him profoundly impressed: "To me it [Design Indaba] was one of the first exposures to the creative economy, you know, really the notion that design and creativity and things perhaps traditionally viewed as hobbies - certainly in the context that I came from - are actually really drivers of opportunity and growth and they can attract people to the city, and also help facilitate a certain lifestyle that's desirable" (Interview Bloor 22.11.2011). What both statements again attest to is the role of the Design
Indaba as an ephemeral yet powerful 'initiation site', in which seemingly adverse paradigms of developmentalism, economic growth, cosmopolitan lifestyle aesthetics and social entrepreneurship are turned into commensurable 'design principles' and thus mutually attainable governmental ideals.

At the same time, however, for me as a regular visitor to the Design Indaba Expo, the above statements also capture the event's characteristic socio-political ambiguity. On the one hand, the colourful offering is dominated by lifestyle-oriented goods that are often more fashionable and decorative than they are 'transformative' in their cosmopolitan style. Determining their 'desirability' are middle-class consumer preferences, nowadays increasingly governed by the promise of 'green', 'sustainable' and 'ethical' lifestyle choices. Even the international design magazine Domus - itself a global capacity in the making of 'starchitects' and the promotion of iconic 'designscapes' - remarked that with regard to South Africa's recent history, it was rather uncanny how the Indaba worked as a "zone of privilege" (Ernsten 15.03.2012).

Hence, the observation of another journalist that "speakers love attending the [Design] Indaba because of the connection forged with audiences who appear to embrace the new and eschew cynicism" (Roper 09.03.2012) must also be taken with a pinch of salt, given that the audience is by and large made up of those 'design evangelists', able to afford the steep conference fee of 7900 ZAR per person. This point of exclusiveness also becomes particularly salient if we consider how many of the WDC 2014's most important public information and participation exercises have been staged in and around the Indaba's socio-spatial confines²³⁰.

²³⁰ The question of accessibility has always been a contentious issue. With participation fees of 7,900 ZAR (approx. 540 €) the conference talks remain out of reach for the general public and even for many local design professionals. With between 45-80 ZAR, a visit to the exhibition is more affordable, with school classes even granted free entry. However, in light of Cape Town's persistent socio-spatial polarisation, Design Indaba - like other major events taking place in the city centre - has also been criticized for geographically excluding already disadvantaged communities through its choice of venue.
8.2.1.2… and 'designer advocacy'  

Although much of the Indaba thus remains dominated by an elitist representation of "sexy design, design for aesthetics, shiny objects and all of the sort for show-biz designers" (Interview Elk 21.11.2012), on the other hand, each year it also features projects that are somewhat at odds with the prevailing air of conspicuous consumption and/or aim to reach beyond the Indaba's luxury downtown conference venue. Admittedly, many of those derived from one of Naidoo's annual 'Design Challenges', which - following his realisation that "cities are big news in the world of design" (Event transcript, 28.2.2012) - focused largely on the problems posed by rapid urbanisation. Some of the ensuing pilot projects - like the already mentioned 10x10 Low Cost Housing Project (see ch. 7.4) - even became early testing grounds for interfacing designer practices with policy advocacy and in this way promoting the figure of 'the designer' as a universal expert of human development. More generally, this also speaks to the vanguard character of the Indaba in positioning its professional constituency as indispensable for the pursuit of 'good' urban governance. In his bodacious signature style, Naidoo for example declared: "[...] what we need is to get a critical mass of designers. We need a proper creative army: an army of the pony-tailed, the tattooed and the pierced. We don't need the policy wonks" (Roper 09.03.2012). This playfully dismissive attitude towards the local political sphere should however not hide the fact that Naidoo's eminent status has nonetheless provided him with a privileged access to power.

Initially though, when I interviewed Naidoo in January 2011, he was - like the majority of my respondents - vastly critical of the way in which Cape Town's ever-changing political leadership had produced a lack of trust in the responsiveness of local governance structures. This situation evidently challenged Naidoo's ability to

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231 Initiated by Naidoo and his team in 2008, this spin-off competition called for original architectural concepts that would address the problem of building affordable houses for the urban poor. With additional private sector sponsorship, ten homes were built in 'Freedom Park' informal settlement based on the winning submission by architect Luyanda Mpahlwa (later WDC 2014 interim committee spokesperson). Though the concept has never been scaled up beyond the ten units for various reasons that cannot be detailed here, the site has nonetheless been turned into a powerful token of local designer advocacy. Image spreads of the brightly painted double-storey units and their smiling occupants featured over and over in the WDC 2014 bid book, on its official website, in brochures and public presentations etc. Moreover, it also served as a tangible showpiece during Icsid's adjudication visit as the judges were taken to the township of Mitchell's Plain to inspect this home-grown design 'solution'.
actualise and leverage his transnational expert status in the same way that he seemed used to elsewhere in the world. He lamented: "We have presented in the past to the mayor and whatever. But we are given more credit abroad. I had more meetings with the mayor of Amsterdam [...] then I can ever recall with any mayor of Cape Town. And part of it is just the lack of awareness, the lack of appreciation, you know they think 'oh these guys are some event organisers' but they don't understand our strategic thinking. [...] I've had more quality meetings with the mayoral team in Shanghai than I've done with my own city and that's a travesty" (Interview Naidoo 26.01.2011). In consequence, when the WDC 2014 bid was eventually launched, Naidoo himself (as well as many of my respondents) perceived it as an official endorsement of his tireless personal advocacy for design over the past 16 years. Nonetheless, in light of his previous experience Naidoo remained sceptical about local government's long-term commitment to the project. Hence, although he and his team contributed content to the bid book and also played an active role in hosting the Icsid judges during their adjudication visit, he did not accept the offer to join the official bid committee.

Only a year later though, with Cape Town's prospects of reigning as the WDC in 2014 officially confirmed, Naidoo's vocal reservations regarding local government seemed substantially reduced if not to say entirely resolved. In February 2012, as the MC of the first public WDC 2014 stakeholder forum, Naidoo not only cheerfully lauded the city government for finally reaching 'the height of its design consciousness', but he also recounted an interesting interpersonal exchange with local government leaders that vividly illustrates his change of heart: "A few months ago we had some lunch and we had some interesting people in the country who were part of a trip to coming out to speak at Design Indaba and they are [sic!] from MIT. [...] And we've got the guys from MIT to have some lunch with the mayor. And she looked at them absolutely decisively, she phoned Councillor Brett Herron, it was the weekend, it was a Saturday at lunchtime and Councillor Herron was asked to come see us the next day, which he duly did, it was on a Sunday! And MIT is here this week and Cape Town will be part of a thriving network of cities the world over, which are going to be part of the 'SENSEable Cities Network' [...] That's the kind of vision and that's the kind of decisiveness that we have already seen from the mayor so we are really looking forward to the wonderful two years to World Design Capital" (Event transcript, 28.2.2012). This quote reveals two important points: Generally, it again exemplifies how the Design Indaba has managed to actualise itself as an international marketplace for design idea(l)s that understands itself
relay for both learning from elsewhere and leading by example through framing Cape Town as Africa's prime urban laboratory.\(^{232}\)

Yet more specifically, Naidoo's nonchalant statement also provides a striking glimpse into the speculative and embodied nature of worlding practices within the framework of Cape Town's close-knit urban governance circuits. While Naidoo's casual access to the upper echelons of power demonstrates his expert power as an influential "transfer agent" (Stone 2004), the episode he recounts also provides further anecdotal evidence to another point; namely the eagerness with which local politicians are seizing interurban networking opportunities in order to defy accusations of parochialism and 'unworldliness', commonly levelled against them by well-travelled, interurban 'elite' actors such as Naidoo himself (see his teasing remark about 'policy wonks' above). In sum, it almost goes without saying that for both the WDC 2014 and events like the Design Indaba, the promise to multiply such interurban networking opportunities and thus to fold different places into the same space of comparison (Rodgers et al. 2014), forms part of their strategic advocacy.

In conclusion, this section aimed to analyse the local socio-political agency of both the Design Indaba and its founder Ravi Naidoo, and their joint role in evoking the idea of design as an intellectual technology in Cape Town's urban governance discourse and practice. Specifically, it has sought to highlight three important points: First, through its annual design competitions, the Indaba has been instrumental in showing how highly politicised issues such as low-cost housing delivery can be converted into ostensibly 'neutral' and 'solvable' challenges by folding them into the technocratic yet emotive narrative of design. Second, and in connection to this, it has also been central in framing design not merely as an end in itself but also as a means for approaching allegedly universal human development issues (see ch. 7.3). Over time, this has also led to a gradually heightened political interest in design and the 'design community' as professional vanguard for furthering both economic and social development aspirations. And third, as I have shown, this governmental paradigm shift from 'design and development' to 'design as development' has also been in no small part connected to the

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\(^{232}\) According to Karvonen and van Heur (2014) urban laboratories are defined as "spaces of innovation and change [that] provide a designated space for experimentation where new ideas can be designed, implemented, measured and, if successful, scaled up and transferred to other locales" (p. 11).
Indaba's charismatic founder Ravi Naidoo, a well-travelled 'design(er) advocate' and
global urban policy entrepreneur with close personal links to local decision-makers. In
light of my above argument, I however contest that - contrary to its popular claims of
aiming for 'a better world through creativity' - the Indaba's ambit in this regard remains
starkly limited by its dominant penchant for cultivating a self-promotional and elitist
design imaginary, built on lifestyle-oriented consumption and peppered with *ubuntu*
capitalist ideals. Nonetheless, the Design Indaba arguably remains the pioneering
institution in terms of creating a local discourse around design and as such - as the
following two examples will illustrate - has opened a space for additional 'designer
advocacy' vehicles as well as alternative design imaginaries to emerge.

"The [Cape Town Design ] network
is the box,
creatives are the crayons inside and
Cape Town is the blank page."
(Creative Cape Town 15.09.2010)

8.2.2 The Cape Town Design Network (CTDN)

The second example of an intermediary institution that for me has come to
epitomise many of the individual ambiguities and collective socio-political intricacies of
Cape Town's budding *designer* governmentality is the Cape Town Design Network
(CTDN). While the Design Indaba has arguably been the first to confidently put the onus
of human development firmly onto the designer subject, the CTDN has been the
institution actively grappling with how exactly to translate this new-found professional
and moral responsibility from 'speculative fiction' into 'speculative fact'.

Officially established in 2010, the creation of the CTDN followed a tried and tested
pattern of local institutional genesis, as Creative Cape Town's Zayd Minty recalls: "When
Creative Cape Town started working on Cape Town's World Design Capital Bid 2014 and its plans with
stakeholders to establish an innovation hub in the East City focused on design and informatics, we realised
there were few structures to talk to. In conversation with various leaders in the industry who had been
working on a design structure called 'One Voice', which was focused on policy issues at a national level, we
realised the need for a local structure that was less formal. So together with a few people who are now on the
[WDC] interim committee we decided to do something about it and helped start up CTDN" (Interview Minty 05.01.2011). In applying the Partnership's signature governance strategy which can be best described as 'incubating your allies', Minty had thus nudged into existence a new satellite structure that was to quickly become one of the most important public interlocutors for both the Fringe and the WDC 2014 bid.

As Michael Wolf, well-known interaction designer and one of CTDN's former chairpersons elaborates: "We achieved a lot with regards to mobilising and activating […] an interest group that would be excited about starting to develop opinions, be informed about the World Design Capital process and become a stakeholder. Actually, because that was from the beginning [ummmhh] probably also when Creative Cape Town initiated this originally…the idea behind it was that this bid will not work without design professionals basically backing the bid" (Interview Wolf 22.02.2012). While Creative Cape Town provided initial administrative, technical and marketing support\(^\text{233}\), the social nucleus of the interest group was firmly located at CPUT's design faculty, revolving around a handful of current and former academics such as retired faculty dean and self-proclaimed 'design activist' Mel Hagen, senior lecturer and Icsid representative Mugendi M'Rithaa and his colleague from the graphic design department Bruce Snaddon, who all simultaneously formed part of the group of volunteers that had been greatly invested in both the WDC 2014 bid and the establishment of the Fringe Design and Innovation District from the get-go.

Thus, while the Fringe was commonly framed as the physical home of the bid vision, the CTDN quickly emerged as its primary social mooring post. Although the majority of its founding members had already been heavily involved in compiling the bid book, what ultimately turned the CTDN into "the face of the bid" (Interview M'Rithaa 30.01.2012) was its key role in activating local design professionals to come out in support of the project during Icsid's final adjudication process. Hence, as a "network of networks", the organisation was "being drawn upon as a kind of brains trust, as hands on deck\(^\text{234}\) to make things happen" (Interview Snaddon 15.02.2013).

\(^{233}\) That CTDN constitutes one of Creative Cape Town's official legacy projects can also be seen in their respective logos, which share the same layout and colour scheme.

\(^{234}\) That the 'hands on deck' however still wanted to hold on to their own steering wheel became evident when shortly after Creative Cape Town had helped to launch the network, it "cut loose" (Interview Wolf
Apart from supporting the WDC 2014 bid, the general goal of the CTDN was explicitly not to set up yet another conventional sector body that would bolster the economic interests of designers - after all this space was already firmly occupied by the Design Indaba. Instead, their overall vision was rooted in a more humanistic view that saw design "as a key enabler to improve lives" (Interview Wolf 22.02.2012) - a core logic, which CTDN proponents continue to promote with great missionary zeal (Interview Hagen 08.02.2012, M'Rithaa 30.01.2012, Snaddon 15.02.2013). In addition, from a more introspective angle, the group also sought to honour its name by providing a joint communicative platform for design professionals and creating a sense of commonality across different creative industry sub-sectors. Moreover, this was to be done under the auspices of a deliberately wide definition of both design and 'the designer'. After all, according to former CTDN chairman Christo Maritz (Owner and Director of 'Design Infestation', the company behind the WDC 2014 bid book): "A teacher who can teach in the dark, engineers who can build bridges where bulldozers can't go, and politicians who can understand tribal differences [sic!] are all designers" (Creative Cape Town 15.09.2010). Though not all my respondents supported this generalist idea in the vein of 'everybody is a designer', with some of them flagging the danger that it could water down the value of design as a professional trade that required skills and in-depth training, most of them nonetheless agreed that the local 'design community' should not be pigeonholed (Interviews Makeka 15.02.2012, Hefer 13.03.2013).

It was not least the very expression 'design community' itself that many CTDN proponents took issue with. On the one hand, their organisation was frequently interpellated as the collective voice speaking on behalf of the city's design practitioners. This perception was certainly also spurred by the fact that many of its key actors frequently assumed the role of well-versed interpreters of design in public forums and for local media outlets. On the other hand, the homogeneity of interests and agendas implied by the word 'community' was nonetheless simultaneously contested, also because for many it evidently jarred with some of the late-modern imperatives of their 'creative' labour

22.02.2012) from its incubator in a mutual agreement. Though it had been initially discussed to add the CTDN to the roster of creative SPVs, this option was quickly dismissed due to its high propensity for political pitfalls. As Wolf explains: "What I think was quite clear to the majority of the group was that we don't want to get too close to government. So we want to, one of the objectives is obviously to create [ummmh] a voice or an interface for the design industry which can then influence government and lobby and be able to create a channel to government which would be building up a reputation […]. So it didn't seem to be the right idea to create this Special Purpose Vehicle which is then very reliant on funding from government" (Interview Wolf 22.02.2012)
such as individualism and the desire to generate interest (and income) by being recognised as different (Interviews Hefer 13.03.2013, Wolf 22.02.2012).

For one, this kind of collective social ambiguity has been reflected by the CTDN's comparatively low level of organisational formalisation. As former chairman Michael Wolf describes: "We don't have a structure really, we have subscribers to a website, people who are on mailing lists and thereabout [ummmh] 750 subscribers and this is also part of - and I am not saying they are exactly the same people - but there are about 700 followers on twitter and about I think on facebook it's a couple more, it's probably 800 to a thousand. [...] So this is more or less the numbers that we have at the moment. But these are not...you know...not members and no definition of any kind of membership benefits" (Interview Wolf 22.02.2012). Secondly, I would argue that it has also found expression in the different ways in which design practitioners have come to grapple with the heightened moral obligations endowed upon their disparate social group by the WDC 2014's 'design(er) city' narrative.

8.2.2.1 Of 'Godsigners' and 'Designer Citizens'

At the heart of this matter lies a contentious debate about the longing of many CTDN proponents to debunk the common perception of designers as elitist producers of exclusive, luxury consumer goods by emphasising their allegedly great ability and willingness to use their creative and innovative abilities to address rampant societal problems. As former CTDN chairman Michael Wolf self-critically concedes: "I am not at all surprised about some critics' cynicism in prospect of Cape Town's World Design Capital title. How could a discipline that seems to only cater for the ones who can afford it, benefit a city in which massive numbers of citizens are cut off from basic services and opportunities?" (Formula D Interactive 13.08.2012). While for Wolf it is mainly about changing the way design and designers are represented, his fellow CTDN network member Mugendi M'Rithaa traces this disjunction back to a deeper chasm in professional (self-)conduct. From the perspective of a 'design educator', he specifically laments: "And the kids who normally go into design - and this is no fault of their own - come from reasonably privileged backgrounds, so design for them is not about solving problems of society, it's about self-actualising, it's about growing their own career [...] So it is my hope that [a] more enlightened understanding of design would become the legacy that we bequeath future generations, that posterity would come to engage with a new understanding of design...not about the catwalk and the 'godsigner'…and I have
spoken about the 'godsigner' before as one of the things we need to challenge constantly. The school of 'godsigners' and 'starchitects', I do not subscribe to that school! I believe that designers should be first of all public servants. They are creative but their motivation is to do public good and if they make money on the side that is welcomed, encouraged but it should be done with a clear conscience. [...] 80% of the time should be the socially conscious designer and 20% since we'll always have the "godsigner" then you can show the other side of design" (Interview M'Rithaa 30.01.2012). The logic that filters through both arguments is that the increased expert authority and political leeway of designers for actively shaping Cape Town's postapartheid transformation should also be accompanied by a heightened level of collective social responsibility.

To be able to contend with these new moral duties, CTDN representatives proposed nothing less than a paradigmatic shift in both (self-)perception and professional ethos. More specifically, it was argued that in a polarised city like Cape Town, the actual relevance of the WDC 2014 accolade would not least become assessed through the ability of designers to actively engage with the problems of marginalised groups. This however prompted further questions and critical self-reflection: "How do we get design to trickle down to the lowest level of engagement? How do we take it from macro level to micro level? How do we get people in the townships to understand what design potentially can do for them? [...] The designer complex that the designer is an expert who knows everything - this is not the case. We [CTDN] support the case of a designer being embedded in context" (Event transcript, 1.11.2011).

Similar to M'Rithaa, Wolf also suggested that the designer should try and relinquish some of her expert power in favour of a more humble and facilitative role, particularly against the backdrop of great social power imbalances. He explains: "Commonly dictated by the powerful, design interventions, even the ones with the potential to do good, are seen with suspicion and often rejected by the 'powerless'. Therefore, the true potential for innovation ex South Africa lies in using design as a strategy for social innovation by developing tools for public participation in the design process. 'Participative design' or 'co-design' is a logical conclusion since the engagement of major stakeholders is crucial to any design process. Well-trained design consultants are masters in facilitating human need, science and technology, and providing the conceptual frameworks for crucial interaction between the stakeholders" (Formula D Interactive 13.08.2012). What his statement also illustrates again is that the 'idea of design' can be evoked for mobilising and enrolling new actor positions into local 'stakeholder governance' mechanism and, at the same time,

What M'Rithaa calls the 'godsigner' has also been captured in the literature in the figure of the celebrity "hero designer" (Knox 2011, p. 51), residing at the top of a professional pyramid scheme whose vast base is constituted by a nameless, fame-less "creative precariat" (McRobbie 2009).
can also provide new governmental micro-technologies for literally setting the rules of engagement.

Overall, what Wolf, M'Rithaa and other CTDN proponents were calling for on the back of the WDC 2014 process was to challenge the abstract and commodity-driven notion of 'Design' (writ large) by promoting an alternative reading and doing of 'design' as a more tangible, contextual and less prescriptive process. In other words, the image of the aloof 'godsigner' was to be replaced by that of the actively engaged 'designer citizen' (see table 7).

Table 7 Dialectics of design

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>character</th>
<th>epistemology</th>
<th>methodology</th>
<th>practitioner</th>
<th>outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Design</td>
<td>abstract</td>
<td>strategic &amp; prescriptive</td>
<td>'godsigner'</td>
<td>product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lowercase</td>
<td>tangible</td>
<td>improvised &amp; facilitative</td>
<td>'designer citizen'</td>
<td>process</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: inspired by Tunstall 12.11.2007, p. 3, expanded by LW

Though with regard to the Design Indaba's previously mentioned urban design competitions it might be said that the CTDN proposition to enrol designers into applying their trade to social problems was not new, I would nonetheless argue that they differed significantly in terms of approach. While the Indaba's 'design challenges' were primarily focused on improving concrete objects - from houses to park benches - the CTDN's interventions were governed by less circumscribed 'design briefs' and furthermore conducted in direct cooperation with local NGOs, research institutions and civic movements.

Prominent cases in point were the so called "Design Storming" sessions. Inspired by 'hack-a-thons' known from the world of software development where programmers come together over a weekend to work on a specific problem statement, 'Design Stormings' seek to apply a similar concept to address pressing social issues (Davis 02.07.2012). The first edition - organised by the CTDN together with Creative Cape Town and the Social Justice Coalition (SJC) - grappled with the topic of solid waste removal in Khayelitsha by bringing together 25 design professionals with local community members to come up with ideas on how to improve the arguably abominable situation (see video #17). While this is not the place to discuss either the actual level of 'co-creation' or the
actual workability of the 'solutions' generated during this and other similar sessions, the point that I want to make revolves more around their potential to act as spaces of opportunity for re-articulating and folding political demands into Cape Town's official 'design(er) city narrative'.

Only a few weeks prior to the first "Design Storming" workshop, the SJC had already staged a 'community caucus' amongst its constituency in Khayelitsha, during which it sought to tease out demands and expectations for the WDC 2014 project, which resulted in the formulation of seven founding principles in a manifesto called "Design by the People" (see box 4; Figure 38). It is important to note that the mayor's and her council's relationship with the Social Justice Coalition has been (and continues to be) regularly marred by bitter public altercations about her administration's failure to properly address the severe lack of toilets and other sanitary facilities for the urban poor (what has colloquially become known as Cape Town's 'big stink'; Interview Silber 17.02.2012).

However, in the case of the 'Design Storming' she had no choice but to engage with their suggestions, as her refusal to do so would have been regarded as a betrayal of her own WDC 2014 promises. Thus, the 'Design Stormers', including members of the SJC, were not only immediately invited to present their results directly to her and a senior delegation of city managers but in light of the event's great publicity the mayor hastily proclaimed her support: "I must say I was really impressed when I was brought to a presentation by a group of about 30 designers and some of them are here this afternoon, and city members listened to all the design solutions that they proposed and I said to one of the MayCo members next to me, how I wish I could be working with people like that every day, who actually come with solutions. And out of that example, the design solution for how to deal with solid waste in informal settlements, I've now put the challenge out to the design world, can we use some of your design methodology to do a pilot project where we can put it into practice before we can put it in as a WDC project? And in consultation with CPUT, together with the design community, can you design this project? Let's do a pilot, I will find the money in the City and we will just change the way in which we deal with solid waste in informal settlements. That is just an example of how design can be used to transform life but also to make sure that people living in informal settlements live in the same clean environment that we live in the city [centre]" (De Lille, Event transcript 13.12.2012). While a site for testing some of the designs was swiftly found, there has not yet been any further communication on its outcome or future roll-out. In the meantime however, in August 2013, another 'Design Storming' already took place in Khayelitsha, this time in cooperation with the NGO Ikamva Labantu on the topic of early childhood development.
What this short vignette aptly illustrates is that design has not only been wielded as an "intellectual technology" (Rose & Miller 1992, p. 178) of Cape Town's urban governance 'elite', but has also been claimed by some 'stakeholders' for the production of alternative design imaginaries and subversive politics. Particularly notable in this regard is the malleable and expedient character of practices like 'Design Storming', which - in conjunction with the discursive power of the WDC 2014 project - was successfully co-opted in order to gain (albeit limited) direct access to local decision-makers. While this makes the emergent design(er) governmentality somewhat enabling, I would nonetheless argue that it is at the same time utterly disabling. For one, because it confines what can be spoken and thought of to a singular technocratic 'problem statement', and secondly because it adopts a notion of self-care and responsible political participation, both of which significantly reduce the possibilities for more radical 'solutions' and antagonistic politics to come about (Hoffman 2014, p. 1585). In conclusion, this socio-political ambiguity falls squarely in line with the purpose of this section, in which I aimed to tease out some of these ambivalent dynamics created by the (self-) perception of the designer subject as new governmental intermediary and primary interlocutor of Cape Town's urban politics.
Box 4 "Design by the People"

Ukuyila Ngabantu / Design By The People / Ontwerp Deur Die Mense
World Design Capital 2014 Community Caucus hosted by the Social Justice Coalition

Founding Principles
Formulated at Inaugural Meeting - 5 May 2012, Site C Hall, Khayelitsha

1. We are committed to the progressive advancement of the quality of life for all people living in Cape Town and South Africa;
2. We acknowledge that unsustainable levels of inequality and poverty across South Africa, particularly prevalent in our expanding urban centres, results in the continued violation of basic rights for those living in historically under-developed communities.
3. We believe that the reshaping of our lived environment through design can contribute to addressing these challenges.
4. We believe that solutions can be accelerated through the development of partnerships – between communities, NGOs, experts, government and the private sector. We believe that this in itself will contribute to unifying our historically divided communities.
5. We believe that sustainable design solutions must grow out of meaningful, participatory engagement with affected communities. In advocating for Ukuyila Ngabantu/Design by the People/Ontwerp Deur die Mense we affirm that change can come through inclusion, engagement and communal action that works towards dignified, healthy and safe communities.
6. We believe that in order for future dignified, healthy and safe communities to be sustainable, environmental consideration needs to form a cornerstone of our work.
7. We believe that the WDC2014 designation should be seen as an opportunity to advance these principles. In order for this to happen, it should also be an opportunity to critically reflect on our past, present and future in an inclusive environment.
"So I didn't come in knowing what design thinking was and these guys have effectively put words to the way that I think on an everyday basis. And one of the things that came up in one of the talks that was given to us about design thinking was that there's two things that characterise a designer, or that characterise design thinking, but particularly a designer: The one is that they're eternally optimistic, [...] but at the same time they are eternally dissatisfied." (Interview Bush 30.07.2013)

8.2.2.2 The WDC 2014 department in the City of Cape Town

On the one hand, the municipality's own internal World Design Capital 2014 department might seem as the most obvious example for and affirmation of the new-found local political agency of design professionals. Yet on the other hand, as I will show, it is also the most experimental and politically ambivalent intermediary organisation of the three I chose to portray. This is particularly due to the tentative and divergent ways in which its proponents are using it as a "soft space of governance" (Haughton et al. 2013) to interpret and instil the notion of 'design thinking' as a new liberal managerial imperative for government officials and citizens alike. At the same time, due to its fuzzy boundaries, the idea of design also becomes evoked as a mechanism of 'worlding', i.e. a new 'selectively empowering' tool for reshaping the way in which both civil servants and citizens negotiate their place in the city and that of their city in the world (see chapter 4.2).

The municipality's WDC 2014 department was officially founded in June 2012 with the appointment of industrial designer and MBA holder Richard Perez as programme director, and placed within the TEAM236 directorate. In accordance with the time frame of the accolade, the WDC 2014 desk is a temporary installation, currently set to be dissolved

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236 TEAM stands for Tourism, Events, Arts and Culture, and Marketing.
again in June 2015. While one part of the department's mandate is to manage the fulfillment of the Host City Agreement signed with Icsid and to oversee that allocated funds are spent accordingly, its other role revolves around acting as a mediator between the adverse spheres of design and government. As Perez explains: "On one side you have creative, divergent thinkers, who thrive on uncertainty; then you have the city operatives, who are all about optimisation, reliability and service delivery - I have to reach a middle ground between these parties, and facilitate progress. [...] My value will be in linking the creative thinkers and the bureaucrats, I move in both of those worlds" (Jooste 01.06.2012). More specifically, according to Perez, the key to bridging this governmental divide lies in the notion of 'design thinking'.

Originally, this term was coined by prominent American design theorist Tim Brown, for whom it represents an ostensibly universal management philosophy that creates competitive advantage through using "the designer's sensibility and methods to match people's needs with what is technologically feasible and what a viable business strategy can convert into customer value and market opportunity" (Brown 2008, p. 86), also (Brown 2009). In other words, the idea of design should not remain the sole domain of designers but should permeate the everyday self-governing practices of anyone seeking to add (market) value, from technicians and engineers to citizen-consumers, the media and public policy practitioners (Milestone 2007, p. 178).

That Perez firmly shares this quasi-ontological take on design can be seen in his statement during the first WDC 2014 'stakeholder forum': "We'd like to see design being demystified, and we'd like to see this happen by educating both communities and government alike on how to unlock our power and capacity of design" (Event transcript, 28.2.2012). In order to address and 'educate' these different constituencies accordingly, the department is working in three different strands: First, an internal strand where it engages with mid-level municipal managers to uncover and review the city's own 'design principles', an external strand, where it hosts so-called community 'co-design workshops' on ward level, and a third strand which deals with an ongoing monitoring process to determine the legacy of the first two strands (see Figure 30, p. 374).

As I have previously stipulated, part of the 'power of design' has been enshrined in the way it has offered new political framing devices, not only in the form of a 'designerly' language but also 'designerly' practices, which are deliberately pragmatic, arguably consensus-driven and thus decidedly apolitical. By way of example, asked about Cape
Town's most pressing urban development issues such as prevailing segregation and lack of proper sanitation for the urban poor Perez offers the following response: "These are really big 'wicked problems' and the thing about wicked problems is that you can't solve them. The key is to understand them and then manage them through design interventions. We're not looking for silver bullets to solve these problems forever. It's about using a design thinking mind to understand the problem, engaging with the stakeholders, engaging with the people that live in the system and then starting to look at solutions" (Botha 18.07.2012). On the one hand, conceptualising Cape Town's transformation as a 'wicked problem' that cannot be 'solved' let alone addressed by just one social group seems to make sense against the backdrop of the city's deeply torn societal fabric. On the other hand, I also think it is important to problematise the variegated ways in which these 'design interventions' operate as new "soft spaces of governance" (Haughton et al. 2013), whose fuzzy boundaries can serve to enable but also to stifle the articulation of the properly political (Swyngedouw 2009).

8.2.2.3 Designs on new soft spaces?

In their elucidating paper, Haughton et al. (2013) define soft spaces as "the 'in-between' spaces of governance that exist outside, alongside or in-between the formal statutory scales of government" (p. 217). Typically limited in time, they are deliberately experimental spaces that seek to redefine individualised and institutionalised routines, thereby blurring the boundaries between previously entrenched sectoral divides. That this also accurately describes the work of the WDC 2014 department becomes clear when one of its employees states: "So we've created very difficult jobs for ourselves to try and sell a process rather than an object. We are working in the space of the unknown, which is not something that governance pretty much ever does, especially not this municipality, in fact any government and we are governed by very very [sic!] strict codes and laws, the Municipal Finance Management Act, which is a national act, that says that every cent of taxpayers money that you spend has to be pre-approved for obvious reasons. And the space that we are working in is the space of the unknown, the space of the experimental, the space of the proactive, the space of the innovative" (Interview Bush 30.07.2013). Following Haughton et al. (2013), I would nonetheless argue that these soft spaces and their fuzzy boundaries are thoroughly double-edged when it comes to how they affect the possibilities for adversarial forms of politics.
On the one hand they unequivocally open up a space for debate, self-critical-reflection and unforeseen alliances - something that all proponents of the WDC 2014 department have stressed as an unequivocally important outcome of their work. As Haughton et al. note, "[i]n this sense, fuzzy boundaries have a more progressive, inclusive potential than simply to act as spaces of deregulation" (p. 218). On the other hand, they also rightly point out that continuous policy and institutional experimentation has been at the heart of variegated neoliberalisation processes as they tend to blur accountability mechanisms and erode the possibility space for articulating more radical demands by insisting on political consensus and collective problem solving. In turn, such a regressive mode of governance tends to obfuscate antagonistic politics and opposition by construing them as diverse and ostensibly appreciated 'inputs' towards already premeditated agreements (Lemke 2007, p. 55).

That such an unobtrusive incrementalism has strongly shaped the work of his WDC 2014 department is an uncontentious fact for its director, who, when asked to describe his way of working, readily admits: "So our level of intervention is incremental it's not radical we not looking at radical innovation here, we're looking at incremental because with an organisation like this I believe [it] works better in the incremental innovation space than a radical innovation because radical innovation is too disruptive for it, it's too much of a paradigm shift, especially in the short time that we've got. [...] We've been very careful not to judge. We're not here to judge people, we're here to say how can design help, how can we help, do you need help? [...] Design does bring creative thinking so how can we bring that creative thinking into our process, but in a way it's not too disruptive because I think if you become too disruptive it will get blocked so it's important to bring it in, in a way in a language that the system feels comfortable with so I think so far the reception has been very good." When in turn, I asked him what implications design as a new political framing device encompassed from his point of view, he responded: "Politics is a funny thing I'm quite new to the whole political space and I find it sometimes irrational but somebody told me that it's a different type of rationality so I've come to accept that. [...] the work that I am doing, it's very important to position it in a space where it's apolitical that it's seen as a methodology to benefit everybody no matter who we are, and tomorrow when we get hit by meteor and half of Cape Town is wiped out that design is a tool that can help everybody. It's not about what colour we are, it's about the fact that we human beings and we want to live in a better place. If one can keep design in that space I think we will be okay but you still have to be careful that it doesn't get used as a tool for politics" (both interview Perez 19.02.2013; emphasis added LW). While it needs to be noted that the reference to wanting to remain 'apolitical' can also be interpreted as not wanting to be
dragged into one of the many party-political tussles, a danger that had already been flagged by many other WDC proponents with regard to 2014 being a national election year, Perez' reflections affirm the rather anti-revolutionary and consensus-driven character of his operation. Moreover, it also shows how 'design thinking' is conceptualised in a rather technocratic manner as a universal methodology that is offered to both individuals and institutions as a means for more effective and efficient self-governance (Rose & Miller 1992; Barchiesi 2011).

In turn, however, the question who can and should be held accountable for the effects of such ostensible "change by design" (Brown 2009) then becomes even more difficult to answer and is certainly even further aggravated if one chooses to juxtapose it with notions of moral relativism and radical subjectivism: "I'm not saying it's [design] always a tool for good or for bad, it's a tool for change. So if you want to change something we can use design to help you change it, but I'm not going to say that it's always going to be for good, it's up to the individual isn't it? So you put it in that place as a sort of neutral entity. It's like a car I don't know if it's a good analogy it's just something that has come to my head now. I buy a car I'm going to use it to drive on holiday and somebody else might use it to go and run somebody over it's still a tool for movement, but somebody else used it in a very different way that I used it, and I can't control that as a car manufacturer, I can't control how people drive my car or my product that I use, so I think everybody has got a right to use design how they want you just hope that the whole ethical and moral rights and obligations and all that sort of things start to inflict itself perhaps over that to make sure that it gets used in a positive way" (Interview Perez 19.02.2013). While, Perez does not inflate design to the ultimate harbinger of positive virtues like many of his peers, his libertarian interpretation is otherwise quite alarming.

Firstly because it assumes that design is somewhat value-free and unaffected by questions of social power, which logically contravenes its conception as the product of socio-cultural processes that are always subjected to divergent power dynamics. And secondly, because in evoking a kind of self-regulated freedom (Rose 1999), it puts the onus of using design in a responsible manner firmly on the individual, thus further eroding more broadly codified forms of collective moral accountability and social ethics.

However, while the above has so far delineated the WDC 2014 department as a regressive soft space, whose consensus-driven politics tend to sustain a neoliberal form of governmentality, I nonetheless want to argue that its fuzzy boundaries have also created an - albeit still incremental - space for more progressive political practices, especially with
regard to public participation. For one, following its idea of finding design principles already at work within the local administration, the WDC 2014 department conducted numerous focus group interviews with mid-level project managers, an employee group specifically chosen for their direct link to the everyday intricacies of policy implementation and service delivery. In what was referred to as an 'appreciative inquiry process', these groups from across different departments were brought together and asked to choose their most successful projects in order to jointly reflect on the basic elements of what made these successful in the eyes of their purveyors. As the project director (a trained industrial psychologist) recalls, what came through strongly in this process was "that working with communities, understanding the communities' requirements is fundamental in getting it right. So it's moving that public participation process from something that 'The City has done a lot of thinking and these are three options we'd like to do here' to a blank canvas. You know 'what would you like us to do here?' And that's a bit of a shift that we're working on at the moment" (Interview Sullivan 11.07.2013). In other words, by providing a space for mid-level technocrats to self-critically engage with their work beyond the tight managerial regime of key performance indicators, clean audit sheets and compliance imperatives (Ward & Jones 1999), the emphasis seems to be ever so slightly shifted towards the need for taking "civic creativity" (Landry 2000; Healey 2004, see also ch. 2.3). At the same time, this governmental practice could also be read as a way of inviting low-level technocrats to participate in the practice of Cape Town's design-led "elite dreaming" (Ong 2011b, p. 17).

However, these top-down interventions seeking to establish design as a new knowledge culture have also been juxtaposed with more bottom-up design experiments in the form of 'co-design workshops'. Similar to the previously mentioned 'Design Stormings', their basic idea is to turn citizens into "instant designers" (see video #18) by enrolling them into a day-long event of 'participatory design'\(^{237}\). With the mandate

\(^{237}\) Interestingly, what also filtered through strongly in my conversation with the project facilitator were her own subjective ambivalences that derived from trying to reconcile her previous work as a critical urban activist with great reservations of event-driven urban development with her current function. Her candid, self-critical reflections again provide an uncanny account of a "defamiliarised double agent" (Roy 2012) that is trying to navigate the choppy waters of Cape Town's ambiguous 'design(er) city' politics. She recalls: "At the time [of the bid] I felt a bit of irritation about the World Design Capital because I'm very, I consider myself an activist first and foremost, excuse the irony of working for the City, working with the state as an activist [chuckles]. So ya, I'm full of contradictions...But at the time I perceived World Design Capital as a very elitist kind of [uhm] international accolade, I had not really supported the World Cup as an international [event] in 2010, in fact that's why I left the country. 'Cos as an architect in the lead-up to the World Cup and the way it was being procured and the way that urban development suddenly stopped and we
basically deriving from the mayor's promise (made during the first WDC 'stakeholder forum') that every one of Cape Town's 111 wards would have their own WDC 2014 project, the practical interpretation was left to her by then newly-established WDC 2014 department, which translated it as "the need to touch every citizen and every area, every geographic area of this very large 2,500 km² city with World Design Capital, with the power of design, with an understanding of design and to, in some way, unlock creativity in citizens" (Interview Bush 30.07.2013).

Every year, local government distributes about 77 million ZAR among its ward and subcouncil structures to conduct small urban upgrade projects, such as playground refurbishments or traffic calming measures. While these so-called 'ward projects' were initially lauded as a key instrument of 'bringing government closer to the people' through more participatory local governance (Buire 2011), their practical implementation has often tended to pan out rather differently: "Over time what has happened is that public participation has now become a perfunctory process so it's actually not intended to actually take on genuine public interest and ideas. It's there because it's a legislated part of reality not because actually you got to learn something and then incorporate it" (Interview Methvin 26.01.2012).

With this problem statement in mind, the 'co-design workshops' sought to specifically invite those social groups who were frequently side-lined in local public engagement exercises to the bargaining table, or in the words of Lindsay Bush, the project's coordinator: "really looking at the citizens - not the same ones whose voices get reflected all the time through the ward allocations or ward councillors. Those voices tend to be the business-active or politically active, commercially active adults and business owners and property owners, they tend to be the ones who's needs and wishes come through the city channels all the time. We want to hear from the youth, we want to hear from the elderly, we wanna hear from the unemployed, we wanna hear from people whose voices are not always heard. And those are the people that we're looking - from the ward project point of view - to capacitate with design, design thinking and an understanding of, in the end, creativity" (Interview Bush 30.07.2013). In practice, apart from youth groups, senior citizens, taxi drivers, local informal trade representatives and other residents of the respective neighbourhood, the
workshop also invited local council and ward committee members as well as the aforementioned mid-level project managers from the municipality's line departments. This workshop group was then completed by an average of four design professionals and a number of design students, with one 'lead designer' tasked to translate the ideas that emerged during the workshop (which was facilitated by a trained external agency) into a design project portfolio, which was then handed back to the local ward councillors for implementation (see video #18).

Curiously, it was exactly the image of the designer as a universal 'do-gooder' and natural interlocutor of community desires, which became thoroughly debunked during the first round of workshops. As Bush uncannily reflects: "What we've realised again, it was sort of an unintended side-effect from these co-design workshops but this is in fact a massive capacity building exercise for designers of all types. So this is not a space that designers are used to working in, and half of all the designers in that room actually have very very little experience of 'design thinking', of what it is, of how participatory processes work, of how to listen to a community and it's quite shocking actually! Well I was quite shocked by it, to realise how lacking in capacity our designers are. There are a number of reasons you can presume for that but [Uhhmmmm] and it could have a lot to do with our education [Uhhmmmm] but it could have to do with other things as well, with the nature of our society and how separate we are, about how classist we effectively are. And then we were also figuring out that another 30% of the remaining 50% of designers who do understand this phase of 'design thinking' and how to analyse a problem and how to listen to clients properly and how to synthesise information and have to facilitate co-design, 30% out of that 50% in fact are not interested. Because they are operating in a space where they consider themselves to be above these kind of processes. So they have [pause] ya, they are designing in isolation, it's not really in their interests, to actually understand communities or their problems and they're very alienated by these structures" (ibid.). There is little point in denying the cutting irony that lies in the fact that a practice initially based on leveraging the allegedly limitless power of the designer subject - after all a key source of legitimacy for Cape Town's overall 'design(er) city' narrative - has failed to encounter the profession's supposedly vast "culture of volunteerism" (SAPA 29.06.2012). Moreover, it also once again epitomises the haphazard and fuzzy governmental logics of the WDC 2014 project not only as a "soft space of governance" (Haughton et al. 2013), but also as a process of worlding through the way in which it tries (and in this case somewhat fails) to fully translate the idea of designer-led public engagement from 'speculative fiction' into 'speculative fact' (Ong 2011a).
Overall and in recourse to Haughton et al. (2013), I would thus contend that 'design interventions' such as the co-design workshops or the previously mentioned 'Design Stormings' (ch. 8.2.2.2) remain decisively double-edged in terms of their politics (p. 222). On the one hand, they arguably address pertinent social issues in a well-intended manner and certainly manage to provide an additional and vibrant space for civil society 'stakeholders' to voice concerns and negotiate demands under the rubric of 'transformative design'. Amongst the vast majority of WDC 2014-related 'design interventions', these workshops were furthermore some of the only few projects that were actively seeking to physically bridge Cape Town's vast socio-spatial divides. By resisting the common reflex of hosting such engagements in the city centre and simply 'bussing in' a selected number of township residents and instead holding the event directly in the respective community halls of suburbs such as Langa, Bellville, Gugulethu and Hanover Park, the geographical and psychological thresholds for access were substantially lowered, which was also reflected positively on the mix of workshop attendants (see video #18).

On the other hand, these 'participatory design' interventions at best constitute "selectively empowered quasi-state apparatuses" (ibid., p. 231), because due to their circumscribed focus on a single, premeditated and often site-specific problem statement, the overall ability to draw into question those underlying, systemic issues that created the problem in the first place remains greatly constricted. Furthermore, through consistently emphasising that all the 'solutions' for the 'design challenge' in question were to be found in and by the community itself only contributed to shifting the responsibilities for service delivery towards the individual, self-managing designer citizen, in turn further deviating attention away from the faltering liabilities of the local developmental state (Barchiesi 2011).

And last but not least, in the true spirit of an aspiring model city, Cape Town's variegated and malleable 'design(er) governance' measures have also already been earmarked as part of a globally marketable post-2014 WDC policy toolkit. As Bush notes: "This is an opportunity to create something, to create an intellectual property that we can roll out to, if not even sell to, other municipalities in developing countries around the world as ways of, new models of governance really. So that is the ultimate" (Interview Bush 30.07.2013). And another respondent confidently adds: "How do we retrofit a commitment that these [government] officials have made in their planning so that it can still iterate in response to a shifting context but at the end they hit a goal post
which, where they haven't wasted tax payer's money, there hasn't been fruitless expenditure, it still speaks to the compliance. That's an absolutely fascinating design challenge and that might be our biggest export after this has come and gone. Richard [Perez] will go and talk to other cities about how you start this process" (Interview Burton 05.08.2013). On the one hand, judging from my own observations, I do believe that some of these incremental 'design interventions' have indeed opened up new and undeniably important spaces for cross-sectoral and interscalar debates, as well as for much needed critical self-reflection. This has for example become visible through an increased impetus for inter-departmental collaboration within the municipality, or through the way a co-design workshop was able to bring the veritable 'archenemy' positions of the local taxi driver association and the public bus operator Golden Arrow to sit down around a table and talk about the design of a transport interchange in Brackenfell (see photos of 'Co-Design Workshop' in Appendix F and video #18). On the other hand, however, I would argue that these 'design interventions' have turned the dial of 'empowerment' even further towards the individual, self-managing designer citizen and thus away from the opportunity to articulate demands for collective forms of social responsibility and formal institutional accountability.

In sum, this final vignette has sought to depict in empirical detail how the municipality's own internal WDC 2014 department has acted as an emergent soft space of Cape Town's local urban governance. As Haughton et al. (2013) have argued, "soft spaces and fuzzy boundaries are used selectively and creatively as an instrument of neoliberal governmentality to break down old rigidities and attempt to rework interscalar governance relationships" (p. 232; emphasis added LW). Particularly the notion of 'design thinking' has proven itself as a vehicle for emphasising individual self-responsibilisation as well as for legitimising unobtrusive, technocratic and thus inherently postpolitical approaches to urban governance (Swyngedouw 2007; Swyngedouw 2009). Hence, it is not surprising yet nonetheless worrying, that the term has already found its way into local policy concepts, such as the soon to be passed municipal Arts and Culture policy. Here, 'design thinking' reigns in the very progressive politics that it seeks to support as it is defined as "a creative, user-centric and collaborative approach to developing innovative solutions in any contexts, which are technically feasible, economically feasible and socially desirable" (p. 5; emphasis added LW).
However, the arguably often neoliberalising logics of this peripatetic 'design(er) city narrative' have by no means gone entirely uncontested. In discussing the controversial rise and eventual tumbling of the Fringe, Cape Town's self-proclaimed 'Innovation and Design District', the following final section provides a telling example of failed policy mobilisation paired with a subversive re-negotiation of urban transformation 'by design'.

"Great design satisfies both our needs and our desires."

(Brown June 2008, p. 92)

8.2.3 Prescribed place-making and unforeseen 'Fringe effects'

While the previous sections have traced and problematised a number of different institutional and subjective iterations of Cape Town's design(er) governmentality, another crucially important aspect for understanding its deriving power effects has thus far remained wantonly neglected in my analysis: the socio-political dynamics of its deriving 'designer' spatialities. To make up for this, I want to use this last section to focus on the making and unmaking of "The Fringe", Cape Town's self-proclaimed "first official precinct for creativity, design and innovation" (thefringe.org.za). Not only has the project been an important crucible for promoting the idea of design as new governmental logic within local urban development discourse and practice, but as I want to show, it has also been a prominent site for publicly contesting prescriptive and elite-driven place-making in postapartheid Cape Town.

Though the Fringe has been both co-constitutive and inter-dependent to the WDC 2014 bid, it is important to note that its conceptualisation preceded the bid by several years. In fact, the origins of what used to be known as the East City Design Initiative (ECDI) date back as far as 2004, when the Partnership had started to rally up cross-sectoral support under the banner of "Reimagining City Hall" to highlight the need for revitalising the underutilised and decaying historic monument by turning it into a prime music venue that was to form the spatial nucleus for the development of a
surrounding cultural precinct. This idea was further advanced through its incorporation into the Partnership's Central City Development Strategy, which demarcated the 'East City' as one of twenty distinct precincts and specifically lauded its potential for becoming a hub for creative and cultural activities in the CBD (Cape Town Partnership & City of Cape Town 2008, p. 24). As both the East City Design Initiative and the WDC 2014 bid had been 'incubated' and steered by the Partnership and its Creative Cape Town Programme with the aid of roughly the same group of project partners, it is not surprising that "the ECDI brand development" was linked to the time frame of the WDC bid and featured as a key legacy project in the bid book (East City Design Initiative February 2010, p. 32; City of Cape Town 2011).

In October 2009, this allowed the Partnership's Andrew Boraine and Creative Cape Town's Zayd Minty to present both initiatives as a programmatic 'package deal' to the MayCo. Their vision - which was jointly developed with the other key stakeholder organisations (see Figure 36) - thus stated in a familiar language: "The East City Design Initiative will result in the premier African environment for design innovation, creativity and entrepreneurship being developed in the Cape Town Central City within the next 10 years. It will showcase design excellence, incubate emerging talent, and enable new innovations to develop. The actual and virtual space created by the initiatives provides an environment for business, the academy, the non-profit sector and government to interact in ways that develop design in the city, province, nationally and Africa-wide. Its impact locally and nationally would lead to the improvement in the quality of life, improved economic growth, sustainable solutions, and a more inclusive society" (East City Design Initiative February 2010, p. 6); emphasis added LW. While the City Council welcomed the initiative and its Spatial Planning Department subsequently became an avid supporter, its World Cup-besieged budget limited its financial involvement. Hence, the Provincial Government of the Western Cape stepped in as the main funder by allocating an initial 1 million ZAR to the Partnership for drawing up a business plan and including the initiative - by then officially renamed "The Fringe" - into their flagship "Cape Catalyst" programme.

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238 The delineation of twenty neighbourhoods was based on a managerial 'divide and conquer' strategy, as individual "development protocols" were to be created for each neighbourhood, to guide the decision-making of planners and developers (Cape Town Partnership & City of Cape Town 2008, p. 18).

239 The name itself can also be understood as a symbol for the Western Cape's increasing shift away from regulative towards 'facilitative' politics, even when the subject of intervention concerns 'hard' infrastructural developments. The other Cape Catalyst Projects are: the Broadband initiative, the Cape Town Health Technology Park, the Saldanha Industrial Development Zone (IDZ), and the the expansion of the CTICC.
Figure 36 The Fringe – Location, basic facts and ‘stakeholder’ network

Source: LW; design: E. Gooris
While, as the vision statement suggests, the economic and political rationales for the Fringe were largely congruent with those of the WDC 2014 bid, its geographical location was based on a range of additional practical and political considerations. For one, although Woodstock had by that time already established itself as the arguably bigger and more prominent local creative industry hub a mere three kilometres from the city centre (Wenz 2012; Booyens 2012), it was argued that focusing on the 'creative' development of the area between Roeland and Darling, Canterbury and Buitenkant Streets would eventually lead to the establishment of an activity corridor that would link the CBD via the former District Six with Woodstock, as envisioned in the Central City Development Strategy.

Secondly, two of the 'strong' and design-centred SPVs - the CCDI and the CTFC - already held their offices and enterprise support facilities in the East City, making it easier to market the area to their respective member bases, as well as to other creative SPVs that could become inclined to relocate to the neighbourhood (East City Design Initiative February 2010, p. 30).

Thirdly, it was furthermore argued that the area was easily accessible due to its close proximity to the main train and bus terminals and also hosted a number of government- and university-owned buildings that could potentially be converted into subsidised, low-cost office space for start-up companies and young design graduates, who were presumed to 'naturally' gravitate towards the area from nearby CPUT. Fourthly, the project also stood to benefit from potentially being able to link into a future high-speed broad-band connection that was being laid out in the Central City and could be presented as a major draw card for attracting ICT-related design businesses (ibid., p. 24). Moreover, in a twist of neo-environmental determinism that often belies a new urbanism-led agenda (Jarvis & Bonnett 2013), the area was also deemed to have "the necessary aesthetic appeal

\[240\] In spite of publicly recognising the need for restitution, the fact that development in District Six has been moving along at a snail's pace has perpetually presented a thorn in the side of impatient inner city property developers. As Derek Stuart-Findlay (former chairman of the SA Property Owners Association) brazenly declared, to him it was simply "appalling that land of that calibre should not be developed after all these years - there should be people living there and the city needs it for the volume of people required to get street level retail working property" (Cape Town Partnership 2009, p. 108); a rather egregious statement considering that the restitution process has been trying to do just that, except not under the free market terms favoured by the likes of Stuart-Findlay.
for creative individuals, with a mix of historical, edgy and urban feel" (Cape Town Partnership March 2011, p. 3). At the same time, any negative 'side-effects' of this edginess, i.e. crime and visible homelessness, could be easily regulated by simply extending the boundaries of the Central City Improvement District by a couple of blocks, a possibility which was not as readily realisable for Woodstock, which at that time did not fall under the Partnership's jurisdiction.

In the second half of 2011, after the initial round of feasibility studies had passed the scrutiny of the project's expansive stakeholder network (but most importantly its funding sources), Creative Cape Town's director Zayd Minty moved full time into the role of the director of the Fringe, which however remained under the auspices of the Partnership. Apart from continuing the area's branding and marketing drive, one of Minty's main tasks was to further flesh out the conceptual foundations of the project. With reference to a number of international and national 'benchmarks', Minty and his project partners adopted a mix of conventional clustering, 'creative' enterprise incubation, and property-led urban regeneration strategies under the banner of an "urban science park model" (Kaiser Associates Economic Development Practice October 2011).

At the time, however, its proponents maintained that the Fringe was about "good public space… but not an urban regeneration project" (Minty March 2012, p. 61) and represented a bottom-up "neighbourhood intervention… not a property development" (Yehuda Raff, event transcript 3.11.2011). Nonetheless, considering just how generously the classic repertoire of urban renewal instruments was being deployed, these were extremely chimeric if not outrightly treacherous claims. After all, throughout the whole of 2011, a small legion of local consultants had been commissioned to compile a veritable

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241 At this point it needs to be noted that even though the Fringe received basic funding through the Cape Catalyst Programme, it was nonetheless urged to develop its own income-generating activities as quickly as possible to eventually financially sustain itself. One suggestion coming from the side of property developers was for the Fringe management team to offer their services as facility managers to cross-subsidise their other 'unprofitable' community development projects, which would have essentially turned them into a glorified janitorial service.

242 While with the Tshwane Innovation Hub in Pretoria and the Philadelphia Science Centre, his report mentions both local and foreign case studies as 'benchmarks', he asserts that "22@Barcelona is an example, that is particularly pertinent to the Cape Town context" (East City Design Initiative 2010, p. 13). In performing its preferred role as an interurban knowledge relay, the Partnership also fleshed out some of the ECDI's already mentioned conceptual role models through inviting "learnings from the Tshwane Innovation Hub", presented by its director David Marais and an "international experience of knowledge transfer" with Nick Leon of 'London Design', a scholar from the Royal College of Art who had also advised the City of Barcelona on their innovation and design strategy.
stack of research reports and policy recommendations from economic development scenarios to property assessments, and from landscaping and transport studies to a full scale urban design framework (ARUP February 2011; Pendelton & Bredenkamp November 2011; Edge Tourism Solutions November 2011; Kaiser Associates Economic Development Practice March 2011; Briggs September 2011; Earthworks Landscape Architecture September 2011).

Moreover, the Fringe's business plan made explicit reference to "increased capital investment and upgrading (resulting in an increased rates base and urban upgrading [sic!])" (Kaiser Associates Economic Development Practice March 2011, p. 1) as one of the project's ostensible benefits. And last but not least, since its inception, the Fringe stakeholders had repeatedly committed themselves publicly to a "new urbanism agenda" (East City Design Initiative February 2010, p. 13) in order to underscore their aim to attract "lifestyle service providers" (Kaiser Associates Economic Development Practice March 2011, p. 12) who could support the creation of a local 'designscape', meaning "distinctive ensembles of new buildings, cultural amenities, heritage conservation projects, renovated spaces, landscaping and street furniture, with inevitably, an associated program of planned events and exhibitions" (Knox 2011, p. 152).

While Minty and his small team were continuously trying to rebuke accusations that their project could trigger gentrification in the area, and even commissioned a social impact study to support their argument of the Fringe as a community-driven process, many of the reports were greatly contradicting these efforts. As an illustrative example, the local property report had the following recommendation for the "Barrack Lodge", a hostel for low-income migrant workers housed right opposite the trendy coffee shop: "The owner has not considered selling as the tenant pays the rent on a regular basis. The boarding house does attract some undesirable elements to the area, and it would be preferable to take over this lease and re-tenant the building with something more appropriate. Clearly the existing tenant would require some financial motivation to terminate their lease earlier than the current expiry date" (Pendelton & Bredenkamp November 2011, p. 13; emphasis added LW). While it needs to be recognised that

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However, it is a rather telling detail that the company commissioned for this report was "Edge Tourism Solutions", whose assessment coined the egregious term 'productive gentrification'. In turn, while they came to the conclusion that it was "negative, likely to occur [and] expected to be permanent in duration"," it was at the same time described to be "of medium to low significance" (Edge Tourism Solutions November 2011, p. 20) for the project as a whole.
most of these documents constituted scoping reports and not (yet) legally binding policies, they still serve as a telling reflection of how gentrification is being increasingly construed in certain 'elite' governance circles as the 'natural' course of urban regeneration (Wenz 15.03.2013).

As the former CEO of business lobby 'Accelerate Cape Town', for example, ascertained in our interview: "You know places that are residential need to be able to be rezoned so that they can become little creative offices rather than houses and of course then that requires leadership and it requires somebody that's able and willing to push that through because of course there is this, there is a thing that's very anti the idea of gentrification you know. You move creative industries into Woodstock and you gentrify it and the poor drug dealers get moved out you know and that's a problem apparently" (Interview Lundy 09.02.2011). It almost goes without saying that in light of what is frequently described as South Africa's national housing crisis (Bond 2000a; Huchzermeyer 2011; Hart 2013), the romantic idea of creating 'little creative offices' instead of much needed housing (especially low-income rental stock) speaks for a dangerously predatory capitalistic mind-set.

Nonetheless, regardless of its lingering air of gentrification, in the wake of the growing excitement generated by the WDC 2014 bid, the Fringe became lauded as the physical showcase of the bid promise. As bid committee member Mugendi M'Rithaa proclaimed: "I think the Fringe is the most advanced manifestation of design thinking in the city. [...] Because it already does exactly what we want to see happen which is [to] bring various actors together in a neutral space that is common heritage to everyone. A space that is owned by no one in terms of the chauvinism but is owned by everyone in terms of a sense of ownership and inclusiveness. So I am very excited about the Fringe" (Interview M'Rithaa 30.01.2012). However, this sense of all-inclusive ownership and unabated excitement was arguably not shared by all 'stakeholders' of the 'Fringe community', as the following section depicts.

8.2.3.1 What's in a name?

As mentioned above, after the initial round of government endorsements for the East City Design Initiative, one of the first courses of action was the re-branding of the area. While branding has certainly become a staple in neoliberal urban regeneration projects, it is important to note that branding policies do not necessarily represent a process of government retraction (or 'roll-back neoliberalism' Peck & Tickell 2002), but
rather stand for an extension of government through new modes of governance that explicitly enrol citizens and non-state bodies in these place-making exercises (Rantisi & Leslie 2006, p. 366). In the case of the East City, this effectively meant the establishment of a "design collaboration" between Creative Cape Town and the municipality's Spatial Planning and Urban Design department, which in January 2011 culminated in a "Design Charette" that included representatives from various partner organisations (The Fringe February 2011, Figure 36). It was during this event that the East City officially became "The Fringe - Cape Town's Design and Innovation District".

While this was a rather unfortunate choice of name as I will elaborate in an instant, it was first of all "the area's oftentimes neglected 'edge' or 'fringe' relationship with the city" that was said to legitimise the name change (EESP 24/09/2011, p. 3). Furthermore, the moniker ostensibly also derived "from the fact that many innovators start off from the mainstream, and often struggle to get to the centre - The Fringe [thus] provides a supportive space for such thinkers" (Creative Cape Town 2011, p. 7). And lastly - in what can be seen as a highly questionable stab at urban myth creation - it was also added that "the Fringe was once home to an infamous nightclub of the same name in the 1990s. Based in Canterbury Street, thus much-loved venue [...] burnt down in a freak accident that claimed the life of a DJ" (ibid.).

While not everyone was entirely convinced of the name (even Minty as the designated director of the project declared that he was "not wild about it"; interview 05.01.2011), it was passed in a majority vote. One argument in support of the brand was that it could be rather easily exported to and replicated in other parts of the city, as a municipal planner explained: "So the idea of a Fringe, you can duplicate it. You can brand it like 'The Fringe City Bowl', The Fringe Khayelitsha, The Fringe... it becomes a name for innovation, you know?" (Interview Kruger-Fountain 15.12.2010).

The more enticing draw-card for companies interested in relocating was however not the area's new name in itself, but rather the expansive media and PR machinery that

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244 The Charette - convened by Minty and facilitated by senior municipal urban designer Liezel Kruger-Fountain who had recently returned from working in the UK for several years - brought together over forty urban planning professionals from the CoCT, PGWC, academic faculties and several architecture and civil engineering firms. Some of these had already been commissioned to compile additional baseline studies that were to guide future strategies for transport and property management in the area (ARUP, March 2011; Spiropolous and Associates, March 2011).
was concurrently set in motion to promote it. As Michael Wolf, who had moved his interaction design company from Observatory to the Fringe, explains: "I think, ya, we also were quite aware that we would get quite a bit of airtime in terms of PR and I confess it was also a strategic decision with the risks attached...you know if it doesn't come off the ground then we're also...we'd have to work with the bad PR as well" (Interview Wolf 22.02.2012).

While the (social) media coverage had put the Fringe into the public spotlight and worked extensively to keep it there, Minty and his team also knew that they could not and would not change the area overnight, but that they were in it for the long haul: "Right now I don't think it has really done anything itself other than word of mouth and made people think about the area and we brought in the {field office} which is a small little manege to negotiate and I think that has got a buzz going and I think there's a bit more stuff happening in the area but we haven't physically done anything [...] There's a business feasibility study being done, and there's a transport plan being done and then we'll move to the next level. What our first major thing for next year - next financial year - we're hoping will be is this incubator hub. So it's using containers to create a little incubator that is also going to be a gathering spot. There's land we've identified etc. but there's a lot of politics and work that has to be done to access this land etc. [...] It's a lot of planning and a bit of branding and we'll do a blog around it. I think the area will very organically happen and if we can convince a few property owners - because we are also doing a property study - to see the opportunity in their building being redeveloped and to find partners then we're moving somewhere. Really, it's a long-term project" (Interview Minty 05.01.2011).

Even so, what was envisioned as a long-term project of 'stakeholder' activation, 'creative' place-making and business incubation had already set itself up for massive contestation and ultimate failure from the moment it started to promote itself as "The Fringe" and proclaim itself as being "adjacent", "bordering" or "on the edge of" District Six (Creative Cape Town 2011; event transcript 3.11.2011).

8.2.3.2 A case of infringement

As already stated in chapter 5.2.2, the demolition of District Six and the forced removals of its approx. 60,000 residents to the outlying areas of the Cape Flats in 1968 has not only left a permanent geographical scar in the form of barren land to the east of the CBD, but also constitutes a collective site of trauma for thousands of ex-residents. Founded in 1994, the District Six Museum was devised both as an independent exhibition space to memorialise the life in District Six prior to its destruction and the national history of forced removals more generally, and as a community-driven institution that actively
seeks to map the memories of ex-residents and stand with the claimants over the course of the drawn-out restitution process (Rassool & Prosalendis 2001). Thus, "[t]he District Six museum has become one place where the sense of absence can be linked to the District's presence in people's lives and popular memory" (Mceachern 1998, p. 503). Consequently and in light of few physical remnants remaining in the former District Six area as points of reference for reconnecting spatial identities, the retrieval of personal memories has become a key aspect of the museum's work and constitutes a powerful resource of solidarity and reclamation (Rassool 2007, p. 120).

In turn, the geographical delineation of the District's location presents a crucial point, which also explains why the museum's representatives were not impressed by neither the sudden renaming of the area nor by the constant misrepresentation of it as spatially divorced from District Six. What is pivotal to understand is that although most of District Six had been razed to the ground and the area of barren land adjacent to the Fringe represents the District Six restitution area, the precinct that was re-designated as "The Fringe" nonetheless fell squarely into the boundaries of what used to be District Six. As the museum's curator Tina Smith explained to me: "They see it from a very different perspective but we see it from the perspective of the fact that they are in District Six. Once you cross this boundary which is Buitenkant [Street] you are in District Six land, you are in District Six!" (Interview Smith 13.03.2012).

In turn, the geographical reinterpretation and discursive representation of the area as the Fringe was regarded as nothing less than a hostile repetition of erasure and forced displacement, thus constituting a major infringement (sic!) of the museum's memory work: "we're very concerned about that because when you read the [Fringe] newsletters and hear what young people are saying about the Fringe there's no relationship to District Six at all. At all! As if, they're coming here and, and...it's not even seen! [...] Basically as they're mapping out this whole relationship and the kind of boundaries and borders and spatial sort of things around this Fringe, it balkanized District Six into a little homeland, right? And that is our major concern! 'Cos you're reframing this whole spatial dynamic and it's going to impact on the work that we do. I mean that's fundamentally going to impact on the work that we're doing" (ibid.) Apart from the thread of 'balkanisation', what also filtered through strongly in the District Six Museum's critique of the Fringe was the feeling of being used as a token of history and misappropriated for lending a sense of 'authenticity' and 'nostalgia' to an otherwise rather generic urban regeneration model.
As the museum's collection manager Chrischene Julius laments: "And the only reason why the District Six identity is mobilised is as some part of...like sort of... some very ugly, misplaced social responsibility that these designers and these creatives actually feel towards District Six. So what they think District Six is, it's not a real trauma that happen to people, they see it as a source of information for them to use in their work and even and that's still I think even giving them too much credit because I don't think they actually use District Six that much in their work as well" (ibid.). In sum, even though the level of frustration was evidently rising amongst District Six representatives and claimants with every new tourism map that delineated the area between Buitenkant and Canterbury Streets as "The Fringe" (and in turn also 're-assigned' the museum's "Homecoming Centre" as well as their permanent exhibition to this new demarcation), it was the proposed Urban Design Framework for the Fringe and the mandatory invitation for public comment that ultimately triggered the eruption of open dissent and disavowal in both written and spoken word.

For one, in March 2013, the District Six Museum's management team submitted an eight page long written response, detailing what they described as an increasingly "uncomfortable engagement" with the Fringe project following the initially positive experiences with the East City Design Initiative and its declared alignment with the museum's vision of a cultural heritage precinct (District Six Museum 04.03.2013, p. 4). What is particularly striking throughout the document is the way in which the authors manage to use the 'designerly' language of the Fringe as a means to express their discontent. In seeking to reclaim the power of interpretation regarding the ideas of design and creativity, they manage to illustrate how the Fringe had in fact failed to recognise "the important role that the District Six Museum has played as an innovative and inclusive space for curators, designers, expressive artists and edgy experimentation when few were prepared to risk this level of collaboration and public participation. The ground-breaking role that the museum played as a 'design laboratory' and 'incubator' for reimagining museums, memorialisation and design is not recognised in any way" (ibid., p. 2).

Furthermore, they also point towards a number of community spaces which from their perspective have acted as beacons of creativity as well as harbingers of productive international networks - unequivocally two of the Fringe's main objectives. They lament: "Key sites that should become important spaces for innovation and design are located in the area that is being cut off from the city centre symbolically and geographically: the Lydia Williams Centre of Memory
(formerly the home of the innovative design hub the Community Arts Project); The Zonnebloem Arts Centre (a key space for the development of primary design and innovation skills and knowledge); and the Moravian Church Hall and Guest house has been used over the years for several Young Curators' Projects in partnership with young photographers, visual and performance artists from Malmo and Stockholm in Sweden. None of the potential for design and innovation is explored here" (ibid., p. 3). In sum, the public response refuted the Urban Design Framework not so much on the basis of its general content but rather on the grounds that its excluded these important reference points and thus rendered them "meaningless by omission" (ibid., p. 5).

Moreover, the authors also tackled the practical conduct of design in the area and its prevailing air of exclusivity more generally by remarking that the stereotypical and patronising ways in which the people of District Six were portrayed by the Fringe were evidence for how "the notion of design/art and intellectual ability is still framed within class and race boundaries operating as invisible ceilings" (ibid., p. 6). As the commentary pugnaciously concluded: "We will not settle for merely being consulted while other entities with far less experience of shedding light on innovative design possibilities are elevated to decision makers" (ibid., p. 7). In sum, the museum's written submission already constituted a powerful rebuttal against the Fringe, its market-led urban development premises, and its displayed disregard for the area's imminent woundedness, mainly through the tactic of providing a counter-narrative of what design should and could effectively mean for the area.

What ended up creating the ultimate crisis of consciousness for the Fringe proponents was a public event held on the 29th of May by the museum at its "Homecoming Centre", which was shrewdly titled: "D6 on the Fringe: The absence of memory in design-led urban regeneration". During the panel discussion in front of a full house, it was particularly the carefully worded yet razor sharp presentation by the museum's director Bonita Bennet which laid open the three crucial and interrelated points of contestation: Firstly the tokenism of public engagement surrounding the Fringe; secondly, the problematic symbolism of the name in recourse to the city's apartheid.

245 It is important to point out that the event was jointly organised with UCT's African Centre for Cities, which had initially been a founding partner of the East City Design Initiative but over the course of the process had distanced itself more and more from the project. However, apart from the museum's director Bonita Bennet, critical urbanist Ismail Farouk (ACC), and a German design student who had worked on gentrification in the Fringe, the podium also featured visual artist Andrew Putter, who was working closely with the Cape Town Partnership, the very organisation which was the main operative force behind the Fringe project. This once more highlights the organisational ambiguity of the Partnership, as well as its popular political practice that seeks to prevent the emergence of antagonist politics by co-opting spaces of critique for self-promotion.
history and the project's overall skewed and excluding politics of representation. Bennet contested: "The way that the public comment, the call for public participation has happened has in some ways mirrored our critique of a particular style of public participation, which really has not evolved out of organic relationships but really coming with an idea, and then asking for public comment afterwards. There's a very great difference between public participation and public comment. And we've been very troubled by how this has happened. In terms of the concept we have been very disturbed that the whole notion of the Fringe has not placed historical and present context completely at the centre of its development. In some context I believe that the notion of the Fringe is a lovely one, it can be edgy, it can be quiet trendy, it can be stimulating, and it can be cutting edge when it speaks to a critique of a normative practice and when one becomes too established and comfortable with the status quo. But in other contexts and that's the context to which I am speaking at the moment, it signals something that is very exclusive, something that is really a battle against invisibility. So in terms when the D6 community hears about the notion of the Fringe and the area that is at the heart of their lives, it's been at the heart of the struggle, when they are asked to comment on an area called the Fringe, of course there's lots of anxiety because all of their lives and their formation has been a lifelong battle against being relegated to the fringe. So the Fringe in this context really ain't trendy at all. It speaks to being fringed out rather than coming into the centre of something and it signals very strongly that the language that has been used in this context is not really for the people who are at the centre of the story. And I think this whole notion of voice is also a very important one [...] People have a voice and sometimes it's not heard and I would like to say that sometimes it's also about giving ourselves ears to really hear what people are saying. And so the D6 Museum has had an uncomfortable relationship with the idea and the objectives of the development of the East City Precinct, since what felt like a rather random shift to the powerful marketing of this part of the city as the Fringe Innovation District" (Event transcript, 29.3.2013, emphasis added LW).

In an important historic recourse, she also reminded the audience of another significant precedent of erasure through renaming in District Six, i.e. the cynical changing of its name to 'Zonnebloem' (Afrikaans for sunflower) by the apartheid regime following the evictions. According to Bennet, the pain this had caused in the past was being inflicted once again through the Fringe: "We are looking at the social discomfort of the Fringe. The social discomfort in the sense that the culture, beliefs and everyday rituals of people who were forcibly removed remains marginalised in the city and is often only given visibility as a curiosity or for tourism. [...] Memory is at the centre and memory is not the decor that comes after you've got an idea. [...] And I think it needs to be said that the District Six Museum has always welcomed development, has always welcomed innovation but not at the expense of the marginalised people of this city. Our challenge is to create a city from the ruins of apartheid that embraces all its citizens and that does that in respectful and dignified ways. This requires patience and it much more than a marketing and a public relations exercise" (ibid.). In re-emphasising
the point that in the Fringe, branding and "vigorous hi-tech lobbying" has taken the place of what had once started as a comparatively inclusive process of cross-sector urban re-imagination, Bennet also sharply refuted the Fringe's (and by association the Partnership's!) practices of using the museum and its archives merely as a 'context provider' for 'fringe benefits' (sic!) and lambasted their 'stakeholder engagement' as an attempt to silence dissent by means of superficial postpolitics. Hence, in closing she pointedly noted that "one can't strive to run a public project along the lines of a private project framework and then expect consensus from everyone around" (ibid.).

During the ensuing heated discussion, many of the audience members also expressed their discontent with the Fringe, for example in describing it as a "buffer zone" of feel-good creativity created to further cordon off poor people from the city centre. What was also strongly reiterated were the museum's demands that design should not be used merely as "an individual expression of vanity", but should instead be seen as "an opportunity to democratise places and spaces that will use design as a tool for social consciousness" (Event transcript, 29.3.2013; ibid., p. 7). Interestingly, what Bennet and some of her colleagues in the audience also came to re-emphasise was, that their demands for being properly included into decision-making processes were not only based on their position as an important stalwart of memorialisation, but equally on their role as a substantial landowner in the area who should in turn be able to command the same respect and attention that the Fringe had extended to other proprietors.

While the museum's critical public commentary certainly rocked the Fringe's boat, it also needs to be recognised that in the interim, the Fringe's small management team had also been substantially weakened by the decision of its director Zayd Minty to leave his job at the Partnership and take on a new position as the head of Arts and Culture in the City of Cape Town. However, from the stance of a participant observer, I would argue that the museum's vociferous podium discussion (in addition to several critical pieces in the local media: Collinson 01.04.2013; Jethro 17.06.2013) had accumulated to deal the final blow to the Fringe. Seeing its reputation as Cape Town's 'good urbanists' besieged, the Partnership started to slowly backtrack, until in December 2013 it effectively admitted

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246 Even the date of publication can be regarded as a greatly strategic move, given that for South Africa December marks the beginning of a two month long summer holiday season, which destines public memory to quickly forget last year's controversies.
its defeat - in its own idiosyncratic way of non-admission of course. In a piece published on its website, the Partnership poses the rhetorical question "Where to for the Fringe?", suggesting with great euphemism that the project had over the past months undergone a phase of deep "reflection, re-evaluation and re-prioritisation" (Cape Town Partnership 05.12.2013).

Construing the issue as if the Partnership had neither been the initiator nor the central driver of the project but instead had always been watching from the side lines, and furthermore without any explicit mentioning of the District Six Museum's critical interventions, the article stated matter-of-factly that "the aggressive branding and promotion of a 'future vision' for the area, and the defining of a loose grouping of organisations and micro-enterprises as a 'district', also attracted criticism. This criticism came particularly from people who were concerned that the Fringe branding and marketing exercise was at serious risk of ignoring and erasing the historic significance of the area, which falls largely within District Six. Concerns were also raised that the initiative ignored some of the existing communities in the area, and needed to engage more broadly and inclusively" (ibid.).

That the Partnership was nonetheless publicly eating the proverbial humble pie and seemed to have taken the District Six Museum's critique to heart also filtered through in the following: "We have learnt significant lessons from our work in the Fringe - that meaningful participation and engagement take time and cannot be rushed; that history and memory provide the foundation for future visions; that places are not products to be packaged and promoted, they are fundamentally about people. We've learnt the value of being increasingly sensitive to the local context, and evolving our approach as we go. These lessons will serve us, not only in the area or in initiatives relating to design for economic development, but also in the rest of our work as the Cape Town Partnership, wherever it lands. [...] In this spirit, the Fringe initiative is evolving into an east city collective, and the Cape Town Partnership will ensure participation from all interested parties, around a range of exciting projects that are planned for the area" (ibid.). In sum, while the heavy public critique orchestrated by the District Six museum did not completely terminate the Partnership's involvement in the area's development247, it nonetheless achieved a significant downscaling of the project and most importantly halted the symbolic encroachment of the Fringe onto the memory of District Six by achieving a complete decommissioning of its branding (or de-branding).

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247 While the Partnership's previous interventions were focused centred on preparing eventual brick-and-mortar-based interventions, their new angle (also due to the being struck off the list of recipients for Cape Catalyst project funding) now revolves around ostensibly less intrusive measures such as 'enhancing neighbourhood communication', 'facilitating public art' and even 'conducting urban ethnography' (Cape Town Partnership 05.12.2013).
Nowadays, the Partnership as well as all other previous 'Fringe'-stakeholders have reverted to again referring to the area in all their public communication material as 'East City' or (not unlike the strategy of a well-known pop idol) 'the East City formerly known as the Fringe'.

In closing, what this final empirical vignette shows is that the idea of design does not only present a vehicle for enforcing neoliberal market logics; instead, it rather presents a fluid signifier that, due to its malleability, can also be used to reclaim the power of interpretation from a powerful, cross-sectoral branding consortium. In mobilising design as a tool for socio-spatial inclusivity that resides at the heart of District Six's commemorative practices (and not on its fringes!), the museum as a powerful intermediary in its own right was able to subvert and ultimately derail the contested top-down re-naming process.

In turn, this once again highlights both the fluidity of Cape Town's 'design(er) city' discourse, and the variegated and hybrid nature of its emergent 'design(er) governmentality'. While - as the final statement of the Partnership shows - this flickering of antagonistic politics has already been reigned in again by its signature spin of postpolitical consensus hogging, the story of the Fringe's rise and demise nonetheless resonates strongly with examples from elsewhere, such as Hamburg and Berlin, where artists have openly rebuked having their creative acumen co-opted for city marketing purposes, and where civic alliances found 'creative' ways and means for playing the creative city at its own game (Novy & Colomb 2012). Overall and with reference to the following conclusion, this illustrates the need for actively provincialising our understanding of creative city logics through paying careful attention to how these are mobilised, grounded and renegotiated in different urban locales.

In sum, this second chapter of my empirical analysis has put forward a two-pronged argument: First, it has provided a critical re- and deconstruction of the way in which the WDC 2014 has constituted a push for a more stakeholder-based urban governance regime in Cape Town under the aspirational trope of becoming the 'first African design(er) city'. While it has been recognised that such heterogeneous "politics of association" (Ponzini & Rossi 2010, p. 1048) can offer a possibility space for greater civic participation, I have also problematised this point against the backdrop of several
constraints that usually accompany such 'governance-beyond-the-state' mechanisms, namely a lack of democratic accountability, an increased responsibilisation of the citizen subject and a push towards consensus-driven postpolitics.

Second, the chapter has contended with the emergent role of 'the designer' and 'the design community' as new macro actors of Cape Town's postapartheid urban transformation. As design professionals have become sought-after experts for legitimising a range of strategic 'neoliberal-developmental' agendas in the wake of the WDC 2014 accolade, I have in turn portrayed and analysed three different institutions that have played a pivotal role for enrolling and actualising a variety of designer subjectivities. While the Design Indaba, the Cape Town Design Network and the municipality's own WDC 2014 department have shown a broad spectrum of different networked practices and politics – from ubuntu capitalist to more developmental and rights-based approaches – I argue that, when taken together, all three have played a pivotal role in shaping Cape Town's 'design(er) city' aspirations and ensuing governmental discourses and practices.

However, in discussing the 'de-branding' of the Fringe Design and Innovation District, I have also presented a case, which has shown how place-making for exclusionary 'design(er) city' visions can be successfully subverted by providing alternative readings of the 'idea of design' and what it should mean for more inclusive urban transformation in contemporary Cape Town. While the intervention of the District Six Museum did not (and was arguably also not intended to) entirely halt the progression of the East City towards becoming a 'design(er) hub', it has however succeeded in reclaiming its rightful place as a 'stakeholder' in determining its future development. With this story of 'designerly' disavowal in mind, I thus want to turn towards my final conclusion.
Conclusion

This thesis set out to explore how the globally pervasive creative city paradigm has been grounded in postapartheid Cape Town and renegotiated through the city's designation as World Design Capital 2014. Drawing on the process-oriented and relational nature of my findings, I have decided to divide the following conclusion into three parts: the first section seeks to offer some critical theoretical rejoinders in recourse to the most important empirical results, before the second section will reflect on the methodological implications of my research. In closing, the third section will then move on to outlining a number of possible empirical angles and theoretical pathways for future research.
9.1 [Theoretical conclusion] Provincialising the creative city and worlding Cape Town by design

As already set out in the introduction, my aim has been to understand the diverse socio-political implications and urban governance dynamics of Cape Town's burgeoning creative city aspirations. Furthermore, at the heart of my approach lies the conception of the creative city not as a pre-determined and neatly packaged set of policy 'solution' but rather as a malleable "vehicular idea" (McLennan 2004; Peck 2012), which has been subject to interurban policy circulations and has also become grounded and rearticulated in Cape Town under the powerful purview of the 'first African design(er) city'.

As chapter 2 has argued, a whole host of 'good urbanism' ideals have become imbued in the promise of a more 'creative' city: from economic competitiveness and the ominous 'creative class' as harbinger of 'smart', 'green' and 'sustainable' urban lifestyles to vernacular, artist-led urban regeneration and fostering 'civic creativity' within local bureaucracies - the creative city paradigm has certainly become the quick change artist of urban development policy and practice.

However, the creative city idea(l) has also taken considerable flack over the past two decades. Critical urban scholarship has aptly shown how seemingly inconspicuous creative city logics have been frequently deployed within exclusionary and socially predatory processes of urban neoliberalisation and how artists and other 'creative' practitioners were being co-opted as handmaidens of capital-driven (self-)governance (see chapter 3). Nonetheless, many of these evidently prolific and important critiques have been conceived against the analytical backdrop of late-modern, post-industrial 'northern' cities, with a veritable dearth of attention paid to the variegation of creative city iterations in 'southern' and particularly African urbanities (for a rare exception see Mbaye 01.01.2011, Mbaye 2014). In turn, I have argued that if we want to take the relational and postcolonial principles of contemporary critical urban scholarship seriously, we need to be careful not to prematurely blinker our encounter by assuming a simplistic diffusion and wholesale import of the creative city as a seemingly universal, hegemonic "fast policy" (Peck & Theodore 2001). Because, as my own findings of Cape Town's evolving creative city governance complex have shown, it is precisely its conceptual fluidity and lack of a
definitive centre that has turned the creative city into a paradigm that is both enduring and globally mobile (see also Prince 2012; Borén & Young 2012).

This has led me to argue that we must actively strive for "provincializing" (Chakrabarty 2008) the creative city as it is grounded, rearticulated and transmogrified in diverse locales across the globe. This also means that we must steer clear of the popular yet inherently futile idea of wanting to define the creative city in any definitive universal and normative terms. Because, even though we are able to trace conventional creative city logics back to certain points of origin (that can also function as so-called "zones of verification", Peck 2012, p. 465) as the early relationship between the Provincial Government's Creative Industry Unit and the UK's DCMS Creative Economy Strategies have shown), this does not automatically mean that these sources have any control over how their ideas are articulated elsewhere (Prince 2012, p. 325).

After all, as recent studies on global policy mobilities have affirmed, policy-making in this day and age is a 'glocalised' process of multiple and often disjointed reverberations (Freeman 2012). Hence, following a more anti-essentialist and generative critique as proposed by the emergent canon of 'southern' urban theory (Parnell & Oldfield 2014), I have chosen to depart from classical creative city critiques, in order to uncover a more 'provincialised', relational but in many ways arguably also more uncertain, account of what I have conceptualised as creative cityness.

This epistemological shift towards an "ex-centric" analysis (Bhabha 2004) has also allowed me to see beyond Cape Town as a contained (and often deemed peripheral) geographical entity. From here I can ask how different imaginaries of the city have become mobilised in global processes of interurban knowledge circulation, i.e. how Cape Town has been 'cast out into the world' (Simone 2001a; Ferguson 2006; Robinson 2011a). As I have shown, this notion of Cape Town as a 'worlding city' (Roy & Ong 2011; Roy 2014) furthermore presents a crucially important challenge to popular 'world' and 'global city' hierarchies. Thus, I would argue that the idea of worlding presents a beneficial research strand to pursue for postcolonial urban scholarship and that its further development will also offer new possibilities for doing critical urban theory both in and from 'southern' cities.
The rebuttal of 'global city' tropes as guiding devices for theory generation does not however mean that "world-conjuring projects" (Ong 2011b, p. 1) such as Cape Town's World Design Capital 2014 bid are not somewhat animated by popular 'world class visions'. Moreover, processes and practices of worlding are by no means divorced from globally uneven dynamics of capital accumulation (Smith 2008), in fact quite the opposite. Nonetheless, casting Cape Town as a 'worlding city'248 recognises that in a globalising "world of cities" (Robinson 2004), power is inherently topological and continuously reflected in a "politics of connectivity" (Allen & Cochrane 2014, p. 1641). This means that variegated dynamics of capital accumulation always actualise themselves in reflexive relation to historical path-dependencies, local urban governance traditions and networked practices of knowledge generation (Brenner et al. 2010). As I have shown for Cape Town (and in this case I would maintain that this also holds true for South Africa more generally), this conjunctive demeanour of neoliberalisation has found expression in hybrid formations, such as the "neoliberal-developmental state" (Bunnell 2013, p. 3) and its ideology of 'economic freedom' through ubuntu capitalism (Houssay-Holzschuch & Teppo 2013). As my empirical analysis posits, these notions have also permeated Cape Town's messy politics of becoming that evolved around the WDC 2014, an accolade that has been publicly celebrated as symbolic of a new chapter for postapartheid transformation (Figure 37).

In consequence, the idea of design has been turned into the latest governmental frontier for Cape Town's local urban development. Moreover, it has become a substantial mooring post for both interurban policy knowledge circulation as well as the kind of benevolent city visioning dynamics that Ong (2011) has shrewdly called "elite dreamings" (Ong 2011b, p. 17). By tracing the complex interpersonal and organisational entanglements that evolved from Cape Town's role as a major host city for the 2010 FIFA Soccer World Cup and its subsequent bidding for the World Design Capital 2014 title, my analysis also showed the importance of taking into account the "political-temporal contingency" (Ward & Jones 1999, p. 301) and intricate path-dependencies of governance logics that bind these seemingly divergent event-led urban development formats together.

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248 At this point, it is also important to highlight once more that worlding presents both an object of empirical analysis and a method for critical deconstruction (Roy & Ong 2011, p. 314).
However, the fact that in Cape Town the "cult of urban creativity" (Peck 2009) has been transmogrified into a cult of design shows us much more than just the displacement of one malleable travelling policy paradigm by another. Rather, it testifies to the international connectedness of Cape Town's 'elite'-driven, 'stakeholder-based' governance networks. In an urban realm that is still woefully torn apart by the legacies of its apartheid past, a handful of influential 'stakeholders' were able to instil the idea of design into the broader local urban development discourse, by framing it as the ultimate locus of development and consequentially position it as a new governmental precept. This not only attests to the ardent involvement of powerful actors in interurban knowledge circulation but also shows the ever-increasing influence of governance intermediaries beyond the state on the making of local politics.

What has thus become clear throughout my analysis is that, on the one hand, the WDC 2014 process has offered plenty of opportunities for interurban diplomacy and lesson-drawing, conducted within different formats of what (McFarlane 2011b, p. 134)
refers to as "urban learning assemblages". These included international summits, study trips and bilateral intercity exchanges with previous and aspiring World Design Capitals such as Helsinki and Taipei (see ch. 7.2.1). On the other hand however, as much as many WDC 2014 proponents displayed an avid inquisitiveness for engaging with 'best practice examples' from elsewhere, there was also an equally strong sense of situated agency, encapsulated in the desire to turn Cape Town into a model 'African design(er) city' in its own right. As Cape Town Design CEO Alayne Reesberg was recently quoted saying: "Cape Town may not be a Xerox PARC\(^\text{249}\), but we are a laboratory. [...] We have valid and authentic things to contribute to solving important global design problems" (O'Toole 03.01.2014). Again, this alludes to how WDC-induced aspirations of influential localised actors are by no means geographically contained. Rather, they stretch well beyond the local, provincial and national scale, frequently claiming to be representative of and relevant to a "majority world context" (M'Rithaa 2012), and even to offer "the best opportunity to design our way out of the old Africa [sic!]" (Creative Cape Town 15.09.2010). In order to find new ways for tracing these inter-scalar dynamics, I have also discussed the need for engaging with alternative sites and practices of discourse formation, namely in the digital realm, by proposing the notion of #governance as a working concept.

Hence, and with regard to this seemingly limitless scope of Cape Town's worlding operations, the following words by Simone (2010) resonate deeply with my overall argument. He notes that "[b]ecause certain collections aim to build more monumental, inclusive, efficient, all-encompassing, and far-reaching operations, they also bring together larger numbers of heterogeneous elements, processes, and histories into their ambit. [...] Rather than conveying stability [however], these major urban developments impart a sense of their own temporariness and insufficiency" (Simone 2010, p. 8). In other words, the taller the tale of potential 'real-world' urban innovation and transformation, the more 'stakeholder positions' need to be enrolled to ensure the stability and broad-based political legitimacy of such world-conjuring projects. However by the same token, the more of these 'heterogeneous elements' are folded into such a divergent process of city-making, the more opportunities there are for moments of subversion, or as Harvey has famously concluded: "The spaces for transformational

\(^\text{249}\) PARC stands for Palo Alto Research Centre and was founded by Xerox to advance research on information technologies and hardware development.
politics are there because capital can never afford to close them down" (Harvey 2001, p. 108). What in my opinion also flows from this is the pivotal realisation that power relationships within fluid and multifaceted operations such as Cape Town's WDC 2014 process are inherently topological and thus cannot be limited to governing by domination but must equally encompass modes of governing by persuasion and even seduction (Allen 2003).

Nowhere has this become more apparent in the research at hand than in the ways in which Cape Town's emergent design(er) governmentality has interpellated the figures of the individual 'designer subject' and the collective 'design community' as both "experts of themselves" (Rose 2006, p. 159) and universal experts of 'transformative' urban governance. Here, I have used Foucault's notion of governmentality, in order to make sense of the entangled, power-laden and at times contradictory political rationalities and relationships that have emerged from the different "mentalities of rule, forms of truth telling, and procedures of expertise" (Rose 1993a, p. 283), that are folded into Cape Town's own 'World Design Capital-ism'.

However, looking at urban politics through the formation (and spatialisation) of particular 'expert' subject groups - for example through the annual Design Indaba or the Fringe Design and Innovation District - is always a more complicated, emergent and conflicted endeavour than merely describing urban politics through their formal representations (Hoffman 2014, p. 1577). What the governmental logics and socio-political practices of design-bred actor alliances such as the Cape Town Design Network or new intermediary institutions such as the municipality's World Design Capital Department aptly demonstrate, is that their situated agency continually oscillates between "rule-following" and "rule-bending" (Amin & Thrift 2007, p. 156) and can thus never be fully reined in by formal corporate governance interests. In turn, this means that, on the one hand, the emergence of the idea of design as a source of both disciplinary and productive power has certainly redefined some political terms of engagement, for example through providing a new language for framing demands and broaching them to local authorities.

On the other hand however, this has also raised some red flags regarding questions of accountability and democratic participation. Even though the seemingly horizontal
purview of Cape Town's design(er) governmentality suggest that it harnesses greater possibility for including disadvantaged parts of society into decision-making processes, it also represents a decisive downloading of the responsibility for social transformation from state structures to the individual (Rantisi & Leslie 2006; Leslie & Rantisi 2011). Even Prof. Edgar Pieterse, himself an original member of the WDC 2014 bid committee has cautioned: "It seems that 'design' is quickly achieving some kind of mythical status, regarded as an elixir to magically transform city dwellers into creative, innovative problem-solvers, tearing down apartheid walls of segregation and exclusion, reducing inequalities and resolving tough development questions around sustainable human settlements and cost-effective public transport. However, I am troubled that these politically correct sentiments combined with creative economy boosterism could amount to little more than hubris (Pieterse 25. June 2011, p. 9). What Pieterse's prudent comment implies and what I have also argued in chapter 8 is that the nowadays omnipresent design(er) city narrative can also be wielded as a tool for displacing the 'properly political', relegating expressions of anger, indignation and self-restitution to an interior intrasubjective world, in turn further fracturing spaces for collective meaning making and spontaneous social action (Henri & Grunebaum 2005, p. 1)

Particularly problematic in this regard is the way in which design professionals are increasingly called upon to determine what should matter to and for marginalized people. While approaches like the 'Design Stormings' collaborate with civic organisations and rights-based local NGOs such as the Social Justice Coalition, there is still an uncomfortable sense of entitlement that speaks from reducing politically sensitive and inherently structural issues to technocratic 'design challenges'. On the one hand, incremental approaches such as the municipality's 'co-design workshops' have shown that they want to provide new inroads for civic participation and emancipatory politics by offering a seemingly basic democratic platform for generating broad-based input. On the other hand however, their consensus-driven, apolitical (and sometimes even ahistorical) design (sic!) also unwittingly limits the ambit for speaking truth to power in more antagonistic ways (Ponzini & Rossi 2010). While it still remains to be seen to what extent these 'co-design solutions' will be actually considered in formal decision-making processes, my hunch is that if no concise follow-up mechanisms are put in place for the post-2014 period, many of these design accords will amount to little more than colourful mock-ups, gathering dust in the antechambers of local ward councillors. In turn and in
spite of the revolutionary rhetoric enshrined in slogans such as "Live Design.Transform Life", the way the idea of design is currently being negotiated in Cape Town often tends to poignantly affirm rather than to substantially challenge the status quo of postapartheid inequality and socio-spatial division.

Nonetheless, while this illustrates how many of these 'creative' practices and potentially radical ideas are continuously being folded back within a more mainstream neoliberal-cum-developmental dictum of local urban governance, it also shows the spatially selective and speculative application of (more-than) neoliberal governmentalities for the purpose of worlding experiments (Collier & Ong 2005; Brenner et al. 2010; Roy & Ong 2011). In turn, this opens up considerable room for alternative socio-political manoeuvring and subversion, as the District Six Museum's success in re-claiming its local power of interpretation over 'the Fringe' by styling itself as the original 'design hub' of the East City has vividly shown.

In sum, Cape Town's convergent and divergent, affirmative and speculative politics of becoming the 'first African design(er) city' are not simply the result of a globally hegemonic creative city discourse that has trickled down to the tip of the African continent. Rather, as this work demonstrated, it constitutes an evolving assemblage of past socio-economic, spatial, political and cultural dynamics, shaped by local institutions, interurban knowledge networks, charismatic decision-makers, discursive events, and budding intermediary organisations (also Grodach 2012b). Hence, I agree with Rodgers et al. (2014) and others (Amin & Thrift 2002; Prince 2010b), who have argued that seeing the city as an assemblage provides us with a somewhat "anti-structural yet structural noun" (p. 1553), an argumentative Möbius band which can help us to describe the heterogeneity, contingency, and emergence of urban politics that are place-based but not simply territorial (Allen & Cochrane 2014, p. 1619). Because, what has filtered through strongly in Cape Town's burgeoning creative-cum-design(er) city nexus has been is inherently topological nature: the ardent longing to find idiosyncratic 'solutions' that address the staggering issue of postapartheid transformation while simultaneously

250 While I have limited my usage of assemblage to describe my object of research, it might be of interest for future inquiry to further explore the term's ontological and epistemological expedience. I nonetheless agree with Coe et al. 2013, p. 139 that its current omnivalent application as a description, object, approach, orientation, and style has resulted in a lack of precision.
leveraging it for presenting the city an internationally recognised "translation space" (Czarniawska 2010) for urban policy knowledge. Precariously holding this composite spectrum of divergent demands and aspirations together has been the idea of design as a transversal yet powerful intellectual technology, whose future deployment in and influence on Cape Town's urban politics presents a rich stream for further critical inquiry in the future.

Finally, I do not want to omit the blind spots of my work. Particularly my proposed combination of different mid-range concepts and proto-theories such as cityness, worlding and policy mobilities with greater epistemological constructs such as political economy and governmentality has evidently created some ontological incongruities. While I have sought to point them out wherever possible, I have however not been able to fully address let alone resolve these conceptual challenges within the framework of this thesis. Further limitations have certainly arisen from wanting to capture and understand relational and networked processes of meaning-making in motion. While this aim has certainly produced valuable insights, it has also created new methodological challenges, which I want to discuss in the following section.
9.2 [Methodological conclusion] Opportunities and challenges for understanding creative cityness by 'studying-up'

In order to generate the data that allowed me to grapple with the multiple facets of Cape Town's messy urban politics and the emergent governance dynamics of the WDC 2014 project, my methodical focus rested on a qualitative mix of semi-structured interviews, participant observation, policy review and (digital) media content analysis (see chapter 6.3.3). Particularly inspired by the methodical recommendations of recent writing on policy mobilities, I wanted to understand what Peck and Theodore (2012) had called the 'social life' of policies, which specifically implied finding ways for studying through the various sites, situations and temporalities of policy making (McCann 2011a; McCann & Ward 2012; Temenos & McCann 2012, Temenos & McCann 2013). At the same time, postcolonial and feminist theorists had also repeatedly highlighted the need to rethink methodological approaches for research in so-called 'southern' urban locales, specifically for describing their dialectic relationships with other cities across the globe (Hall 2006; King 2006; Bunnell & Maringanti 2010; Roy 2011b, Roy 2012; Roy 2014).

In combination, both points reinvigorated my aim to 'study up', i.e. to focus my research on proponents of the local governance 'elite'. Hence, I cast my net of interview respondents far and wide, ranging from charismatic business lobbyists to high-profile local government officials and from 'design(er)' knowledge brokers to other 'expert' groupings with relatively immediate access to and influence on forums of local decision-making.

While writing on 'southern' cities has popularised the idea of "makeshift urbanism" (McFarlane 2011b, p. 39), this idea is mostly used for describing the resilience of slum dwellers and the way their ingenious practices of making-do shape and sometimes even manage to appropriate the face of cities. However, in spite of the fact that it has been recently suggested that 'makeshift urbanism' should not only be regarded as a descriptor of...
slum development but could be equally applied for grounding globally mobile policy 'truths' (Coe et al. 2013, p. 148), the overwhelming majority of qualitative inquiry conducted in and on 'southern' urbanities remains focused on the former. While there is no denying that research on 'slum urbanism' continues to provide us with an undoubtedly much needed nuanced understanding of how the urban poor not only dwell but in fact carve out a living in the city, there simultaneously persists a lack of understanding as to how 'elite'-driven city-making can too constitute a veritable 'makeshift'. This is an important caveat that I have sought to substantiate throughout my thesis.

Because after all, having observed, chronicled but also participated in Cape Town's creative-cum-design city antics during several extended periods of field research over the past four years (that have also transformed my own positionality), I have gained first-hand experience on their often disjunctive, haphazard and improvised character. For example, more than a few of my respondents described the WDC 2014 process as well as their own work in it with speculative phrases like "painting the bus as we go" or "managing the element of chaos". This had made me realise that my 'elite' respondents too were what Clarke (2007) has been referred to as "subjects of doubt" (p. 142). Many gave (unsolicited!) reflections of their own positionality and sometimes even provided detailed and often self-critical reasoning for why they had subscribed to certain urban development ideals or supported different policy initiatives. A number of them were also closely connected to or even part of the local urban scholarship register, meaning that they had been (arguably to different degrees) exposed to competing urban development theories and their critiques (see also Borén & Young 2012).

Thus, I have come to fully share (Clarke 2007, p. 142)'s suggestion "that the practice of scepticism is a popular rather than an academic commonplace, "and furthermore to second his methodological appeal that these subjects "require an analysis that is attentive to the breaks and disjunctures in the circulation of [policy] discourses, rather than [simply] assuming their effectivity." In other words: if we are serious about tracing how certain urban development logics such as the creative city paradigm are folded into local 'elite' governance discourses and practices, we cannot foreclose the
possibility that moments of subversion, contestation and even emancipation\textsuperscript{251} can even arise from actor positions and network coalitions usually cast as accomplices of urban neoliberalisation (Roy 2010, p. 221).

In consequence, this again supports the practice of intersecting qualitative interview data with findings from participant observation in order to not only discern dominant governmental rationalities, but also to simultaneously capture the personal conflictedness of many 'elite' subjects. On the one hand, as the institutional ethnographic work of political geographer (Kuus 2004, 2007, 2011, 2014) aptly shows, this requires "a constant back-and-forth between structural conditions and individual tactics" (Kuus 2014, p. 10). With regard to the processual and contingent nature of my own field research, I also share her argument that it is precisely this kind of slow, messy, often tedious and necessarily ambiguous work, which promises a more binocular perspective on both structure and agency.

On the other hand however, there is no denying that practical challenges abound in trying to accurately map topologies of power that are stretching across global urban space (Allen & Cochrane 2014). For one, it has been rightfully argued that not only state hierarchies but even conventional multi-scalar approaches are no longer sufficiently helpful for framing urban politics, particularly given that we can nowadays be in at least two worlds at once: the 'actual' and the 'digital' world (Rodgers et al. 2014). Hence, I have posited the idea to get to grips with the arising methodological conundrum by working with the interrelated notions of '#governance' and '#ethnography' (see chapters 6.3.4 & 7.5), in order to also take into view the ever-more growing influence of new communication technologies on urban governance. Of course, these methodological propositions remain conceptually tentative and require further explication as well as empirical testing and substantiation. Nonetheless, I would maintain that in light of the rapid digitalisation of our everyday lives, the pertinence of finding viable methods for making sense of this emergent terrain of social interaction and its political implications can hardly be understated.

\textsuperscript{251} Here it is important to once more recognise the great normative isomorphism within Cape Town's local urban governance realm, where a significant number of people in key positions have participated in and were shaped by the experience of the anti-apartheid struggle.
Moreover, this of course also goes along with the recognition of more inextricable constraints: for example, even though it might be desirable to be able to indefinitely follow globally meandering urban policy paradigms through their different local iterations, this remains circumscribed by a variety of practical issues, ranging from questions of accessibility to those of affordability. The latter set of constraints is certainly increasing within the entrepreneurial frameworks of tertiary education and university-based research across the globe. Nonetheless, this should however not deter us from self-reflexively devising methodological and theoretical tools that can help us gain a more holistic picture of how different cities are mobilised and 'cast out into the world'.
"What will the circus leave us? Hopefully not just empty cages."
(Interview Reesberg 19.06.2013)

"As we move into 2014 we will realise that while apartheid would never ever come back again under the same name, one should not underestimate the sly inventiveness of bad politics."
(Evita Bezuidenhout in Cape Times 31.12.2013)

9.3 Prospects for future research

As we have seen, international accolades provide ample opportunity for story-telling and Cape Town's very own story as the reigning World Design Capital 2014 continues to be written as I am drawing this thesis to a close. With over 460 different initiatives recognised as official WDC 2014 projects - from 'community-driven' campaigns for saving the wetland reserve 'Princess Vlei' to the large-scale 'starchitectural' development of an old Waterfront silo into the 'Zeitz Museum of Contemporary African Art' - it is suffice to say that 'designerly' discourse and practice continues to permeate the city. Furthermore, recently gazetted policies such as the "Western Cape Design Strategy" have continued to draw the idea of design further into the realm of formal government intervention, praising it as a 'driver of competitive advantage and local innovation' (Provincial Government of the Western Cape 18.09.2013). With it, the figure of the designer continues to further establish itself as a coveted 'expert' authority. It does not even seem unreasonable to think that what civil engineers were to modernist apartheid city visions, designers are swiftly becoming to Cape Town's contemporary cityness - a

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252 It however needs to be noted that a great number of projects have not been originally created for the World Design Capital year but have been pre-existing public and private initiatives. This has led to projects like the BRT Bus System and even the contested Cape Town Stadium being honoured with the official WDC 2014 stamp of approval. In turn, some critics have already lambasted this re-packaging as a form of deceit, which greatly overstated the accolade's actual impact (Sampson 23.02.2014; Felix 18.08.2014).
celebrated professional-ideological bulwark (see also video #15 & #16). Hence, I posit four focus areas that I think are important for future research.

First of all, it is crucial to continue to closely monitor the growing urban agency of design professionals, including the different ways and means by which it is articulated and actualised. This specifically includes further scrutinising the ability of the 'design(er) city' to harbour more radical political thinking and action of postapartheid urban change that go beyond consensus-driven middle-way approaches. In addition, we also need to go on asking uncomfortable questions, such as what the increasing drive towards individual self-responsibilisation "by design" means for more agonistic pluralism (DiSalvo 2010; Simone 2012).

Secondly, I share Borén and Young's (2012) position, who have argued that we also need to ask how dominant narratives of 'design' and 'creativity' might contrast with alternative understandings of the concepts by other urban actors (p. 1802). That adverse perceptions of what design can and should do not only exist but can also result in alteration has been recently shown by the City Council’s intention to remove benches in the CBD's Company Gardens often used by the homeless population as a place to rest and sleep, and to 'involve designers and artists' in replacing them with more 'creative' seating that would prevent this (Nicholson 20.08.2013). However, this blatant attempt of co-opting art and design practitioners in further displacing an already marginalised people was heavily slammed by both the media and proponents of the 'design community', leading the City Council to suspend the idea indefinitely.

While "terrains of resistance" (Routledge 1993) against such anti-social readings of design remain rather fragmented, it does not mean that they do not exist. Faint traces of attempts to bend the notion of 'design' back towards idea(1)s of socio-spatial justice can even be found in recent policy documents, such as the City of Cape Town's draft Arts and Culture Policy. Here, Cape Town is envisioned as "South Africa's centre for inclusive creative excellence" (p. 22) and it is noted that "the aim to pursue worldclass [sic!] cultural programming" must be balanced with "developing and supporting cultural programming

253 As design theory constitutes a growing field of design-related disciplines, the question of how design ontologically and epistemologically relates to different notions of the political also requires further problematisation (Milestone 2007; DiSalvo 2010).
that is meaningful and of excellent quality for people living in more marginalised sections of the city” (p. 20).

Thirdly and connected to this are further issues, which I have only been able to touch upon in passing, such as the implications of the 'design(er) city' vision for notions of postapartheid citizenship. Here, advances from the theoretical realm of feminism such as Miraftab's (2006) concept of invited versus invented spaces of citizenship might provide a good platform to juxtapose more formal civic campaigns such as "Design by the People" with more spontaneous and confrontational appropriations of design (see Figure 38).

![Figure 38 Invitation to 'Design by the People' lecture series and 'design(er) city' themes at a SJC Sanitation March](source)

This would also further feed into the idea of seeing the WDC 2014 as a topological assemblage of worlding practices: as both part of an increasingly neoliberalising governance regime that seeks to create harmless success stories that fit with 'elite' visions of a more entrepreneurial city, and as a possibility space that can also allow for the kind of
slippage and subversion that constantly exceeds it (Gibson-Graham 2006a, Gibson-Graham 2006b; Coe et al. 2013; Roy 2014).

And finally, the WDC 2014 process also needs to be followed further in its development as a platform of heightened interurban exchange and city diplomacy. Recently, the local Dutch Embassy organised a two week-long event, aptly called "The Department of Design", which according to the Consulate General "symbolizes the changing relationship between our two countries, from aid to trade and from giving to sharing" (Brown 19.05.2014). Supported by the usual suspects of powerful design intermediaries (Design Indaba Founder Ravi Naidoo, WDC 2014 Department Head Richard Perez etc.) and involving the celebrated Dutch design company Droog, the initiative was not only a platform for knowledge exchange but also explicitly a 'matchmaking opportunity' for Dutch and South African businesses.

For one, events like this present themselves as interesting case studies to further understand how tactics of scale-jumping are both produced and used by different WDC 2014 proponents. Moreover though, they also allow us to trace if and in how far Cape Town might indeed become a (temporal or more permanent) 'destination' for policy tourists, who are interested in learning the ropes of becoming a 'design(er)city'. If recent visits by high-profile delegations from Taipei (the designated World Design Capital 2016) and the long list of international design luminaries confirmed to attend the upcoming Design Policy Conference are anything to go by, we should continue to '#stay tuned' and '#follow the conversation'.
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Design Indaba
www.designindaba.com/

Future Cape Town
futurecapetown.com/

Bizcommunity
http://www.bizcommunity.com

World Design Capital - Cape Town 2014
www.wdccapetown2014.com

Cape Craft and Design Institute
www.ccdi.org.za/

The Fringe
thefringe.org.za

Twitter accounts:
@CityofCT
@ctpartnership
@CreativeCT
## Appendix A: Attended events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meeting/Event</th>
<th>Date(s)</th>
<th>Venue</th>
<th>Suburb</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Fringe meeting with Bandwidth Barn on possible relocation</td>
<td>6 October 2010</td>
<td>Cape Town Partnership Headquarters, Bree Street</td>
<td>CBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creative Cape Town Annual Launch 2011</td>
<td>13 September 2011</td>
<td>Everybody Love Everybody Studios, The Bank, 50 Canterbury Street</td>
<td>East City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central City Partners Forum (during Creative Week 2011)</td>
<td>14 September 2011</td>
<td>The Fugard Theatre, Caledon Street</td>
<td>East City</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Fringe and Cape Catalyst Projects - Provincial Government Briefing Session</td>
<td>19 September 2011</td>
<td>Cape Town Fashion Council, Harrington Street</td>
<td>East City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Fringe Presentation of Kaiser and Associates Report</td>
<td>22 September 2011</td>
<td>Cape Town Partnership Headquarters, Bree Street</td>
<td>CBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WDC 2014 Pre-Announcement Party</td>
<td>25 October 2011</td>
<td>The Assembly, Harrington Street</td>
<td>East City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WDC 2014 Announcement **</td>
<td>26 October 2011</td>
<td>The (field office), Barrack Street</td>
<td>East City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WDC 2014 - First Media Briefing **</td>
<td>1 November 2011</td>
<td>The (field office), Barrack Street</td>
<td>East City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fringe Community Meeting #1 **</td>
<td>3 November 2011</td>
<td>CCDI Offices, Barrack Street</td>
<td>East City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Town Partnership Annual General Meeting 2011 **</td>
<td>16 November 2011</td>
<td>Southern Sun/Cape Sun Hotel</td>
<td>Waterfront</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Craft and Design Institute -10 Year Anniversary</td>
<td>24 November 2011</td>
<td>The Assembly, Harrington Street</td>
<td>East City</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fringe Community Meeting #2</td>
<td>31 January 2012</td>
<td>The Fugard Theatre, Caledon Street</td>
<td>East City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Fringe Handmade Market #1 &amp; #2</td>
<td>3 December 2011; 4 February 2012</td>
<td>Harrington Square</td>
<td>East City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development Partnership CEO Forum</td>
<td>22 February 2012</td>
<td>Cape Town International Convention Centre</td>
<td>Foreshore/CBD</td>
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<tr>
<td>1st WDC 2014 Stakeholder Meeting **</td>
<td>28 February 2012</td>
<td>Cape Town International Convention Centre</td>
<td>Foreshore/CBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infecting the City Public Arts Festival 2012 Panel Discussion: &quot;Towards a Public Art Policy for a World Design Capital&quot;</td>
<td>9 March 2012</td>
<td>Hiddingh Hall, UCT Hiddingh Campus</td>
<td>CBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Design Strategy Task Group Meetings</td>
<td>22 March 2012; 18 of April 2012</td>
<td>CPUT Design Faculty</td>
<td>East City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trend Talk # 2 @ Free World Design Centre</td>
<td>16 May 2012</td>
<td>Freeworld Design Centre</td>
<td>De Waterkant/CBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting/Event</td>
<td>Date(s)</td>
<td>Venue</td>
<td>Suburb</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPAZA Living Lab - Outreach Workshop</td>
<td>19 May 2012</td>
<td>Bus Tour to Du Noon and Philippi</td>
<td>Du Noon; Philippi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Cape Town Department of Arts and Culture Public Art Workshop</td>
<td>22 October 2012</td>
<td>Cape Town City Hall</td>
<td>CBD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cape Town Partnership Annual General Meeting 2012 **</td>
<td>30 October 2012</td>
<td>Trinity</td>
<td>Greenpoint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Irene Grootboom Memorial Dialogues - Design by the People Seminar</td>
<td>1 November 2012</td>
<td>Site C, New Hall</td>
<td>Khayelitsha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Irene Grootboom Memorial Dialogues - Design by the People Panel Discussion</td>
<td>7 November 2012</td>
<td>Central Methodist Church, Greenmarket Square</td>
<td>CBD</td>
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<td>Fringe Talks #1</td>
<td>8 November 2012</td>
<td>The Bank, Harrington Street</td>
<td>East City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Irene Grootboom Memorial Dialogues - Design by the People Panel Discussion</td>
<td>13 November 2012</td>
<td>Lookout Hill, Spine Road</td>
<td>Khayelitsha</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Design Can Do - Workshop Result Presentation</td>
<td>26 November 2012</td>
<td>Truth Coffee Shop, Buitenkant Street</td>
<td>East City</td>
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<tr>
<td>2nd World Design Capital Stakeholder Forum **</td>
<td>13 December 2012</td>
<td>Cape Town City Hall</td>
<td>CBD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Talk on World Design Capital by Cape Town Partnership Managing Director</td>
<td>19 February 2013</td>
<td>UCT, Middle Campus, Kramer Law Building</td>
<td>Rondebosch</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cape Town Design Network/Design Indaba - Film Screening: &quot;Design &amp; Thinking&quot;</td>
<td>19 February 2013</td>
<td>The Bank, Harrington Street</td>
<td>East City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meeting/Event</td>
<td>Date(s)</td>
<td>Venue</td>
<td>Suburb</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gentrification Workshop KISD and CPUT - Final Presentation</td>
<td>22 February 2013</td>
<td>CPUT Design Faculty</td>
<td>East City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infecting the City Public Arts Festival 2013 - Thinking the City Lectures</td>
<td>13 March 2013</td>
<td>6 Spin Street</td>
<td>CBD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ralph Borland and Jenny Fatou Mabaye</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;Design and the creative city: the creative city for whom?&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infecting the City Public Arts Festival 2013 - Thinking the City Lectures</td>
<td>14 March 2013</td>
<td>6 Spin Street</td>
<td>CBD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ismail Farouk and Edgar Pieterse</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>&quot;Managing access: spatial challenges and the regulation of culture&quot;</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Ubuntu Business Networking Breakfast - Speaker: Cape Town Design NPC CEO</td>
<td>9 May 2013</td>
<td>DoubleTree by Hilton Upper East Side Hotel</td>
<td>Woodstock</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alayne Reesberg on WDC 2014 **</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>iZimvo zase Kasi (former Central Cities Partner Forum)</td>
<td>24 May 2013</td>
<td>Cape Town International Convention Centre</td>
<td>Foreshore/CBD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Panel Discussion: &quot;D6 on the Fringe: The absence of memory in design-led urban regeneration&quot;</td>
<td>29 May 2013</td>
<td>District Six Museum Homecoming Centre</td>
<td>East City</td>
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<tr>
<td>Co-Design Workshop, World Design Capital Ward Project Pilot for Durbanville,</td>
<td>13 June 2013</td>
<td>Bellville Civic Centre</td>
<td>Bellville</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brackenfell and Bloekombos (Subcouncil 7) on &quot;Transport Interchanges and Trade&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conversations on World Design Capital, hosted by Creative Nestlings</td>
<td>15 June 2013</td>
<td>6 Spin Street</td>
<td>CBD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arts and Culture Indaba, City of Cape Town</td>
<td>18-20 June 2013</td>
<td>Cape Town City Hall</td>
<td>CBD</td>
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<tr>
<td>2013 Ways to Do Public Art Exhibition Walkabout</td>
<td>18th of June 2013</td>
<td>Cape Town City Hall</td>
<td>CBD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Future Cape Town, &quot;Bold City&quot; Mini-Conference</td>
<td>29 June 2013</td>
<td>Cape Town International Convention Centre</td>
<td>Foreshore/CBD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Design Dialogue Cape Town Design Network</td>
<td>23 July 2013</td>
<td>The Assembly, Harrington Street</td>
<td>East City</td>
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<td>Open Design Week Opening and Exhibition</td>
<td>21 August 2013</td>
<td>Cape Town City Hall</td>
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<td>Meeting/Event</td>
<td>Date(s)</td>
<td>Venue</td>
<td>Suburb</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Woodstock Open Day and Dialogue, hosted by the Cape Town Partnership</td>
<td>27 November 2013</td>
<td>Woodstock Town Hall</td>
<td>Woodstock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Town Partnership Debate &quot;How do we encourage citizen-led change in Cape Town?&quot;</td>
<td>24 February 2014</td>
<td>The Assembly, Harrington Street</td>
<td>East City</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

** Transcribed events
## Appendix B: Short biographies of key WDC 2014 'stakeholders'

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>(* 18 February 1959)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Boraine, Andrew</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currently:</td>
<td>CEO of the Western Cape Economic Development Partnership (EDP) (since 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previously:</td>
<td>CEO of the Cape Town Partnership (2003-2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chairperson of the South African Cities Network (2001-2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chairperson of the Cape Town International Convention Centre (2006-2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>City Manager in the City of Cape Town (1997-2001)</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>(*N/A)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Burton, Lianne</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currently:</td>
<td>Independent Communications Consultant and Content Developer (since 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previously:</td>
<td>Consulting Content Developer for City of Cape Town, Department of Arts and Culture (March - August 2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marketing and Communications Consultant, Cape Craft and Design Institute (December 2013-August 2014)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communications Strategist, Cape Town Partnership (April 2011 - August 2014)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Executive Manager: Marketing, Cape Town Tourism (May 2009 - June 2011)</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>(* 17 February 1951)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>de Lille, Patricia</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currently:</td>
<td>Executive Mayor of the City of Cape Town (since 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previously:</td>
<td>Founder and President of the Independent Democrats (2003 - 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chancellor of the Durban University of Technology (2004-2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Member of Parliament (2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Date of Birth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elk, Erica</td>
<td>*2 December 1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hagen, Mel</td>
<td>*N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Makalima-Ngewana, Bulelwa (*N/A)

**Currently:**
CEO at Cape Town Partnership (since 2013)

**Previously:**
Managing Director at Cape Town Partnership (2004 - 2013)
Senior Manager for Africa Programs at Centre for Conflict Resolution (2001-2004)

## Makeka, Mokena (*1976)

**Currently:**
Owner and Creative Director at Makeka Design Lab (since 2002)
Board Member of National Department of Arts and Culture National Creative Industries Federation (since March 2014)

**Previously:**
Chairman of the Board, Isandla Institute (2009 - 2014)
Member, World Economic Forum: Global Council for Design (2009 - 2011)
Vice Chair of the Board, Cape Town Heritage Trust (2006-2010)
Oversight Committee Technical Team Member for the 2010 FIFA World Cup (2005 - 2010)

## Minty, Zayd (*8 November 1966)

**Currently:**
Manager of the Department of Arts and Culture at the City of Cape Town (since August 2012)

**Previously:**
'The Fringe' Director at the Cape Town Partnership ( January 2010 - July 2012)
Creative Cape Town Coordinator at the Cape Town Partnership (January 2008 - December 2011)
Head of Public Programming, District Six Museum (March 2003 - September 2005)
Arts and Culture Officer at Robben Island Museum (January 1997 - September 1998)
Director Community Arts Project (January 1993 - September 1996)
### Mpahlwa, Luyanda (*1958)

**Currently:**
Founder and Director of DesignSpaceAfrica (since 2009)

**Previously:**
Oversight Committee Technical Team Member for the 2010 FIFA World Cup (2005 - 2010)
Director and Partner at MMA Architects (1997 - 2009)
Freelance architect in Berlin (1997 - 2000)

### M'Rithaa, Mugendi (*N/A)

**Currently:** Industrial Design Professor at the Cape Peninsula University of Technology (since 2005)
Executive Board Member, Icsid (since 2009)

**Previously:**
Lecturer at University of Botswana (2001 - 2005)
Lecturer University of Nairobi and Nairobi Institute of Technology (1994 - 2001)

### Naidoo, Ravi (*N/A)

**Currently:**
Managing Director Interactive Africa; Founder of Design Indaba (since 1993)

**Previously:**
Project Manager of the World Cup Preparation and 2010 FIFA Kick-off Conference (2006 - 2010)
Manager and Government Liaison for the 2010 FIFA World Cup bid (2000 - 2006)

### Pascoe, Grant (*N/A)

**Currently:**
Member of the African National Congress and Campaign Manager in the Northern Cape (since 2014)

**Previously:**
MayCo Member for Tourism, Events and Marketing (2011 - 2014)
Chairperson for the Democratic Alliance Cape Town Metro (2010 - 2014)
Councillor for Westridge, Mitchells Plain (2001 - 2014)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>*<em>Perez, Richard (<em>1970)</em></em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Currently:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director of World Design Capital Department at the City of Cape Town (since 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Previously:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director at Dot Dot Dot Ex Why Zed Design (2003 - 2012)</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>*<em>Platzky, Laurine (<em>N/A)</em></em></th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Currently:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Director General at the Provincial Government of the Western Cape (since 1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Previously:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape Coordinator of the 2010 FIFA World Cup</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PhD in Regional Development at the Institute of Social Studies, Rotterdam (1988 - 1995)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinator at Surplus People Project and National Committee Against Removals (1980 - 1988)</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>*<em>Reesberg, Alayne (<em>N/A)</em></em></th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Currently:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEO at Cape Town Design NPC (since 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Previously:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Owner of Reesberg and Partner Consulting (2007 - 2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner at Heidrick &amp; Struggles (2010 - 2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director, Enterprise and Partner Group at Microsoft (2001 - 2007)</td>
</tr>
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</table>
**Whelan, Chris (*N/A)**

**Currently:**
- CEO at Accelerate Cape Town (since 2012)
- Board Director at WESGRO (since 2014)

**Previously:**
- Chief Knowledge Officer at Ernst & Young, Asia Pacific Division (2011 - 2012)
- Futurist and Business Transformation Consultant at Ernst & Young (2010 - 2011)
- Performance Improvement Practitioner at Ernst & Young (2005 - 2010)

**Winde, Alan (*N/A)**

**Currently:**
- Western Cape Provincial Government, Minister for Finance, Economic Development and Tourism (since 2009)

**Previously:**
- Chief Whip of the Opposition, Western Cape (1999 - 2009)
- Western Cape Provincial Finance Chairman (1999 - 2009)

**Wolf, Michael (*5 November 1971)**

**Currently:**
- Founder & CEO of Formula D Interactive (since 2007)
- Founding Member and Management Committee of the Cape Town Design Network (since 2011; Chairperson 2011 - 2012)

**Previously:**
- Advisor Cape Craft and Design Institute (2012)
- Design Coordinator at MTE Studios (2005 - 2007)

**Sources:** LinkedIn South Africa; Who's Who South Africa
### Cape Town for World Design Capital 2014 - Bid Partner Organisations

<table>
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<th>Organisation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Accelerate Cape Town</td>
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<td>African Centre for Cities (UCT)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cape Craft and Design Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cape Film Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Peninsula University of Technology (Infomatics and Design)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cape Town Fashion Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cape Town International Convention Centre</td>
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<td>Cape Town Partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cape Town Tourism</td>
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<tr>
<td>City of Cape Town</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interactive Africa/Design Indaba</td>
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Appendix C: List of interview partners [names withheld for privacy, available upon special request]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Surname</th>
<th>First Name</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Organisation &amp; Affiliation</th>
<th>'Stakeholder' Type</th>
<th>Date of Interview</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Bam</td>
<td>Researcher</td>
<td>Cape MIC - Cape Music Industry Commission</td>
<td>SPV</td>
<td>22 December 2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Bell</td>
<td>Project Manager</td>
<td>Cape Town for World Design Capital 2014 (CT Partnership)</td>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>20 February 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Benjamin</td>
<td>Owner</td>
<td>Make Content; WDC 2014 Board Member</td>
<td>Design Practitioner</td>
<td>05 March 2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Bloor</td>
<td>Councillor</td>
<td>City of Cape Town Urban Planning Portfolio</td>
<td>Government (Loc.)</td>
<td>22 November 2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>5*</td>
<td>Boraine</td>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>Cape Town Partnership</td>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>17 December 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Bos</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>Representative for Business in Arts SA</td>
<td>Advocacy Group</td>
<td>09 February 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Burton</td>
<td>Marketing and Communication Strategist</td>
<td>Cape Town Partnership; WDC 2014 Bid Committee Member</td>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>05 August 2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Elk</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>WDC 2014 Department at City of Cape Town</td>
<td>Government (Loc.)</td>
<td>30 July 2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Ellen-bogen</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>artb Gallery - Bellville Art Association</td>
<td>Government (Loc.)</td>
<td>21 February 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Gordon</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Electric Lead Designs</td>
<td>Design Practitioner</td>
<td>11 February 2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Forbes</td>
<td>Consultant</td>
<td>PGWRC - Department of Economic Development &amp; Tourism</td>
<td>Government (Prov.)</td>
<td>06 December 2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Forbes</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Cape Craft and Design Institute; WDC 2014 Board Member</td>
<td>SPV</td>
<td>21 November 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Fisher</td>
<td>Executive Chairperson</td>
<td>Cape Town Festival</td>
<td>Arts and Culture Practitioner</td>
<td>30 January 2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Forbes</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>PGWRC Creative Industries Unit; Freelance Consultant</td>
<td>Government (Prov.); Consultant</td>
<td>18 January 2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Forbes</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Woodstock Industrial Centre</td>
<td>Arts and Culture Practitioner</td>
<td>12 February 2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Forbes</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Cape Craft and Design Institute; WDC 2014 Bid Committee Member</td>
<td>Design Practitioner; Academia</td>
<td>08 February &amp; 11 March 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Forbes</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Furnspace 3D; WDC 2014 Curator</td>
<td>Design Practitioner</td>
<td>13 March 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Forbes</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>VANS - Visual Arts Network of SA</td>
<td>SPV</td>
<td>17 January 2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Forbes</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Animal Farm; WDC 2014 Board Member</td>
<td>Design Practitioner</td>
<td>13 March 2013</td>
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<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Forbes</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>PANSA - Performing ARts Network South Africa</td>
<td>SPV</td>
<td>08 December 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surname</td>
<td>First Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Organisation &amp; Affiliation</td>
<td>‘Stakeholder’ Type</td>
<td>Date of Interview</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jongens</td>
<td>Nicoline</td>
<td>Designer</td>
<td>The Bank - Design Collective in the Fringe</td>
<td>Design Practitioner</td>
<td>28 October 2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>Julius</td>
<td>Chrischene</td>
<td>Project Manager</td>
<td>District Six Museum</td>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>13 March 2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kirschenbaum</td>
<td>Elad</td>
<td>Owner</td>
<td>Woodstock Industrial Centre</td>
<td>Design Practitioner</td>
<td>08 January 2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kollala</td>
<td>Faith</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>Local Area Economic Development at City of Cape Town</td>
<td>Government (Loc.)</td>
<td>30 November 2011</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kruger-Fountain</td>
<td>Liezel</td>
<td>Planner</td>
<td>City of Cape Town</td>
<td>Government (Loc.)</td>
<td>15 December 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lillie</td>
<td>Denis</td>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>CFC - Cape Film Commission</td>
<td>SPV</td>
<td>16 January 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lourens</td>
<td>Jacky</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>CFC - Cape Film Commission</td>
<td>SPV</td>
<td>04 January 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lundy</td>
<td>Guy</td>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>Accelerate Cape Town; WDC 2014 Bid Committee Member</td>
<td>Advocacy Group</td>
<td>09 February 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M'Rithaa</td>
<td>Mugendi</td>
<td>Lecturer</td>
<td>Cape Peninsula University of Technology; WDC 2014 Bid Committee and Icsid Executive Member</td>
<td>Design Practitioner; Academia</td>
<td>30 January 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makalima-Ngewana</td>
<td>Bulelwa</td>
<td>Managing Director</td>
<td>PGWJC - Commercial Arts and Entertainment Unit</td>
<td>Government (Prov.)</td>
<td>17 January 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makeka</td>
<td>Melanie</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Makeka Design Lab; WDC 2014 Bid Committee Member</td>
<td>Design Practitioner</td>
<td>15 February 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McKinnell</td>
<td>Jenny</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>CITI - Cape Information Technology Initiative</td>
<td>SPV</td>
<td>11 March 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mdidimba</td>
<td>Sticks</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>Indigenous Content Manager at ArtScape</td>
<td>Arts and Culture Practitioner</td>
<td>07 December 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methvin</td>
<td>Tanner</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>The Africa Centre</td>
<td>Advocacy Group</td>
<td>26 January 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minty</td>
<td>Zayd</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Creative Cape Town Initiative; The Fringe (both Cape Town Partnership; WDC 2014 Bid Committee Member)</td>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>05 January 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mukanga</td>
<td>Florence</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Arts in Africa and Arterial Network</td>
<td>Advocacy Group</td>
<td>03 December 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muspratt-Williams</td>
<td>Angela</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>PANSA - Performing Arts Network of SA</td>
<td>SPV</td>
<td>08 December 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naidoo</td>
<td>Ravi</td>
<td>Director/ Curator</td>
<td>Design Indaba; WDC 2014 International Advisory Committee Member</td>
<td>Design Practitioner; Advocacy Group</td>
<td>26 January 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pascoe</td>
<td>Grant</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Theatre in the District</td>
<td>Arts and Culture Practitioner</td>
<td>24 January 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>City of Cape Town – Mayoral Committee Member</td>
<td>Government (Loc.)</td>
<td>09 October 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Page</td>
<td>Name</td>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Affiliation</td>
<td>Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>44</td>
<td>Perez</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>City of Cape Town - WDC 2014 Department</td>
<td>19 February 2013</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>Platzky</td>
<td>Deputy Director</td>
<td>PGWC Policy and Strategy; WDC 2014 Bid Committee Member</td>
<td>21 February 2012</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>Ramkiliwan</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>CTFC - Cape Town Fashion Council</td>
<td>08 November 2011</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>Reesberg</td>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>City of Cape Town - WDC 2014 Interim Manager</td>
<td>15 February 2012</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>Project Manager</td>
<td>Formula D interactive</td>
<td>03 February 2012</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Rosa</td>
<td>Managing Director</td>
<td>Creative Futures</td>
<td>17 January 2011</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Sewpaul</td>
<td>Project Manager</td>
<td>District Six Museum</td>
<td>13 March 2012</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>Silber</td>
<td>Policy Director</td>
<td>Cape Peninsula University of Technology; WDC 2014 Board Member</td>
<td>15 February 2013</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Smith</td>
<td>Exhibition Coordinator</td>
<td>City of Cape Town - WDC 2014 Department</td>
<td>11 July 2013</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>Theunissen</td>
<td>Director</td>
<td>Cape MIC - Cape Music Industry Commission</td>
<td>01 December 2010 &amp; 15 November 2011</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57*</td>
<td>Tarrat-Cross</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>City of Cape Town - WDC 2014 Department</td>
<td>18 January 2011</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>Webster</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>African Arts Institute; Arterial Network</td>
<td>22 January 2009</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59*</td>
<td>Theunissen</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>City of Cape Town – Department of Arts and Culture</td>
<td>24 January 2011</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>Truter</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>Jazz Poetjie Projects</td>
<td>17 January 2011</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>Wellmann</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>Accelerate Cape Town; WDC 2014 Board Member (Vice Chair)</td>
<td>11 March 2013</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>Webster</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>WESGRO - Creative Industries Portfolio</td>
<td>09 December 2010</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>Winde</td>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>PGWC - Finance, Economic Development</td>
<td>14 February 2011</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
*Interviews recorded during the author's previous Master thesis research
Appendix D List of WDC 2014 governance members

Colour Code:

Neo-Corporatist/PPP
Academia
Government
Creative/Design Profession
NGO

"Cape Town for World Design Capital 2014"-Bid Partner Organisations

- Accelerate Cape Town
- Cape Craft and Design Institute
- Cape Film Commission
- Cape Town Fashion Council
- Cape Town International Convention Centre
- Cape Town Partnership
- Cape Town Tourism
- African Centre for Cities (UCT)
- Cape Peninsula University of Technology (Infomatics and Design)
- City of Cape Town
- Interactive Africa/Design Indaba

WDC 2014 Bid Committee; later transformed into 'Interim Advisory Team' in January 2012

Bulelwa Makalima-Ngewana
Managing Director (later CEO) of the Cape Town Partnership

Guy Lundy
CEO of Accelerate Cape Town (till June 2012)

Lianne Burton
Cape Town Partnership, Marketing and Communications Strategist

Rashid Lombard
CEO of espAfrika; Organiser of Cape Town International Jazz Festival
Rashid Toefy
CEO of Convenco, Cape Town International Convention Centre Company

Zayd Minty
Coordinator of Creative Cape Town (later Director of The Fringe)

Catherine Stone
City of Cape Town, Director of Spatial Planning and Urban Design Unit

Jo-Ann Johnston
Western Cape Provincial Government, Chief Director of Trade and Sector Development

Laurine Platzky
Western Cape Provincial Government, Deputy Director-General of Provincial Strategic Management

Luyanda Mpahlwa
Architect, Director of Design Space Africa

Mokena Makeka
Architect, Director of Makeka Design Lab

Y Tsai
Product Designer, Director of Tsai Design Studio

Mel Hagen
Design Activist, Former Dean of the Faculty of Informatics and Design at CPUT

Prof. Dr. Mugendi M'Rithaa
Industrial Designer, Lecturer at the Cape Peninsula University of Technology, Icsid Board Member (President-elect for 2013-2015)

Prof. Dr. Edgar Pieterse
Director of the African Centre for Cities at UCT

WDC 2014 Multi-Sector Board Selection Committee (July 2012)

Luyanda Mpahlwa [Chair]
Architect, Director of Design Space Africa

Leshni Shah
Operations Director Design Indaba

Gavin Silber
Deputy Secretary General/Coordinator of the Social Justice Coalition
Mike Marsden
Deputy City Manager of the City of Cape Town

Martin Smuts
Executive Deputy Mayor of Stellenbosch Municipality

Rashid Toefy
CEO of Convenco, Cape Town International Convention Centre Company

Bulelwa Makalima-Ngewana
Managing Director (later CEO) of the Cape Town Partnership

Cape Town Design NPC Board Members (November 2012)

Prof. Russel Botman [Chair; till June 2014]
Rector and Vice Chancellor of the University of Stellenbosch

Prof. Francis Petersen [Chair, from June 2014]
Dean of the Faculty of Engineering and the Built Environment at UCT

Chris Whelan [Vice Chair]
CEO Accelerate Cape Town

Erica Elk
CEO of the Cape Craft and Design Institute

Masana Mayimele Chikeka
Deputy Director of the National Department of Arts and Culture

Martin Smuts
Executive Deputy Mayor of Stellenbosch Municipality

Laurine Platzky
Western Cape Provincial Government, Deputy Director-General of Provincial Strategic Management

Anton Groenewald
City of Cape Town, Executive Director for Tourism, Events and Marketing

Gillian Benjamin
Owner of Make Content

Porky Hefer
Designer and Owner of Animal Farm Creative Consultants

XVIII
TaliaSanhewe
Managing Director of Talia Productions

BruceSnaddon
Chairman of the Cape Town Design Network and Senior Lecturer in the Graphic Design Department at the Cape Peninsula University of Technology

NoeleenFrancesMurray
Architect and Academic at the Centre for Humanities Research at UWC

Dr ChrisNhlapo
Deputy Vice Chancellor for Research, Technology, Innovation and Partnerships at CPUT

WDC 2014 Curatorial Panel (from March 2013)

Paul Duncan [Head Curator]
Head of Homeware Design at Woolworths

Lourina Botha
Co-director at Studio Shelf (Design Studio)

Guto Bussab
Multidisciplinary artist; founder Muti Films, Muti Photography and TheMutiGallery

Andrea Couvert
Director at Slowdesign (Communication Agency)

Brandon De Kock
Group Content Director at RamsayMedia

Joy Ezeka
Independent Art Consultant and Design Strategist

Ilse Schermers Giesel
Gallery-owner and Art-dealer

Steven Harris
Owner of Furnspace3D (Software Business) and The Bank Design Collective

André James
Industrial Designer

Gregor Jenkin
Furniture Designer

Zodwa Kumalo-Valentine
Online Fashion, Beauty and Homeware Content Manager for Woolworths

Stephen Lamb
Eco-Designer

Ricky Lee Gordon
Street Artist and Gallery Owner

Wayne Lowe
Executive Director at HWB Communications

Mokena Makeka
Architect, Director of Makeka Design Lab

Annemarie Meintjes
Deputy Editor at VISI Design Magazine

Joel Merris
Creative Director of Liquid Crystal Design Studio (Corporate Branding Company)

Roelf Mulder
Managing director at ...XYZ Design (Industrial and Product Design Company)

Neo Muyanga
Musician and Music Writer

Siphiwe Ngwenya
Musician, Former Member of Hip-Hop Band 'Skwatta Kamp'

Marlon Parker
Head of Mxit Reach

Luke Pedersen
Furniture and Homeware Designer at 'Pedersen and Lennard'

Neil Pendock
Writer and Lifestyle Journalist

Anet Pienaar-Vosloo
Former Head of Communications at Naspers

Brett Pyper
Former CEO for the National Arts Festival in Grahamstown, now CEO of the Klein Karoo Nasionale Kunstefees

XX
Christopher Swift
Artist and Environmentalist

Strijdom Van der Merwe
Artist, Sculptor and Graphic Artist

Ilze Wolff
Architect, Partner at Wolff Architects

Laura Robinson
CEO of the Cape Town Heritage Trust and past President of the Cape Institute for Architecture

Velma Corcoran
Head of Marketing at Cape Town Tourism

Merle O’Brien
Lecturer at Vega School of Brand Leadership, PhD Student in Future Studies and Odissi dance instructor

Richard Kilpert
Lecturer at Vega School of Brand Leadership

Mel Hagen
Design Activist, Former Dean of the Faculty of Informatics and Design at CPUT

Rael Futerman
Industrial Design Program Leader at CPUT

David Gibbs & Mark Saint Pôl
Landscape Architects and UCT Lecturers

Mark Swilling
Division Head of Sustainable Development in the School of Public Leadership at Stellenbosch University and Academic Director of the Sustainability Institute

Ashraf Jamal
Cultural Analyst at the Faculty of Design & Informatics at CPUT

Eugene Cloete
Vice Rector Research at the University of Stellenbosch

Camilla Swart
Head of Western Cape Branch of 'Bridge' (NGO for Innovation in Education)

Icsid International Advisory Board (from April 2013)
**Trevyn McGowan (South Africa)**  
Founder of Southern Guild Design Foundation

**Kunlé Adeyemi (Nigeria)**  
World-renowned Architect, Designer and Urbanist, CEO at NLÉ Architects

**Ravi Naidoo (South Africa)**  
Founder of Design Indaba

**Srini Srinivasen (USA)**  
CEO of Lumium, a Creative Product Design Company based in Palo Alto/California

**Sean Carney (Netherlands)**  
Chief Design Officer for Philips and Chief Design Officer for Philips Consumer Lifestyle

**Prof. Dr. Mugendi M'Rithaa (South Africa)** (additional member from June 2013)  
Industrial Designer, Lecturer at CPUT, Icsid Board Member (President-elect for 2013-2015)

_Addendum:_ "After a public call for nominations, CTD nominated Trevyn McGowan and Kunle Adeyemi. In addition, CTD nominated a third candidate, Ravi Naidoo, because of his outstanding contribution to the growth and recognition of the value of design in South Africa and his global insight." In June 2013, Mugendi M'Rithaa "was approved as an additional member of the IAC to provide on-the-ground advice to the programme team" (Cape Town Design September 2013, p. 12).
# Appendix E Video Annotations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Video #1 Dr. Prof. Mugendi M'Rithaa – What is World Design Capital? And why do we want it?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Duration: 00:15:06; Produced by Cape Town Design Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Town Design Network Event, 19th of May 2011. Presentation by M'Rithaa on the WDC accolade and its potential for Cape Town; Review of previous WDCs; 00:06:16 introducing 'Live Design.Transform Live' slogan; 00:09:30 status of the current bidding process (review of submissions)</td>
</tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Video #2 Lianne Burton – Even if we don't win, we cannot loose</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Duration: 00:13:58; Produced by Cape Town Design Network</td>
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<tr>
<th>Video #3 – Cape Town's Official WDC 2014 bid video</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Duration 00:02:07; Produced by Muti Films for the Cape Town Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impressions of Cape Town, including establishing and end shots of the Atlantic Seaboard and the Cape Town Stadium precinct. Also features different snippets of the BRT bus system, graffiti and public art, designers and their objects, 'creative' co-working spaces, a fashion show, a scene in an unidentified townships, the Fan Walk Bridge, VPUU's main facility in Khayelitsha, the Cape Town International Convention Centre, and several coffee shops. The video is set to the tune of Freshlyground's &quot;Mowbray Kaap&quot;, the band being arguably one of South Africa's most beloved and internationally well-known pop music acts.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Video #4 – WDC 2014 Pre-Announcement Party</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Duration 00:03:43; Produced by One.Dog.Chicken for the Cape Town Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impressions of the build-up to the World Design Capital 2014 Pre-Announcement Party at &quot;The Assembly&quot; in &quot;The Fringe&quot;, 25th of October 2011. Includes short snippets from the speeches of Mokena Makeka (Makeka DesignLab), Zahira Asmal (Designing South Africa), Matthew Buckland (Silicon Cape Initiative), Andre Vorster (On Top of The World Cape Town), Zayd Minty (Creative Cape Town/The Fringe), Lianne Burton (Communications Director of Cape Town's WDC bid) as well as voices from the audience.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Video #5 – IDA Delegation Interviews

**Duration 00:15:01; Private videos by Sky Grove (Cape Town Tourism)**

Interviews with members of the Cape Town WDC 2014 delegation: Andrew Boraine answers the question "What can Cape Town take away from the conference?"; Bulelwa Makalima-Ngewana answers the question "What is your impression of the conference?"; Mayor Patricia de Lille answers the question "How did you find it and what do you think we can learn from the international design community?"; Councillor Grant Pascoe answers the question "How is the case of design in Cape Town and how important is design for the public sector?"; Michael Wolf gives his impressions of the first day of the IDA conference; Mugendi M'Rithaa reflects on the relevance of design for Cape Town's local governance.

### Video #6 – Live Video of the Announcement in Taipei

**Duration: 00:07:04; Produced with handheld device by an unidentified delegation member**

Private video of the announcement ceremony at the IDA Congress in Taipei, 26th of October 2011. Features speech by Icsid President Mark Breitenberg (2009-2011) introducing the individual members of the WDC selection committee. From 00:03:10 onwards, he introduces the three finalist cities. Cape Town is presented as the winner at 00:06:10, followed by ululating and an *in prompt* rendition of the song Shosholoza by members of the delegation.
### Video #7 – The Morning of the Announcement at the [field office]
Duration: 00:03:49; Produced by One.Dog.Chicken for the Cape Town Partnership

Establishing shot of the bid book, invited spectators arrive with supporter paraphernalia like badges etc.; me perusing the official Bid Book and sipping my coffee. Short introductory remarks by Guy Lundy (CEO of Accelerate Cape Town); overview of the excited screams, balloons and flying paper streams; voice snippets from Y Tsai (architect and designer); Zayd Minty (Creative Cape Town/The Fringe); Porky Hefer (Designer); Laura Wenz (you know who that is); Peter Cronje (Director of Communications at the City of Cape Town); Nicoline Jongens (Architect and PR Liaison for 'The Bank').

### Video #8 – Acceptance Speech by Mayor Patricia de Lille
Duration: 00:08:20; Produced with handheld device by an unidentified delegation member

Speech by Cape Town's mayor, accepting the accolade on behalf of the city at the IDA Congress in Taipei, 26th of October 2011. For full text see transcription folder.

### Video #9 – Eyewitness News Report "Cape Town Crowned World Design Capital"
Duration: 00:02:07; Produced by Aletta Gardner for EWN

Establishing shot of WDC 2014 Mural, sponsored by Visi Magazine; Interview with Mariette du Toit-Helmbold (Cape Town Tourism) and Zayd Minty (Creative Cape Town/The Fringe) showing off the Bid Book

### Video #10 – Capetonians Share Their Thoughts on Design 25 August 2011
Duration: 00:09:00; Produced by Muti Films for Cape Town Partnership

Interviews with different WDC 'stakeholders'; Mokena Makeka (Architect; Makeka Design Lab); Tina Smith (Curator for the District Six Museum); Andrew Boraine (CEO Cape Town Partnership); Bulelwa Makalima-Ngewana (MD of the Cape Town Partnership); Tessa Graaf (Director Montebello Design Centre); Kobus Meiring (CEO Optimal Energy); Luyanda Mphalwa (Architect; Design Space Africa); Roelf Mulder (CEO …xyz design); Nicola Irving (Architect; ccnia); Yehuda Raff (Coordinator for The Fringe); Rashid Toefy (CEO of CTICC)

### Video #11– What it means for Cape Town to be World Design Capital 2014
Duration: 00:03:58; Produced by Cape Town Design NPC

Establishing shot of City Bowl and Table Mountain; Interviews with 'creatives': Mokena Makeka (Architect; Makeka Design Lab); Gitanjali Maharaj (Artisan Printer); Adrian Heneke and Paul van der Spuy (BlueCollar.WhoteCollar Fashion); Katie Thompson
Video #12 – What Does Design Need to Solve for You?
Duration: 00:03:32; Produced by One.Dog.Chicken for Cape Town Partnership
Design Indaba March 2012; Establishing shot of the Expo and the WDC 2014 stand as well as the bid book; people writing and pinning post-its; Appearances by Andrew Boraine (CEO of Economic Development Partnership); Johannes Cronje (Dean of Informatics and Design CPUT); Marjorie Naidoo (Communications Manager Cape Craft and Design Institute); Andy Cartwright (Design Indaba Innovation Award Winner); Shouniez Johnson (Graphic Design at Design Infestation); Dirk Coetser (Architect); Eran Eyal (Founder of Springleap); Bianca de Klerk (Visual Artist); Sharp-Lee Mthimkulu (Graphic Designer); Evan Rice (WDC 2014 Interim Project Manager); Luyanda Mphalwa (Architect Design Space Africa)

Video #13 – Official Signing Ceremony
Duration: 00:03:19; Produced by Cape Town Design NPC
Signing Ceremony on the 29th of June 2012 at the Plascon Freeworld Design Centre; Featuring interviews with and speech snippets by Dilki De Silva (Icsid Secretary General); Africa Melane (Radio Host and MC); Patricia de Lille (Mayor of Cape Town); Soon-In Lee (Icsid President)

Video #14 – Official Signing Ceremony Gala Banquette
Duration: 00:03:55; Produced by Cape Town Design NPC
Signing Ceremony Gala Banquette on the 29th of June 2012 at Moyo Restaurant in Kirstenbosch Botanical Gardens; Establishing shot of the table setting; Appearances by Bulelw Makalima-Ngewana (CEO of Cape Town Partnership); Mugendi M'Rithaa (CPUT Professor for Industrial Design); Guy Lundy (Business Strategist); Patricia de Lilla (Mayor of Cape Town); Soon-In Lee (Icsid President); Final shot: blowing out the candles of a specially design WDC cake.

Video #15 – The Loeries March for Creative Freedom
Duration: 00:02:25; Produced by The Loeries and sponsored by Cape Town Tourism and the City of Cape Town
Mock News Feature as promotion material for the 34th Loeries, South Africa's biggest advertising and communications award; Theme: 'Protest for Creative Freedom'; Protesters are 'armed' with placards that display adapted anti-apartheid struggle slogans such as "I
am an Adman"; "Viva African Creativity Viva"; "One Brief; One Revert". The marchers also present a "Creative Freedom Charter" modelled upon the ANC's original and calling for their industry to be 'original' and to 'not beg down – keep fighting'; other slogans include "We must fight for great ideas" and "We must stop to look to America and Europe for directions"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Video #16 – What is Design?</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Duration: 00:03:26; Produced by the Cape Craft and Design Institute</td>
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</table>

Animated educational video for introducing the work of designers and the different design disciplines. Protagonist Alex, a product designer likes to ride his skateboard and is joined by his friends the architect, the fashion designer, the urban designer etc. The London Tube map is introduced as an example for 'good' and 'clever' design; "You see, great design can often solve problems we didn't even know existed"; "Is there such a thing as 'bad design'?" The answer is yes, for example apartheid. Also modernist architecture such as the displayed 'Good Hope Centre'; Introducing South African designed internationally successful products; appearance by MyCiti BRT system
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Video #17 – Design Storming</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Duration: 00:02:46; Produced by Andrea Couvert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participatory Design Workshop by the Cape Town Design Network with Social Justice Coalition; Video produced by Workshop Group No. 2; Close up of sketching and brainstorming sessions on solid waste drop-off points; interview with Social Justice Coalition Coordinator about developmental design</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Video #18 – City of Cape Town Co-Design Workshops</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Duration: 00:08:00; Produced by City of Cape Town</td>
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<tr>
<td>Overview of four pilot co-design ward workshops; Aim: To encourage collaboration between designers and the public; Process of co-design problem statement explained; First workshop took place in Subcouncil 17 (Turf Hall; Hannover Park); Challenge: Transformation of former sport's field to activate the site as an open public space through the ward allocation; workshop procedures and 'design thinking' explained; making 'vision boards' and present vision to rest of audience; distillation of 'design principles' based on the needs; physical scale model building on top of satellite images of the site; ideas generated are then taken by the designers and synthesised before being presented and handed over to the subcouncils and ward committees. Voices of the participants: Evelyn Walters (Community Development Worker); Matthew Bennett (Mitchell's Plain Youth Representative); Annisa Joubert (Mitchell's Plain Netball Team); Zingisani Moepa (Chairperson Youth Development Forum Bloekombos); Passion (Community Worker Tafelsig); Daniel Christians (Ward Councillor of Ward 81 Mitchell's Plain)</td>
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<tr>
<th>Video #19 – The Fringe Handmade Creative Good Market</th>
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<tr>
<td>Duration: 00:03:49; Produced by One.Dog.Chicken for The Fringe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Fringe Handmade Market on Harrington Square 3rd December 2011; Interview with Zayd Minty (Director of The Fringe Design and Innovation District); project for promoting young emerging designers and crafters; Aysha Kumali (Events Coordinator The Fringe Handmade Market); Richard Harris (Owner of Woodheads); representative introducing work of Cape Craft and Design Institute; &quot;The Fringe is there to enable, incubate and showcase design and informatics talent in the city and to help promote our design industry&quot;</td>
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</table>